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
BLUE PACIFIC CONTINENT VOLUME 1

Primer on Pacific Regional Climate Change Action

January 2024

Disaster Management Reference Handbook Series

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Front Cover

Original photo by NASA. ISS007-E-07304 (13 June 2003) --- This view of Earth's horizon was taken by an Expedition 7 crewmember onboard the International Space Station (ISS), using a wide-angle lens while the Station was over the Pacific Ocean. https://eol.jsc.nasa.gov/SearchPhotos/photo.pl?mission=ISS007&roll=E&frame=7304

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Letter from the Director

The United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reported that 2023 was the warmest year on record and warned that the world would need to be prepared for that level of warming to drive extreme weather and rising sea levels.[1] During the year, droughts, floods, and violent storms struck every corner of the globe.

The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM) knows the potential for climate change-influenced hazards to become disasters as happened in our own back yard, the Pacific Ocean, throughout 2023. From the twin tropical storms – Judy and Kevin – that struck Solomon Islands and Vanuatu in February and March through the fires that devastated Lahaina, Maui, in August, and the droughts that suffocated parts of Micronesia and Tonga in the autumn, the potential magnitude of suffering is clear. And the CFE-DM is committed to partnerships that build the resilience of communities across the Pacific – and globally.

The Center's work on understanding the impacts of climate change has matured since we took on the mission for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in 2022. We ran our first climate change wargame in December that year, and our engagements with regional partners have built on that success. Through 2023, we joined U.S. and regional governments, humanitarians, and military forces to share data on climate change impacts and to seek a common understanding of how we can adapt to try to insulate ourselves from the worst of those impacts.

Although the CFE-DM has built climate change information into its regular engagements, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster response workshops in the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Tonga – we know that it is Pacific Island communities themselves that are the leading forces in planning and implementing projects that will secure the futures of their people and their islands.

To begin to understand the work of the inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, academic programs, and advocacy initiatives active in the Pacific Islands region, the CFE-DM presents this two-volume "Blue Pacific Continent." It takes as its starting point the leadership of the Pacific people themselves through their states and communities. Volume I provides both a primer on organizations rooted in the Pacific and an examination of what is at stake for the region. Volume II collates the national and territorial contexts, hazards, and government plans to address the impacts of climate change. Taken together, the CFE-DM hopes that these "Blue Pacific Continent" volumes are a resource for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and government personnel who may be working on the issues of climate change and security with partners in the Pacific region.

Sincerely,

Joseph D. Martin, SES
Director

About the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance

Overview

The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM) is a United States (U.S.) Department of Defense (DoD) organization comprised of nearly 30 subject matter experts that provide academic research, civil-military coordination training, and operational insights to support decision making before, during, and after crises. The Center is designed to bridge understanding between humanitarians, civilian, and military responders. CFE-DM partners with a diverse group of governmental and nongovernmental actors, as well as academic institutions to increase collaborations and capabilities in humanitarian assistance and disaster response. While maintaining a global mandate, the Indo-Pacific region is our priority of effort and collaboration is the cornerstone of our operational practice. The Center is a direct reporting unit to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and is located on Ford Island, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii.

Vision

The Joint Force, allies, and partners are fully prepared to conduct and support foreign humanitarian assistance.

Mission

CFE-DM builds crisis response capacity in U.S. and partner militaries, enhances coordination and collaboration with civilian and foreign partners, and strengthens those relationships to save lives and alleviate human suffering before, during, and after humanitarian crises.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The "Blue Pacific Continent" is both a mindset and a geographic region. The Southwest Pacific Ocean is home to more than two dozen island states and territories that range in size and population. The people of these islands vary in myriad ways, but the key that connects them is the ocean itself. Many – if not most – have origin stories that tell of ancestors who sailed to their islands across vast distances, and navigating the ocean spaces between their islands meant that the water connected rather than separated them, as scholar Epeli Hau'ofa wrote in "Our Seas of Islands" three decades ago.[2]

And yet, changes in the ocean pose an existential risk to the people of the Blue Pacific Continent. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) finds that sea level rise in the region is higher than the global average with some areas of the region seeing 4 millimeters (mm; 0.15 inches) of rise annually.[3] Not only does this rise threaten to inundate low-lying islands and atolls, but rising sea temperatures are also changing ocean currents, weather, and ecosystems in ways that threaten the lives and livelihoods of island communities.

Most of these island communities emit miniscule amounts of greenhouse gases, and they confront extremely high costs attached to many mitigation and adaptation measures. Thus, the states and territories of the Blue Pacific Continent have long worked together to speak in a collective voice and pool their intimate knowledge of their environments to exert pressure on the world's emitters and donors. This pressure is intended both to impel action to address the drivers of climate change and to attract funding for these small countries' efforts to shift energy use, agriculture and forestry sectors, and the built environment.

The most recent collective action was the 2022 endorsement by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent that targets a resilient Pacific Region.[4] The 2050 Strategy comes on the heels of the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security, which defined climate change as the "single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific."[5] Boe itself built on a series of previous declarations, and all of the Pacific strategies and frameworks point to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). All Pacific Island countries are parties to the UNFCCC, and Pacific Island territories are also parties via the countries to which they are attached. At the United Nations (UN) and its subsidiary organizations, many of the islands participate as a bloc to press for climate change action.

As parties to the Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC, these island countries prepare and submit Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) that lay out ambitions for cutting emissions and adapting to climate change impacts. Major development banks and multi-lateral financial institutions are tasked through the UNFCCC and subsidiary agreements to channel funding marked specifically for climate change adaptation (CCA). Among key bilateral donors are Australia, China, the European Union (EU), Japan, Korea, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (U.S.). The Pacific Islands individually and through inter-governmental organizations frequently access and utilize multilateral and bilateral funding to develop plans that integrate CCA and disaster risk reduction (DRR) because of the notions of risk mitigation that underpin both.

This volume seeks to collect in one place the names and scopes of action of organizations, agencies, and networks that Pacific peoples use to undertake CCA and DRR action. It also examines the "why" of climate action and points to future challenges as the climate changes. The CFE-DM's Blue Pacific Continent Volume II - Reference Book of National and Territorial Climate Change Risks and Plans digs deeper into the individual states' and islands' exposure to climate hazards and their efforts to address their vulnerabilities to the impacts of those hazards.

PART I

The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is the intergovernmental organization integrating most of Oceania and, more specifically the Pacific Islands, in a political arena where they can work toward shared strategies that allow them greater international heft than if they were to act individually. Along with the political and diplomatic PIF, various alliances, coalitions, and communities of states undertake technical action on information, law, science, and other matters. In this realm, the Pacific Community (SPC) and Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) incorporate the greatest number of member-states and -territories and foster innovations and initiatives that their members can join. The Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific (CROP) integrates all three of these major groupings along with technical agencies and organizations. Figure 1 details the membership of PIF, CROP, SPC, and SPREP.

Within the region, there are several subregional groupings and practical associations that allow key cultural and historical ties to define membership and action. These groups promote their member-states' community needs on various cultural, diplomatic, political, and security issues. And finally, Pacific Island countries and territories join larger global players – e.g., Australia, France, and the U.S. – in regional economic, environmental, and security arrangements that offer Pacific Islands venues to both pressure larger states on climate action and to encourage those powers to participate more effectively in climate security in the region.

The aforementioned groups and their strategies also promote and encourage the work of regional non-governmental organizations (NGO) and researchers. Local, national, and trans-national NGOs and alliances of NGOs use the political and economic climate frameworks published by organizations such as PIF as guides for planning and executing projects on sustainability, resilience, and community preparedness. And finally, all of this action is underpinned by regional scientists and scholars working at home and in international academic fora to build the research basis for action on climate change. In particular, scholars working in the University of the South Pacific and with associated institutions deliver cadres of professionals to work on climate change within the Islands and prepare advocates who continue to demand global action.

The U.S. administration appointed the country's first ever Envoy to the PIF in 2022; Ambassador Frankie Reed was tasked with expanding U.S. ties and coordination with PIF and its members.[6] Photo 1 shows the U.S. Envoy to the PIF at the 52nd PIF Leaders Meeting in Cook Islands in November 2023.[7]



Photo 1: Ambassador Reed Attends PIF Leaders Meeting, 2023

Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)

Preeminent regional political, economic, and security body.

18 members: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands (Republic of), Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu; Tokelau (Associated Member)

Forum Secretary-General and Secretariat

The PIF Secretary General acts as Secretary to the Forum and is responsible for the management of the Forum Secretariat. The Forum Secretariat mandate is set by decisions made at annual meetings of PIF Leaders, ministerial meetings convened by the Forum Secretariat, and decisions made under the Framework for Pacific Regionalism.

Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific (CROP)

Comprising the heads of nine regional organizations, CROP works to improve cooperation, coordination, and collaboration in achieving sustainable development in the Pacific region. The PIF Secretariat Secretary-General is chair of CROP.

CROP agencies: Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO), Pacific Power Association (PA), Pacific Islands Development Program (PIDP), Pacific Community (SPC), Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO), The University of the South Pacific (USP), and PIF Secretariat

Climate Change Adaptation Actor: SPREP

Lead regional organization charged with protecting and managing the environment and resources of the Pacific.

26 members:

- American Samoa (U.S. Territory)
- Australia
- Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (U.S. Territory)
- Cook Islands (Special Sovereignty)
- Fiji
- France
- French Polynesia (French Territory)
- Guam (U.S. Territory)
- Kiribati
- Marshall Islands (Republic of)
- Micronesia (Federated States of)
- Nauru
- New Caledonia (French Territory)
- New Zealand
- Niue
- Palau
- Papua New Guinea
- Samoa
- Solomon Islands
- Tokelau (New Zealand Territory)
- Tonga
- Tuvalu
- Vanuatu
- United Kingdom
- United States of America
- Wallis and Futuna (French territory)

Climate Change Adaptation Actor: SPC

Largest, member-owned, international development organization in the Pacific.

27 members:

- American Samoa (U.S. Territory)
- Australia
- Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (U.S. Territory)
- Cook Islands (Special Sovereignty)
- Fiji
- France
- French Polynesia (French Territory)
- Guam (U.S. Territory)
- Kiribati
- Marshall Islands (Republic of)
- Micronesia (Federated States of)
- Nauru
- New Caledonia (French Territory)
- New Zealand
- Niue
- Palau
- Papua New Guinea
- Pitcairn Island (Territory of the United Kingdom)
- Samoa
- Solomon Islands
- Tokelau (New Zealand Territory)
- Tonga
- Tuvalu
- Vanuatu
- United Kingdom
- United States of America
- Wallis and Futuna (French territory)

Figure 1: Foundational Organizations in the Pacific

Regional Political Institutions

Pacific Islands Forum

PIF is a political and economic policy organization, founded in 1971. As of 2023, it includes 18 members, shown in Table 1.[8]

PIF's vision is for a region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion, and prosperity, so that all Pacific people can lead free, healthy, and productive lives. It works to achieve this vision by fostering cooperation between governments, collaborating with international agencies, and representing the interests of its members. PIF holds an annual meeting of heads of government. After the annual meeting, a ministerial-level dialogue meeting is held with selected non-regional parties. The five founding Dialogue Partners - Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), and U.S. - have since been joined by 16 other countries. The Dialogue partners are shown in Table 2.[9]

Dialogue Partners must meet and continuously adhere to the following criteria:

1. Demonstratable commitment to advancing the vision and priorities of the Leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum.
2. Long-established historical connections to the Pacific region, which may include strategic, security, economic, social, and cultural links.
3. Long-term forward commitment to the Pacific region as demonstrated through foreign policy commitments, engagement strategies, diplomatic missions and engagement with regional organizations, and transparency in declaring economic, political, and strategic interests in engaging in the region.
4. Dedicated support for the sustainable and resilient development of the Pacific region including development assistance, trade and investment promotion, knowledge transfer and technical cooperation, people to people

Members		
Australia	Cook Islands	Fiji
French Polynesia (French Territory)	Kiribati	Marshall Islands (Republic of)
Micronesia (Federated States of)	Nauru	New Caledonia (French Territory)
New Zealand	Niue	Palau
Papua New Guinea	Samoa	Solomon Islands
Tonga	Tuvalu	Vanuatu
Associate Member		
Tokelau (New Zealand territory)	-	

Table 1: PIF Members

Canada (1989)	Chile (2021)	China (1990)
Cuba (2012)	European Union (1991)	France (1989)
Germany (2016)	India (2003)	Indonesia (2001)
Italy (2007)	Japan (1989)	Korea, Republic of (1995)
Malaysia (1997)	Norway (2021)	Philippines (2000)
Singapore (2021)	Spain (2014)	Thailand (2005)
Turkey (2016)	UK (1989)	United States of America (1989)

Table 2: PIF Dialogue Partners (and Year Aligned)

exchange, and south-south cooperation.

5. Shared interests and common positions on international issues and a commitment to using global networks and membership of international organizations to support Forum priorities.
6. Commitment to engaging with the Forum in accordance with the Blue Pacific Principles for Dialogue and Engagement, which are:
   a. One Blue Pacific – recognizing and engaging with the full Forum Membership
   b. Regional priorities – embedding and progressing the Forum's regional priorities
   c. Partnership approach – joint planning, programming, and delivery by both the Pacific Islands Forum and the Forum Dialogue Partner(s)
   d. Utilizing existing mechanisms – aligning with, and seeking to build off existing regional and international mechanisms, processes, and meetings
   e. Collective outcomes and impact – developing joint outcomes statements and outlining a clear process for follow-up and implementation.[10]

The Forum has an established "gentlemen's" agreement that leadership should rotate among the sub-regions of Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia, although only one Micronesian has held the leadership position, Kiribati's Sir Ieremia Tabai, who was appointed in 1992. Table 3 shows the history of leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum and its predecessor organization, the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation.[11]

The key overarching climate change strategy of PIF is the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. PIF leaders endorsed the development of the Strategy at their 2019 meeting in Tuvalu and endorsed the final 2050 Strategy at the 51st PIF meeting in Fiji in 2022. The 2050 Strategy sets out the region's approach to collectively work together to achieve the long-term vision and aspirations of the 2050 Strategy, through seven key thematic areas. Each thematic area is guided by its own "2050 ambition," which serves as an agreed-upon long-term objective. It also encompasses 10 Leaders' Commitments and various strategic pathways to guide the region's trajectory.

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Ratu Sukuna Road
Suva, Fiji
Tel: +679 331 2600
Email: *info@forumsec.org*, *media@forumsec.org*

Year took office	Head	Country (sub-region)
Secretary General, Pacific Island Forum Secretariat		
2021 – present	Henry Puna	Cook Islands (Polynesia)
2014 – 2021	Meg Taylor	Papua New Guinea (Melanesia)
2008 – 2014	Tuiloma Neroni Slade	Samoa (Polynesia)
2008 – 2008	Feleti Teo (Acting)	Tuvalu (Polynesia)
2004 – 2008	Greg Urwin	Australia
1998 – 2004	Noel Levi	Papua New Guinea (Melanesia)
1992 – 1998	Ieremia Tabai	Kiribati (Micronesia)
1988 – 1992	Henry Naisali	Tuvalu (Polynesia)
Associate Member		
1986 – 1988	Henry Naisali	Tuvalu (Polynesia)
1983 – 1986	Mahe Tupouniua	Tonga (Polynesia)
1982 – 1983	John Sheppard (Acting)	Australia
1980 – 1982	Gabriel Gris	Papua New Guinea (Melanesia)
1972 – 1980	Mahe Tupouniua	Tonga (Polynesia)

Table 3: PIF Secretariat Leadership

Melanesian Spearhead Group

Founded in 1988 by Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) now also includes Fiji and a political party representing indigenous New Caledonians (FLNKS); Timor-Leste and the United Liberation Movement for West Papua are observers, and Indonesia is an Associate Member who represents the five Melanesian-majority provinces of Indonesia. Table 4 shows the membership of MSG.

The founding and abiding focus of MSG is decolonization of Melanesian-inhabited islands, and the MSG also promotes stronger cultural, political, social, and economic links among the people and communities of Melanesia. Since 2005, there has been a regional trade agreement, the MSGTA.[12]

Various Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) link the MSG to regional and international economic and cultural bodies.[13]

The MSG Secretariat is headed by the Director General, who is responsible for the implementation of Leaders' mandates and for directing and coordinating policies within the framework of the MSG 2038 "Prosperity For All" Plan. The Secretariat comprises the Executive, the Director General, Deputy Director General, Senior Executive Officer, and five programs, each headed by a Programme Manager. Other key meetings and bodies are:

- Leaders' Summit – makes decisions on MSG's mandates and policies
- Foreign Ministers Meeting – delivers recommendations for sub-regional cooperation and decisions to be taken by the Secretariat;[14]
- The Senior Officials Meeting - the MSG governing body, reports to the Foreign Ministers Meeting[15]

Since the first Environment and Climate Change Ministers Meeting in 2012 in Fiji, the MSG realigned its Environment, Climate Change, and Natural Resources Development program into three streams:.

- Climate Change – Delivered the MSG Needs–Based Climate Finance Strategy (2019) in partnership with the UNFCCC Secretariat, and the Secretariat is working with Members on a "Means of Implementation" framework to develop national pipeline projects to complement national efforts on reviewing and updating NDCs
- MSG Forest Programme – Secretariat and Members are working with technical assistance from Griffith University and GIZ to put forward a Proposal to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and other potential donors for financing to implement projects in high-value primary forest areas and communities
- Fisheries and Marine Resources – implementation of the MSG Roadmap for inshore fisheries and Sustainable Development 2015–2024, supported by the MSG-Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Memorandum (2020)[16]

Contact: MSG Secretariat
Independence Gardens
PMB 9105
Port-Vila, Republic of Vanuatu
Tel: +678 27791 or +678 27691

States / Parties		
Fiji	Solomon Islands	Papua New Guinea
Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS; New Caledonia)	-	
Observers		
Timor-Leste	United Liberation Movement for West Papua	-
Associate		
Indonesia	-	

Table 4: MSG Members, Observers, and Associates

Micronesian Islands Forum

The Micronesian Islands Forum (MIF) is a sub-regional, inter-governmental organization that assists member heads of state and governments to develop and implement local and sub-regional programs, develop policy, address economic activity, and build inter-personal relationships. Members are shown in Table 5; there is a standing invitation to Kiribati to join.

Among the key issues being tackled at MIF are legal, managerial, financial, and institutional requirements to uphold commitments to marine and land conservation, livelihoods, fisheries, and climate-related DRR. There are committees and councils that work on issues of health, tourism, renewable energy, transport, information and communications technology (ICT), education and workforce development, and gender equality.[17]

The MIF Secretariat meets twice annually with the designated representatives of each jurisdiction to ensure Leaders' initiatives are implemented.[18]

Contact: Secretariat

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Email: *hblesam@gmail.com*

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands	Guam (U.S. territory)	Marshall Islands (Republic of)
Micronesia (Federated States of)	Palau	Nauru
Chuuk State (FSM)	Kosrae State (FSM)	Pohnpei State (FSM)
Yap State (FSM)	-	

Table 5: MIF Members

Polynesian Leaders Group

The Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG) is an inter-governmental organization with twelve members, shown in Table 6. Hawaii, New Zealand, and Rapa Nui (Easter Island) were all admitted in 2019. Launched in 2011 with a MoU,[19] the group brings together independent and self-governing countries and territories within the Polynesian geographical region.[20]

The goal is to ensure a future for Polynesian peoples and countries by maintaining a dialogue about how to strengthen individual and collective ways to address challenges such as education, culture and language, climate change, healthcare, and regional economics.[21]

PLG leaders meet annually to receive reports on and discuss issues, operations, and membership. The secretariat floats along with the chair, which turns over annually. The Chair/Secretariat country is tasked with organizing the next meeting, implementing decisions taken by the Group, facilitating coordinated activities, and, most especially, disseminating information. PLG has hewed closely to the views and verbiage of SPREP on issues of climate change, and, ahead of the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference of Parties (COP21) in Paris, PLG issued the Taputapuatea Declaration to demand a limit to global land temperature rises over baseline to 1.5°C by 2100.[22]

American Samoa (U.S. territory)	Cook Islands	French Polynesia (French Territory)
Hawaii (U.S. State)	New Zealand	Niue
Rapa Nui (territory of Chile)	Samoa	Tokelau (New Zealand territory)
Tonga	Tuvalu	Wallis and Futuna (French territory)

Table 6: PLG Members

FRANZ Arrangements

The FRANZ Arrangement – aka, the Joint Statement on Disaster Relief Cooperation in the South Pacific – was signed by France, Australia, and New Zealand in December 1992. It is an agreement among the three countries to coordinate disaster reconnaissance and relief assistance in the Pacific upon a request from a partner. Table 7 shows those partners as of 2023.

The Arrangement is civilian-led; the lead agencies are the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development (*https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/*), Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT; *https://www.dfat.gov.au/*), and New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT; *https://www.mfat.govt.nz/*). They are supported by militaries in a system that ensures FRANZ players adhere to the principles of sovereignty and the leadership of the affected state. The FRANZ countries coordinate with other stakeholders during a disaster response; the Pacific Humanitarian Team is among the key stakeholders.[23] During the response to the January 2022 Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha'apai response, FRANZ partners were among the most robust military responders; France chaired,[24] and the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) Headquarters Joint Operations Command was the host of the International Coordination Cell that included defense personnel from the FRANZ countries, Fiji, Japan, Tonga, the UK, and the U.S.[25] During the response to Tropical Cyclones Kevin and Judy, which struck Vanuatu in early 2023, the three FRANZ signatories coordinated among themselves in a military cell chaired by New Zealand.[26] At the 30th anniversary of the arrangement, the three signatories committed to investing in local preparedness initiatives in the face of climate change-influenced hazards in the partner states. These initiatives emphasize local health response capacity, eco-friendly humanitarianism, sharing lessons learned, engaging Pacific partners in their priorities, and supporting emergency planning and training.[27]

The chair of the arrangement rotates among the three signatory countries, and, during responses, the points of contact for FRANZ action are the respective FRANZ high commissioners/ambassadors in the affected state.[28]

Arrangement Signatories		
Australia	France	New Zealand
Arrangement Partners		
Cook Islands	Fiji	Kiribati
Nauru	Niue	Papua New Guinea
Samoa	Solomon Islands	Tokelau (New Zealand territory)
Tonga	Tuvalu	Vanuatu

Table 7: FRANZ Arrangement Signatories and Partners

Quadrilateral Defense Coordinating Group

The "Pacific Quad" (P-QUAD) is made up of Australia, France, New Zealand, and the U.S. It provides maritime surveillance to the Pacific Island states.[29] The U.S. Coast Guard is USINDOPACOM's representative in the grouping whose activities include joint patrols to ensure compliance with international fisheries agreements.[30] The P-QUAD engages with Pacific Island countries and territories (PICT) partners via the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) and other bodies in an effort to enhance maritime security in the Western and Central Pacific. Table 8 shows the members of P-QUAD.[31]

Australia	France	New Zealand	United States of America

Table 8: P-QUAD

South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting

The South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting (SPDMM) is a biennial ministerial-level meeting that includes Australia, Chile, Fiji, France, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga, plus the U.S. and the UK as observers. The objective is to deliver a forum to better connect the militaries of participating countries by focusing on "coordination of approaches and perspectives through information sharing and dialogue, consistently with national and international confidentiality requirements; and advancing interoperability through combined exercises."[32] Under SPDMM, the Climate Change and Defence Working Group is an initiative in recognition that climate change is among the key security threats to the region as a whole.

Exercise Ready Assist is SPDMM's initiative to bring regional stakeholders together in a workshop and exercise on humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR). The inaugural iteration was hosted by Tonga in 2017 with the objective being to develop a regional network of HADR practitioners, including regional civilian, military, and police representatives. Participating countries include SPDMM countries and partners, to include Cook Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, FSM, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, the U.S., and Vanuatu.[33]

After the 2021 SPDMM, HADR Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) were proposed, and they were shaped in 2022 at the Fiji-hosted EXERCISE LONGREACH. The SPDMM Regional HADR SOP (September 2022) were the outcome. The SOP is a framework for effective use of regional military assets and deployment of personnel in a multi-national disaster response operation in support of an affected state in the South Pacific. It is intended to serve as a means to establish SPDMM Standby Arrangements for HADR. The SOP still requires bilateral agreement for delivery of external assistance to an affected state, and the writers were, as of publication of this handbook, still working to identify national focal points and preferences for coordination structures. Table 9 shows the members and observers of SPDMM.[34]

Australia	Chile	Fiji
France	New Zealand	Papua New Guinea
Tonga	-	
Observers		
United Kingdom	United States of America	-

Table 9: Members and Observers of the SPDMM

Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific

CROP comprises the heads of nine inter-governmental, regional organizations in the Pacific. Formed originally in 1988, it is governed by the CROP Charter of 2018. CROP functions as a coordination mechanism for the heads of the regional organizations and as a high-level advisory body that provides policy advice and facilitates policy development at the national, regional, and international levels. The PIF Secretariat Secretary-General chairs CROP and holds the coordinator's role; the Secretary-General reports to PIF Leaders.[35]

As of 2023, CROP agencies include:[36]

- Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA)
- Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO)
- Pacific Islands Development Program (PIDP)
- Pacific Power Association (PPA)
- The Pacific Community (SPC)
- Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP)
- Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO)
- The University of the South Pacific (USP)
- Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)

Figure 2 displays the logos of each of the CROP member organizations.

The CROP Charter (2018) reflected the 2014 Framework for Pacific Regionalism and shifted CROP's emphasis to supporting an increased commitment to regionalism in terms of sustainable development, inclusive economic growth, strengthened governance, and security. CROP member-agency executives are tasked with engaging other key regional players, particularly UN system agencies and non-state actors that have expertise in CROP agencies' areas of action. These expert agents and agencies may also participate in CROP working groups, as appropriate.[37]

The CROP agencies' heads meet annually with PIF Leaders, and after this meeting, they move to their own annual meeting wherein they develop work agendas based on PIF Leaders' decisions. Additional meetings of CROP agency heads and deputies occur throughout the year for coordination and implementation monitoring. Next, CROP task forces are formal, results-oriented, and time-bound; as of 2022, there were three: Nuclear Legacy Issues in the Pacific, 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, and International Engagement and Advocacy for Ocean Events. Finally, CROP working groups are informal, conform to on-going regional initiatives, deliver policy advice, and may construct implementation strategies. As of 2022, working groups included: Gender, Human Resources Development, ICT, Energy Technical, Marine Sector, Pacific Sustainable Development, Communications, and Corporate.[38]

Figure 3 shows the CROP architecture and coordination arrangements.[39]



Figure 2: CROP Member Organizations




Figure 3: CROP Architecture and Institutional Arrangements

Forum Fisheries Agency

Founded by PIF leaders in 1979 with the signing of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention, FFA is an advisory body that counts as members 17 PIF members – shown in Table 10. FFA's Country Service Level Agreements with members are non-binding. They provide direction on the delivery of the FFA Secretariat services for each member and set out the expectations of each member and the Secretariat in respect of priorities.

The Forum Fisheries Committee meets annually to consider regional policies, the budget, and FFA work program. There are approximately 80 staff at the Honiara headquarters; they support national contact points in departments of foreign affairs and fisheries over the following work streams:

- Fisheries management – providing policy and legal frameworks for the sustainable management of tuna
- Fisheries development – developing the capacity of members to sustainably harvest, process, and market tuna to create livelihoods
- Fisheries operations – supporting monitoring, control, and surveillance of fisheries as well as treaty administration, information technology, and vessel registration and monitoring
- Corporate services – supporting the organization's work through administration, human resources, budgeting, and other corporate functions[40]

Photo 2 shows an FSM patrol boat participating in FFA's Operation Rai Balang exercise in 2020.[41]

FFA Secretariat
PO Box 629 Honiara
Solomon Islands
Tel: +677 21124
Email: *info@ffa.int*



Photo 2: FSM Patrol Boat in FFA Exercise in 2020

Australia	Cook Islands	Fiji
Kiribati	Marshall Islands (Republic of)	Micronesia (Federated States of)
Nauru	New Zealand	Niue
Palau	Papua New Guinea	Samoa
Solomon Islands	Tokelau (New Zealand territory)	Tonga
Tuvalu	Vanuatu	

Table 10: FFA Members

Pacific Aviation Safety Office

Headquartered in Port-Vila, Vanuatu, PASO was founded in 2002.[42] It is an international organization that focuses on aviation safety and security services, and it is responsible for regional regulatory oversight of aviation safety services for the 10 signatory states of the Pacific Islands Civil Aviation Safety and Security Treaty. The signatory states are identified in Table 11.[43]

Leadership of PASO takes the form of the PASO Council, which consists of representatives of the governments of the 10 treaty signatories. There are additional observer organizations of the PASO Council; they include Airways New Zealand, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Association of South Pacific Airlines (ASPA), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), PIF Secretariat, U.S. Federal Aviation Agency, and the World Bank.

The PASO Council sets the overall vision, purpose, and strategy of the organization and sets and assesses annual work plans and objectives of the PASO Office. The Council appoints a General Manager who manages daily business. At the annual General Meeting in Vanuatu, the Council elects a Chair and two Deputies who then chair sub-committees – Corporate Sub-Committee and Operations Sub-Committee.[44] Under the General Manager, the PASO Office coordinates technical operations and oversees day-to-day business administration. It is tasked with close coordination with member states to ensure their regulatory oversight needs are met and that Pacific aviation safety overall is enhanced by guidance and training opportunities. Within the Office, the Head of Regional Engagement works on CROP cooperation and coordination.[45] Figure 4 shows the organizational structure of PASO.[46]

Pacific Aviation Safety Office

Rue D'Artois, Nambatu
P O Box 139, Port-Vila, Vanuatu
Tel: +678 28500 / +678 29024
Email: *info@paso.aero*

Treaty Signatories		
Cook Islands	Kiribati	Nauru
Niue	Papua New Guinea	Samoa
Solomon Islands	Tonga	Tuvalu
Vanuatu		
Associate Members		
Australia	Fiji	New Zealand

Table 11: PASO Treaty Signatories and Associates




Figure 4: PASO Organizational Structure

Pacific Community

SPC is a member-owned (27 states and territories), international development organization, formed by treaty (Canberra Agreement, 1947; as the South Pacific Commission). Table 12 shows member states and territories. Leadership and decision-making include:

- Conference of the Pacific Community - ministerial level, every 2 years
- Committee of Representatives of Governments and Administration (CRGA) - undertakes regular business decisions/ governance
- CRGA sub-committees - such as Implementation of the Strategic Plan, Pacific Board for Educational Quality, Audit and Risk Committee, etc.

SPC is a scientific-technical organization tasked with supporting development across all sectors and disciplines – resilience and climate action, natural resources and biodiversity, food systems, equity, education and social development, sustainable economies and livelihoods, planetary health, and transforming institutional effectiveness. It is accredited to the Green Climate Fund and Adaptation Fund to support members ability to access and manage climate financing. SPC is one of three organizations (with SPREP and PIF Secretariat) who undertake secretariat and coordination functions of the Pacific Resilience Partnership (PRP) Taskforce. In addition, the Community is organized across regional centers of excellence and sub-regional offices that undertake national, regional, and international engagements and conduct country, integrated, and sectoral programs.

The SPC Strategic Plan 2022-2031 – Key Focus Area 1: Resilience and Climate Action does the following:

- Recognizes the climate crisis as the greatest challenge to the region
- Sets a year 2031 goal of thriving Pacific peoples armed with information for decision making and resources for low-carbon, climate-resilient development
- Advocates Pacific-led pathways to integrate data and indigenous knowledge to inform policy-makers, managers, and responders[47]

SPC hosts the Pacific Community Centre for Ocean Science (PCCOS), which helps Pacific governments and communities easily access ocean science and expertise. It delivers scientific services supporting Ocean Management, Governance, and Observations. Figure 5 shows the variety of expertise and services PCCOS deliver.[48]

SPC's Digital Earth Pacific (*https://www.spc.int/DigitalEarthPacific*) is crafted to deliver an operational earth and marine observation system that integrates decades of satellite data and makes it easy to access and use. It is planned so as to provide digital infrastructure for all stakeholders

American Samoa (U.S. territory)	Australia	Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
Cook Islands	Fiji	France
French Polynesia (French Territory)	Guam (U.S. territory)	Kiribati
Marshall Islands (Republic of)	Micronesia (Federated States of)	Nauru
New Caledonia (French Territory)	New Zealand	Niue
Palau	Papua New Guinea	Samoa
Tonga	Tuvalu	Vanuatu
United Kingdom (Pitcairn)	United States of America	Wallis and Futuna (French territory)

Table 12: Pacific Community Members




Figure 5: PCCOS Expertise and Services Supporting the "Blue Pacific Continent"

in the Pacific to use tools, technologies, and capacities to monitor and track climate change, food insecurity, and disaster risk. The Microsoft Planetary Computer is the backbone, and it will be housed at SPC; development is planned across the following phases:

- PHASE I (2022-2023): develop technical infrastructure, co-create products and services, engage stakeholders, and operationalize
- PHASE II (2024-2026): increase capabilities of Digital Earth Pacific and create new, innovative, and decision-ready products and applications
- PHASE III (2027-2029): nurture established ecosystem of data, users, applications, and knowledge; users are not only using data from Digital Earth Pacific but creating their own products and services powered by Digital Earth Pacific.

Digital Earth Pacific founding members and leadership include the Pacific Community (Co-Chair); Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, Tonga (Co-Chair); Lands and Survey Department, Fiji; Office of the Chief Secretary, Republic of Marshall Islands; Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, Vanuatu; University of the South Pacific; Committee on Earth Observation Satellites; Geoscience Australia; Group on Earth Observations; and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), United States.[49]

The Pacific Data Hub (*https://pacificdata.org/*) is led by SPC with support from the New Zealand MFAT. It serves as a single access point for vetted and authoritative data and as a vehicle for investment in sustainable data infrastructure in the region. The Hub hosts five portals and ten dashboards with tools and topics specific to data sets and contributing organizations.

The Global Climate Change Alliance Plus Scaling up Pacific Adaptation (GCCA+ SUPA) is a 4.5-year project (2019-June 2023) funded by the EU and implemented by SPC in partnership with SPREP and the USP, in collaboration with the governments and peoples of Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, FSM, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Tonga, and Tuvalu. The objective is to enhance CCA and resilience within 10 countries by strengthening the implementation of sector-based, but integrated, climate change and disaster risk management strategies and plans.[50]

SPC also hosts the Regional Pacific NDC Hub (*https://pacificndc.org*/) in Fiji; the Hub is a data platform that allows regional countries to upload, manage, and implement their NDCs, set out under the Paris Agreement.

- The Hub is a contributor to the NDC Partnership (115 countries and 80 institutions) to deliver climate action when governments identify their NDC implementation priorities and the type of support needed to translate them into actionable policies and programs[51]
- It serves Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, FSM, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Nauru, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu
- Administered by GIZ and implemented by SPC in partnership with Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) and SPREP; these four are the Coordination Group; funding comes from the EU, Germany, Australia DFAT, and New Zealand MFAT

Figure 6 shows the Pacific NDC Hub organization and financial structure.[52]

The Pacific Islands Emergency Management Alliance (PIEMA) was a project of SPC that ran through March 2023 with the expectation that PIEMA II would be developed.[53] It was launched in 2013 as part of the EU's Building Safety and Resilience in the Pacific and with support from SPC, Australasian Fire & Emergency Services Council, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the New Zealand Ministry for Civil Defence and Emergency Management. Members include 14 countries and 15 agencies, notably national disaster managers (National Disaster Management Offices, etc.), the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police Conference, and the Pacific Islands Fire & Emergency Services Association. SPC provides secretariat and coordination support for PIEMA. Figure 7 illustrates the stakeholders working toward PIEMA.[54]

The PIEMA goal is to create best-practice emergency response across the region and thereby increase resilience with more coordinated disaster management and CCA. Tasks include building trust, leadership, and teamwork in response agencies while creating a common language and cooperative systems and doctrines to ensure consistent and credible information is collected and used.[55]

SPC's central organizational structure includes various directorates and divisions. Of key interest to climate change issues are:

- Directorate of Climate Change and Sustainability - *https://www.spc.int/cces*
  - As of 2023, this Directorate has a Climate Finance Unit that supports members in their interactions with global green financing organizations, and it provides technical or programming support to the Kiwa Initiative and the Regional Pacific NDC Hub
- Geoscience, Energy and Maritime Division - *https://gem.spc.int/*
  - Disaster and Community Resilience Programme that promotes partnerships and governance for climate- and disaster-




Figure 6: Pacific Regional NDC Hub Partners and Work Units




Figure 7: PIEMA's Formula for Effective Emergency Management

resilience development and water security, monitoring and assessments of hazards and risk, investments for environmental and water resilience, and disaster management capacity; operationalizes SPC's Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific (FRDP) work

- Georesources and Energy Programme includes policy, technical assessment, data and strategy, the Pacific Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, and geoinformatics sections
- Oceans and Maritime Programme consists of sections for sustainable and safe maritime transport, ocean and coastal monitoring and prediction, ocean management and literacy, and earth and marine observation

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Fax: +679 337 0021
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SPC Office in Europe
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75017 Paris
France
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Email: *oliviera@spc.int*

Pacific Islands Development Program

Formed in 1980, PIDP's objective is to enhance the quality of life in the Pacific islands. It serves as a forum through which Pacific leaders discuss critical issues of development with interested countries, donors, NGOs, and the private sector. It is the Secretariat of the Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders (PICL),[56] which includes the government leaders of the PICTs and states shown in Table 13.[57]

PIDP initiatives include funding and multi-media projects that support the discussion of key issues for Pacific communities; some examples:

- In partnership with the Climate Ready program of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), PIDP delivered the Small Grants Guide to help community groups and other organizations demonstrate their knowledge and capacity to create a successful small grants proposal; issues covered include: making the "climate case" for a project, linking a project to existing policies and frameworks, incorporating gender equity, disability, and social inclusion issues, risk management, and other program elements[58]
- The U.S. South Pacific Scholarship Program provides students from Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu opportunities for Master's and Bachelor's degree study at the University of Hawai'i, funded by the U.S. State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs; these students study agriculture, business, communications/journalism, education, environmental studies, gender studies, management of NGOs, political science, public administration, public health, and STEM fields[59]
- The East-West Center's NOAA-funded Pacific Regional Integrated Sciences and Assessments (Pacific RISA) provides interdisciplinary research and partnerships with local, national, and regional decision-makers to help Pacific island communities adapt to climate variability and change by translating climate data and projections into meaningful information for specific island locations; Pacific RISA focuses on American Samoa, Guam, Hawai'i, the Marianas, Marshall Islands, FSM, and Palau; the Pacific RISA team coordinates the Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment (PIRCA) to assess climate change indicators, impacts, and adaptive capacity for each U.S.-Affiliated Pacific Island country and territory[60]

Contact: 1601 East-West Road
Honolulu, Hawai'i 96848, USA
Tel: +1 808 944 7724
Email: *pidp@eastwestcenter.org*

American Samoa (U.S. territory)	Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands	Cook Islands
Fiji	French Polynesia (French Territory)	Guam (U.S. territory)
Hawaii (U.S. State)	Kiribati	Marshall Islands (Republic of)
Micronesia (Federated States of)	Nauru	New Caledonia (French Territory)
Niue	Palau	Papua New Guinea
Samoa	Solomon Islands	Tonga
Tuvalu	Vanuatu	-

Table 13: Member Governments of the PICL

Pacific Power Association

PPA is an inter-governmental agency that promotes direct cooperation among PICTs' power utilities on issues of technical training, information exchange, sharing senior management and engineering expertise, and other activities. Members pool their resources and expertise to gain international representation and improve access to international power sector assistance programs. Members are: American Samoa Power Authority, Chuuk Public Utility Corporation, Commonwealth Utilities Corporation (Saipan), Electric Power Corporation (Samoa), Électricité de Tahiti, Électricité et Eau de Calédonie, Électricité et Eau de Wallis et Futuna, Enercal (New Caledonia), Energy Fiji Limited, Guam Power Authority, Kosrae Utility Authority, Kwajalein Atoll Joint Utility Resource, Marshalls Energy Company, Niue Power Corporation, Nauru Utilities Authority, Palau Public Utilities Corporation, PNG Power Limited, Pohnpei Utility Corporation, Public Utilities Board (Kiribati), Solomon Islands Electricity Authority, Te Aponga Uira O Tumu-Te-Varovaro (Cook Islands), Tonga Power Limited, Tuvalu Electricity Corporation, UNELCO Vanuatu Limited, and Yap Public Service Corporation.[61]

In 2020, the U.S. joined the PPA as an Affiliate Member, represented by the U.S. Embassy in Suva, Fiji. The U.S. had already been represented in the body by Affiliate Members, the U.S. Department of the Interior and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Photo 3 shows the U.S. Ambassador to Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu at the time as the U.S. new status became official.[62]

The PPA provides direct links between the private sector and member utilities to improve private sector services and make their presence in the region more productive. It delivers sustainable energy technical guidelines,[63] and as part of the Solar and Wind Measurement Campaign, PPA is working on a mapping assessment of solar and wind capacity to enhance awareness of resource potential for renewable technologies and to provide governments with a spatial planning framework to guide investment in the sector.[64] In addition, the PPA established the Pacific Power Association Disaster Assistance Program (PDAP), a mutual disaster recovery and assistance program intended to enable members to accelerate response and recovery efforts after disasters through sharing human resources and equipment; signatories of the PDAP MoU include four state utilities from FSM, two utilities from the Marshall Islands, and utilities from Palau, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Tonga, and Tuvalu.[65]

The PPA Secretariat is the focal point and coordinates PPA activities, including representing Members at energy fora, assisting Members with requests, and working with development partners and regional and international organizations in the development of electricity utilities in the Pacific Islands.

- The Secretariat is headed by the Executive Director[66]
- The Board includes representatives from each member utility[67]

Contact: Secretariat
Goodenough Street,
Suva, Fiji
Tel: +679 3306-022
Fax: +679 3302-038



Photo 3: U.S. Joines PPA as Affiliate Member

Pacific Tourism Organisation

The SPTO focuses on sustainable tourism and helps lead tourism policy and development across the Pacific within the context of escalating impacts of climate change. There are 21 government members, detailed in Table 14.

From among these members, 19 have committed to sustainable tourism and have opportunities to use the SPTO Sustainable Tourism Policy Framework of eco-initiatives that include environmental clean-ups, developing geoparks, and delivering recovery toolkits. In addition, there are 200 private sector members.[68] Under the SPTO, the following bodies deliver leadership:

- Council of Ministers of Tourism – meets annually; monitors and reviews SPTO policies, strategies, work program activities, and budgets, provides comments, recommendations, and guidance, and secures funding from donors
- Board of Directors - consists of one representative from each member-government, and five members representing the private sector; meets at least twice each year to approve and monitor SPTO's annual core and work plan budgets, approve and monitor operating policies and strategies, supervise the implementation of work programs, review and monitor operating rules, procedures, and regulations in the financial and administrative matters of SPTO, and advise on other matters
    - Management – headed by a Chief Executive who is appointed by the Board and who carries out the day-to-day administrative functions of SPTO[69]

Contact: SPTO Head Office

Level 3, FNPF Place
Victoria Parade
PO Box 13119
Suva, Fiji
Tel: +679 330 4177
Fax: +679 330 1995
Email: *tourism@spto.org*

American Samoa (U.S. territory)	China	Cook Islands
Fiji	French Polynesia (French Territory)	Kiribati
Marshall Islands (Republic of)	Micronesia (Federated States of)	Nauru
New Caledonia (French Territory)	Niue	Papua New Guinea
Rapa Nui (territory of Chile)	Samoa	Tonga
Tuvalu	Vanuatu	Wallis and Futuna (French territory)

Table 14: SPTO Members

PIF Secretariat

As detailed in the "Political Bodies" section of this document, PIF is also a key CROP agency with a leadership role therein.

The Secretary General of PIF is responsible for the management of the PIF Secretariat and, in close consultation with the Forum Chair and within the limits set by the Forum Leaders from time to time, for setting Forum Leaders' Meeting agendas and coordinating responses by members to regional events, particularly crises. The Secretary General also performs several other key functions, which include being the Pacific Ocean Commissioner. As the Pacific Ocean Commissioner, the Secretary General advocates for the secure future of Pacific people based on the sustainable development, management, and conservation of the Pacific Ocean and its resources.[70]

Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment

SPREP is the lead regional organization for the protection and sustainable development of Pacific Island environments. It was established in 1992 to support cooperation and coordination on environmental matters in the region. SPREP has 26 members, as depicted in Table 15.[71]

SPREP is a key organization for climate action in the Pacific. It works closely with its members, as well as with partners, donors, and local communities to deliver on environmental management and sustainable development in the region. SPREP focuses on four priority areas:

- Biodiversity and ecosystem management
- Waste management and pollution control
- Climate change resilience
- Environmental monitoring and governance[72]

SPREP is the Secretariat of the Nouméa Convention (For the Protection of Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region and Protocols), Waigani Convention (to Ban the importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacific Region), and Apia Convention (on Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific). As such, it facilitates effective function of the Convention and subsidiary bodies through administrative, logistical, management, and procedural support; reports on work done as well as administrative and budgetary matters; keeps Parties informed and communicates information received from one Party to other Parties; and implements Convention decisions and supporting parties' implementation of decisions.[73]

Contact: Secretariat
Apia, Samoa
Tel: +685 21929
Email: *sprep@sprep.org*

American Samoa (U.S. territory)	Australia	Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
Cook Islands	Fiji	France
French Polynesia (French Territory)	Guam (U.S. territory)	Kiribati
Marshall Islands (Republic of)	Micronesia (Federated States of)	Nauru
New Caledonia (French Territory)	New Zealand	Niue
Palau	Papua New Guinea	Samoa
Solomon Islands	Tokelau (New Zealand territory)	Tonga
Tuvalu	Vanuatu	Wallis and Futuna (French territory)
United Kingdom	United States of America	

Table 15: Members of the Secretariat of SPREP

The University of the South Pacific

The USP is a key CROP agency with a role in delivering research and educating future leaders to find solutions to development issues within the region and globally. The USP is discussed more fully in the Academic Networks and Alliances section further in this document.

Regional Development Bodies

Pacific Islands Development Forum

The Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) seeks to enable the development of green/blue Pacific economies. Members are shown in Table 16. The Pacific Islands Association of NGOs (PIANGO) and the Pacific Islands Private Sector Organisation (PIPSO) provide civil society organizations (CSO) and private sector representation. While PIDF excludes Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S., it does include CSO and private sector representation from those countries, and observers include many European, African, Latin and North American, and Asian states.[74]

PIDF is a platform for Pacific governments, civil society, and the private sector to:

- Advocate for the significance of climate change for the lives and livelihoods of Pacific Islands and Pacific Islanders
- Implement policies for sustainable development and poverty eradication that respond to climate change and globalization
- Accelerate integration of the three pillars of sustainable development – i.e., environment, social, and economic – to harmonize the pursuit of economic growth with the needs of societies and the environment
- Facilitate the use of tools, approaches, and innovations to stimulate robust debate while fostering an inclusive change agenda

The PIDF Conference is the apex decision-making body and comprises the Leaders' Summit and Members' Representative Council.

- The Leaders' Summit comprises Leaders of Pacific Islands governments and Pacific organizations; it meets annually.
- The Members' Representative Council comprises three members from each National/Local Sustainable Development Board or their equivalent, a member each from PIANGO and PIPSO, and the Secretary General; it meets twice a year.
- The National/Local Sustainable Development Boards ensure national and local priorities influence the agenda; they meet quarterly.[75]

In 2017, PIDF and the UN Office for South-South Cooperation signed an MoU to share analysis and information on the contribution of South-South Cooperation towards sustainable development; jointly identify and explore scaling-up programs that work towards the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement, the Sendai Framework, the SAMOA pathway, and other relevant frameworks; support PIDF member stakeholders to share their experience of South-South cooperation; and contribute to the Southern Climate Partnership Incubator initiative.[76]

Contact: Secretariat

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Suva, Fiji
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Fax: +679 3311572
Email: *secretariat@pidf.int*

PIDF Member States		
Fiji	Kiribati	Marshall Islands (Republic of)
Micronesia (Federated States of)	Nauru	Palau
Solomon Islands	Timor-Leste	Tokelau (New Zealand territory)
Tonga	Tuvalu	Vanuatu
Private Sector Representatives		
PIANGO	PIPSO Pacific Islands Private Sector Organisation	-

Table 16: Members of PIDF

Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility

Established in 2008, the Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility (PRIF) is a multi-agency coordination and technical assistance mechanism whose institutions and procedural frameworks deliver development assistance from partners (ADB, World Bank, Australia DFAT, the EU and European Investment Bank, JICA, New Zealand MFAT, and the U.S. State Department) to members' infrastructure sectors. As of 2023, there are 13 members, shown in Table 17.[77] PRIF coordinates the development of National Infrastructure Investment Plans (NIIP) by supporting member governments' development of strategies for infrastructure financing, manpower, and sustainability; complete plans are available at *https://www.theprif.org/national-infrastructure-investment-plans*.

There are four partner meetings annually and six Community of Practice (CoP) sessions annually.

- CoP sessions bring together Pacific infrastructure practitioners in government, regional organizations, academia, and the private sector for thematic events (e.g., insurance, building codes, sustainable energy management, localization, gender and inclusion, and sea level rise)[78]
- The annual PRIF Week provides a forum for stakeholders; the 2023 event, "Quality Infrastructure for a Blue Pacific Continent" (16-20 October 2023), examined climate and disaster resilience, national infrastructure planning for sustainable and inclusive economic growth, life-cycle costs, approaches to environmental and social safeguards, value for money procurement and better project implementation, localization and the private sector, and gender and social inclusion[79]

The PRIF Coordination Office, hosted by ADB in Sydney, Australia, operates as the secretariat for meetings, fund oversight, communication, and outreach, but partners retain responsibility for and ownership of plans to administer and implement their projects. Work on the PRIF action plan devolves to working groups, which comprise sector specialists from the PRIF partners across sectoral or thematic areas (e.g., energy, transport, urban development, water and sanitation, ICT, sustainable infrastructure management, and environment and social) who advocate coordinated responses to priority and emerging infrastructure development issues in the Pacific region.[80]

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Level 20, 45 Clarence Street
Sydney NSW 2000
Australia
Tel: +61 2 8270 9444
Email: *enquiries@theprif.org*

Cook Islands	Fiji	Kiribati
Marshall Islands (Republic of)	Micronesia (Federated States of)	Nauru
Niue	Palau	Samoa
Solomon Islands	Tokelau (New Zealand territory)	Tonga
Tuvalu	Vanuatu	-
Associate Member		
Papua New Guinea	-	

Table 17: PRIF Members

Pacific Resilience Partnership

The PRP, established in 2017, is a set of governance arrangements to support implementation of the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific (FRDP). From the outset, the goal was to utilize existing mechanisms and directly involve decisionmakers. The PIF Officials Committee and SPC and SPREP Governing Councils direct PRP action and respond to PRP reports. The PRP includes:

- Pacific Resilience Meeting (PRM)
- PRP Taskforce
- PRP Taskforce Support Unit
- PRP Technical Working Groups

The relationships among these bodies are illustrated in Figure 8.[81]

The biennial PRM is crucial to PRP because it brings together all stakeholders to ensure visibility of Pacific-led actions that can inform others regionally and globally.[82]

The PRP Taskforce is considered the prime mover in operationalizing the PRP arrangements. The Taskforce includes representatives of five countries and territories (one each from Polynesia, Melanesia, Micronesia, the Pacific Territories, and Australia/New Zealand), five civil society or private sector representatives, and five representatives of regional organizations and development partners (one each from development partners, multilateral development banks, regional organizations, the UN system, and academia). The Taskforce meets several times each year. Secretariat services are provided collectively by SPC, SPREP, and the PIF Secretariat.[83]

Technical working groups are established to respond to specific needs for action and implementation of the FRDP. Membership is open to all countries, territories, CROP agencies, and stakeholders with interest in the topic under consideration. Working group topics have covered risk governance, disaster risk financing, displacement, localization, information and knowledge management, water security, carbon pricing, and resilient infrastructure and housing, among other topics.[84]

The Support Unit includes PIF Secretariat for leadership in convening and coordinating political dialogue, SPC for leadership in disaster risk management and technical expertise, and SPREP for leadership in climate change and technical expertise.[85]




Figure 8: PRP Governance Mechanisms

Climate Science Services

Pacific Meteorological Council

The Pacific Meteorological Council (PMC) is a specialized subsidiary body of SPREP; it was established in 2011 to facilitate and coordinate the scientific and technical program and activities of the Regional Meteorological Services.[86] PMC provides policy-relevant advice to the SPREP Meeting on the needs and priorities of its member countries and territories in relation to meteorology, hydrology, oceans, and related fields to keep them well-informed of critical weather, climate, and early warning issues. Membership of PMC is comprised of the Directors or heads of Meteorological Services of SPREP Members. PMC meets every other year, in odd-numbered years.[87] The Pacific Meteorological Desk Partnership (PMDP) is the Secretariat for the PMC.[88]

The Sixth Pacific Meteorological Council (PMC-6) Meeting in August 2023 in Fiji focused on strengthening weather, climate, water, ocean, and related development services in the context of sustainable development for a resilient Blue Pacific.[89] The meeting brought together Heads of the Pacific National Meteorological and Hydrological Services (NMHS), directors of National Disaster Management Offices from across the Pacific, CSOs, development partners, and the private sector. PMC-6 ended on a note of optimism about the potential of the Weather Ready Pacific (WRP) program,[90] which aims to enable small Pacific Island states to better anticipate, prepare for, and respond to extreme weather events and water and ocean risks.

PMC Member National Services include:

- Australian Bureau of Meteorology
- Cook Islands Meteorological Service
- Fiji Meteorological Service
- Kiribati Meteorological Service
- FSM Weather Station
- New Zealand National Meteorological Service
- Niue Meteorological Service
- Papua New Guinea Meteorological Service
- Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI) National Weather Service
- Samoa Meteorology Division
- Solomon Islands Meteorological Service
- Tonga Meteorological Service
- Tuvalu Met Service
- NOAA
- Vanuatu Meteorological Services
- World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

The WRP program of the PMC aims to strengthen the Pacific region's ability to anticipate, plan for, and respond to high impact and extreme weather, water, and ocean events. The end objective of WRP is to deliver a Pacific Weather Exchange to give Pacific nations access to localized, accurate, and timely forecast and warning products derived utilizing world-leading forecast capability.[91] At its 2023 meeting, PMC continued to work toward agreeing on the next steps to invest in and establish governance norms for WRP moving forward.[92]

Pacific Meteorological Desk Partnership

The PMDP is a regional weather and climate services coordination mechanism managed by the SPREP and WMO to deliver a regionally coordinated effort to service SPREP Members needs in the area of weather and climate services. The PMDP is made up of two core components – the Apia Secretariat Component and the Partners Component. Both components play specific roles and interact closely together to provide combined efforts and outputs as a single Desk function.[93] The Apia Secretariat Component includes the Secretariats of SPREP and WMO; the Partners Component is the collective of development partners' technical expert institutions who deliver expertise to the national meteorological services across the Pacific.[94]

World Meteorological Organization

The WMO is a specialized agency of the UN and is dedicated to international cooperation and coordination on the state and behavior of the Earth's atmosphere, its interaction with the land and oceans, the weather and climate it produces, and the resulting distribution of water resources. WMO's focus is broadly "weather, climate, and water."[95]

The WMO's Regional Office for Asia and the South-West Pacific covers 24 WMO members. The Pacific Islands are supported by the WMO Representative Office for the South-West Pacific in Apia, Samoa. From there, WMO collaborates with various partners from the UN, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and members' meteorological services to enhance weather and climate early warning systems. This office also supports members' development of policies to build resilience against the impacts of climate change.[96]

The WMO is supporting Pacific governments to enhance understanding of climate indicators. The WMO's State of the Climate in the South-West Pacific 2022 report provides a snapshot of climate indicators including temperatures, sea level rise, ocean heat and acidification, and extreme weather events for the year. The report also highlights the socio-economic risks and impacts on key sectors.[97]

WMO Representative Office for the South-West Pacific

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WMO Regional Office for Asia and the South-West Pacific

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WMO RA-V Pacific Regional Climate Centre Network

The WMO RA-V Pacific Regional Climate Centre (RCC) Network is a virtual Centre of Excellence that assists NMHSs in the Pacific Islands region to deliver better climate services and products and to strengthen their capacity to meet national climate information and service delivery needs. The RCC is supported by the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG), National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) New Zealand, Australian Bureau of Meteorology, NOAA, Asia Pacific Climate Centre (APCC), United States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), SPREP, Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), Météo-France, University of Hawaii, and SPC.

Although currently in its demonstration phase, the RCC has been endorsed by the WMO. It is expected to have a focus on the following nodes:

- Long-Range Forecasting – led by NIWA and Australia's Bureau of Meteorology with support from Météo-France, NOAA, University of Hawaii, APCC, SPREP, and SPC
- Climate Monitoring – led by NOAA and University of Hawaii with support from Australia's Bureau of Meteorology, SPC, SPREP, and NIWA
- Climate Change Projections – led by CSIRO with support from USGCRP, Australia's Bureau of Meteorology, and SPREP
- Operational Data Services – led by Australia's Bureau of Meteorology with support from NOAA, University of Hawaii, SPC, and NIWA
- Training – led by SPREP with support from NOAA, UPNG, Australia's Bureau of Meteorology, NIWA, SPC, and CSIRO[98]

Climate Action Advocacy Initiatives

Alliance of Small Island States

The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is an inter-governmental organization founded in 1990. It represents 39 small islands or low-lying coastal developing states and serves as a lobby and voice for members in negotiations and processes surrounding climate change and sustainable development.[99] Moreover, it provides a collective means for small island states with minimal human or financial resources within their UN delegations to exercise influence in climate-oriented negotiations.[100]

Countries from the Caribbean, the "Africa, Indian Ocean, South China Seas" Group, and Pacific are members. Table 18 shows the PICT members.

Among the roles AOSIS has played was as advocate at the 21st UN Climate Conference of Parties (COP21) in Paris, where, in partnership with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Commission, it pooled the resources of its membership to press negotiators on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions levels and their responsibility for the long-term effects thereof.[101]

A key concern for AOSIS members is the impact of climate change on small island states' maritime zones. The 2021 AOSIS Leaders' Declaration expressed members' will to see continuity of their rights and entitlements based on present territory rather than on territory left after the impacts of climate change-induced sea level rise are measured. Few member states had – at the time – submitted their full declarations of maritime zone information, and a key step is to depose that legal paperwork.[102]

In 2013, AOSIS launched its Climate Fellowship Programme to bring young professions from small island states to New York for a one-year training on climate change law, policy, and science, including a semester at Columbia University. Fellows go on to support their home countries' and AOSIS' positions at UNFCCC meetings and related negotiations. The program aims to build member-states' future climate change policy- and decision-making cadres.[103]

AOSIS operates from the diplomatic mission to the UN of the country that holds the Chair, which rotates among the three regions. Due to its structure, there is no regular budget or secretariat; funds for meetings, workshops, etc., are donated by non-AOSIS governments, UN bodies, or other sources. The Chair frequently operates as the main fundraiser, and the heads of state of AOSIS member-states function as an assembly to confirm or reject rules of operation or consensus.[104]

Cook Islands	Fiji	Kiribati
Marshall Islands (Republic of)	Micronesia (Federated States of)	Nauru
Niue	Palau	Papua New Guinea
Samoa	Solomon Islands	Tonga
Tuvalu	Vanuatu	-

Table 18: AOSIS Pacific Members

Climate Vulnerable Forum

The Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) is an international partnership of 58 countries who represent all world regions and who are threatened by climate change; it has a South-South cooperation focus to act together to secure climate justice (upholding human rights, preserving the Earth, social progress, and better standards of living). Key actions focus on the nexus of DRR, ecology, renewable energy, and financing climate action. CVF's priorities are:

- Define and articulate priorities of climate-vulnerable countries
- Promote action to tackle climate change (by international actors and domestically within vulnerable states)
- Commission research to inform responses
- Build awareness, partnerships, and momentum for action to safeguard the vulnerable

It is led by a rotating two-year chair (Ghana for the 2022-2024 period); government leaders are present at CVF Summits, while foreign affairs or environment or climate ministers represent countries at other events. Additional work is done via three bodies:

- Troika – three members (incumbent, previous, and incoming chairs) who coordinate CVF work and support the chair
- Thematic Ambassadors – envoys who promote the forum's key priorities and messages
- Expert Advisory Group – appointed through the Chair or Troika to deliver technical advice
- Secretariat - hosted by the Global Center on Adaptation

Pacific members as of 2022 are shown in Table 19.

The V20 is "The Group of 20 Finance Ministers of Vulnerable Countries." As of 2023, it had 68 member-nations which, though they account for only 5% of global GHG emissions, are systematically vulnerable to climate change and seek to work together to push for international economic engagement in addressing climate disruptions. The V20 formed after the CVF published its 2013-2015 action plan to strengthen economic and financial responses to climate change.[105] Within the Asia-Pacific, there are 22 members; Table 20 shows members from among Pacific Island states.[106] Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu were founding V20 members.[107]

Key work of the V20 occur via the following bodies:

- V20 Ministerial Dialogue – includes any CVF member or a state that has adopted the Costa Rica Action Plan; chaired by the CVF chair; provides overall strategic guidance and priorities, may form specialized bodies on specific topics, commissions research, and acts as a regular (twice annually) forum for discussion, exchange, and collaboration
- Troika - composed of three lead V20 Participants and chaired by the V20 Chair; oversees and facilitates implementation of the V20 Work Plan; proposes the agenda

Fiji	Kiribati (Presidency / Chair 2010-2011)	Marshall Islands (Republic of) (Presidency / Chair 2018-2020)
Palau	Papua New Guinea	Samoa
Tuvalu	Vanuatu	Timor-Leste

Table 19: CVF Pacific Members

Fiji	Kiribati	Marshall Islands (Republic of)
Palau	Papua New Guinea	Samoa
Tonga	Tuvalu	Vanuatu
Timor-Leste	-	

Table 20: Pacific Members of the V20

for consideration by the V20 Ministerial Dialogue, drafts Work Plan, and may secure and approve the allocation of any resources
- Secretariat – provided by the ad hoc technical secretariat of the CVF[108]

The Global Center on Adaptation is the V20 managing partner with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative, InsuResilience Global Partnership, and the World Bank/Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction (GFDRR) as additional partners.[109]

The V20 works to address economic and financial issues beyond the remit or competency of any one organization. It seeks to:
- Promote public and private climate finance mobilization
- Exchange best practices on the economic and financial aspects of climate change
- Develop approaches to climate finance
- Jointly advocate and take collective action

Vision 2025 is the V20's 5-year strategy to leverage investment, lower the cost of capital constraints on climate-smart investment, support development of domestic disaster risk financing and insurance, support worker wage and re-skilling programs, and promote climate-sensitive fiscal policies and renewable energy resources. At the top of the agenda is to exceed the target of US$100 billion from developed economies in support of developing countries' climate action and to ensure a new target is set along with a shift away from debt as an instrument of finance. Additional goals are to work toward aligning development aid and concessional financing with climate resilience goals. Final targets are to ensure that climate risks are systematically integrated into international financial institutions and technical assistance mechanisms.[110]

As of 2020, the V20 decided to launch the CVF & V20 Joint Multi-Donor Fund to channel resources directly into the worst-affected communities with small-scale grants with development support from the Global Environment Facility's Small Grants Programme.

In 2022, the V20 delivered the first calculation of economic losses (as a percent of gross domestic product [GDP]) from climate change.[111] The conclusions of the V20 Loss Report (2000-2019) were intended to deliver the members evidence to present to global partners to underscore the urgency of mitigating climate change, to emphasize the need to scale up investments in adaptation, and to demand a mechanism to address loss and damage.[112]

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Geneva 1202
Switzerland
Email: c/o the V20 Secretariat:
secretariat@v-20.org

National Focal Points for PICTs

Fiji – Ministry of Economy
http://www.economy.gov.fj/

Kiribati – Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
http://www.mfed.gov.ki/

Marshall Islands – Ministry of Finance
http://rmi-mof.com/

Palau – Ministry of Finance
https://www.palaugov.pw/executive-branch/ministries/finance/

PNG – Department of Finance
https://www.finance.gov.pg/

Samoa – Ministry of Finance
https://www.mof.gov.ws/

Timor-Leste – Ministry of Finance
https://www.mof.gov.tl/?lang=en

Tonga
in-coming as of September 2023

Tuvalu – Ministry of Finance
https://mfed.tv/

Vanuatu – Ministry of Finance and Economic Management
https://doft.gov.vu/

Coalition of Atoll Nations on Climate Change

Formed in 2014 by the governments of Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Tokelau, and Tuvalu, the Coalition of Atoll Nations on Climate Change (CANCC) is intended to serve as an "Early Warning System" for the world to understand the threat climate change poses to development and security.[113] These countries view the importance of their role as ensuring that the world knows that what is happening to them will happen to the rest of the world. As such, their actions include amplifying atoll nations' concerns, sharing knowledge, catalyzing solutions and support, and securing diplomatic outcomes. Table 21 shows the membership of CANCC.[114]

At its founding, CANCC members pushed for binding commitments and agreements on targets at the global level to address climate change, and they sought protection and supplementation of their water resources, coastline protection, resilient infrastructure and sustainable development initiatives, raising the CANCC islands to heights above the predicted sea level rise, and strengthening their population's preparedness through education, workforce skills, communication, and public awareness.[115] It is a partner in the UNDP-adelphi-International Organization for Migration (IOM) project to develop a regional and national climate security risks assessment framework.[116]

Kiribati	Maldives	Marshall Islands (Republic of)
Tokelau (New Zealand territory)	Tuvalu	-

Table 21: CANCC Member Governments

Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law

Established on 31 October 2021 in accordance with the Agreement for the Establishment of the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (COSIS), members are Antigua and Barbuda, Niue, Palau, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu;[117] membership is open to all AOSIS members. The group's mandate is to promote and contribute to the definition, implementation, and progressive development of rules and principles of international law concerning climate change, including but not limited to the obligations of States relating to the protection and preservation of the marine environment and their responsibility for injuries arising from internationally wrongful acts in respect of the breach of such obligations. It seeks to assist small island developing states (SIDS) to promote and contribute to this mission with a focus on protection and preservation of the marine environment, including through international courts, generally by requesting advisory opinions from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on issues linked to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Antigua and Barbuda and Tuvalu were the two originating signatories, and Antigua and Barbuda deposited the agreement with the UN.[118]

In September 2023, Antigua and Barbuda and Tuvalu represented COSIS by presenting evidence to the ITLOS in a request for an advisory opinion framed upon the specific obligations states have under UNCLOS relating to Part XII of the Convention.[119] The advisory opinion (non-binding) would determine whether carbon emissions absorbed by the ocean should be considered marine pollution, and the opinion would detail what obligations emitters have and could guide national climate protection laws as they are being crafted. Table 22 shows the Pacific members of COSIS.[120]

Niue	Palau	Tuvalu	Vanuatu

Table 22: Pacific Members of COSIS

Global Green Growth Institute

GGGI is a treaty-based, international, inter-governmental organization, founded in 2012. As of 2022, it had 46 member-states, and membership is open to any UN member-state or regional integration organization. In Oceania/the Pacific, Australia is a member-state; Fiji, Kiribati, PNG, Tonga, and Vanuatu are member-states and host operations; Marhsall Islands, Nauru, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu are partner-states and host operations. Table 23 shows the GGGI Pacific region members, partners, and hosts.

GGGI delivers project development, catalyzes green investment (voluntary contributions from donors), and supplies technical assistance. It does this by employing 600+ staff members and consultants, 80% of whom are embedded with government ministries in member-states.[121] These staff members and consultants serve as advisors and partners who enable and facilitate members' transitions to low-carbon, green economies and provide policy advice and technical support for development of green growth plans, policies, and regulations and for mobilizing green investment, implementing projects, and developing local capacities,

Internal work is done across the following bodies:

- GGGI Assembly - composed of all GGGI members; meets annually to review progress; elects Council members and appoints a Director-General
- GGGI Council – executive level, led by the Chair; approves strategy, budget, admission of new members, and criteria for green growth planning and implementation programs
    - Chair: Ban Ki-Moon; Vice-Chairs: 2-year terms filled by country representatives
    - Council (2023): Côte d'Ivoire, Indonesia, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, H.E. Ban Ki-moon, H.E. Maria Kiwanuka, H.E. Boonam Shin, Dr. Pepukaye Bardouille, and the Director-General of GGGI
- GGGI Institute – headed by the Director-General, who represents GGGI externally and provides strategic leadership[122]

Donors or resource partners are divided into "Core" and "Earmarked," depending on the ways in which donated funds can be used. The Core partners are: the United Kingdom's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Denmark's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Norway's Ministry of Climate and Environment. Earmarked funding comes from UN agencies; national development agencies from across Europe, North America, the Middle East, and Asia; multi-national banks and financial institutions; and major philanthropic groups. In 2020, the New Zealand MFAT and GGGI signed a partnership to support Pacific country planning for low emissions, climate resilient futures via policies, plans, and investment roadmaps.[123]

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Australia	Fiji	Kiribati
Marshall Islands (Republic of)	Nauru	Niue
Palau	Papua New Guinea	Samoa
Solomon Islands	Tonga	Tuvalu
Vanuatu	-	

Table 23: GGGI Members, Partners, and Hosts

Kiwa Initiative

The Kiwa Initiative launched in 2020 with the goal of delivering easier access to climate change adaptation funding for nature-based solutions (NbS) for national and local authorities, civil society, international and local NGOs, and regional organizations in PICTs. As of 2023, the PICTs eligible for funding were Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, FSM, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tokelau, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Wallis and Futuna; they are shown in Table 24. Local projects can receive grants for €25,000-400,000 (US$27,000-430,000), and regional projects can receive grants for €1.5-5 million (US$1.61-5.4 million); the EU, France's AFD (managing donor), Canadian Government, Australian DFAT, and New Zealand MFAT are funding donors. Projects include technical assistance from SPC and SPREP for regional projects; local projects are managed by the International Union for Conservation of Nature, and regional projects (defined as include at least two eligible countries or territories), are overseen by AFD with Secretariat support.[124]

Funded projects include efforts in Micronesian fisheries coastal management, Fiji invasive species management, New Caledonia protection and restoration of coastal zones and safeguarding of seabird colonies, Tonga youth integration into conservation, Fiji mangrove restoration, Vanuatu tree planting and coral reef restoration, Samoa national park management, and Timor-Leste ecosystem restoration using customary law, among others.[125] Photo 4 shows mangroves at low tide at Viti Levu, Fiji.[126]

Leadership of the Initiative is overseen by AFD. The Steering Committee includes one representative each from Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia.

Secretariat/AFD Pacific Regional Office

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Photo 4: Mangrove at Viti Levu, Fiji, at Low Tide

Cook Islands	Fiji	French Polynesia (French Territory)
Kiribati	Marshall Islands (Republic of)	Micronesia (Federated States of)
Nauru	New Caledonia (French Territory)	Samoa
Solomon Islands	Timor-Leste	Tokelau (New Zealand territory)
Tuvalu	Wallis and Futuna (French territory)	-

Table 24: PICTs Eligible for Kiwa Initiative Funding

Local2030 Islands Network

Launched in 2019, the Local2030 Islands Network is a platform for island "economies" (i.e., nations, states, and communities) to develop and share locally-driven, culturally-informed climate change and sustainability solutions. Island states and countries with islands may join the Network, and inter-governmental organizations, NGOs, businesses, academe, and philanthropists can joint as partners. The co-secretariat is undertaken by the Hawaii-based Green Growth UN Local2030 Hub and the Global Island Partnership. They are, in turn, supported by a steering committee of senior leaders.[127] There are 20 members of the Network as of January 2024; Pacific member are shown in Table 25.[128]

Broadly, the Network provides and promotes virtual learning and opportunities through Communities of Practice, events, and webinars, and it facilitates support for SDG implementation. The Communities of Practice include any islands who want to participate in working on topics that underpin the Network's four principles – local goals, public-private partnerships, measuring progress, and concrete action. Key working Communities focus on clean energy, data, and tourism.[129]

Contact

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Honolulu, HI 96848
Email: *info@islands2030.org*

Fiji	Guam (U.S. territory)	Hawaii (U.S. State)
Marshall Islands (Republic of)	Palau	United States of America

Table 25: Local2030 Islands Network Pacific Members

Pacific Climate Change Centre

Hosted by SPREP, the Pacific Climate Change Centre (PCCC) is the regional center of excellence for climate change information, research, and innovation. The governments of Samoa and Japan committed to PCCC in 2015 at the 7th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM7). As the host country for SPREP, Samoa also hosts the PCCC. JICA provides funding through grant aid.[130] PCCC works across four themes: climate change science and services, CCA, climate change mitigation and low carbon futures, and climate finance.[131] The center aims to provide four primary functions:

- Knowledge brokerage: Building relationships between the producers and users of climate change knowledge so that Pacific Governments and other decision-makers receive timely, robust information in user-friendly formats.
- Applied research: The PCCC will host research projects that are designed to address specific research objectives and priorities identified in the region and which lead to practical outcomes for the Pacific.
- Capacity building through training and learning: The PCCC will be a one-stop shop for the improved coordination of climate change training and will help the region to more effectively learn from climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts to date.
- Supporting Innovation: The PCCC will support the development of innovative products and services which can increase resilience in the Pacific.[132]

Non-Government Organizations

Pacific Island NGOs range from hyper-local to international in their scope and membership. Many rely on local, island-based concepts of community and ecology to guide their work. While some have strong international donor relationships, others eschew those links in favor of community leadership and resources. Nonetheless, all have strong commitments to messaging the extent of the threat of climate change for the communities they serve, and they emphasize ensuring that all publics, regardless of where they are in the world, accept the need for action to reduce the losses and damage associated with climate change impacts.

350 Pacific / Pacific Climate Warriors

350 Pacific is an arm of 350.org, an international environmental organization. 350 Pacific supports frontline communities affected by the climate crisis throughout the Pacific and within diaspora communities in Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S.[133] The number one target for the Pacific Climate Warriors (PCW) is to halt the exploration, production, and use of fossil fuels,[134] and it seeks to encourage a move toward 100% community-owned renewable energy and to ensure climate justice. They plan and launch protests, marches, and workshops that target youth and their communities, and they participate in global conferences.[135] On a practical level, with Honnold Foundation support, eight PCW "Solar Scholars" dispersed 20 RE-Charge TekPaks, portable solar modules made for off-grid power allocation, to increase disaster resilience on 15 islands; each system can power three light bulbs and has three USB ports and an inverter for low-power applications; the project went hand-in-hand with 350's Solar Scholars training to educate communities on integrating renewable energy in disaster preparedness and emergency response and to empower graduates to train additional members of their community.[136]

PCW is organized based on the concept of a "fale," which means "house" in many regional languages. Within the "Fale," country teams support the foundation, the pillars (four groups in the Pacific and diaspora) hold up the beams, and the Secretariat (350.org Pacific staff) uphold administrative duties, guided by the Council of Elders. Figure 9 illustrates the PCW organizational fale and philosophy.[137]

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Figure 9: Pacific Climate Warriors "Fale" of Leadership and Work

Alliance for Future Generations

Based in Fiji, AFG is a collective of 500 youth from networks working towards a fairer, equitable, and more sustainable future.[138] AFG's work is structured around four thematic working groups, each led by a Focal Point Officer who drives the work and coordinates with members.

Contact:
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The Climate Reality Project

Launched in 2006 and hosted at the University of Melbourne, the Climate Reality Project for Australian and the Pacific is the regional arm of the international Climate Reality Project, founded by Al Gore and focused on ensuring that the truth of climate change and climate science is publicizes.

The Project's regional focus is on ensuring climate activists can connect climate change to peoples' lives, and it offers training and workshops.[139] It has trained more than 2,400 leaders in the region. However, only two are from the "Blue Pacific" (separate from Australia and PNG) – Dr. Murukesan Krishnapillai (College of Micronesia – FSM Campus, Climate Science – focus on CCA of displaced communities in small islands) and Talua Nivaga (Young Climate Leaders, Tuvalu; founder Fuligafou - New Transformation Youth-Led Association).[140]

In 2022, the Australia and the Pacific branch developed extensive briefing and messaging materials ahead of the COP27 in Egypt for use in presentations, and it supported an eight-session training course preparing Indigenous representatives from the Pacific to attend the COP and lobby effectively.[141]

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Climate Tok

Climate Tok is a Fijian NGO that, since 2019, has worked across the country's provinces to build relationships and consult with communities impacted or threatened by climate-induced displacement.[142] Climate Tok has convened community representatives to discuss loss and damage, and relocation issues. The first convening, in 2019, contributed to the first draft of Fiji's Relocation SOP, and the second, in 2022, resulted in the report, "Our Stories: A Report of the 2nd Community Representatives Convening on Climate-Forced Displacement and Relocation," and a call for audits of how displaced, maritime, and rural communities deal with climate change-induced displacement.[143]

Along with the "Our Stories" report, Climate Tok launched the video, "Climate-induced Loss, Damage and Relocation in Fiji," which allowed participants in Fiji's relocation standard operating procedure process to narrate their experiences. Photo 5 shows a still from the video from YouTube.[144]

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


Photo 5: Still from "Climate-Induced Loss," from YouTube

Pacific Conference of Churches

PCC has 33 member churches and 10 councils of churches in 18 countries and territories across the region. Members represent various Christian faith confessions and are mostly descendants of mission churches. Funding for the group comes from Bread for the World, Global Ministries, KAIROS, the Methodist Church in Britain, UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and UN Women. The heads of the PCC's member organizations meet to mandate the secretariat's work during a General Assembly every four years. The following bodies participate in leadership of PCC:

- The General Assembly appoints the Moderator, Deputy Moderator, and an executive committee (which must include women and young people), and elects the General Secretary
- The Executive Committee meets each year to consider the work of the Finance and Business Committee
- The annual Pacific Church Leaders Meeting falls outside of the PCC Constitution but allows an additional advisory and oversight layer to guide the work of the secretariat[145]

Member Churches: Anglican Church of Melanesia (Solomon Islands), Catholic Archdiocese of Tonga (Episcopal Conference of the Pacific; CEPAC), Catholic Bishops Conference of PNG and the Solomon Islands, Conference of Churches of Christ Vanuatu, Congregational Christian Church of Samoa: Ekalesia Fa' apotopotoga Kerisinao I Samoa, Congregational Church of American Samoa, Cook Islands Christian Church, Diocese of Polynesia (Anglican) (Samoa, Tonga, and Tikanga Pasefika [Fiji]), Eglise Protestante de Kanaky Nouvelle Caledonie: Protestant Church of Kanaky (New Caledonia), Ekalesia Kerisiano Niue, Ekalesia Kelisiano Tuvalu, Etaretia Porotetani Maohi (French Polynesia), Evangelical Lutheran Church of PNG, Fiji Council of Churches, Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga, Gereja Injili Di Indonesia: Evangelical Church of Indonesia, Gereja Kristen Injili di Tannah Papua: Evangelical Church in the Land of Papua, Kiribati National Council of Churches, Kiribati Uniting Church, Maori Council of Churches: Te Runanga Whakawhanaunga i Nga Hahi, Methodist Church in Fiji, Methodist Church in Samoa, Methodist Church of New Zealand (Te Haahi Weteriana o Aotearoa), Nauru Congregational Church, Niue Council of Churches, Nukuno Protestant Churches Association (FSM), PNG Council of Churches, Presbyterian Church in Aotearoa New Zealand, Presbyterian Church of Vanuatu, Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Honiara, Roman Catholic Diocese of Rarotonga (CEPAC), Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Suva (CEPAC), Roman Catholic Church (CEPAC) (French Polynesia), Roman Catholic Church (CEPAC) (Kiribati), Roman Catholic Diocese of Port Vila (CEPAC), Samoa Council of Churches, Solomon Islands Christian Association, St Andrews Presbyterian Church (Fiji), Tonga National Council of Churches, United Church of Christ in the Marshall Islands, United Church in the Solomon Islands, United Churches of Christ Pohnpei (FSM), United Church of Papua New Guinea, Uniting Church (Australia), and Vanuatu Christian Council[146]

In addition to its religious work, PCC accompanies regional church leaders to COP meetings to speak on climate change and helps governments relocate communities and design national relocation policies. PCC has entered a Carbon Sequestration program with Fiji's Ministry of Forests to plant a native forest as mitigation against increased carbon emissions, PCC staff members who travel overseas must plant two trees upon their return.[147]

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Pacific Elders Voice

The Pacific Elders Voice is an independent group of Pacific elder statesmen and -women who collectively seek to provide guidance and advice on policy to strengthen regional resilience.[148] The members emphasize that climate change is the most important threat to the region, and they advocate for Pacific people to have the key voice in developing strategies for the region, including multi-lateral security and military strategies. They strenuously demand that the world's largest economies meet targets for GHG emissions reductions.[149] In Photo 6, Pacific Elders Voice elder-statespersons participate in a panel at the Australian National University in September 2022; the photo is a screen capture from the Pacific Elders Voice (@PacifidElders) X account.[150]



Photo 6: @PacificElders X Account Shows Elders on Panel

Contact:

https://pacificelders.org/contact/

Pacific Island Students Fighting Climate Change

Founded in March 2019 by 26 USP (Vanuatu campus) students,[151] as of 2023, there were Pacific Island Students Fighting Climate Change (PISFCC) chapters on Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Tonga although members have represented all PICTs. PISFCC has sought PIF leaders' action to take climate change issues to the International Court of Justice (ICJ),[152] and additional work has focused on developing educational materials on social media, organizing and participating in regional panels, creating animated videos, information sheets, and briefs, and conducting talanoa (a process of inclusive, participatory and transparent dialogue) with youth organizations in the region.[153] PISFCC led the drive for a UN resolution to seek advisory opinion from ICJ clarifying nations' obligations to tackle climate change; Vanuatu eventually did successfully bring the motion before the UN General Assembly (UNGA), and an opinion is expected in 2024.[154]

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Pacific Islands Association of Non-Governmental Organisations

PIANGO is a regional network of NGO coordinating bodies (National Liaison Units; NLU) based in 25 PICTs. Its mission is to assist NGOs in the Pacific to initiate action, to give voice to their concerns, and to work collaboratively with other development actors for just and sustainable human development.[155] PIANGO partners with, among others, the PIF Secretariat, the EU, and Brot für die Welt.[156] Photo 7 is from PIANGO Regional Training on Project Management.[157]



Photo 7: PIANGO Runs Regional Training on Project Management

PIANGO NLUs

Marianas Alliance of Non-Governmental Organizations – MANGO
PO Box 500631 · Saipan, MP 96950-0631 · USA
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Civil Society Forum of Tonga – CSFT
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Hiti Tau – Tahiti
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Development Service Exchange – DSE
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Samoa Umbrella for Non-Governmental Organisation – SUNGO
P O Box 1886, Apia, Samoa
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Email: *ceo@sungo.ws*
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PNG Civil Society Organisation Forum – PNG CSOF
P.O. Box 7973, Boroko, NCD, Papua New Guinea

Niue Island (Umbrella) Association of NGOs – NIUANGO
P.O. Box 51, Kaimiti, Alofi, Niue
Tel: +683 4155
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Council for International Development – CID
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Unite Territoriale de Liaison Nationale en Kanaky – UTLN
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Marshall Islands Council of NGOs – MICNGOS
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Kiribati Association of Non-Governmental Organisation – KANGO
Tearaereke, South Tarawa, 678 Tarawa, Kiribati

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Fiji Council of Social Services – FCOSS
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Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) Alliance of NGOs – FANGO
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The Cook Islands Civil Society Organisations Inc. – CICSO
CICSO Ministry of Internal Affairs, P.O. Box 2064,
Rarotonga, Cook Islands

American Samoa Association of NGOs -ASANGO
PO Box 1788, Pagopago, American Samoa

Australian Council for International Development – ACFID
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https://acfid.asn.au/

- Members: American Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, FSM, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu; Interim Members: Bougainville (PNG), Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Palau, Wallis & Futuna; Observers: Hawaii, Timor-Leste, Tokelau, West Papua (Indonesia)[158]

Secretariat:
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Email: *info@piango.org*

Pacific Islands Climate Action Network

Founded in 2013, the Pacific Islands Climate Action Network (PICAN) is an informal network of 150 NGOs, CSOs, social movements, and non-profits[159] that work on climate change across PICTs. PICAN represents Pacific civil society at the international level via the Climate Action Network. PICAN's focus is on advocating for policies and actions at home and in driving non-Pacific governments to respond with more ambitious climate change policies and actions.[160]

PICAN is structured into Working Groups that integrate CSOs and NGOs with expertise – i.e., DIVA for Equality is the Chair of the Gender and Climate Justice Working Group.[161] As a network, it undertakes information and knowledge sharing, training and capacity-building, developing and sharing policy recommendations, regional and international meeting and conference development and participation, support to PICTs in international negotiations, and awareness. It operates via four national nodes: KiriCAN (Kiribati), TuCAN (Tuvalu), VCAN (Vanuatu), SICAN (Solomon Islands).[162]

Contact

Email: *canpacificislands@gmail.com*

United Nations Association

Founded in 2014 at USP Laucala (Suva, Fiji) as the Fiji Model UN Society, the group became United Nations Association (UNA) Fiji in 2019. It is an NGO focused on ensuring that Fijians understand the role of multilateralism within the UN in addressing global issues, especially within the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). The organization provides a framework for members and trainees (in its Diplomacy Programme) to undertake grassroots-level projects within Fiji; some recent projects have focused on improving community transport, Tonga volcano/tsunami relief, mangrove planting, and community clean-ups.[163] Overall addressing climate change and its impacts is a focus of action, and UNA Fiji participates in PICAN.[164] Indeed, its upfront mission is to create international consensus around the climate emergency and move toward a shared plan for saving the planet's most exceptional places.[165]

Leadership includes an Ambassador / Patron who acts as the organization's Chief Advisor: Amenatave V Yauvoli "Amena." He is joined by a Vice-Patron, Tregar Albon Ishoda. Both of these men are regional statesmen with high-level diplomatic postings within their respective governments.[166]

Contact

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Academic Networks and Alliances

Climate research spans the globe. The networks and alliances mentioned below are focused on the impacts of climate change within the Pacific region. In particular, scholarship is focused on NbS, community survival in displacement, energy and transportation, and equitable adaptations. The field of climate security is also developing among these scholars who will be a key constituency for future strategies and assessment frameworks.

Australian National University (ANU) Institute for Climate, Energy and Disaster Solutions (ICEDS)

ANU's ICEDS represents 600 climate, energy, and disaster risk researchers, including academics, visiting fellows, honorary members, and PhD students. Its mission is to advance innovative solutions to address climate change, energy system transitions, and disasters. It tackles this mission by facilitating integrated approaches to research, teaching, and policy engagement, and it leads the ANU Below Zero Initiative to reduce the University's GHG emissions to below zero.[167] ICEDS maintains MoUs with the various agencies, including the U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), the Italian Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic Development (ENEA), CIEMAT (the Spanish renewable energy agency), the Industrial Technology Research Institute of Taiwan (ITRI), and Ecole Polytechnique (Orsay) in France. In addition, ICEDS is a member of the Australia-Indonesia Centre (AIC) and the Australia-Germany Energy Transition Hub.[168]

ICEDS' External Advisory Committee has representation from Australia's Climate Change Authority; the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment, and Water; Australian Youth for International Climate Engagement; Investor Group on Climate Change; the National Emergency Management Agency; The Australian Industry Group (Ai Group); and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.[169]

Contacts: ANU Institute for Climate, Energy & Disaster Solutions

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The Australian National University
Acton, ACT, 2601
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Email: *iceds@anu.edu.au*
https://iceds.anu.edu.au/contacts/general-enquiries

Micronesian Center for Sustainable Transport (MCST)

Founded in 2017 under the MCST Framework, the MCST is intended to offer a forum for research, analysis, and implementation of practical projects. It is housed at USP "Long Island" Campus, Majuro, RMI, and its first projects are linked to RMI's NDC targets related to low carbon transport.[170] MCST works by integrating private sector initiatives for which MCST provides research and market analysis (e.g., Project Cerulean for a low-carbon powered commercially-operated freighter).[171]

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Pacific Climate Security Expert Network (PCSN)

The first meeting of PCSN was in December 2021. It was convened by the UNDP Pacific Office under the multi-country "Climate Security in the Pacific" Project. The network allows inclusive, cross-disciplinary information sharing and dialogue, collaboration, and expert advice on climate security risk management for the region.

Its role is to:

- Provide technical and policy advice
- Ensure activities align with global and regional initiatives
- Give guidance on increasing understanding of climate security[172]

Pacific Islands Climate Adaptation Science Center (PI-CASC)

The U.S. Department of the Interior established PI-CASC in 2011 as a collaborative partnership between the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, as the National CASC) and a university consortium hosted by the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, with the University of Hawai'i at Hilo and the University of Guam. As one of nine regional CASCs, it is designed to deliver science-based tools, techniques, and information for sustainability and climate adaptation programming across fish, water, wildlife, land, and human factors in communities across the Pacific.

Territory covered by PI-CASC span the ocean area from the Hawaiian archipelago to the U.S.-affiliated islands of the South Pacific (USAPI) (i.e., CNMI, American Sāmoa, Guam, the Pacific Remote Islands, and the Freely Associated States (FAS) – FSM, and Palau).[173]

Partnerships for PI-CASC span the U.S. Government (e.g., Fish and Wildlife, USGS, U.S. Forest Service, Park Service, and NOAA), Hawaii state and county offices and Hawaii-based NGOs, regional organizations (e.g., Conservation International, Nature Conservancy, and Pacific Fire Exchange), Guam government departments and offices, and USAPI government, academic, and civil society groups.[174]

Various academic programs and leadership fellowships at the three universities deliver scientists, managers, and educators to Pacific Island governments, schools, and communities.[175] Moreover, PI-CASC cultivates communities of practice, including with practitioners in Alaska, reef and invasive species managers, and sea level rise and drought experts.[176]

Sea Grant College Program (Hawai'i Sea Grant) School of Ocean and Earth Science and Technology (SOEST)
University of Hawai'i at Mānoa
2525 Correa Road, HIG 238
Honolulu, Hawai'i 96822

UH Hilo
200 W. Kawili St.
Hilo, HI 96720

University of Guam
Micronesian Area Research Center
UOG station
Mangilao, GU 96923

Pacific Islands Universities Research Network (PIURN)

The PIURN seeks to deliver collaborative research, training for graduate and doctoral students, links among academe, industry, government, and society, and storing documentation of research as part of PIF's 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent "education, research, and training" pillar.[177] There are 15 PICT universities who collaborate on research via PIURN. They include: Christ's University in Pacific (Tonga), Divine Word University (PNG), Fiji National University, National University of Samoa, National University of Vanuatu, Pacific Adventist University (PNG), Papua New Guinea University of Natural Resources and Environment, Papua New Guinea University of Technology, Solomon Islands National University, University of Fiji, University of French Polynesia, University of Goroka (PNG), University of New Caledonia (UNC), University of Papua New Guinea, and the USP.[178] The Co-Chairs are the USP Vice-Chancellor and UNC President; the Secretariat is based at USP, Fiji; the PIURN board is made up of Vice-Chancellors of member-universities.[179]

PIURN promotes four strategic research themes: Food Security and Nutrition, and Health and Non-Communicable Diseases; Climate Change and Biodiversity, including Land Degradation; Capacity Building, and Data and Statistics; and Social Development, Gender Equality, and Education.[180] PIURN calls for research project proposals annually and facilitates those projects with the lead of one member university in collaboration with supporting universities and external partners.[181]

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Email: *info@piurn.org*

University of Auckland Centre for Asia Pacific Refugee Studies (CAPRS)

The University of Auckland CAPRS brings together academics, people from refugee communities, government, civil society, and the private sector to collaborate on projects on current and future forced displacement situations.[182]

Key research projects within CAPRS include:

- "Building a Responsive Research Infrastructure for Climate and Conflict Induced Displacement in the Asia Pacific" - seeks to seed projects in the Pacific and integrate untapped large data sets (in New Zealand) to inform best practice and policy solutions related to forced migration; includes masters scholarships for Pacific students to conduct research on climate change displacement
- "Developing a Guiding Framework for Engaging Pacific Populations in Disaster Risk" - focuses on disaster communications with various refugee background communities through capacity building with refugee background research assistants
- "International Climate Migration and Climatic Poverty (INTERCEPT)" - brings together experts from economics, development studies, and information science in Germany and New Zealand to examine the role of climatic changes in triggering the decision of individuals, families, and communities to migrate within and across countries
- "Climate-Induced Migration: Global Scope, Regional Impacts and National Policy Frameworks" - provides holistic interdisciplinary expertise on climate-induced migration; will contribute to understanding when, where, how, and at what scale climate-induced migration takes place in different world regions[183]

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)

The NTS Centre conducts research and analysis, facilitates discussions, engages policymakers, and builds awareness and capacity to address challenges in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. It hosts workshops and roundtables and provides a networking platform for NTS research institutions through the NTS-Asia Consortium, which the NTS Centre leads and coordinates.[184]

- The NTS-Asia Consortium is a network of 30 think tanks and research organizations that builds the NTS scholar network, builds research capacity, mainstreams the NTS field, and collates a regional database of NTS publications and resources
- It holds annual meetings, conferences, and roundtables augmented by constant virtual presence[185]

NTS examines issues that are "challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise from non-military sources, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crime."[186]

- Climate Security Research Program
  - Falls under NTS Centre's "Sustainable Security" program, which examines slow onset scenarios with long-term impacts such as climate, food, and economic security
  - The Climate Security stream focuses on Planetary Health and Climate Change Adaptation
    - Planetary Health - examines economic and development progress as the cause of environmental degradation; advocates for systems-level and cross-sectoral interventions that are aimed towards nature protection and conservation
    - Climate Change Adaptation - audits CCA and DRR policies at national level across the region; Compares frameworks for climate change cooperation across regions; examines regional cooperation mechanisms for climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts; analyzes regional climate change cooperation on transportation, energy, and cities; and examines north-south and south-south cooperation for climate mitigation and adaptation measures in the region[187]

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Singapore 639798
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/nts-centre/

The University of the South Pacific

The USP was chartered by the British monarchy in 1970 with the following member-countries - Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tuvalu, Tonga, and Vanuatu. The Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (or his/her representative) sits on the USP Council.[188] There are 14 campuses across member-states.[189] The USP delivers education, training, and policy advice to address new and emerging opportunities and challenges; as a member of CROP, it has a role in finding solutions to development issues that are encountered at the regional and national levels.[190] In its role as a regional integration organization, the USP's work is coordinated by the Regional and International Engagement Unit and its Development Cooperation Coordinator, which is also responsible for the coordination and management of the USP's relationship with other CROP agencies and for ensuring the USP's engagement with the region, international agencies, and development partners, including PIF Secretariat.[191]

Two of the university's Strategic Research Themes bear directly on the USP's role as a hub for research that informs policy:

- Theme 1: Sustainable, Inclusive, and Equitable Economies – Key projects: "Climate Change, Mental Health, and Wellbeing in the Pacific Islands: Frontier Conversations about Trauma, Culture, Resistance, Resilience, and Restoration"; "Sustainable and Resilient Communities – Technology and Tradition Development of a Geospatial Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for sustainability strategies and enhanced community resilience in Fiji"
- Theme 2: Oceans, Ecosystems, and Climate Resilience – Key projects: strengthening the inter-relationship between traditional knowledge and modern science and building a better understanding of the social contexts, impacts, and resilience to the challenges that the region faces; using digital literacy to curate rural women's lived experiences of education and learning; and establishing a Pacific-wide reef fish tissue bank for elucidating regional population[192]

The Pacific Centre for Environment and Sustainable Development (PaCE-SD) falls the under the USP's Deputy Vice-Chancellor for Research and International. Projects are managed individually - e.g., USP-European Union Global Climate Change Alliance (USP EUGCCA), European Union Pacific Technical and Vocational Education and Training on Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Adaptation (PaCTVET), Food Security, Peace Corps, etc.

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Tel: +679 32 32897
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PaCE-SD opened in response to the region's need for further research into the environment to empower the people of the Pacific to adapt to the impacts of climate change and pursue sustainable development. It collaborates with university stakeholders; national, regional, and international development partners; and regional governments. The USP's PaCE-SD confers a Post Graduate Diploma (PGDip), Master of Science (MSc), or Doctorate (PhD) in climate change. It also conducts integrated studies of climate change and sustainable development, promotes science-policy interactions and project level involvement among governments, regional partners, and the USP, enhances local knowledge systems and community-based utilization of natural resources towards culturally appropriate climate adaption and sustainable development pathways, and facilitates Pacific Island Countries' use of USP knowledge and expertise in issues of climate change, environment, sustainable development, and resource management.[193]

Under PaCE-SD's community resource tools are mapping, planning, and vulnerability assessment guides and handbooks, links to

regional weather and climate scientific agencies, project reports, and factsheets.[194]

- The Community Mapping and Quantum GIS (QGIS) climate and disaster risk mapping toolkit for local communities is one of the projects coming out of PaCE-SD's EUGCCA project intended for community members (CSOs, students, government, businesses, etc.) to:
  - be able to identify and understand risks and vulnerabilities
  - gain the skills and knowledge to collect data of their own environment and create a geodatabase of resources
  - create hand drawn maps of all assets and infrastructures, areas at risk, risks, and vulnerabilities in their communities
  - transfer collected data onto a desktop and use the QGIS software to highlight issues
  - keep their knowledge within their communities, and
  - use the maps and collected data to present to local governments, NGOs, or donors to seek assistance[195]

The USP's version of "Climate Change Snakes and Ladders" was published in 2019 and, like other versions, targets young people not only to familiarize them with various hazards, vulnerabilities, and coping capacities, but to encourage them to play with their families to ensure all are learning about these issues. Figure 10 shows the "Climate Change Snakes and Ladders" game board.[196]



Figure 10: USP PaCE-SD's Climate Change Snakes and Ladders Board

National Focal Point Office Contacts

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Australia				
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Cook Islands				
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Ministry of Environment, Government of French Polynesia	Éliane TEVAHITUA	Bâtiment de la Culture, face au CESEC, 1er et 2ème étage, BP 25 51 – 98713	+(689) 40 80 30 00	secretariat.vp@gouvernement.pf
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GoV	Iautu, Florence – Acting Strategic Manager	P.M.B. 063 George Pompidou Building Port Vila	(678)2 5301 or (678)2 3565	piccap@vanuatu.com.vu
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PART II

The Blue Pacific Continent

> *"We should not be defined by the smallness of our islands, but by the greatness of our oceans. We are the sea, we are the ocean. Oceania is us. We must wake up to this ancient truth and together overturn all hegemonic views that aim ultimately to confine us again, physically and psychologically. It is time to create things for ourselves, to create established standards of excellence that match those of our ancestors."*[532]
>
> -Epeli Hau'ofa, Pacific scholar, University of the South Pacific

Regional Overview

The Pacific as a region has historically been conceived by European powers as the Pacific Islands, the South Seas, the South-West Pacific, or the South Pacific. In a 1993 essay, "Our Sea of Islands," Pacific scholar Epeli Hau'ofa reconceptualized the region as Oceania, as communities connected rather than separated by the sea.[197] Epeli's vision underpins the conceptualization of the Blue Pacific Continent.[198] In 2022, the PIF, the region's preeminent political body, endorsed the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent (2050 Strategy),[199] developed through an extensive consultative process with Pacific communities. The 2050 Strategy sets out a vision of a "resilient Pacific Region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity, that ensures all Pacific peoples can lead free, healthy and productive lives."[200]

This Blue Pacific Continent is home to more than two dozen states and territories. The history of colonialism has shaped the different forms of statehood in the region.[201] Australia, Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, PNG, RMI, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu are independent states.[202] The region is also home to one U.S. State (Hawaii) and eight self-governing territories: American Samoa, Guam, and Northern Mariana Islands (U.S. territories); French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna (French territories); Pitcairn (United Kingdom territory); and Tokelau (New Zealand territory).[203] Among the states listed here are the 18 members of the PIF, the region's preeminent political and economic policy organization: Australia, Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, PNG, RMI, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.[204] Figure 11 shows a map of the "Blue Pacific Continent," as found in the PIF's 2050 Strategy.[205]

The Blue Pacific Continent is home to an estimated 12 million people (excluding Australia, New Zealand, and Hawaii).[206] The most populous country is PNG with an estimated 9 million people.[207] The least populous is Pitcairn Island with an estimated 50 people.[208] Kiribati, FSM, and PNG have some of the world's largest Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), an area of ocean, generally extending 200 nautical miles beyond a country's territorial sea.[209] Table 26 summarizes the population estimates, sub-regions, and capital cities of some of the states and territories of the Blue Pacific.

Island States and Territories Associated with Other Countries

Realm of New Zealand

Niue and the Cook Islands are independent, self-governing states in free association with New Zealand. They are considered part of the Realm of New Zealand under the British Commonwealth. These arrangements are symbolic, and each state manages their own affairs. Under the Niue Constitution Act of 1974, New Zealand provides necessary economic and administrative assistance to Niue, as well




Figure 11: Map of the Blue Continent

State or Territory	Population (Est. 2022)	Sub-Region	Capital
American Samoa (U.S. territory)	57,085	Polynesia	Pago Pago
Cook Islands	15,406	Polynesia	Avarua
Federated State of Micronesia	105,987	Micronesia	Palikir
Fiji	901,603	Melanesia	Suva
French Polynesia (French territory)	280,855	Polynesia	Papeete
Guam (U.S. territory)	179,900	Micronesia	Hagåtña
Kiribati	122,735	Micronesia	Tarawa
Northern Mariana Islands (U.S. territory)	58,986	Micronesia	Saipan
Marshall Islands (Republic of)	54,446	Micronesia	Majuro
Nauru	11,928	Micronesia	Yaren
New Caledonia (French territory)	274,330	Melanesia	Nouméa
Niue	15,32	Polynesia	Alofi
Palau	17,976	Micronesia	Melekeok
Papua New Guinea	9,311,874	Melanesia	Port Moresby
Pitcairn (United Kingdom territory)	50	Polynesia	Adamstown
Samoa	200,999	Polynesia	Apia
Solomon Islands	744,407	Melanesia	Honiara
Tokelau (New Zealand territory)	1,497	Polynesia	No official capital
Tonga	99,283	Polynesia	Nuku'alofa
Tuvalu	10,788	Polynesia	Funafuti
Vanuatu	307,941	Polynesia	Port-Vila
Wallis and Futuna (French territory)	11,302	Polynesia	Mata Utu
TOTAL	**11,659,576**		

Table 26: Pacific Islands' and Territories' Population Estimates, Regions, and Capital Cities

as assistance with foreign affairs, defense, and security, if requested by the Niue government.[210] The principles of the New Zealand–Cook Islands partnership are set out in the Joint Centenary Declaration, as signed by the Prime Ministers of both countries in 2001.[211] Nationals of Niue and Cook Islands are New Zealand citizens. Tokelau is a territory of New Zealand and part of the New Zealand Realm, and its residents are citizens of New Zealand.[212]

States in Free Association with the U.S.

FSM, RMI, and Palau each have a bilateral Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the U.S.; they are, therefore, also referred to as "Freely Associated States" (FAS). In the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. administered the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) from 1947 to 1986; TTPI included the FSM, RMI, and Palau, as well as the Northern Mariana Islands.[213] FSM and RMI became independent in 1979 and 1986, respectively. Palau became independent in 1994. Following independence, each of the three countries entered bilateral COFAs with the U.S. The U.S. Department of the Interior Office of Insular Affairs overseas Compact-related financial assistance. Each FAS receives whole-of-government assistance from the U.S. in return for the U.S. receiving the exclusive right to maintain defense assets in the territorial lands and waters of these island nations. Among the facets of the COFA with RMI are details of the Marshall Islands' hosting the U.S. Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll, including the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, a key component of the U.S. missile defense network. The COFAs are renewed periodically. COFA-related agreements between the U.S. and FSM and the U.S. and Palau were signed in May 2023; these agreements renewed the commitments for 20 years.[214] A 20-year agreement between the U.S. and the Marshall Islands was signed in October 2023[215] and sent to the U.S. Congress in December 2023; however, as of the writing of this handbook, the renewal had not been ratified by the U.S. Congress.

U.S. Territories and Commonwealth States

Guam became a U.S. territory in 1898. The Guam Organic Act of 1950 conferred U.S. citizenship on Guamanians and established the territory's government.[216] American Samoa became a U.S. territory by deed of cession, starting in 1900. The matai (local chiefs) of Tutuila, the largest island in American Samoa, ceded the island to the U.S. in 1900. The Manu'a island group followed in 1904. Swain Island joined the territory in 1925 by an act of the U.S. Congress. Authority over American Samoa was initially placed with the U.S. Navy, which oversaw the territory until 1951. Authority was transferred to the U.S. Department of the Interior in 1956, and this structure endures.[217]

Through its administration of the TTPI, the U.S. entered a Covenant with the CNMI in 1975. The Covenant recognized CNMI as a self-governing Commonwealth in political union with and under the sovereignty of the U.S.[218]

U.S. State of Hawaii

Hawaii is a U.S. State. In 1898, Hawaii was annexed to the U.S. through a U.S. congressional resolution known as the "Newlands Resolution." In 1959, after a popular referendum, Hawaii became a state under the U.S. federal government. The Hawaii State Constitution, effective since 1959, provides that English and Hawaiian are the state's official languages.[219]

French Overseas Territories

French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna are the inhabited overseas territories of France in the Pacific; they are administered under the Ministry of Overseas Territories.[220] The defense of the territories is the responsibility of the French Armed Forces in Polynesia and New Caledonia, which, together, have some 2,900 troops permanently stationed in the Pacific.[221]

United Kingdom Territory

The Pitcairn Islands, with a population of approximately 50 people, is an overseas territory of the UK. The island was settled by mutineers of the HMS Bounty in 1790, when the island was considered uninhabited.

Climate Crisis in the Blue Pacific Continent

In 2018, through the landmark Boe Declaration on Regional Security, PIF Leaders defined climate change as the "single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific."[222] The Boe Declaration underpins longstanding statements by PIF Leaders who are calling global attention to the threat of climate change; these statements include the Kainaki II Declaration (2019), Port Moresby Declaration (2015), Niue Declaration (2008), Biketawa Declaration (2000), Aitutaki Declaration (1997), and Honiara Declaration (1992). The Boe Declaration was a watershed moment for the region as it expanded the concept of security for the first time to encapsulate non-traditional security areas including human security, humanitarian assistance, environmental security, and disasters and climate change.[223]

Pacific Island countries engage in international climate change action as part of a group of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), a UN-designated grouping of the world's small island states that face unique social, economic, and environmental vulnerabilities.[224] SIDS have contributed the least to global GHG emissions but are the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.[225]

SIDS are represented by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) at the UNFCCC COP meetings. AOSIS was established in 1990 to represent the interests of SIDS in international climate change and sustainable development negotiations and processes.[226] AOSIS has proven to be a strong negotiating group within the UNFCCC and has been instrumental in shaping the outcomes of the 23rd COP in Bonn, Germany, in 2017 and the Paris Agreement. AOSIS work has helped ensure a strong focus on SIDS in the context of the Agreement.[227] AOSIS selects the SIDS Board Member to the Green Climate Fund (GCF).[228]

Most SIDS are also members of the G-77. The G-77 Group + China is the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries within the UN. It is a means for the countries of the Global South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the UN system and promote South-South cooperation for development.[229]

The Synthesis Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report notes already widespread and rapid change in the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere, and biosphere and consequent adverse loss and damage to nature and people. Global mean sea level increased by 20 centimeters (cm; 7.9 inches) between 1901 and 2018 with more recent decades showing greater acceleration in mean rise. Meanwhile, hundreds of species have been lost, driven by increases in the magnitude of heat extremes on land and in the ocean. In all regions, increases in extreme heat events have resulted in human mortality and morbidity. The occurrence of climate-related food-borne and water-borne diseases and the incidence of vector-borne diseases have increased. Climate and weather extremes are increasingly driving displacement, with Pacific SIDS among those states being disproportionately affected relative to their small population size.

The Synthesis Report also found that continued GHG emissions will lead to increasing global warming. Every increment of global warming will intensify multiple and concurrent hazards. Global warming will continue to increase in the near term (2021–2040). Longer-term assessments depend heavily on the GHG emissions scenario used in modelling with warming for the period 2081–2100 ranging from 1.4°C (2.5°F) for a very low GHG emissions scenario to 2.7°C (4.9°F) for an intermediate scenario and 4.4°C (7.9°F) for a very high emissions scenario. Continued global warming is projected to intensify the global water cycle, including variability, global monsoon precipitation, and very wet and very dry weather and climate events. Projected changes also include further global mean sea level rise

and increased ocean acidification. Compound heatwaves and droughts are projected to become more frequent, tropical and extratropical storms are expected to intensify, and periods of fire weather will be more common.[230]

Pacific SIDS are especially vulnerable to the effects of ocean warming. The "Blue Pacific Continent" is 98% ocean and 2% land.[231] Compared to larger landmasses, many climate change-driven impacts and risks are amplified for small islands due to their being surrounded by ocean, comparatively small land areas, and remoteness.[232] According to the WMO, sea level rise in the Southwest Pacific is higher than the global mean and reaches 4 millimeters (mm; 0.15 inches) per year in several areas.[233] The IPCC Sixth Assessment Report finds that over the near-term (2021-2040), sea level rise that impacts the Pacific SIDS will range 0-20 cm (0-7.9 inches) over the 1995-2014 baseline across all emissions scenarios. The rise will escalate significantly over the long-term (2081-2100) to a range of 20-120 cm (7.9-47.2 inches) depending on emissions scenario, but all models project a rise of at least 20 cm (7.9 inches) by the end of the century.[234] The IPCC also notes a trend of increasing daily mean temperatures in the Western Pacific of 0.14°C (0.25°F) per decade during the period 1951-2015. The projected rise for the Pacific SIDS by the year 2100 is 1-2°C (1.8-3.6°F) based on mid-range emissions scenarios and 2-4°C (3.6-7.2°F) based on worst-case emissions scenarios.[235]

Based on the USGCRP Fifth National Climate Assessment, as delivered to the U.S. Congress in 2023, Figure 12 illustrates some potential climate indicators and impacts for Pacific Island environments and communities, both on high volcanic islands and atolls, in terms of sea surface temperature, sea level, and tropical cyclone intensity.[236]

In July 2023, the PIF released the Pacific Climate Security Assessment Guide, which outlines the above risk pathways or trends. The guide's development was supported by the Climate Security in the Pacific Project, funded by the UN Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and implemented by the UNDP, the IOM, and Adelphi, in partnership with PIF Secretariat and national governments of Kiribati, RMI, and Tuvalu.[237]

Threats to the Blue Economy

Climate change will affect subsistence economies and the incomes of an estimated 75% or more of Pacific Islanders. In remote communities, the risk could hang over 100% of people. Commercial fisheries, a major source of revenue for Pacific Island governments, are increasingly under strain. Coastal fisheries, upon which many Pacific Islanders depend for sustenance and livelihoods, are also under threat. Natural disasters across the region are impacting tourism and threatening an income stream that showed promise prior to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.[238]

Land, food, water, and health security

On average, 80-90% of lands in Pacific Islands are customarily held, a status that offers both opportunities and barriers for land management. Tensions over land scarcity are rising, especially within family units.[239]

Food insecurity continues to intensify due to climatic and other natural disasters, population growth, urbanization, and poor economic conditions. Food imports due to climate stress are contributing to vulnerability through negative health impacts and increased exposure to volatility in food supply and costs.[240]

Water stress is pronounced in atoll states that are forced to rely almost exclusively on rainwater catchment systems. Only approximately 20% of people have access to piped water across the region, and those people without piped-water access disproportionately represent low-income groups.[241]

Disaster Risk

A 2022 UNESCAP report described the disaster risk landscape for Pacific Island countries as "being reshaped by cascading and converging hazards under a new disaster-climate-health nexus and increasing vulnerability




Figure 12: Climate Change Indicators and Impacts

of populations to cascading hazards."[242] The region is often ranked amongst the most disaster-impacted regions in the world due to the number of people affected by disasters per capita. The region also suffers high economic losses and costs associated with disasters. Annual economic losses due to climate-induced disasters are estimated to be US$1.075 billion or 5% of the combined GDP of Pacific SIDS. Losses are especially high for Palau, Tonga, and Vanuatu with average annual losses (AAL) valued at 11.98%, 19.20%, and 20.67% of national GDP, respectively.[243]

The PIF-endorsed FRDP is the overarching regional framework for climate change and disaster risk management, providing high-level voluntary strategic guidance to different stakeholder groups.[244] The FRDP is implemented through the PRP Taskforce. The SPC, SPREP, and PIF Secretariat provide secretariat support for the PRP Taskforce.[245]

Climate and mobility

Climate change is exacerbating the drivers of mobility in the region; these drivers include livelihood, food, and water insecurity. Most mobility is internal migration to urban areas, and this movement puts further pressure on land and water resources, public services, and employment opportunities. On average, 23% of the region is urbanized, although there are vast differences between countries and territories. Nauru and RMI have 100% and 78% urbanization, respectively, while only 13.5% of the population in PNG lives in urban areas.[246]

In November 2023, PIF Leaders endorsed the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility.[247] The framework will guide governments, communities, non-state actors, and partners in ensuring a rights-based and people-centered movement in the context of climate change. The framework emphasizes staying in place, planned relocation, migration, and displacement through a proactive, inclusive, and collaborative regional approach that "reflects common Pacific interests in a culturally appropriate manner, while respecting national sovereignty and diversity."[248] The framework development was supported by the Pacific Climate Change Migration and Human Security (PCCMHS) Programme conducted by the IOM, UNESCAP, International Labour Organization, and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, together with PIF Secretariat and the Platform on Disaster Displacement.[249]

At the national-level, Tuvalu has spearheaded a novel climate mobility arrangement with Australia in a bilateral treaty signed in November 2023. The treaty, known as the "Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union," will allow up to 280 Tuvaluans to resettle in Australia through a special mobility pathway.[250] The arrangement is the first climate mobility-focused arrangement for the region. Typically, migration arrangements with Australia have been tied to labor mobility.[251] The Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility could spur other climate mobility arrangements like the Tuvalu-Australia agreement.[252]

Maritime boundaries and state sovereignty

Climate change and sea level rise can alter the seemingly permanent marine features (e.g., low elevation reefs, islands, and sand banks) that define maritime zones for Pacific Island states. Pacific Islands face the risk of losing territory, with lowest-lying atolls facing the risk of complete inundation. The implications under international law of the inundation of national territories of small-island and low-lying states, as well as their depopulation, are the subject of considerable debate and concern for Pacific Islands.[253] In acknowledging the risk, PIF Leaders in 2021 adopted a Declaration on Preserving Maritime Zones in the Face of Climate Change-related Sea Level Rise. Pacific leaders proclaimed, "our maritime zones, as established and notified to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with UNCLOS, and the rights and entitlements that flow from them, shall continue to apply, without reduction, notwithstanding any physical changes connected to climate change-related sea-level rise."[254]

Pacific Islands are pushing for greater global

attention to the risk to their statehoods, cultures, and heritages due to climate change. The Global Center for Climate Mobility is enabling the Rising Nations Initiative, a UN Member States-led initiative supporting the Pacific countries' efforts to preserve their sovereignty, protect their statehood, and safeguard the rights and heritage of affected populations in the face of the existential threats posed by climate change.[255]

Climate Change Action in the Blue Pacific Continent

Parties to the Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC are required to prepare and submit an NDC to the UNFCCC Secretariat and to update it every five years. The NDC is a non-binding climate action plan to cut emissions and to adapt to climate impacts.[256] The UNFCCC also provides for a national adaptation plan (NAP) process for least developed countries (LDC) and other developing countries.[257] The list of LDCs is managed by the UN Economic and Social Council, and listing entitles countries to preferential market access, aid, special technical assistance, and capacity-building on technology among other concessions.[258] The national adaptation planning process helps states to reduce their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change by building adaptive capacity and resilience and to facilitate the integration of climate change adaptation into relevant new and existing policies, programs, and activities, in all relevant sectors.[259] Currently, LDCs in Oceania are Kiribati, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. Samoa and Vanuatu graduated from the LDC designation in 2014 and 2020, respectively.

All Pacific Island countries have submitted their NDC to the UNFCCC Secretariat.[260] Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu have National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) as designated LDCs (although Samoa graduated from this status in 2014 and Vanuatu in 2020, respectively).[261] Fiji, PNG, and Tonga have finalized and published their NAPs. Other Pacific Island countries are developing their NAPs or have provided for adaptation in other climate or disaster-related planning documents.[262] Table 27 summarizes Pacific Island countries' NDC submissions, NAP publication, NIIP development, climate policies and plans, and SIDS or LDC designations.[263]

At the regional level, the Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change (PACC) Programme implemented by SPREP is the first major climate change adaptation initiative in the Pacific region. PACC began in 2009 and pre-dates the Paris Agreement. PACC takes two approaches: 1) working to enhance adaptive capacity on the ground, and 2) supporting the mainstreaming of climate risks into national development planning and activities. PACC works with 14 Pacific Island countries in three key climate-sensitive areas: coastal zone management, food security and food production, and water resources management. Each country is hosting a pilot project in one of these theme areas to demonstrate how climate change adaptation can work on the ground.[264]

In 2016, the FRDP was endorsed by the PIF as the overarching regional framework for climate change and disaster risk management.[265] The FRDP has three goals: 1) strengthen integration of adaptation and risk reduction, 2) low carbon development, 3) strengthen disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. The multi-stakeholder PRP is supporting implementation of the FRDP. The PRP Taskforce is comprised of state members, civil society, and private sector members. PIF Secretariat, SPREP, and SPC provide secretariat support to the PRP.[266] Efforts are stakeholder-driven and based on an annual work plan and leaders' priorities.

Climate finance underpins national-level climate adaptation action in the Pacific Islands. Pacific Island countries are accessing climate finance through bilateral donors, multilateral development banks, and multilateral climate funds as discussed further later in this document. A 2021 assessment by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) found that financing has fallen short of annual estimated adaptation needs. Without additional grant-based access to climate finance, Pacific Island countries will face severe challenges in meeting the cost of climate adaptation. A detailed discussion of climate

Country/Territory	NDC Submitted	NAP Published	NIIP	Other Climate Policies/Plans	SIDS and LDCs designation
American Samoa (U.S. territory)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Cook Islands	First NDC submitted 2016	None	2015; updated 2021	Climate Change Policy 2018-28 and the Cook Islands Climate Change Country Programme 2018-2030, Joint National Action Plan (JNAP) for Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation 2012	SIDS
Federated State of Micronesia	Updated NDC submitted in 2022	Readiness Proposal for NAP Development submitted to GCF 2022, re-submitted 2023	N/A	Climate Change Act 2013	SIDS
Fiji	Updated NDC submitted in 2020	December 2018	2023-2034	National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) 2018	SIDS
French Polynesia (French territory)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	SIDS
Guam (U.S. territory)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Kiribati	Enhanced NDC submitted in 2023	January 2020	2022-2032	National Framework for Climate Change and Climate Change Adaptation (NFCCCCA) 2013; National Disaster Risk Management Plan (NDRMP) 2012	SIDS, LDC
Northern Mariana Islands (U.S. territory)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Marshall Islands (Republic of)	Updated Second NDC submitted in 2020	NAP process commenced in 2019	N/A	2050 Climate Strategy of 2018	SIDS
Nauru	Updated First NDC submitted 2021	RONAdapt to be updated to become NAP through Readiness Proposal submitted to GCF in 2022	2011; updated by Nauru Economic Infrastructure Strategy and Investment Plan 2019	Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management Framework (RONAdapt) 2015	SIDS
New Caledonia (French territory)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Niue	First NDC submitted in 2016	None	Transport Strategy and Short-term Action Plan 2017-2026	Climate Change Policy 2009; Joint National Action Plan (JNAP) for Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management 2012	SIDS
Palau	First NDC submitted in 2016	Readiness Proposal to prepare NAP submitted to GCF in 2022	2021-2030	Palau Climate Change Policy (PCCP) 2015	SIDS
Papua New Guinea	Second NDC submitted in 2020	May 2023	N/A	Climate Change Management Act 2015, Amendment 2022	SIDS
Pitcairn (United Kingdom territory)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	SIDS
Samoa	Second NDC submitted in 2021	NAPA 2005	N/A	Samoa Climate Change Policy 2020; NAPA 2005; National Policy on Combating Climate Change (NPCCC) 2007	SIDS
Solomon Islands	Updated First NDC submitted in 2021	NAPA 2008	2013; Priority Infrastructure Investment Pipeline 2021	Solomon Islands National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) 2023-2032 (2023); Long Term Low Emission Development Strategy (LT- LEDS)(2023)	SIDS, LDC
Tokelau (New Zealand territory)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Tonga	Second NDC submitted in 2020	Published 2021	2010; 2013-2023; 2021-2030; and post-volcano/ tsunami update	Tonga Climate Change Policy - A Resilient Tonga by 2035 (2016)	SIDS
Tuvalu	Updated First NDC submitted in 2022	NAPA 2007	Priority Infrastructure Investment Plan 2020-2025	National Climate Change Policy 2021-2030 (2021)	SIDS, LDC
Vanuatu	Revised and enhanced NDC submitted in 2022	NAPA 2007	Infrastructure Strategic investment Plan 2015-2024	Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy 2016–2030 (2015)	SIDS
Wallis and Futuna (French territory)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 27: Pacific Islands' NDC Submissions, NIIPs, NAP Preparation, and Climate Plans

finance to Pacific Islands is included further in the report.

Relatedly, the lack of credible scientific data of climate change in Pacific nations is a hurdle for states when developing proposals for climate financing in terms of designing a climate rationale and justifying adaptation assistance.[267] The PMC, a subsidiary of SPREP, facilitates and coordinates the scientific and technical programs and activities of the Regional Meteorological Services. The PMC's WRP program seeks to address the need for localized scientific information.

Climate Change Frameworks and Assessments

By and large, the UNFCCC is the overarching global framework to which regional strategies and policies point. The overarching Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent 2050, launched by PIF in 2022, sets the goals for overall sustainable development and was presaged by the Boe Declaration on Regional Security (2018), which elaborated an understanding of climate change as the region's top security threat. Finally, the FRDP advocates for integrated approach climate change action and is the most comprehensive framework for addressing challenges posed by climate change.

As a means to define, integrate, and plan for climate security, the various organizations and fora have elaborated strategies, frameworks, and guides for action. PIF's Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent 2050 is the overarching blueprint for Pacific regionalism and sustainable development and has become the strategy to which many other regional, sub-regional, and national plans and policies refer. Moreover, it is a reference point for extra-regional partners to understand how and where to integrate with the Pacific Islands on development issues, especially climate change. Figure 13 illustrates key frameworks, their proponents, and their implementing bodies.

International Frameworks

Pacific Island states are all parties to the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement 2016. As SIDS, Pacific Island states are members of AOSIS and support its advocacy framework, including the latest Leaders' Declaration 2021. PICTs also support the SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action Pathway (SAMOA Pathway).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

The UNFCCC was signed by 154 states at the UN Conference on Environment and Development, informally known as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. UNFCCC now has near universal membership (198 Parties) including Pacific Island states.[268] UNFCCC sets out a framework for international cooperation to combat climate change by limiting average global temperature increases and coping with the impacts of climate change.[269] The Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997 and ran from 2005 to 2020; it was the first measure to implement the UNFCCC. The Paris Agreement signed in 2015 and entering into force in 2016 supersedes the Kyoto Protocol.

Below are key milestones achieved through the UNFCCC:

- 1988: the IPCC is set up.
- 1990: IPCC's first assessment report released. IPCC and second World Climate Conference call for a global treaty on climate change. UNGA negotiations on a framework convention begin.
- 1994: UNFCCC enters into force.
- 1995: The first Conference of the Parties (COP 1) takes place in Berlin.
- 1997: Kyoto Protocol formally adopted at COP 3.
- 2005: Entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol.
- 2009: Copenhagen Accord drafted at COP 15 in Copenhagen. Countries later submitted emissions reductions pledges or mitigation action pledges, all non-binding.

Key Frameworks and Partners

Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent 2050

The overarching blueprint to advance Pacific regionalism for the next three decades; launched by Pacific Leaders (within PIF) in 2022.

Climate Services

Pacific Roadmap for Strengthened Climate Services 2017 – 2026

Proponent - SPREP

Pacific Meteorological Council (PMC)

Subsidiary body of SPREP, with mandate to facilitate and coordinate the scientific and technical program and activities of the Regional Meteorological Services.

Climate Finance

- **Regional Guideline for the Green Climate Fund (under development)**
- **Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Climate Module, 2020**
- **Pacific Climate Change Finance Assessment Framework, 2013**

Partners: Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre (PFTAC) and members of the PIF Technical Working Group on Public Financial Management and Climate Change Finance.

Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management

Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific (FRDP), 2016

Overarching regional framework for climate change adaptation and disaster risks management. Developed through SPREP and SPC collaboration with other partners.

Pacific Resilience Partnership

Implements the FRDP. Includes:

- Support Unit: PIFS, SPC, SPREP
- Taskforce: 5 country members, 5 civil society organizations and private sector members, 5 regional organizations and development partners
- Technical Working Groups
- Biennial Pacific Resilience Meeting

Partners: Australia's Department of Foreign of Affairs and Trade (DFAT), World Bank Pacific Resilience Program (PREP), the European Union's Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change and Resilience Building (PACRES) Project, SPC, SPREP, and PRP task force members.

Climate Security

Boe Declaration on Regional Security 2018 and Action Plan 2019

Proponent - PIF
Elevated climate change as a stand-alone regional security priority.

Pacific Climate Security Assessment Guide, 2023

Implements Boe Declaration Action Plan, Acton 1.3.
Partners: UNDP, IOM, UN Peacebuilding Trust Fund, and Adelphi.

Pacific Fusion Center

Created by Charter signed by PIF Members in 2022 to deliver training and strategic analysis against security priorities identified in the Boe Declaration Action Plan.

Key
Forums, networks, and entities
Frameworks, roadmaps, and guidelines

Figure 13: Key Frameworks and Partners

- 2013: Key decisions adopted at COP 19 include decisions on further advancing the Durban Platform, the Green Climate Fund and Long-Term Finance, the Warsaw Framework for REDD Plus and the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage. Under the Durban Platform, Parties agreed to submit "intended nationally determined contributions," known as INDCs, well before the Paris conference.
- 2015: Intensive negotiations took place under the Ad Hoc Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action throughout 2012-2015 and culminated in the adoption of the Paris Agreement by the COP on 12 December 2015.

Paris Declaration Agreement 2016

The Paris Agreement is a legally binding international treaty on climate change and succeeds the Kyoto Protocol. It was adopted by 196 Parties at COP21 in Paris, France, on 12 December 2015. It entered into force on 4 November 2016. Its overarching goal is to hold "the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels" and pursue efforts "to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels."[270] Pacific Island states are all parties to the Paris Agreement.[271]

Alliance Of Small Island States Leaders' Declaration

Pacific Islands are active members of AOSIS, an intergovernmental organization representing SIDS in the UN, that has actively called for global attention to the impact of climate change since the 1990s. The AOSIS has proven to be a strong negotiating group within the UNFCCC.[272] In 2021, AOSIS endorsed a new Leaders' Declaration for the first time in seven years. The declaration was launched ahead of the pivotal UN COP26 in Glasglow, Scotland, in 2021. The key points include a call for G20 countries to take account of their subsidies to the fossil fuel industry, which generates the majority of global GHG emission. The Declaration urges the international community to scale up support that is critically needed for finance, as SIDS do not have adequate access to funding and endure a complicated process of application.[273]

Small Island Developing States Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway 2014

The SAMOA Pathway is the dedicated, internationally agreed, program of action for SIDS for the decade 2014 - 2024. An official document was formally adopted by UN Member States as the outcome of the Third International Conference on Small Island Developing States, held in Samoa in September 2014.[274] The SAMOA Pathway includes 14 priorities; they are climate change; sustainable, inclusive, and equitable economic growth with decent work for all; sustainable energy; water and sanitation; sustainable consumption and production; management of chemicals and waste, including hazardous waste; biodiversity; invasive alien species; oceans and seas; food security and nutrition; sustainable transportation; health and non-communicable disease; gender equality and women's empowerment; and social development.[275]

The Fourth International Conference on SIDS is set for May 2024 in Antigua and Barbuda. The meeting will review progress on the SAMOA Pathway and propose a new decade-long program of partnerships and solutions.[276] In preparation for the May 2024 meeting, the Pacific SIDS met in Tonga in August 2023. At the meeting, the Pacific SIDS took stock of regional progress on the SAMOA Pathway and found that the framework had been mainstreamed into national policies and plans although additional work was needed on issues of ocean health, water, energy, and the special needs of vulnerable groups – e.g., the elderly and people living with disabilities. In the context of regional limitations on financial resources and access to sustainable finance as well as the post-COVID-19 world, the Pacific SIDS agreed on positions regarding priorities and recommendations for the 2024 meeting; the loudest two priorities are for developed countries who are parties to the

Paris Agreement to meet their commitments on climate finance and to expedite climate change mitigation measures.[277]

Regional Frameworks

The Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent 2050 (2050 Strategy), launched by PIF Leaders in 2022, is the overarching framework for sustainable development of the region. The Boe Declaration on Regional Security adopted by PIF Leaders in 2018 is the lead framework for understanding climate change as the region's top security threat. The FRDP advocates for an integrated approach to CCA and DRR and is the most comprehensive framework for addressing the development challenges posed by climate change.

Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent 2050

The Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent 2050 (2050 Strategy) is the overarching blueprint for Pacific regionalism and sustainable development. The 2050 Strategy focuses on seven thematic areas: 1) political leadership and regionalism; 2) people centered development; 3) peace and security; 4) resource and economic development; 5) climate change and disasters; 6) ocean and natural environment; and 7) technology and connectivity. Figure 14 illustrates these themes and the political commitments underpinning them.[278] The 2050 Strategy reaffirms the 2018 Boe Declaration's expanded concept of security including climate security.[279] Pacific Leaders have called on development partners to fully align their policy positions and resources to the 2050 Strategy.

Boe Declaration on Regional Security 2018

The Boe Declaration was a watershed moment for the region because it expanded the concept of security for the first time to incorporate non-traditional security areas including human security, humanitarian assistance, environmental security, and disasters and climate change. The Boe Declaration elevated climate change as a stand-alone regional security priority and as the single, greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific.[280] Climate security is the top strategic area of focus in the Boe Declaration Action Plan 2019.[281] The Boe Declaration's expanded concept of security was reaffirmed in the 2050 Strategy.

Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific 2016

The FRDP is a voluntary non-political framework that supports coordination and action on a number of key issues related to climate change and disaster risk management in the region.[282] The FRDP recognizes the clear overlap between CCA and DRR and is the world's first integrated regional framework to build resilience to climate change and disasters.[283]

The FRDP advocates for an integrated approach to addressing climate change and disaster risk management in two ways:

- Integrated actions to address climate change and disasters, whenever possible (i.e., where there are similar tools and resources required to monitor, analyze and address climate and disaster risks). An integrated approach can reduce duplication and optimize use of limited resources and sharing of technical expertise.
- More effective mainstreaming of action to address climate change and disaster risks into development planning including policy making, planning, financing, programming, and implementation, which includes building resilience into governance structures and processes, partnerships, communications, and financing.[284]

The FDRP is implemented through the PRP Taskforce, whose membership includes member states, civil society and private sector representatives, and regional organizations and development partners.[285]

FDRP is closely aligned to global agreements such as the Paris Agreement on Climate Change 2015, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, the SAMOA Pathway 2014, the Sustainable Development Agenda 2015-2030, and the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016.[286]




Figure 14: 2050 Strategy Thematic Pillars

Kainaki II Declaration for Urgent Climate Change Action Now, 2019

The Kainaki II Declaration for Urgent Climate Change Action Now is the strongest statement the PIF has ever issued collectively on climate change and was a key advocacy instrument to support the Pacific's collective voice at the UN Secretary-General's Climate Action Summit in New York in September 2019, the 25th Conference of the Parties (COP 25) to the UNFCCC in Chile in December 2019, and other global meetings. Kainaki II Declaration was the first time the PIF agreed and declared that there is a 'climate change crisis' facing the Pacific Island Nations.[287]

Pre-Paris Agreement Declarations

There are a series of Declarations by Pacific Leaders that brought pressure to bear on the international community to enact legally binding commitments to reduce GHG emissions and to seriously tackle the threat of climate change. Key regional political and non-political statements and declarations include:

Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Declaration on Climate Change Action 2015 (also known as the Lifou Declaration)

Pacific Island leaders declare that an increase of 1.5°C would severely exacerbate the particular challenges facing the most vulnerable smaller island states of the Pacific, and urge all effort be made to stay within the global temperature goal, as noted by the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in its Lima Call for Climate Action. In this declaration, Pacific Leaders call for the timely conclusion of the negotiations under the UNFCCC to adopt a new, ambitious and legally-binding international climate change agreement applicable to all Parties.[288]

Polynesia Leaders Group Taputapuatea Declaration on Climate Change 2015

Also known as Polynesia Against Climate Threats (P.A.C.T), the PLG Taputapuatea Declaration on Climate Change 2015 urges the international community to recognize the specific vulnerabilities and the special case for SIDS as referred to in the SAMOA Pathway. The declaration urges the international community to stay within the global temperature goal and to enact a binding agreement to this effect; to support adaptation through the Green Climate Fund; to account for loss and damage. The declaration further recognizes climate change impacts including the intensification of extreme weather events, loss of territorial integrity, population displacement, and impact on natural and cultural heritage. The declaration was signed by leaders of French Polynesia, Niue, Cook Islands, Samoa, Tokelau, and Tonga.[289]

Majuro Declaration on Climate Leadership 2013

The Majuro Declaration is intended to highlight the Pacific Leaders' strong political commitment to be the region of "Climate Leaders" and is an effort to spark a new wave of climate leadership that accelerates the reduction and phasing down of GHG pollution worldwide.[290] It was signed by all PIF members, committing to emissions reduction and the transition to renewable energy. The Declaration was intended to mobilize political will for the 20th COP (2014) to achieve a universal, ambitious, and legally binding climate change agreement by 2015. The declaration was supported by PIF Dialogue partners including the U.S., EU, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and South Korea.[291]

Nukualofa Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Weather and Climate Services for a Resilient Pacific, 2015

The 'Nuku'alofa Ministerial Declaration for Sustainable Weather and Climate Services for a Resilient Pacific' links regional goals to international sustainable development frameworks, specifically the SDGs. The Declaration, inter alia, calls for: support to ensure the speedy implementation of the Pacific Roadmap on Strengthening Climate Services in the Pacific; and exploring possibilities for establishing and operating a Regional Climate Centre and a WMO Regional Training Center, developing regional research capacity, and convening an annual Pacific Island Climate Outlook Forum in the future.[292]

Smaller Islands States Leaders Port Moresby Declaration on Climate Change, 2015

The Declaration calls on all nations, particularly the advanced economies in Pacific region and beyond, to rise to the challenge of climate change and take transformational action to steer us on a path where climate change is no longer a threat to our planet. It recognizes and aligns with the positions expressed in the statements issued by other Pacific Summits on Climate Change, in particular the Suva Declaration on Climate Change in September 2015, the Nuku'alofa Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Weather and Climate Services for a Resilient Pacific in July 2015, the Polynesian Leaders' Taputapuatea Declaration on Climate Change in July 2015, the Lifou Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change in April 2015, the SAMOA Pathway in September 2014, the Majuro Declaration on Climate Leadership in September 2013, and the Niue Declaration on Climate Change in August 2008.[293]

Niue Declaration on Climate Change, 2008

The declaration calls on the PIF's international partners to take measures to reduce emissions and to use cleaner fuels and renewable energy sources. PIF leaders call for the strengthening of meteorological services as well as the distribution of climate change information.[294]

Nouméa Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, 1986

The Convention for the Protection of Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific

Region (1986) is also known as the SPREP Convention or Nouméa Convention. The Convention has two Protocols that also entered into force in 1990. This Convention is the major multilateral umbrella agreement in the Pacific Region for the protection of natural resources and the environment.[295]

Waigani Convention on Hazardous and Radioactive Waste 1995

The Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacific Region, known also as Waigani Convention, entered into force on 21 October 2001. The Waigani Convention constitutes the regional implementation of the international hazardous waste control regime (Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions). There are however some differences; the Waigani Convention also covers radioactive wastes, and its territorial coverage includes each Party's EEZ (200 nautical miles) (rather than extending only to outer boundary of each Party's territorial sea [12 nautical miles] as under Basel). The Convention is also strongly related to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other matters, 1972 (London Convention).[296]

Climate Assessments

IPCC Assessment Reports

The IPCC prepares comprehensive Assessment Reports about the state of scientific, technical, and socio-economic knowledge on climate change, its impacts and future risks, and options for reducing the rate at which climate change is taking place.[297] The latest report is the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) which consists of three Working Group contributions and a Synthesis Report.[298] The report takes into account "the interdependence of climate, ecosystems and biodiversity, and human societies; the value of diverse forms of knowledge; and the close linkages between climate change adaptation, mitigation, ecosystem health, human well-being and sustainable development." Each finding is based on an evaluation of underlying evidence and agreement with a stated level of confidence using five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high and very high. [299]

The AR6 make the following overarching finding of observed climate change impacts and attribution:

> *"Human-caused climate change is already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe. This has led to widespread adverse impacts on food and water security, human health and on economies and society and related losses and damages to nature and people (high confidence). Vulnerable communities who have historically contributed the least to current climate change are disproportionately affected (high confidence)."*[300]

The following are some of the specific findings for Pacific Island countries, considered as SIDS in IPCC reporting:

- LDCs and SIDS have much lower per capita emissions (1.7 tCO2- eq and 4.6 tCO2-eq, respectively) than the global average (6.9 tCO2-eq), excluding CO2-LULUCF.[301]
- Without rapid, deep, and sustained mitigation and accelerated adaptation actions, losses and damages will continue to increase, including projected adverse impacts in Africa, LDCs, SIDS, Central and South America, Asia, and the Arctic, and will disproportionately affect the most vulnerable populations (high confidence).[302]
- Climate and weather extremes are increasingly driving displacement in Africa, Asia, North America (high confidence), and Central and South America (medium confidence), with small island states in the Caribbean and South Pacific being disproportionately affected relative to their small population size (high confidence). Through displacement and involuntary migration from extreme weather and

climate events, climate change has generated and perpetuated vulnerability (medium confidence).[303]

- Increasing weather and climate extreme events have exposed millions of people to **acute food insecurity and reduced water security**, with the largest impacts observed in many locations and/or communities in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, LDCs, Small Islands, and the Arctic, and for small-scale food producers, low-income households, and Indigenous Peoples globally (high confidence).[304]
- Soft and hard adaptation limits have already been reached in some sectors and regions, in spite of adaptation having buffered some climate impacts (high confidence). Individuals and households in low lying coastal areas in Australasia and Small Islands and smallholder farmers in Central and South America, Africa, Europe, and Asia have **reached soft limits** (medium confidence), resulting from financial, governance, institutional, and policy constraints and can be overcome by addressing these constraints (high confidence).[305]
- For individuals and households in low-lying coastal areas, in Small Islands, and smallholder farmers transitioning from **incremental to transformational adaptation** can help overcome soft adaptation limits (high confidence).[306]
- At a global warning level of 1.5°C., many low-elevation and small glaciers around the world would lose most of their mass or disappear within decades to centuries (high confidence). Regions at disproportionately higher risk include Arctic ecosystems, dryland regions, SIDS, and LDCs (high confidence).[307]
- Above 1.5°C global warming level, limited freshwater resources pose **potential hard limits for Small Islands and for regions dependent on glacier and snow melt (medium confidence)**.[308]
- As the scale and pace of sea level rise accelerates beyond 2050, long-term adjustments may in some locations be beyond the limits of current adaptation options and for some small islands and low-lying coasts could be an existential risk.[309]
- Vulnerability will also rise rapidly in low-lying SIDS and atolls in the context of sea level rise (high confidence).[310]

U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Climate Change and International Responses Increasing Challenges to US National Security Through 2040, 2021

The 2021 U.S. NIE on climate change assessed the Pacific Islands' high exposure to climate change and low adaptive capacity as contributing to the region's high vulnerability. The NIE forecasts the following climate security risks for the Pacific Islands to 2040:

- Climate change is likely to increase the risk of instability in small island states in the Pacific.
- Low-lying Pacific Islands are highly vulnerable to climate change because of their minimal adaptive capacity and high exposure to tropical storms and rising sea levels.
- Although no island nation is forecast to disappear by 2040, about 20% of their landmass is projected to face annual wave flooding from higher seas that will damage infrastructure and threaten food and water security because of saltwater intrusion of groundwater resources.
- Climate change also may amplify the strain already being caused by overfishing, and together they will hasten commercial fisheries' collapse, which will harm local diets and economies as regional fish consumption is three-to-five times the global average, foreign fishing licenses make up a large share of government revenue, and onshore processing provides jobs.[311]

Climate Security Expert Network, Climate-Fragility Risk Brief: Pacific Islands Region

The Climate Security Expert Network (CSEN) is comprised of about 30 international experts and supports the Group of Friends on Climate and Security and the Climate Security

Mechanism of the UN system. CSEN is convened by adelphi, a Germany-based independent think tank and public policy consultancy on climate, environment, and development. CSEN has produced country and regional Climate-Fragility Risks Briefs, including for the Pacific Islands.[312] The 2019 Climate-Fragility Risks Brief for the Pacific Islands Regions identifies five climate fragility risks:

- Displacement and forced migration
- Challenges to the blue economy
- Decline in health and productivity of Pacific People, food, and water security
- Coping capacity and natural disasters
- Impacts of sea level rise on maritime zones and boundaries.[313]

The Brief identifies five entry points to address risks, including:

- Providing financial resources through fit-for-purpose modalities and scaled-up development, security, and climate finance.
- Accelerating international cooperation and efficient development programs to manage climate change-induced migration.
- Addressing Pacific SIDS' concerns about the implications of climate change for maritime jurisdictions and associated resources.
- Strengthening data collection and monitoring and early warning systems, and improving understanding and knowledge of localized impacts and risks.
- Ensuring there is a clear, coordinated and efficient UN support system for the region and country-specific situations.[314]

The Brief was prepared by Coral Pasisi with contributions from adelphi, the German Federal Foreign Office, the Climate Security Mechanism, CSEN, SPC, the PIF Secretariat, SPREP, FFA, UNDP, and the University of Wollongong's Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS).[315]

Pacific Climate Security Assessment Guide 2023

The Pacific Regional Climate Security Assessment Guide is a joint product of the PIF Secretariat and the Climate Security in the Pacific Project, jointly implemented by the UNDP and IOM and supported by the UN Secretary-General's PBF.[316] The Assessment Guide, was developed through extensive consultation with regional specialists, key regional institutions, civil society and with PIF member representatives, and aims to support the region's effort to unpack climate security risks so that appropriate responses can be put in place.[317] The Assessment Guide is not a comprehensive regional climate security risks assessment, but it does highlight the five climate fragility risks identified in the CSEN Brief (discussed earlier), as "regional climate security pathways" or the predominant climate security trends in the region.[318]

Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment (PIRCA), East-West Center

The East-West Center PIRCA assesses the state of knowledge about climate change indicators, impacts, and adaptive capacity of the USAPI and the Hawaiian archipelago. Reports are available for FSM, American Samoa, CNMI, Guam, and Palau.[319]

Climate Finance

Climate finance refers to local, national, or transnational financing, drawn from public, private, and alternative sources and that seeks to support mitigation and adaptation actions that will address climate change.[320] Climate action requires significant financial investment to reduce emissions, for example by transitioning to new energy systems. Climate finance is also required for significant investments in climate adaptation, such as infrastructure that can withstand climate change impacts.[321] A 2021 report by the IMF estimates the average investment need for climate-proofing infrastructure is 3.3% of GDP for the greater Asia-Pacific region during the next decade. But this average is 6.5-9% of GDP for the Pacific Island countries.[322] The extensive coastal protection needs of these countries contributes to the disproportionately high public sector investment costs.[323]


Pacific Island countries are accessing climate finance through bilateral donors, multilateral development banks, and multilateral climate funds (e.g., Green Climate Fund, Global Environment Facility, and the Asian Development Fund). Figure 15 depicts the climate finance architecture of Pacific Island countries, according to the IMF.[324]

UNFCCC Financial Mechanism

The UNFCCC foresees a Financial Mechanism to enable financial assistance and technology transfer from Parties with more resources (Parties listed in Annex II) to those with fewer resources and who are more vulnerable to climate change impacts.[325] There are two key operating entities to the Financial Mechanisms – the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). Since the 16th session of the COP in November 2010, in Cancun, Mexico, both GCF and GEF have reported annually to the COP Standing Committee on Finance, which is charged with assisting the COP to exercise its functions in relation to the Financial Mechanism.

Green Climate Fund

At the COP 17 held in Durban, South Africa, in 2011, the GCF was designated as the operating entity of the financial mechanism envisioned under Article 11 of the UNFCCC. In 2013, the GCF Secretariat established its headquarters in Incheon City, South Korea. The GCF is governed by an independent Board that is guided by the COP. The GCF Board is comprised of 24 members with an equal number of members



Source: IMF staff.
Note: The acronyms are listed by group. The Funds are as follows: Asia-Pacific Climate Finance Fund (ACLiFF), Asia Development Fund (ADF), Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD), Adaptation Fund (AF), Adaptation for Small Agriculture Program (ASAP), Climate Change Fund (CCF), Canadian Climate Fund for the Private Sector in Asia II (CFPS II), Climate Investment Funds (CIF), Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environment Facility (GEF), Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action Facility (NAMA), Pilot Program on Climate Resilience (PPCR), Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), Strategic Climate Fund (SCF). The Implementing Entities are as follows: World Bank (WB), International Development Association (IDA), Asian Development Bank (ADB), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The Recipients are as follows: National Development Banks (NDBs), Financial Institutions (FIs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

Figure 15: Climate Finance Architecture in the Pacific Islands

from developing and developed country Parties. For developing country Parties, the 12 seats are allocated as follows:

- three members and alternate members from Asia-Pacific
- three members and alternate members from Africa
- three members and alternate members from Latin America and the Caribbean
- one member and alternate member from SIDS
- one member and alternate member from LDCs
- one member from developing countries Parties not included in the regional grouping or constituencies listed above.[326]

Board members are selected by their respective constituency or regional group within a constituency for three-year terms.[327] For the SIDS constituency, the selection is made by the Chair of AOSIS. In 2021, AOSIS nominated a representative from Antigua and Barbuda for the Board seat, and a representative from Kiribati as the alternate for 2022-2024.[328]

SPREP and SPC have Regional Implementing Entity status for GCF. Pacific Island countries with designated national authority focal points to GCF include:

- Cook Islands
- Fiji
- Kiribati
- Marshall Islands
- Micronesia (FSM)
- Nauru
- Palau
- Papua New Guinea
- Samoa
- Solomon Islands
- Tonga
- Tuvalu
- Vanuatu

Global Environment Facility

The financial mechanism under Article 11 of the UNFCCC is partly administered by the GEF. Since 2001, the GEF has managed the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF).[329]

LDCF

The LDCF helps LDCs carry out, inter alia, the preparation and implementation of NAPAs.[330] The main UN agencies implementing LDCF funds are the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), UNDP, UNEP, and the UN Industrial Development Organization.[331] In 2023, SIDS comprised 14% of projects and programs approved under the LDCF. Pacific SIDS accessing LDCF resources as of 30 June 2023 include:

- Kiribati (US$32.5 million)
- Solomon Islands (US$33.33 million)
- Tuvalu (US$22.05 million).[332]

SCCF

The SCCF supports projects focused on adaptation; technology transfer and capacity building; energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry, and waste management; and economic diversification. As of 30 June 2023, the SCCF had approved 97 projects with US$368.19 million in GEF finance, and US$2,705.66 million in co-financing.[333] The report on SCCF approved projects for SIDS is more difficult to discern. A component of the SCCF focused on SIDS (SCCF-A) has had 5% of approved projects and programs in SIDS.

Bilateral, Regional, and Multilateral Climate Funds

The UNFCCC further states that the developed country Parties may also provide financial resources through bilateral, regional, and other multilateral channels to support mitigation and adaptation in developing and vulnerable countries.[334] Table 28 describes some of the key climate funds active in Pacific Island countries.

Bilateral donors

The major donors and contributors to adaptation-focused bilateral funding are Australia, Japan, EU, New Zealand, South Korea, United Arab Emirates, and Germany.

Climate Fund	Description and Website	Project Location
Adaptation Fund (AF)	The AF was established to finance concrete adaptation projects and programs in developing countries that are parties to the Kyoto Protocol and are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. AF is legally registered in Germany. Website: https://www.adaptation-fund.org/about/governance/	Cook Islands, Fiji, FSM, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands
Climate Investment Fund (CIF)	Established in 2008, the CIF is a multilateral climate finance partnership that channels concessional finance through six multilateral development banks for both upstream advisory and downstream investment activities to support climate action. Website: https://www.cif.org/governance	PNG, Samoa, Tonga
Asian Development Bank (ADB) Funds	The Asian Development Fund (ADF) provides grants to ADB's lower-income developing member countries. It was established in 1974, initially to provide concessional loans. Website: https://www.adb.org/what-we-do/funds/adf/projects The Asia-Pacific Climate Finance Fund (ACLiFF) is a multi-donor trust fund established in 2017 by Germany as the first financing partner. The fund supports the development and implementation of financial risk management products that can help unlock capital for climate investments and improve resilience to the impact of climate change. Website: https://www.adb.org/what-we-do/funds/asia-pacific-climate-finance-fund	Cook Islands, FSM, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu Cook Islands, Fiji, FSM, Nauru, Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu
Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD)	The ADFD is a foreign aid agency established by the government of Abu Dhabi in 1971. The fund provides concessionary loans to fund economic and social development projects. Website: https://www.adfd.ae/english/Pages/Home.aspx	Tonga
Adaptation for Small Agricultural Program (ASAP)	The ASAP is the IFAD's flagship program for channeling climate finance to small-scale farmers. Donors include Belgium, Canada, Finland, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Website: https://www.ifad.org/en/asap	Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA)	The GCCA was launched in 2007 by the European Commission to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on climate change between the EU and LDCs and SIDS. The GCCA Plus Scaling up Pacific Adaptation (GCCA+ SUPA) is a 4.5-year project (2019-2023) funded by the EU at €14.89 million (US$15.9 million) and implemented by SPC in partnership with SPREP and the USP. Website: https://gem.spc.int/projects/gcca-supa	Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Tonga, Tuvalu
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action Facility (NAMA)	NAMAs are concrete projects, policies, and/or programs that shift a technology or sector in a country onto a low-carbon development trajectory. The concept of NAMAs can be found in the Bali Action Plan arising from COP13 in Bali, Indonesia. Website: https://unfccc.int/topics/mitigation/workstreams/nationally-appropriate-mitigation-actions#The-NAMA-Registry-	No Pacific Island country has recorded a NAMA in the registry
Loss and Damage Fund	At the time of drafting this report, the Loss and Damage fund had been officially launched as part of COP28, in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The intent of the fund is to support at-risk nations in the wake of climate change events with funding from nations with high emissions. To date, US$287 million has been pledged from high emitting nations.	

Table 28: Key Climate Funds

Implementing Entities

Entities implementing climate funds are the World Bank, International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, the ADB, UNDP, UNEP, FAO, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, among other multilateral entities. Funding mechanisms include grants, concession loans (official and non-official development assistance), guarantees, and equity.

Recipients

Recipients of climate investment include:

- Cook Islands
- Fiji
- Kiribati
- Marshall Islands
- Micronesia (FSM)
- Nauru
- Niue
- Palau
- Papua New Guinea
- Samoa
- Solomon Islands
- Tonga
- Tuvalu
- Vanuatu

PIF Climate Change and Finance

PIF has been working with Members and partners to strengthen national public financial management (PFM) system and processes and advocacy for climate change considerations to complement the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework. It also provides advice and support on country readiness for "direct access" through National Implementing Entity (NIE) accreditation to the GCF and AF.[335] PIF Secretariat work is supported by Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre (PFTAC) and members of the Technical Working Group on PFM and Climate Change Finance.[336]

Pacific Climate Finance Assessment Framework 2013

The Pacific Climate Change Finance Assessment Framework (PCCFAF) was developed by the PIF Secretariat to improve PIF Member States' access to and management of climate change resources. The framework lays out the dimensions of climate change financing:

- Funding Sources
- Policies and Plans
- Institutions
- Public Financial Management and Expenditure
- Human Capacity
- Development Effectiveness

The PCCFAF was applied in eight countries and has been recognized by the UNFCCC's Standing Committee on Finance as global good practice for assessing the needs of developing countries.[337]

Emerging Issues

The impacts of climate change and climate hazards can affect various aspects of human security, economic stability, and geopolitical dynamics. Effects on local, national, and regional stability will be complex as, rather than acting as a discrete event, climate change is a "threat multiplier," meaning it can escalate social, political, and economic tensions. As the negative impacts of climate change intensify, they can contribute to compounding security risks such as loss of livelihoods, competition for natural resources, migration, internal displacement, political unrest, diminished social cohesion, increased recruitment by violent extremist organizations, and malign influence by state and non-state actors. Moreover, impacts will affect differing groups within each society differently as they inhabit discreet geographies, social classes, economic sectors, and political groupings. Three key issues that fall under this escalation of risk are climate security, mobility, and gender, each of which is being addressed by specific policies and frameworks across local, national, and international levels of action and each of which intersects with other climate change challenges in various ways.

Figure 16 illustrates the human security dimensions of climate change, adapted from the IOM-led Pacific Climate Change Migration

Economic Security: Climate change threatens poverty alleviation and sustainable development, as many communities depend on natural resource-based livelihoods. People and communities who cannot migrate due to limited economic resources ("trapped populations") are particularly vulnerable to economic insecurity. Climate change may also impact fisheries and tourism and, therefore, have a negative impact on GDP. Addressing climate change and disasters diverts an increasing proportion of public expenditure away from social and economic services.	Personal and Community Security: An increase in sexual and gender-based violence has been reported during times of disasters and times of food and water scarcity. Climate change exacerbates existing vulnerabilities and increases personal and community security threats. At the same time, climate change and disasters can contribute to vulnerability to exploitative forms of mobility, e.g., human trafficking and smuggling. Communities moving away from traditional and ancestral lands face loss of cultural identity and indigenous knowledge and erosion of community well being and security
Food Security: Climate change affects food security through impacts on agricultural production and fisheries, intertwined with other environmental challenges. Climate change is likely to have significant impacts on migration of fish, a key source of nutrition and livelihoods in the region, and it may lead to changing quantity and variety of yields.	Environmental Security: Climate change and environmental security are intrinsically linked. Climate change increases the intensity and frequency of weather-related hazards, but also exacerbates existing environmental degradation resulting from unsustainable use of resources.
Health and Water Security: Climate change affects social and environmental determinants of health - clean air, safe drinking water, sufficient food, and secure shelter - and influences nutrition and reproductive health. Water security, particularly the availability of fresh water for consumption and suitable water for irrigation is challenged by increasing saltwater intrusion. Changing temperatures allow vector-borne diseases to reach new geographic locations	Political Security: Limited protection is offered under international law for people displaced by climate change. Similarly, there is a need to recognize "ontological security," which relates to security at the level of an existential threat for some islands. In addition, migrants participating in labor mobility schemes face challenges with respect to full enjoyment of their labor and human rights, including equal opportunity for women and marginalized groups in accessing the schemes and high migration costs for some corridors.

Figure 16: Facets of Human Security Threatened by Climate Change

and Human Security (PCCMHS) concept documents.[338]

IPCC projections for the Indo-Pacific region as a whole include higher likelihood of heat waves and extreme heat, drought, and flooding.[339] Additionally, small islands could be increasingly impacted by a larger proportion of the most intense tropical cyclones, storm surges, drought, changing precipitation patterns, sea level rise, and coral bleaching.[340] Climate impact drivers interacting with human systems and ecosystems could result in:

- Increased frequency and intensity of climate hazards, posing a threat to life, livelihoods, food production, freshwater resources, property, and critical infrastructure and services;
- Impacts on and disruption to food production, yields, and systems, and resulting food scarcity and decreased food security;
- Strain on freshwater resources from decreases in water supply and quality;
- Migration and displacement from shifting populations seeking labor opportunities, shelter, food, water, and safety;
- Damage and disruptions to infrastructure, facilities, services, transportation, communications, and human settlements; and
- Impacts on human health, including increased risk of disease outbreaks, malnutrition, and direct mortality from climate-related hazards.

In the Indo-Pacific region, there are multiple dynamics that will cause and shape the climate crisis. Climate change impacts will be felt on top of existing challenges and will complicate vulnerabilities. For example, climate change impacts could exacerbate the existing challenges of rapid urbanization, industrialization, and economic growth; growing geostrategic competition and maritime boundary disputes; ongoing conflicts from separatist movements and transnational violent extremist organizations; and piracy and organized crime in the region.[341] The extent to which climate change will aggravate human, state, and geopolitical issues will depend on several factors, including how fast the world can reduce GHG emissions and how effectively the region adapts to climate change. Figure 17 presents one way to think about the impacts and consequences of major climate hazards.[342]

Climate Security

Climate security is a lens through which to understand the link between climate change and peace and security. Climate change can be conceptualized as a threat to national security and social systems, as well as a challenge for states' defense capabilities, and, therefore, many states view climate change as a threat multiplier and, in some circumstances, a direct threat. However, as a whole, the international community has spent more than 15 years debating how to define, discuss, and address the security implications of climate change despite loud and consistent advocacy by PICTs to take up the challenge. In fact, the Pacific states, communities, and organizations are moving forward with climate security conceptions and actions regardless of international agreement. The overarching frameworks guiding PICTs' understanding of climate change impacts on security are PIF's 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security and the 2019 Boe Declaration Action Plan. A 2023 PIF Pacific Climate Security Assessment Guide sets out an analytical framework for governments to assess national climate security risks. Figure 18 charts the relationship among the key Pacific declarations, strategies, and frameworks on climate security.

The Climate Security Concept

The paradigm of climate security emerged in 2007 with the release of a report by a cohort of top former U.S. military leaders for the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA). The CNA report defined climate security as a "threat multiplier," exacerbating other threats in the most volatile regions in the world.[343] In 2014, CNA followed up with a report recognizing that in some parts of the world the impacts of climate change would be more than threat multipliers; they will serve as a direct threat and a catalyst for instability and conflict.[344] More recently, the U.S. has tied climate change to national security, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has debated the links between climate change and international peace and security.

The American Security Project (ASP) is compiling a Global Climate Security Index. In a preliminary review ASP found that "about 70% of nations in the world explicitly state that climate change is a national security concern," and almost all nations that have official military planning have stated that their government considers missions like HADR as critical responsibilities of their armed forces.[345] In the expectation that climate change will exacerbate the hazards that drive disasters and conflict and, therefore, trigger humanitarian need, many states expect their armed and security forces to become more involved in HADR over time.

Since 2007, the UNSC has debated the linkages between climate change and peace and security. In March 2017, UNSC Resolution 2349 highlighted the need to address climate-related risks in responding to the conflict in the Lake Chad basin. In July 2018, a debate was held on "understanding and addressing climate-related security risks."[346] In February 2023, the UNSC held an open debate on the security implications of sea level rise. Representing the Pacific Islands, Coral Pasisi, Director of Climate Change of the SPC, stressed that sea level rise is a direct security threat and a threat multiplier to the Blue Pacific Continent.[347]




Figure 17: Estimates of Major Climate Hazards, Impacts of Concern, and Consequences




Figure 18: Climate Security as Part of Pacific Regional Security

Yet the UNSC has been slow to examine climate change, as some Member States believe that climate change should fall under other UN entities mandated to lead on social and economic development or environmental protection.[348] One of the leading UN entities examining climate security is the UNDP. UNDP has defined climate security to refer to the impacts of the climate crisis on peace and security, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.[349] On a global level, since 2018, UNDP, along with the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, UNEP, and the UN Department of Peace Operations, have undertaken the Climate Security Mechanism that seeks to help the UN system address climate-related security risks more systematically.[350]

In the Pacific, UNDP has partnered with the IOM, PIF Secretariat, and CANCC, with funding from the UN Secretary-General's PBF, to conduct a Climate Security in the Pacific Project, discussed in the next section under "Pacific Climate Security Assessment Guide," to support regional states to identify climate security risks.[351] The PBF is the UN's financial instrument of first resort to sustain peace in countries and regions at risk of or affected by security challenges, including caused by climate change.[352]

Pacific Climate Security Framework

In the Pacific, the overarching framework guiding understanding of climate change impacts on security are the PIF Boe Declaration on Regional Security 2013 and the 2019 Action Plan. A 2023 PIF Pacific Climate Security Assessment Guide sets out an analytical framework for governments to assess national climate security risks.

Boe Declaration on Regional Security 2018

In 2018, PIF Member States adopted the PIF Boe Declaration on Regional Security elevating climate change as a stand-alone regional security priority and as the "single great threat to the livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific."[353] The Boe Declaration represented a watershed moment for the region because it expanded the concept of security for the first time to incorporate non-traditional security areas including human security, humanitarian assistance, environmental security, and disasters and climate change.[354] The Boe Declaration is the most comprehensive policy statement on regional security. Other declarations including the Honiara Declaration (1992), Aitutaki Declaration (1997), Biketawa Declaration (2000), Niue Declaration (2008), Port Moresby Declaration (2015), and Kainaki II Declaration (2019) have contributed to the advancement of this conceptualization of security.[355]

PIF Boe Declaration Action Plan 2019

The Boe Declaration Action Plan, enacted in 2019, is the leading regional security strategy, endorsed by all 18 PIF Member States, including the 14 Pacific Island countries, the territories of French Polynesia and New Caledonia, and Australia, and New Zealand. A Pacific Regional Security Roadmap is under development and will further articulate the link between the Boe Declaration Action Plan and the Implementation Plan of the 2050 Strategy for a Blue Pacific Continent. In the interim, the Boe Declaration Action Plan is the lead security strategy.[356] Enhancing the region's climate security is the top priority among the six areas of focus of the Action Plan.

- Boe Declaration Action Plan. 2019, Strategic Focus Area 1: Climate Security:
  - Action 1.1: Secure sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of the impact of climate change
  - Action 1.2: Maintain the dignity and well-being of our communities in the face of the impacts of climate change
  - Action 1.3: Understand and contextualize the impact that climate change will have on regional security
  - Action 1.4: Capacity building
  - Action 1.5: Implementation of Paris Agreement
  - Action 1.6: Promote the FRDP
  - Action 1.7: Support for appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Climate Security to the UNSC

The Boe Declaration Action Plan does not provide a definition of climate security but recognizes that climate change will present an environmental security risk, a human security risk, and an existential national security risk, as climate change threatens livelihoods, security, and the well-being of the peoples of the Pacific. The 2019 Action Plan envisions further assessment to understand and contextualize the impact that climate change will have on the regional security landscape through its interaction with human security and conflict.[357]

Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent to 2050 (2022)

The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent – the overarching blueprint for Pacific regionalism and sustainable development – reaffirms the Boe Declaration's expanded concept of security. A Pacific Regional Security Roadmap is under development and will further articulate the link between the Boe Declaration Action Plan and the Implementation Plan of the 2050 Strategy for a Blue Pacific Continent. In the interim, the Boe Declaration Action Plan is the lead security strategy.[358]

PIF Pacific Outlook Report 2022-2023

The first-ever PIF Pacific Outlook Report 2022-2023 reiterates that climate change remains the single greatest security threat for the region and is a continuing threat multiplier across all regional security priority areas – natural disasters, gender-based violence, cybercrime, and transnational organized crime. The report states, "The Pacific region is uniquely vulnerable to worsening climate risks, which threaten to cause irreversible economic, social, cultural, and environmental damage." The report highlights the fact that Pacific Island countries experience up to four times greater sea level rise than the global average, and for low-lying atoll nations, such as Kiribati, Tuvalu, and RMI, the threat is existential.

Pacific Climate Security Risk Assessment Guide 2023

Although the Boe Declaration Action Plan does not provide a definition of climate security, given the complex and multifaceted nature of climate change impacts, the 2019 Action Plan envisions further assessment to understand and contextualize the impact that climate change will have on the regional security landscape through its interaction with human security and conflict under Proposed Action 1.3. In support of Action 1.3, the PIF Secretariat, since 2020, has collaborated with UNDP, IOM, and national governments through a Climate Security in the Pacific Project, funded by the UN Secretary-General's PBF. The initiative produced the Pacific Climate Change Assessment Guide to support states in analyzing their climate security risks.[359] The Guide outlines five pathways for states to analyze the security dimensions of climate change: 1) Climate change challenges livelihoods and the blue economy; 2) Climate change threatens land availability and usability, putting pressure on food, water, and health security; 3) Climate risks exacerbate disasters and erode the resilience of vulnerable groups and governments; 4) Climate change affects mobility trends and can exacerbate risks; 5) Climate change threatens unsecure maritime boundaries and sovereignty and could undermine regional stability.[360]

The following is a summary of some of the risks identified under the five change pathways:

Pathway 1: Climate change challenges livelihoods and the blue economy

- Climate effects on subsistence economies will directly impact incomes of an estimated 75% or more of Pacific Islanders. In some remote communities, the risk could threaten 100% of people.
- Commercial fisheries are increasingly under strain; they are a major revenue source for governments.
- Coastal fisheries are under pressure, and many Pacific Islanders depend on fisheries for sustenance and livelihoods. Reefs, in particular, are under threat, and their plight has important implications for biodiversity.

- The tourism sector is undermined from natural disasters across the region, and a possible income stream that showed promise prior to the COVID-19 pandemic is threatened.[361]

Pathway 2: Climate change threatens land availability and usability, putting pressure on food, water, and health security; Figure 19 illustrates Pathway 2

- Food insecurity continues to intensify across the Pacific due to climatic and other natural disasters, population growth, urbanization, and poor economic conditions.
- Food imports, in response to climate stress, are contributing to vulnerability due to increased negative health impacts and the potential risks associated with volatility in food supply and cost.
- Water insecurity remains a key challenge across the region. Water stress especially affects atoll states, forced to rely almost exclusively on rainwater catchment systems.
- Growing competition over land can facilitate or exacerbate tensions between those who own land and those who "informally" settle on it.
- Land governance issues, in particular balancing customary landowner rights with national needs and priorities, could complicate various climate security aspects, like disaster response and climate change adaptation.[362]

Pathway 3: Climate risks exacerbate disasters and erode the resilience of vulnerable groups and governments

- The economic losses and costs associated with disaster risks are high. Annual economic losses due to climate-induced disasters in Pacific SIDS are estimated to be US$1.075 billion or 5% of the combined GDP of Pacific SIDS. Losses are especially high for Palau, Tonga, and Vanuatu with AAL valued at 11.98%, 19.20%, and 20.67% of national GDP, respectively.
- Debt burdens are increasing across the Pacific and are worsened by the confluence of the COVID-19 pandemic, declining GDP, and the high cost of disasters.
- Disaster displacement is a major challenge for poor population groups who are often subject to repeat displacement.[363]




Figure 19: Illustration of Pathway 2 from the Pacific Climate Security Risk Assessment Guide

Pathway 4: Climate change affects mobility trends and can exacerbate risks

- Mobility is a long occurring phenomenon in the Pacific Islands. Up to this point, climate impacts have not been the leading factor for migration, but as climate change increasingly impacts livelihood, food, water, health, and land security, it will likely become a more prominent factor in decision making and increase mobility rates among those who can afford to move.
- Internal migration is the primary mode of mobility. This has largely comprised rural-to-urban migration for better livelihood opportunities and access to education, health, and other public services.
- International mobility is a less worn path for most Pacific Island communities and will often be motivated by historical or familial ties to other countries. International migration can also provide relief to overcrowded cities and improve the resilience of those who remain by generating personal financial benefits and remittances from those that migrate over the short term (e.g., labor schemes or education visas) or long term (e.g., residence in other countries).
- Internal disaster displacement is a widespread phenomenon in the region. Tensions in receiving communities, especially when displacement is longer-term, can lead to social problems and put displaced communities at risk of material insecurity.[364]

Pathway 5: Risks to maritime boundaries and sovereignty and regional stability

- Land loss from permanent inundation remains an acute risk for some Pacific Island states. Some of the Solomon Islands, like Kale and Rapita Islands, have already disappeared completely.
- A more immediate concern is the threat of persistent and consistent temporary flooding. This will impact livelihoods and food and water systems, as well as health and safety, and, ultimately, make land uninhabitable. In some countries, such as Tuvalu and other low-lying atolls, permanent inundation could be a reality in the next 30 years.
- This phenomenon occurs due to reinforcing and compounding climate risks, including sea level rise, coastal erosion, king tides, and storm surges. That risk is even higher for low-lying atolls and raised atolls, such as Tokelau, Cook Islands, parts of the FSM, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and RMI.
- International relocation has limited precedent with most having occurred during colonial times. Generally, organized schemes have had mixed success. The i-Kiribati Banaban community settled in Rabi, Fiji, continues to express grievances while Tuvaluans living in Kioa, Fiji, feel more settled. The complexity of these processes requires deep thinking and strong inclusive processes and procedures in place to reduce potential for conflicts in the future.
- Collective action is key to address the security implications of climate change but, considering the region's high level of reliance on overseas development assistance, Pacific countries can be exposed to external actors' own interests.
- The region is experiencing increasing interest by larger regional and extra-regional powers who are all pledging to focus attention in the area due to its strategic importance. This interest has been experienced in Britain's "Pacific Uplift," Indonesia's "Pacific Elevation," New Zealand's "Pacific Reset," Australia "Pacific Step-up," China's "Belt and Road Initiative," and as "an essential part" of the U.S. "free and open Indo-Pacific region."[365]

<u>Pacific Regional Climate Mobility Framework</u>

Through the Pacific Climate Change Migration and Human Security Programme (PCCMHS), Pacific Island countries developed a regional collaboration framework on human mobility because of climate change. A Joint Working Group of Pacific states and PCCMHS partners, including SPC and PIF Secretariat and its Co-Chairs, and the Governments of Fiji

and Tuvalu moved development forward such that it was adopted in 2023.[366] The Framework is discussed in greater depth in the "Mobility" section of this document.

Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2012-2015

The Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (2012 – 2015), recognizes that climate change and natural disasters are threat multipliers that can exacerbate existing tensions and result in violence and instability. Moreover, during natural disasters and conflicts, forced displacement heavily disrupts the lives of women and their families and increases the risk of sexual and gender-based violence.[367] The intersection of climate change and gender is further explored in the "Gender" section of this document.

Kainaki II Declaration for Urgent Climate Change Action Now, 2019

The Kainaki Declaration requests that the progress within the UNFCCC keep pace with the challenges faced in the Pacific in line with the Boe Declaration on Regional Security. Pacific Leaders "note with grave concern and fear for our collective future that global greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise, reaching record levels; and based on current trends, without urgent action, we will exceed 1.5°C by as early as 2030 and reach 3°C or more by the end of this century."[368]

National Security Strategies and Climate Change in the Pacific

The impact of climate change has been considered in several countries' national security policies and strategies. In addition to Australia, France, and New Zealand, four Pacific Island countries have formal national security strategies. They are Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu.

Palau's 2022 National Security Strategy lists economic security as the country's top concern. Climate change considerations are integrated throughout Palau's National Security Strategy, including the need to shift to a more proactive approach to DRR to respond to climate-inducted national disasters.[369]

Samoa's National Security Policy of 2018 identifies natural disasters and climate change as challenges for the country's security and economic interests. The strategy requires that climate and disaster resilience be mainstreamed and integrated into strategic planning by government agencies and sectors.[370]

The Solomon Islands' National Security Strategy of 2020 identifies 17 security threats, ranging from climate change to health. With regards to the challenges of climate change, of particular concern is sea level rise, which is causing widespread erosion and inundation of low-lying atolls. The Solomon Islands has seen annual sea levels rise by as much as 10 mm (0.39 inches) over the last two decades.[371]

Australia last released a national security strategy in 2013. Since then, separate policies and planning documents address Australia's national security interests; they include the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper and the Defence Strategic Review of 2023. In addition, the Treasury's intergenerational reports and reports by the independent Productivity Commission also articulate Australia's national interests and fall within the broad parameters of a national security conversation.[372] The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper recognizes the security implications of climate change and states, "[t]he challenge posed by climate change will deepen over the next 10 years. Countries will need to factor climate change into long-term planning and investment, including its implications for national and regional security." Moreover, in 2018, Australia's Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade issued its report on an inquiry into the implications of climate change for Australia's national security. The report contained four main parts: climate change-related threats to national security; suggestions for improving domestic coordination; suggestions for improving coordination within Defence; and opportunities to increase regional resilience. Australia's 2023 Defence Strategic Review recognizes climate

change as a national security threat.[373] The Review states that climate change will lead to increased demands from defense for HADR tasks domestically and abroad. It further predicts that climate change will accelerate risks in the Pacific region and thereby lead to mass migration, increased demands for peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and intrastate and interstate conflict.[374]

New Zealand launched its first National Security Strategy (NSS) in August 2023; it outlines 12 core interests. They are: 1) Strategic competition and the rules-based international system, 2) Emerging, critical, and sensitive technologies, 3) Disinformation, 4) Foreign interference and espionage, 5) Terrorism and violent extremism, 6) Transnational organized crime, 7) Economic security, 8) Pacific resilience and security, 8) Maritime security, 9) Border security, 11) Cyber security, and 12) Space security.[375] Climate change is viewed as part of the three transboundary challenges to New Zealand's national security outlook alongside terrorism and cyber. New Zealand's NSS reiterates the Boe Declaration's definition of climate change as the "single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of Pacific peoples."[376] In particular, the risks presented by sea level rise, more extreme weather events, freshwater shortages, pressure on food stocks, and migration – both internal and cross-border – are acknowledged.[377]

Moreover, in 2018, New Zealand released its assessment, "Climate Crisis: Defence Readiness and Responsibilities," outlining the security impact of climate change in terms of its environmental, social, and security impact.[378] This framework has been adopted and expanded in New Zealand's Defence Policy and Strategy Statement of 2023, and is illustrated in Figure 20.[379]

France first released a policy on defense and security in the Indo-Pacific through "France and Security in the Asia-Pacific" in 2014. The 2014 policy highlighted the challenges posed by a changing strategic context marked by inter-state tensions but makes no mention of climate change.[380] The policy document was updated in 2016, 2018, and 2019.[381] The 2019 policy recognizes environment security as a shared responsibility, and climate change is highlighted as threat multiplier in the Indo-Pacific. As part of the implementation of the Paris Agreement, France is developing a policy of environmental security.[382] Moreover, during a 2018 speech, President Macron placed France's commitments to taking action against climate change as among the top four priorities for its regional engagement.[383]

U.S. Climate Security Framework

The U.S. Government climate security framework comprises Executive Order (EO) 14008 Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of the Climate Change and International Responses Increasing Challenges to U.S. National Security Through 2040, and DoD strategies and plans.

Executive Order (EO) 14008 Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad

In 2021, the Biden Administration issued EO 14008 and elevated climate change as a national security threat. EO 14008 directs that addressing the climate crisis be an essential element of U.S. foreign policy and national security.

Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate

The Biden Administration has appointed a Special Presidential Envoy for Climate to elevate the issue of climate change in U.S. diplomatic engagements. The Special Presidential Envoy for Climate is charged with leading U.S. diplomacy to address the climate crisis. Integrated closely with the State Department's existing expert staff and personnel, including the Office of Global Change in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, the Special Presidential Envoy's team works to ensure that the U.S. actively engages on climate, including exercising strong U.S. leadership to increase global climate ambition.[384]



Figure 20: Climate Change Impacts and Risks Framework, New Zealand

The key workstreams of the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate include: constructive engagement in the Paris Agreement and related agreements and processes; driving global GHG emission reductions so as to keep a 1.5°C limit on temperature rise within reach; enhancing adaptation and resilience to climate impacts; climate-aligning financial flows; driving overseas clean energy innovation and competitiveness; and better integrating climate and other areas, including the ocean, biodiversity, the Arctic, and international shipping and aviation activities.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

USAID defines "climate security" as: the ways in which the impacts of and responses to climate change alter the socioeconomic and geopolitical systems that affect peace and security. It recognizes that shifting weather patterns, sea level rise, and extreme events have the potential to undermine national, community, and individual security as they undermine resilience to disasters or conflict. This action works by exacerbating resource competition, livelihoods insecurity, transboundary tensions

over water, and global food markets. As a response to the overlapping drivers and impacts of conflict and climate change, USAID has developed various approaches to integrate climate change programming and peacebuilding programming.[385] The guiding document for this integration is the USAID Climate Strategy 2022-2030.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

In response to EO 14008, the U.S. National Intelligence Council within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence produced a NIE of the Climate Change and International Responses Increasing Challenges to U.S. National Security through 2040.[386] The NIE is the most authoritative assessment from the Intelligence Community and represents the consensus view of all 18 of the Community's elements. The baseline observational data was provided by the U.S. Federal Science Agencies on the Climate Security Advisory Council.[387]

The 2040 NIE predicts that, "climate change will increasingly exacerbate risks to U.S. national security interests as the physical impacts increase and geopolitical tensions mount about how to respond to the challenge."[388] The NIE further predicts that "[i]ntensifying physical effects will exacerbate geopolitical flashpoints, particularly after 2030, and key countries and regions will face increasing risks of instability and need for humanitarian assistance."[389] Significantly, the NIE report assessed the Pacific Islands to be one of the regions most vulnerable to the impact of climate change due to states' high exposure to climate risks and low adaptative capacity.[390] Figure 21 is a table from the NIE 2040 report summarizing the key risk estimates in the category of geopolitical tensions over climate response, climate-exacerbated geopolitical flashpoints, and climate impacts fomenting country-level instability.[391]

National Security Strategy 2022

The 2022 National Security Strategy identified climate change as a central challenge and declared, "We will also work to enhance partners' resilience to transnational challenges, including climate and biological threats." To define the nature of climate and security, the strategy identified the following:

- Integrate climate change into national security planning and policies
- Climate change is a shared challenge at the core of national and international security and must be treated as such

Tackling shared challenges in a competitive international environment will require us to think and act in new ways.[392]

U.S. Department of Defense

In 2016, the DoD issued Directive 4715.21: Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience, which established policy and assigned responsibilities to provide the DoD with the resources necessary to assess and manage risks associated with the impacts of climate change. It foresaw a need for deliberate preparation, close cooperation, and coordinated planning to facilitate efforts to improve climate preparedness and resilience, to help safeguard the U.S. economy, infrastructure, environment, and natural resources, and to provide for the continuity of DoD operations, services, and programs. This directive instructed Combatant Commanders to assess climate change-linked risks to U.S. security interests within their areas of responsibility and risks to U.S. operations that result; they were then required to identify associated U.S. military capability gaps and operational risks.[393]

More recently, in response to EO 14008, the U.S. DoD has established a framework to address the climate crisis. The three key framework documents are the DoD Climate Adaptation Plan (CAP), the DoD Climate Risk Analysis (DCRA), and the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The Joint Forces have also produced climate strategies including U.S. Army Climate Strategy (2022), U.S. Navy Climate Action 2030, and Department of the Air Force, Climate Action Plan.[394]

DoD Climate Adaptation Plan

In September 2021, the DoD released the CAP,

Climate Change and International Responses Increasing Risks to US Interests Through 2040

Risks to US national security interests through 2040 will increase as countries respond to the intensifying physical effects of climate change. Global temperatures most likely will surpass the Paris Agreement goal of 1.5°C by around 2030, and the physical effects are projected to continue intensifying.



Risk		2021	2030	2040
Geopolitical Tensions Over Climate Responses	Perception of Insufficient Contributions to Reduce Emissions	Low	Medium	High
	Carbon Dioxide Removal not at Scale for Countries' Net-Zero Pledges	None	Low	Medium
	Developing Country Demands for Financing and Technology Assistance	Medium	High	High
	Petro States Resisting Clean Energy Transition Away From Fossil Fuels	Low	Medium	High
	Competition With China Over Key Minerals and Clean Energy Technologies	Low	Medium	High
	Contention Over Use of Economic Tools To Advance Climate Interests	None	Low	Medium
Climate Exacerbated Geopolitical Flashpoints	Miscalculation Over Strategic Competition in the Arctic Leading to Conflict	None	Low	Medium
	Cross-Border Water Tension and Conflict	Low	Medium	High
	Cross-Border Migration Attributed to Climate Impacts	Medium	High	High
	Ungoverned Unilateral Geoengineering	None	Low	Medium
Climate Effects Impacting Country-Level Instability	Strain on Energy and Food Systems	Low	Medium	High
	Negative Health Consequences	Low	Medium	Medium
	Internal Insecurity and Conflict	Low	Low	Medium
	Greater Demand for Aid and Humanitarian Relief	Medium	High	High
	Strain on Military Readiness	None	Low	Medium

Note: This graphic does not project government and non-government actions that might mitigate risks. The IC defines the level of risk as the probability of the issue

Figure 21: NIE 2040 Estimate of Key Climate Change Risks

outlining five lines of effort: 1) climate-informed decisions; 2) train and equip a climate-ready force; 3) resilient built and natural installation infrastructure; 4) supply chain resilience and innovation; and 5) enhance adaptation and resilience through collaboration with partners and allies.[395] In 2022, the DoD provided a CAP Progress Report highlighting action against the five lines of effort.[396]

DoD Climate Risk Analysis

In October 2021, the DoD released the DCRA, prepared to meet the requirements of EO 14008, Section 103(c). The DCRA is the first Pentagon report focused on the strategic risks of climate change and is considered the starting point for shared understanding of the risks and path forward.[397] For the Indo-Pacific, the DoD assessed that sea level rise and more extreme weather events will complicate the security environment, place key DoD warfighting infrastructure and surrounding communities at risk, and challenge local capacity to respond.[398] In particular, the DCRA highlights U.S. defense assets located in Guam, the Marshall Islands, and Palau as vulnerable to climate-induced hazards. Furthermore, the DCRA points out that competitors such as China may try to take

advantage of climate change impacts to gain influence.[399]

National Defense Strategy 2022

Although climate is not called out explicitly in the four priorities of the NDS 2022 (i.e., defending the homeland; deterring strategic attacks; deterring aggression; building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem), support for addressing climate change is integrated throughout. Specifically, the NDS recognizes:

- Extreme weather conditions will affect basing and access while degrading readiness, installations, and capabilities
- Climate change is creating new corridors of strategic interaction, particularly in the Artic region
- Increased demands, including on the Joint Forces for disaster response and defense support of civil authorities, and effects on security relationships with some Allies and partners
- Insecurity and instability related to climate change may tax governance capacity in some countries while heightening tensions between others, whether natural or human-made, for the Department and the Joint Force.[400]

DoD Climate Change Working Group

In March 2021, DoD established a Climate Change Working Group to coordinate DoD responses to EO 14008 and subsequent climate-related and energy-related directives.[401] The working group is chaired by a special assistant for climate to the Secretary of Defense for climate.[402]

Climate Security Actors

Pacific Island Leaders

Through a series of political declarations, Pacific Island Leaders have linked climate change to the region's security. Declarations including the Honiara Declaration (1992), Aitutaki Declaration (1997), Biketawa Declaration (2000), Niue Declaration (2008), Port Moresby Declaration (2015), and Kainaki II Declaration (2019) have contributed to the advancement of the broad definition of security as adopted in the Boe Declaration of 2018.[403]

PIF Secretariat

The Policy team at the PIF Secretariat has collaborated with national governments, international partners UNDP and IOM, and Adelphi to develop the Pacific Climate Security Assessment Guide, as discussed earlier, under the Climate Security in the Pacific Project.[404]

Pacific Fusion Centre (PFC)

The PFC was born out of the 2018 Boe Declaration; it was established in 2019 with the assistance of Australia and was initially located in Canberra during an interim phase. In July 2022, the 18 PIF Members signed the PFC Charter, placing the governance of the PFC under the PIF. The PFC's headquarters has been established in Port-Vila, Vanuatu.[405]

The PFC has a mandate to work with 12 regional organizations and law enforcement secretariats under its charter to enhance information sharing, cooperation, analysis, and assessment, and to expand situational awareness and capacity across the Pacific.[406]

At the PIF Joint Heads of Pacific Security Meeting in January 2023, the PFC was tasked with undertaking an assessment of the timeline of the catastrophic impact of climate change in the region. In undertaking this task, the PFC Director James Movick has noted the challenges of securitizing climate change for the purpose of intelligence analysis. According to the Director, the "regional technical organizations have not yet settled on a definition of climate security, but nevertheless the PFC is working towards analysis that will provide understanding of the security impact of climate change."[407]

Mobility

Endorsed by PIF leaders in November 2023, the first ever Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility states:

> *"The history of our Blue Pacific Continent is a story of mobility. Over thousands of years, our people have moved within and*

beyond the region in response to changing environmental, economic, political, and social conditions. Our connection to land and ocean is deep and immutable and represents the foundations of our Pacific identity and well-being."[408]

Globally, people move in search of better lives, to diversify income, or to offset losses and avoid hazards. Meanwhile, some people are forced to relocate or are displaced because of destruction of material resources, culture, and habitat. In the end, human mobility can be driven by a mix of these pull and push factors, and historically, climate change-driven movement has been considered a subset of disaster-driven displacement.[409]

With about half the population of the PICTs living within 10 kilometers (km; 6 miles) of the coast, communities in these states and territories are at risk of slow-onset events such as coastal erosion, saline intrusion, and sea level rise, all of which have the potential to cause severe economic and human impacts. The latest predictions from the IPCC confirm that sea level rise, saltwater intrusion, and coastal flooding will threaten the livelihoods of coastal communities and, therefore, drive permanent relocation.[410] Increasingly, the constellation of proactive and reactive human movements related to climate change is considered "climate mobility."[411]

Large- and small-scale mobility is not new to the Pacific, and the 20th and 21st centuries are not exceptions.

Wholesale displacement of island and atoll residents occurred in the Marshall Islands between 1946 and 1958 during U.S. nuclear testing. Fallout contaminated Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, and Utrik atolls; several islands within Bikini and Enewetak were vaporized. As of the 2020s, monitoring and chemical assessments of the land, sea, wildlife, and vegetable produce of the impacted atolls continues to find radiation in varying concentrations and levels of danger. Several hundreds of people were evacuated from atolls slated for testing and that were exposed to fallout, and their several thousands of descendants remain in various states of displacement. Their numbers range from the 400-500 who have returned to Utrik to the more than 8,000 Bikini descendants who live in other atoll communities. These communities remain more vulnerable than non-displaced Marshallese communities due to higher rates of radiation-linked health conditions, less access to productive land, and disruption of cultures and traditions. In addition, follow-on contamination of the environments of atolls that hosted testing cannot be ruled out as sea level rise reaches previously inland deposits of contaminated soil and other debris and increases the potential for nuclear contamination to leach into surface water and near-shore fishing grounds.[412]

Yet the forced relocation of Marshallese by the U.S. government is not the norm.

In 1947, 35 people from Vaitupu, Tuvalu's largest atoll, relocated to Kioa Island, in northern Fiji, because of concerns about land scarcity. The island was purchased the year before resettlement began. This move was community initiated and managed with assistance from the local colonial administration.[413] As of 2022, some 500 Kioans – Fijians of Tuvaluan descent – lived on the purchased island, and they are again working to adapt their home to be resilient to coming climate change impacts.[414]

Other communities have refused to move.

In the 1940s, large-scale phosphate mining was thriving in Nauru; however, the activity was making the land uninhabitable, and mining operators sought the relocation of the entire island population to facilitate operations of the miners. By the 1950s, the UN Trusteeship Council entertained proposals to facilitate individual migration to Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. Nauruan representatives rejected the proposals. In the 1960s, the Government of Australia suggested relocating Nauru's people to an island off Queensland, Australia. Nauruans again rejected the proposal on the grounds that they did not want to lose their national sovereignty and Nauruan identity nor become a minority in a new land and subject to discrimination.[415]

There have been some very high-profile recent cases.

Communities from the Carteret Islands in PNG have faced and continue to confront pressure to relocate. Since 1994, islanders from the seven atolls forming the Carterets, which lie only 1.2 meters (m; 3.9 feet) above sea level, have lost about 50% of their land, and several families relocated, many to Bougainville Island, 80 km (50 miles) away. These people were proclaimed in the international media as the "world's first climate refugees,"[416] although most UN or other international agencies do not apply this label due, in part, to the fact that Carterets families moved within PNG rather than across an international boundary in flight from war, violence, conflict, or persecution, as required in the 1951 Refugee Convention.[417] Resettlement programs are being led by the community, especially the Carteret Council of Elders and Tulele Peisa, which formed under the Council of Elders' aegis.[418] Rebuilding lives and livelihoods has not proven easy for the 30 families who had relocated as of 2022. Moreover, additional families – totaling 350 families leaving the Carterets by 2027 – are expected to swell the ranks of the displaced with minimal funding or assistance from the global community. The challenges of purchasing land and adapting to the socio-economic ways of a new space will be long term.[419]

Meanwhile, Fiji has led the way developing planned relocation of whole villages and SOPs for such operations. In 2014, the village of Vunidogoloa, home to some 140 people, became the first village to be relocated in a planned fashion and specifically within the context of sea level rise linked to the climate crisis. The plan to relocate took 10 years to put together and involved the community, the government of Fiji, and various UN and other international organizations. While the people of the new village are broadly safe and secure, the move was not without mishaps, the most commonly cited being that all of the new homes were built without kitchens… a result of a male-dominated consultation process. The successes and failures of the Vunidogoloa relocation helped Fiji adapt and revise its relocation planning and SOPs just as subsequent moves have led to additional lessons learned and revisions.[420]

Defining the Challenge

There is no legally defined terminology to describe movement in the context of climate change, but it is generally agreed that there are three main forms, as mentioned in the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework and reflected in subsequent global frameworks:

- Migration (understood as predominantly voluntary)
- Displacement
- Relocation (planned and based on consensus)

All of these forms fall under "climate mobility," which describes any type of movement – forced or voluntary, temporary or permanent, within or across international borders – potentially arising in the context of climate change. The ability to move out of areas affected by climate change for the purpose of resilience is a fundamental human right. However, this movement may also exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and generate new risks as it can lead to exploitation or discrimination in destination areas due to limited safe and regular migration options.[421] Indeed, a study on slow-onset effects of climate change and human rights protection for cross-border migrants from the Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) confirmed that climate change-related cross-border movement is most likely to involve movements between developing countries, a circumstance that puts greater pressure on countries that can least bear it.[422]

Already, some estimates expect to see more than 50,000 people displaced from their homes every year due to climate-related events and disasters. As the Pacific is one of the world regions most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, there is little reason to think that these estimates are too high.[423] Both voluntary migration flows and displacement internally and across borders could escalate. Some 340,000 Pacific-born people already resided overseas for

various reasons in 2019; some 20% of islanders lived in another Pacific country (mostly Fiji or Vanuatu) while the remainder lived elsewhere – frequently Australia, New Zealand, or the U.S. For each PICT, the scope of their international relations and internal socio-economic profile will determine the forms mobility takes. Entry and admissions agreements – i.e., opportunities for permanent residence or seasonal work – help determine the most popular destinations for Pacific migrants. Meanwhile, trends of internal migration tend to be rural to urban within islands but also include "step migration," where people from remote outer islands move to towns and cities on main islands and then move overseas.

Various potential outcomes emerge from scenarios developed to estimate the numbers of people who currently live on atoll islands and who may move. In the worst possible scenario, by 2050, approximately 350,000 people residing in atoll countries (Tuvalu, Kiribati, RMI, and Tokelau) and regions of FSM, Palau, PNG, Solomon Islands, and Tonga, will be at risk of sea level rise. Communities would thus face increased risk of displacement or will feel pressure to migrate to higher areas in their own country or overseas. One survey found that over 70% of households in Kiribati and Tuvalu and 35% in Nauru would consider migration as a way to cope with intensified sea level rise or droughts. However, the same survey found that limited finances and limited access to international migration opportunities would act as critical impediments.[424]

Factors determining the impact on communities are determined by each country's location in the Pacific, the type of island formation (volcanic or coral atoll), and the level of dependence of populations on natural resource-based livelihoods. Along with these factors, PICTs exhibit different abilities to adapt, shaped by levels of economic and social development alongside issues relating to governance, standards of urban and rural planning, and the availability of natural, human, and financial resources.

UN Frameworks, Agreements, and Compacts

The UNFCCC COP16 held in Cancun, Mexico, in 2010 called on parties to understand, coordinate, and collaborate to address climate-induced displacement, migration, and planned relocation. Subsequent COPs placed migration within the loss and damage agenda. The Paris Agreement (2015) and an accompanying COP decision created a Taskforce on Displacement, an expert body to fall under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, which had been organized at COP19 (2013). Taskforce recommendations on how to avert, minimize, and address climate change impacts on displacement were adopted at COP24 in Poland in 2018.[425] Then, at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, in 2022, parties reached an agreement for a dedicated loss and damage fund,[426] and while operationalization of the fund won agreement at COP28 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, in December 2023, pledges by developed countries to the fund totaled less than 0.2% of the estimated US$400 billion annually in loss and damage that vulnerable countries are expected to experience.[427]

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM), endorsed by nearly all UN Member States in 2018, was the first intergovernmental negotiated agreement that covered all dimensions of international migration. It is a policy document and framework for action that articulates challenges linked to climate mobility and outlines actions to address these issues. Among other appeals, the GCM calls for strengthening flexible pathways for regular migration, including development of practices for admission and stay for migrants who may be compelled to move because of the adverse impacts of climate change and disasters.[428] Takeaways from the GCM with relation to climate-impelled migration were:

- Slow onset environmental degradation, natural disasters, and climate change impacts are drivers of contemporary migration
- Migration has multiple causes as environmental drivers interact with political, economic, and demographic drivers

- Comprehensive responses to address drivers must be designed appropriately for the countries of origin to make migration a choice rather than a desperate necessity; additional responses fit within disaster preparedness, DRR, and disaster response, as well as facilitation of population movements
- Climate change mitigation and adaptation measures in countries of origin need to be prioritized to minimize drivers of migration
- Adaptation in situ or return of migrants might not be possible in some cases; strengthening regular migration pathways (planned relocation and visa options) need to be part of migration management tools
- States need to cooperate to identify, develop, and strengthen solutions for people migrating in the context of slow-onset environmental degradation (in particular desertification, land degradation, and sea level rise) and slow-onset disasters (drought)
- Regional level work will be important to address environmental drivers of migration
- State-led initiatives that focus on mobility linked to natural disasters outside of the UN context must be taken into account
- There is a need for more investment in strengthened evidence, data, and research to address environmental migration challenges.[429]

The first UN Human Rights Council resolution on human rights and climate change that also addressed considerations of climate mobility came in 2017. Resolution 25/20 noted "the urgency of protecting and promoting human rights of migrants and persons displaced across international borders, in the context of the adverse impact of climate change."[430] The Resolution also requested a report on the gaps in protecting human rights that were specific to migration and displacement within the context of climate change. Meanwhile, in collaboration with the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), the OHCHR prepared its own report on slow-onset climate effects on human rights protection for cross-border migrants.[431] The gap report identified key areas of international law wherein climate mobility is not explicitly covered and where there is room for discussion to ensure comprehensive protection of persons crossing borders in the context of climate change. As of the writing of this handbook, OHCHR continues to promote application of human rights protections to climate migrants rather than reopen discussions on legal definitions of terms like "refugee" in other laws and treaties.[432]

Nansen Initiative

Outside of UN processes, the Nansen Initiative led to the development of the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, or the "Protection Agenda."[433] The Nansen Initiative was a state-led, bottom-up, consultative process intended to identify effective practices, draw on the actual practice and experience of governments, and build consensus on principles and elements to address the protection and assistance needs of persons displaced across borders in the context of disasters, including the effects of climate change. Launched in October 2012, the Nansen Initiative built on the UNFCCC Climate Change Conference's Cancun Agreement, which had a focus on CCA, alongside the Nansen Principles from the 2011 Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement. The Protection Agenda consolidated the outcomes of a series of regional inter-governmental consultations and civil society meetings convened by the Nansen Initiative.[434] The Protection Agenda was endorsed by over 105 states and is not legally binding but, rather, sets out a toolbox to prevent, prepare, and respond to disaster displacement. The implementation of the Nansen Protection Agenda is spearheaded by the PDD, with a focus on developing regional solutions.[435]

The Nansen Principles

1. Responses to climate and environmental displacement need to be informed by adequate knowledge and guided by the fundamental principles of humanity, human

dignity, human rights, and international cooperation.
2. States have a primary duty to protect their populations and give particular attention to the special needs of the people most vulnerable to and most affected by climate change and other environmental hazards, including the displaced, hosting communities, and those at risk of displacement. The development of legislation, policies, and institutions as well as the investment of adequate resources are key in this regard.
3. The leadership and engagement of local governments and communities, civil society, and the private sector are needed to address effectively the challenges posed by climate change, including those linked to human mobility.
4. When national capacity is limited, regional frameworks and international cooperation should support action at national level and contribute to building national capacity, underpinning development plans, preventing displacement, assisting and protecting people and communities affected by such displacement, and finding durable solutions.
5. Prevention and resilience need to be further strengthened at all levels, particularly through adequate resources. International, regional, and local actors have a shared responsibility to implement the principles enshrined in the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disaster.
6. Building local and national capacity to prepare for and respond to disasters is fundamental. At the same time, the international disaster response system needs to be reinforced. The development of multi-hazard early warning systems linking local and global levels is critical.
7. The existing norms of international law should be fully utilized, and normative gaps addressed.
8. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement provide a sound legal framework to address protection concerns arising from climate and other environmental internal displacement. States are encouraged to ensure the adequate implementation and operationalization of these principles through national legislation, policies, and institutions.
9. A more coherent and consistent approach at the international level is needed to meet the protection needs of people displaced externally owing to sudden-onset disasters. States, working in conjunction with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant stakeholders, could develop a guiding framework or instrument in this regard.
10. National and international policies and responses, including planned relocation, need to be implemented on the basis of non-discrimination, consent, empowerment, participation, and partnerships with those directly affected, with due sensitivity to age, gender, and diversity aspects. The voices of the displaced or those threatened with displacement or loss of home or livelihood must be heard and taken into account, without neglecting those who may choose to remain.[436]

Pacific Regional Context

Several instances of planned relocation among PICTs illustrate the challenges inherent in all climate-related mobility. In the colonial era, relocations occurred after environmental degradation because of mining (from Banaba, Kiribati, to Rabi Island, Fiji) or due to land scarcity (as discussed above with Tuvaluans who moved to Kioa, Fiji). Subsequent analyses and the narrated experiences of the people involved in these relocations underscored the importance of perceived choice in the process, which ideally includes consultation with and participation of affected people in decision-making. A lack of such inclusion risks exposing migrants to loss of identity and loss of rights, real concerns that drove repeated Nauruan refusals to relocate in the mid-20th century. Among those elements threatening loss of identity is the risk of loss of

customary land, which, throughout the region, is key to individual and community culture and livelihood.

The possibility and need for planned relocation have been repeatedly raised for some PICTs as questions about their continued habitability persist. While these states and territories are frequently presented as "special cases," they are, themselves, insistent that their goal is to remain and to retain sovereignty even as some recognize the need to plan for a worst case where population movement is inevitable. The right to nationality and prevention of statelessness pertains here.[437] On this score, PIF's Niue Declaration on Climate Change (2008) encouraged increased assistance with relocation, if necessary, recognized the desire of Pacific peoples to continue to live in their own countries where possible, and urged development partners to provide support for adaptation and, if necessary, relocation.[438]

The FRDP (2017-2030) lists priority actions for a range of stakeholders to address human mobility. These actions strengthen national governments', regional and civil society organizations', and other partners' capacities to protect individuals and communities migrating in the context of climate change by using national policy processes that integrate vulnerable communities. Under the FRDP governance arrangements, the PRP stood up a Technical Working Group (TWG) on Human Mobility[439] in 2019. The TWG, chaired by IOM, is intent on moving all partners to address issues of climate-driven and disaster-induced displacement and planned relocation via collaboration to improve understanding of diverse community needs, experiences, knowledge, capacity, and perspectives. In 2021, the TWG organized the Pacific Regional Consultation on Internal Displacement in collaboration with the UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement. It facilitated a platform for Pacific national governments to share their perspectives on issues of internal displacement with a global mechanism tasked with finding solutions.[440] The participating governments' statements and recommendations were incorporated in the High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement's Report,[441] which completed the Panel's mandate in September 2021.[442] More recently, the TWG published research regarding the use of traditional and indigenous knowledge to inform relocation planning in the expectation that climate change will more frequently mean that, rather than individuals choosing to migrate, entire communities will need to move.[443]

Additional areas building to a regional approach to climate mobility are the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security, which reaffirmed climate change as the single greatest threat to livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of Pacific peoples,[444] and the "2050 Strategy," endorsed by PIF leaders in 2022 and that enshrined the regional approach in order to pressure global bodies and players to take action even as they support each other on local and regional efforts, including mobility. Within the 2050 Strategy's Climate Change and Disasters Thematic Area, climate change- and disaster-related mobility includes all previously mentioned actions – relocation, migration, and displacement. This 2050 Strategy Theme views protection of rights, cultural practice, and heritage or traditional knowledge as a major underpinning of any future protocols for climate mobility.[445]

Other initiatives include the Pacific Climate Change Centre in Apia, Samoa; it will contribute to increased data and understanding of climate mobility. Moreover, the Pacific Resilience Facility will provide financing options for resilient development and preparedness to minimize mortality, displacement, and economic losses. The PIDF endorsed the 2015 Suva Declaration, which highlighted that climate-related displacement is already occurring, and the PIDF Nadi Bay Declaration (2019) strongly supported the need for a UN resolution to protect the rights and human security of displaced people. The Polynesian Leaders Group's 2018 Amatuku Declaration recommends the establishment of a Grand Coalition of Pacific Leaders on Climate Change Displacement and Migration.[446]

Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility

In November 2023, at the PIF Leaders Meeting in Cook Islands, the PIF leaders endorsed the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility. It is the first document of its kind to address the issues of migration, displacement, and planned relocation in a comprehensive way and will be a critical tool for implementing the 2050 Strategy. The Framework was partly developed through the Pacific Climate Change Migration and Human Security (PCCMHS) - led by IOM with partners, UNESCAP, the International Labour Organization, OHCHR, the PIF Secretariat, and PDD; it was supported through funding from the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, and Aotearoa New Zealand's International Development Cooperation Programme — Ngā Hoe Tuputupu-mai-tawhiti.[447] Consultations toward the framework included experts, politicians, civil society groups, and communities themselves.[448]

The Framework recognizes that no amount of climate change mitigation taken today will halt processes driven by decades of GHG emissions. Thus, it encourages proactive planning to ensure that people and communities vulnerable to the impacts of climate change are enhancing their own resilience and decreasing, rather than increasing the risks to which they are exposed. Contextualizing climate-induced mobility as a form of loss and damage, the Framework seeks to ensure that PICTs have access to technical and financial support to manage the risks and costs associated with relocation. Broadly, the Framework takes a human rights approach to mobility and reiterates PIF's Declaration on Preserving Maritime Zones in the Face of Climate Change-Related Sea-Level Rise, which explicitly states that PICTs will continue to exercise sovereignty and sovereign rights over maritime zones and resources based on the right to stay. Indeed, the objective is to deepen collective responsibility and accountability for the stewardship of the Blue Pacific Continent and ensure protection against statelessness and respect associated rights.

The core areas for action within the Framework are:

- Staying in Place – PIF member states will continue to advocate for climate change mitigation actions, especially GHG emissions reductions, and CCA to ensure that communities can use scientific and traditional knowledge to adapt themselves to new climate realities and remain or return to a more resilient space after a climate-related disaster event.
- Planned Relocation – As a last resort, this organized process should ensure that people can settle somewhere with the conditions for rebuilding their lives and maintaining their cultures; such processes must be undertaken only in consultation with the affected people – i.e., those being relocated and those receiving communities; international legal norms will need to be initiated to ensure that people relocated across borders are protected.
- Migration – People who choose or are forced to move to improve their lives will be supported by regional and national authorities who will advocate for labor, education, and family reunification agreements for cross-border mobility.
- Displacement – Emergency evacuations should be carried out only within the strictures of law, for the shortest period possible, and only to reduce the risk of loss of life; regional partners will deliver relief and assistance to those displaced within or outside their countries and to ensure durable solutions are found, and each country or territory should undertake work to identify at-risk communities and conduct contingency planning and exercises for addressing risks.[449]

As part of its action plan, PIF committed itself to helping PICTs identify and share best practices and guidelines for planned relocation.

National Policies

In 2021, PIF, in commentary to the International Law Commission, noted that

most PICT governments had not published comprehensive migration-related CCA policies because, among other factors, the issue is culturally and politically fraught and there is a lack of data on the scale and patterns of possible climate change-related migration – data that would allow these governments to produce realistic strategies and plans.[450] Nonetheless, various countries continue to work on climate change-related policies, laws, and advocacy strategies that will form the basis of national, regional, and, potentially, international laws, resolutions, and practices. The following narratives provide some examples of this national-level activity; they are listed in alphabetical order by country.

- Cook Islanders are citizens of New Zealand and, as such, can resettle to New Zealand for any reasons; they are also legally allowed to reside and work in Australia under the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement.[451]
- Based on requirements in Fiji's Climate Change Act (2021) and the National Planned Relocation Guidelines (2019), the National Relocation Taskforce stood up to help develop SOPs for Planned Relocation. The Taskforce is comprised of representatives of 30 government agencies responsible for various stages of the relocation process.[452] The SOP itself was approved by Fiji's cabinet in March 2023, and the government then launched consultations with various villages and settlements identified as at-risk due to climate change.[453] The Planned Relocation Guidelines outline state and non-state support for internal relocation of coastal communities. The Government of Fiji also developed Displacement Guidelines that seek to reduce displacement risk, manage displacement when it occurs, and identify durable solutions. Several other climate change policy documents – the National Adaptation Plan and the National Policy on Climate Change (2018-2030) – make references to planned relocation, displacement, and human mobility, including emphasis on labor mobility initiatives as tools to support climate change adaptation priorities.
- FSM prioritizes helping its population remain in their island homes. In its Nationwide Climate Change Policy, the FSM "reaffirms … its people's rights and desire to continue to live sustainably on their islands" and in its Nationwide Integrated Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Policy, the FSM states its goal to "prevent environmental migration through adaptation strategies." In implementing adaptation, the FSM lays out principles to be followed, especially coordination between national, state, and local actors across multiple sectors – and both the FSM's Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Policy and National Disaster Response Plan emphasize this element. The Constitution enshrines the right of citizens or persons to migrate within the borders of the State, a right that is particularly critical in the face of displacement induced by climate change, including sea level rise and inundation of atolls and other low-lying islands. In addition, based on the FSM-U.S. COFA, citizens of FSM can enter the U.S. and establish non-immigrant residence more easily. Many Micronesians already utilize this option for voluntary migration – for education, health, and work – into the U.S.[454]
- Kiribati's climate change policy focuses on managing internal displacement and relocation that may occur in the context of loss and damage due to climate change.[455] Although a former President secured 6,000 acres of land in Fiji as a potential future refuge for climate migrants from Kiribati, subsequent administrations have shifted away from that "migration with dignity" plan and toward plans to build up the country's land and bring some areas 2 m (6.6 feet) higher above sea level.[456] The 2013 National Framework for Climate Change and CCA did identify key requirements for short, medium, and long-term planning with relation to population resettlement.[457]
- Rather than planning for out-migration, a

process rejected by Nauruans in the 20th century, Nauru has considered the "Higher Ground Initiative" to relocate homes and critical infrastructure away from the low-lying coastal areas and to interior areas. The plan to develop model interior settlements is intended to involve national consultation with communities, landowners, and development partners.[458]

- Like Nauru, Niue has considered a plan to relocate settlements away from more exposed and densely populated areas and to interior, less exposed zones. The initiative has already seen the hospital and fuel depot located away from the coastline, but the cost and complexity of relocating entire settlements means little progress has been made to date.[459]
- Based on the Palau-U.S. COFA, citizens of Palau can enter the U.S. and establish non-immigrant residence more easily. Many Palauans already utilize this option for voluntary migration – for education, health, and work – into the U.S.[460]
- RMI's Tile Til Eo 2050 Climate Strategy, published in 2018, prescribed that the National Adaptation Plan should consider measures for relocation. Tile Til Eo states that it is likely that some Marshallese will migrate and that RMI may not be able to accommodate the entire 60,000-plus residents projected to be living in the country by 2030. The challenge laid before the Government in the Strategy is to simultaneously assure the right of citizens to remain in the islands and ensure continued opportunity for migration for those who choose to relocate.[461] At COP28 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, RMI did release its NAP, which was based on massive public consultation and explicitly promotes adaptation in place with the financial and technical backing of the developed world; it does, however, concede that many Marshallese will migrate away as climate impacts worsen despite such relocation being rejected by many of the residents consulted for the NAP process.[462] Based on the RMI-U.S. COFA, citizens of RMI can enter the U.S. and establish non-immigrant residence more easily. Many Marshallese already utilize this option for voluntary migration – for education, health, and work – into the U.S.[463]
- Past efforts to develop guidelines in the Solomon Islands have been impeded by the country's land tenure system; since customary ownership of the land prevails, acquisition of land for relocation cannot be undertaken without required amendments to legislation and other deep structural changes.[464] Despite these setbacks, in 2022, IOM helped publish the Solomon Islands Planned Relocation Guidelines, which provide for the voluntary, planned, and coordinated movement of people to suitable locations, away from risk-prone areas, where they can enjoy their rights under customary, national, and international law. The Guidelines establish a framework for decision-making, planning, and undertaking relocation based on the findings of the Solomon Islands National Adaptation Programmes of Action (2008), which states that climate change is the "most important environmental and developmental issue for Solomon Islands" and that adaptation measures need to be implemented with "some urgency." The National Climate Change Policy (2012-2017) also recognized that climate change will threaten national development goals and place added burden on government resources. Finally, the National Security Strategy (2020) recognized climate change as "the number one global security risk facing Solomon Islands." Based on these policies and strategies, the Solomon Islands Government had already identified several communities that could benefit from planned relocation, and it documented instances of communities conducting community-driven relocations following accepted traditional protocols.[465]
- The Government of Tuvalu sponsored a draft UN General Assembly resolution titled, "Providing Legal Protection for Persons Displaced by the Impacts of Climate Change,"

in 2019. Although the resolution was never tabled in plenary,[466] it did elevate the issue by urging the international community to provide protection and assistance to people displaced internally and across borders by the impacts of climate change. The draft resolution sought an international legally binding instrument to provide appropriate protections to uphold the human rights of climate-displaced persons.[467] Additional international work by Tuvalu promotes a Special Pacific Access Category for Tuvaluans – and, presumably, other Pacific Islanders – seeking to migrate due to the effects of climate change.[468] Nationally, Tuvalu's Te Kaniva: Climate Change Policy (2012-2021) seeks to maintain national sovereignty through, among other things, increasing preparedness for displacement through planning for each island and advocating for the establishment of new migration arrangements. Tuvalu also aims to promote the development of an international legal framework for the relocation and recognition of Tuvalu as a sovereign state if sea level rise submerges the island nation.[469] Among other projects, the Te Ataeao Nei (Future Now) will attempt to build a "digital nation," which, in a worst-case scenario where the country's land is all submerged, will host government services that allow Tuvalu to continue to operate as a sovereign state.[470] On the migration arrangement front, in November 2023, Tuvalu and Australia signed the "Falepili" pact that, among other things, will allow 280 Tuvaluans annually to migrate to Australia and will allocate funds for land reclamation in Tuvalu's capital.[471]

- Vanuatu was the first country worldwide to launch the National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement. The policy proposes guidelines to address both short- and long-term displacement, contains guiding principles, defines strategic areas for intervention, and identifies actions to be led by a range of different actors. Vanuatu's Climate Change and DRR Policy (2016-2030) addresses issues of displacement, which are subsequently elaborated upon in a dedicated policy document.[472]

Gender

While climate change will impact everyone worldwide, the impacts will be felt differently by people depending on their locations, ages, income groups, genders, and other individual factors. Because of gender-based inequalities and discrimination in various parts of the world, women and girls are often more vulnerable than men and boys to phenomena influenced by climate change. This increased vulnerability mirrors the challenges to conflict resolution and peacebuilding that the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda has developed to address. Since the first WPS-related UN Security Council resolution in 2000, this agenda has come to encompass advocacy for women's inclusion in all aspects of conflict prevention, mediation, and peacebuilding. As UN Women assesses that the climate crisis may actually amplify existing gender inequalities,[473] there is a clear need and a growing effort to understand the gendered impacts of climate change and to develop more nuanced and gender-sensitive approaches to build resilience by including women in decision-making at all levels.

Climate Change Impacts on Women

The negative impacts of climate change will have widespread consequences but, in many contexts, will disproportionately affect the most vulnerable, including women, children, and the elderly. Furthermore, climate change impacts can magnify pre-existing inequalities,[474] as they can expose people to new or greater hazards and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities or erode coping mechanisms. Pre-existing patterns of discrimination and structural inequalities can put women at a major disadvantage as they result in women and girls not enjoying the same rights as males, not having legal status to own or control land, and not having access to education, public information, or climate finance opportunities. When women are poorer, receive

less education, and are excluded from decision-making processes, they become more vulnerable. During disasters, cultural norms surrounding gender roles can decrease women's coping capacity and restrict their ability to evacuate or adapt.[475] The IPCC reports that women and girls:

- Are at greater risk of food insecurity
- Are more likely to die in extreme weather events; and
- Face a greater mental health burden.[476]

Multiple factors can lead to disparate outcomes between people of differing genders, incomes, educational backgrounds, ethnicities, and disabilities,[477] and these outcomes often include increased vulnerability of groups that sit at the intersections of these factors. In other words, while women in general may experience greater vulnerability, women of minority races or ethnicities, poor women, or women living with disabilities may face exponentially greater risk.[478] The power dynamics and societal expectations that define roles, responsibilities, behaviors, and differential access to, use of, and ownership of resources for people with different identity elements shapes how people experience and manage risk, including in the contexts of climate change and insecurity. Of particular interest here, the experiences of men and women are shaped by the society in which they live, which can lead to differences in work, household roles, and access to resources or information.

Men and women may do different work; in many cases, women are unpaid or paid much less than men, or the gendered division of labor may concentrate women in the informal sector. In general, across the Pacific, women work disproportionately in agriculture or fisheries,[479] and in tourism-affiliated jobs such as handicrafts, cleaning, and restaurant work.[480] All of these sub-sectors are vulnerable to the direct and indirect impacts of climate change as they can be disrupted by storms, coastal erosion, saltwater intrusion, drought, falling fisheries productivity, pandemics, and even changing international travel practices. The disproportionate rate of female employment in these sectors – either informally or as low-paid, low-skilled labor – means that women's financial security is directly threatened by climate change. An Overseas Development Institute (ODI) analysis of events entered in EM-DAT, the international disaster database, alongside market and satellite assessments found short-term reductions in agricultural production and exports following hurricanes. Adverse agricultural impacts appear to be more pronounced in smaller island economies and in islands characterized by lower agricultural diversification. Statistical analyses also find that agriculture and tourism are the sectors most severely affected by climate change-influenced phenomena. Climate change-enhanced storms, floods, heatwaves, and droughts can lead to crop failures, job losses, and food or livelihood insecurity for agricultural workers. Cyclones' negative impacts on tourist arrivals has been found to last up to two quarters following a cyclone,[481] and women who experience these longer-term work disruptions frequently have little or no ability to shift to other employment and, if they work informally, they are left out of government-funded unemployment or re-training schemes.[482]

Beyond direct economic damage, during and immediately after emergencies, the duties of caring for children and elderly relatives, cooking, and ensuring the household has fuel and water often fall upon women. Climate change impacts can lead to increasing scarcity of food, water, and energy sources and add to economic pressures on families. These impacts can increase the burden of work borne by women and girls, for example, by increasing the distance they must travel to gather clean water. Frequently, this increase also means they are subject to intimidation, gender-based violence, sexual harassment, child marriage, and rape. The onslaught of climate-induced disasters could also increase the risk to women and girls of organized trafficking.[483]

Finally, due to social structures and mores, men and women may have differentiated access to resources and information, including access to the internet, and this lack of access could mean unfamiliarity with disaster preparedness

or early warning information. Ownership or control of a mobile telephone, the cost of a data plan or other media subscription, or free time to read and search for information may be dictated by the [male] head of household. In many developing and patriarchal societies, this access difference is exacerbated as women may have less formal education and decision-making power, reducing both their ability to understand climate information or early warnings and their presence in policy discussions, which can decrease their resilience.[484]

Papua New Guinea, Fragility, Climate Change, and Gender

One key country in the Pacific provides an example of the nexus among climate change, gender, and governance.

PNG already faces moderate exposure to flood, drought, and cyclones alongside non-hydrometeorological hazards, such as volcanic eruptions. Climate change is likely to increase hazards and disproportionately affect PNG's poorest residents. In PNG, climate impacts could include:

- A decrease in frequency but increase in intensity of cyclones
- Sea level rise that continues to inundate coastal communities, as has already happened in the Carteret Islands
- More intense heavy precipitation that fuels river and coastal flooding and landslides; and
- Ocean acidification and warming that threaten fisheries and coral reefs.[485]

Heightened vulnerability in PNG stems from widespread poverty, poor infrastructure, corruption, and safety and security concerns.[486] Four phenomena that are both cause and symptom of shortcomings in the country's development have been identified: 1) weak governance, 2) economic inequality, 3) vulnerability to climate change, and 4) intercommunal and gender-based violence.[487] However, a World Bank report notes that a complete understanding of climate risks in PNG is hindered by limited data on many aspects of social vulnerability and the lack of localized historical and future climate change data.[488]

In PNG, patriarchal gender norms limit women's political participation and threats of divorce, shame, harassment, and violence prevent women from exercising political agency.[489] Additionally, women's exclusion is perpetuated in health, education, and employment disparities that lead to unequal opportunities for men and women.[490] Indeed, an Australian Broadcasting Corporation International Development survey of citizens found that the "dominant patriarchal mindset and systemic gender inequality was perceived as a key barrier to equal opportunity for women," including participation and representation in decision-making or leadership positions. Additionally, the survey found that women reported having less freedom to express their opinions, less knowledge on social issues, and less access to media. Although mobile phone and internet access has increased in recent years, women are among the groups who remain disadvantaged in digital access.[491]

Given its size, population, and geo-strategic importance, PNG has attracted various international programs that seek to shore up its political, economic, and social sectors in an effort to reduce its vulnerability in the face of intensifying natural hazards.

The PNG-Australia Climate Change Action Plan (PACCAP), signed in 2018, provides a framework for bilateral information sharing and cooperation on climate change. Via the plan, Australian support to PNG integrates infrastructure, education, private sector development, food security, energy, governance, and health; among other projects for small businesses and solar off-grid power systems, the Water for Women project "Strongim WASH Komuniti Projek" sought to deliver water, hygiene, and sanitation services to more than 40,000 people, especially women and people living with a disability, in PNG's East Sepik province, where it is expected that climate change will put pressure on water resources.[492]

The U.S., too, seeks to help PNG address root exposure, structural weakness, and

lack of coping capacity. In 2019, the Global Fragility Act (GFA) was signed into U.S. law to strengthen the security and prosperity of people by helping to fortify parts of the world that continue to grapple with challenges that can lead to destabilizing conflict and violence. In 2020, the U.S. Government released the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, the Global Fragility Strategy (GFS), a 10-year strategy to address conflict prevention and stabilization. The GFS was followed in 2022 by the Prologue to the GFS in which the Biden administration identified PNG as a partner country under the GFA,[493] and GFA-related country plans were released in 2023.[494] The 2022 Prologue identified the changing global climate as a collective challenge and stated that the U.S. will "integrate policy approaches in multiple priority areas—from democratic support and climate change to diversity and gender equity—within the GFA framework," and "consider and address the risks posed by the impacts of climate change and other environmental security risks and test new ways of building climate resilience."[495] The GFS instructs U.S. embassies and missions to establish coordination mechanisms for engagement and directs them to implement plans and programs based on partner engagement to ensure lasting impacts rely on solutions driven by local needs and perspectives. Promoting the role of women in addressing climate security challenges will require connection of local and global efforts and translation of political commitments into actions,[496] and the 2023 country plan for PNG incorporates the long-term goal of "communities and marginalized populations in PNG, especially women, are more empowered and included."[497]

Pacific Women

In 2012, leaders of the PIF endorsed the Pacific Leaders Gender Equality Declaration (PLGED) to throw their weight behind efforts to lift the status of women in the Pacific and empower them to be active participants in economic, political, and social life. Among key issues to which the leaders pointed were girls' education, violence against women, and a lack of women's representation in Pacific legislatures, all of which "[imposed] a high personal, social, and economic cost on Pacific people and nations." The Leaders sought national policy actions to incorporate articles from the Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) into legislative and statutory reforms and policy initiatives, support the production and use of sex-disaggregated data and gender analysis to inform government policies and programs, and strengthen consultative mechanisms with civil society groups on budget and policy issues. They called upon countries to remove barriers to women's employment, market access, and financial services, information, and training.

Additionally, leaders called on partners to work in a coordinated, consultative, and harmonized way to support national efforts to address gender inequality, to increase financial and technical support to gender equality and women's empowerment programs, and to adopt strategies to provide employment and consultation opportunities for women in the planning and delivery of development assistance to the region.[498]

Meanwhile, under SPC stewardship, the Pacific Ministers for Women endorsed the latest Pacific Platform for Action (PPA) on Gender Equality and Women's Human Rights (2018-2030) to accelerate implementation of the PLGED and to promote gender equality and the well-being of all women and girls across all age ranges, geographic regions, disability statuses, ethno-linguistic groups, sexual orientations, and gender identities in recognition of how the various elements of social identity can increase or reduce vulnerability. Under the PPA, gender equality is defined as "equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities of women and men and girls and boys." It focuses on ensuring that the interests, needs, and priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration across social, economic, and political spheres, and it proclaims the right to participate in decision-making and to occupy leadership

positions, which, if done intentionally, can ensure women's voices are incorporated into plans and strategies to address climate change. As part of its custodianship of the PPA, SPC convenes the Triennial Conference of Pacific Women and the Meeting of Pacific Ministers for Women.[499]

For over 40 years, the Triennial Conference of Pacific Women, hosted by SPC, has brought together decision-makers, development partners, researchers, and civil society to impel Pacific societies toward gender equality. The Conference adopted the first PPA in 1994[500] and a revised PPA in 2004,[501] before endorsing the most recent PPA (2018-2030) in 2017. Under CROP's mandate, SPC's Human Rights and Social Development division continues to be the regional lead on implementing PPA and on ensuring that gender-focused programming is integrated across regional technical activity.[502] Separately, the Pacific Islands Forum Women Leaders Meeting (PIFWLM) was only elevated to a standing PIF meeting in 2021 with the first annual meeting held in 2022. This elevation to a standing meeting to be held ahead of the annual PIF Leaders Meeting was intended to ensure that the voice of Pacific women is an official part of PIF's regional decision-making process.[503]

At the 2023 PIF Leaders Meeting, leaders then endorsed the revitalized PLGED, which will now apply to action on gender equality and social inclusion commitments under the PIF's 2050 Strategy. With respect to the 2050 Strategy, PLGED reaffirmed that climate change and disasters, including nuclear contamination, have a disproportionate impact on women and girls in all their diversity, particularly women and girls with disabilities and women and girls living in rural, remote, and maritime areas.[504] The 2023 PIFWLM promised a thorough review of the 2050 Strategy to ensure that work plans under the strategy have integrated gender equality and social inclusion.[505]

A key challenge to implementation of the PLGED has been a lack of female leadership at the highest levels of PICTs' economic, political, and social hierarchies. It has often been asserted that diversity – including gender diversity – in planning and decision-making processes improves outcomes. Women – or other minorities – can offer different perspectives and priorities and help ensure that strategies address the needs of all.[506] Only two women have ever led a Pacific Island Country (which excludes Australia and New Zealand): Hilda Heine, former president of the Marshall Islands, and Fiame Naomi Mata'afa, Prime Minister of Samoa (as of December 2023). Traditional rules around political leadership can prevent women from even standing in elections, let alone taking power.[507] Still, Pacific women have not been idle in promoting adaptation and mitigation as they have pioneered local, community-based solutions to pressing problems linked to climate change, especially displacement from ancestral lands.[508]

Given their small stature and historic marginalization, PICTs have rarely had representation on top international treaty bodies, including the committee overseeing CEDAW. Among the remedies suggested by the second annual PIFWLM, held in Fiji in September 2023, was to host an extraordinary session of the CEDAW Committee in 2025. The expectation is that this event would provide the Pacific as a whole and civil society organizations in particular with an opportunity to engage with the Committee of experts in a way that would foster learning and collaboration. SPC, through the USAID-funded PROJECT Governance and DFAT-funded Pacific Women Lead, would organize and finance the session. Because of the previously cited lack of Pacific representation on UN treaty body committees, Pacific voices, especially those of women, are not heard in those international fora.[509]

There remains a potential pitfall in that efforts to see women leap into local, national, and international political leadership without concurrent economic programming could see only elite Pacific women gaining access to decision-making. Among the major obstacles to Pacific women fully participating in the formal economy are childcare and education. As more families and individual family members move to urban centers for work, they lose village social

structures that provide access to the extended family, which would normally care for children. Without this care – either at home in the village or in urban centers, parents – usually women – cannot fully participate in the workforce.[510]

At the local level, ensuring that non-elite women are integrated into decision-making surrounding CCA and DRR is the work of various Pacific NGOs and non-profits that recognize that "in the Pacific, women are synonymous with food and responsible for providing food on the table for their families regardless of supply or availability." Women in charge of households' food already adapt all the time to changing conditions – e.g., re-planting mangroves to protect family agricultural land from saltwater intrusion and flooding. By sharing observations and solutions with their neighbors, they are already ensuring that adaptations that work become more commonly used. These community actions, outside formal power structures, often go unnoticed by [male-led] formal structures that more commonly control financing for CCA. To see such a local, female-led project in action, examine femLINKpacific's Women Wetem Weta (Women's Weather Watch) in Vanuatu.[511] Women Wetem Weta is a women-led communications platform that provides early disaster warning, health and violence prevention messages, and other practical information through SMS. It reaches over a quarter of Vanuatu's population who might otherwise not have access to this information.[512] Although this program is seeing success in Vanuatu, in areas where women's access to mobile telephones or ability to purchase voice/text or data plans is limited, such a solution would require other methods that must be developed by the target community rather than by outsiders.

Loss and Damage

Finally, of major importance to the Pacific SIDS is the issue of loss and damage and the potential for changes to global "loss and damage" funding to improve the resilience of the world's most vulnerable people, including women and girls.

To first outline the shortcoming, people who do not have formal title to assets, whose assets are not secured by insurance, or whose tools or products may not have "monetary" value are traditionally left out of resilience and recovery programs. Lack of access to formal banking can exacerbate this marginalization. In many countries, social structures dictate that women do not have formal title to land, bank accounts, or even rights to access funding separate from their male family members.

SIDS suffer disproportionately high macroeconomic and fiscal impacts from extreme weather due to their small population size, limited resources, narrow sector specialization, and human resource capacity constraints. As climate events increase in frequency and intensity, SIDS will be forced to take on more debt, reducing their ability to invest in resilience, and they will, in turn, confront limits on their capacity to respond when the next disaster occurs. Climate change will thus precipitate a vicious cycle, undermining SIDS' opportunities for sustainable development.

Parties to the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement (Article 8.1) recognize the importance of averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, but the lack of official definition of "loss and damage" has proven to be a major obstacle to governments and international organizations taking appropriate action.[513] In fact, the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction glossary of terminology from the Sendai Framework on DRR does not include definitions for either "loss" or "damage."[514] Nonetheless, there are some working definitions that focus on economic and non-economic factors:

- Economic loss and damage includes loss of physical assets, goods, and services that are commonly traded in markets (e.g., loss of income, damage to infrastructure and property).
- Non-economic loss and damage can be considered as the remainder of impacts and risks that are not commonly traded in markets, such as human losses (loss of life

and health), societal loss and damage (loss of cultural heritage, territorial loss, and loss of indigenous knowledge) and environmental losses (loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services).

In the literature on DRR, disaster losses and damages are further classified as being direct or indirect.

- Direct damage is the monetary value of the partially destroyed physical asset, assuming the destroyed asset will be restored to pre-disaster conditions (in quantity and quality). These damages are usually quantified in economic terms and estimates are available for many disasters. In the case of a culturally significant site being destroyed, assigning a monetary value to the loss and replacement value cannot account for the lost social and cultural significance that the site represents to a community.
- Indirect losses, on the other hand, are the secondary effects that arise from the direct loss and damage that disrupt the flow of goods and services until assets are rehabilitated or rebuilt and some degree of 'recovery' has taken place. Unlike direct damages, indirect losses are difficult to quantify because they often spill out beyond the affected area, are cascading and may have long time lags – materializing decades later.

To extend the narrative in relation to gendered impacts, in societies where women are less likely to own physical assets – land, buildings, tools, etc. – it is more difficult to measure the direct and indirect damage and losses suffered by women during either sudden-onset disasters or long-term climate change.

An ODI assessment found that the most climate-attributed losses and damages globally are experienced in Caribbean SIDS, where 92% of attributed deaths, 85% of attributed numbers of people affected, and 93% of economic losses of all SIDS occurred. The root of this overrepresentation of Caribbean SIDS in loss and damage is partly down to there being more recorded events (and accompanying losses) in the EM-DAT dataset for Caribbean SIDS (272 of 434), than for Pacific SIDS (132 of 434) or Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea (AIS) SIDS (32 of 434). The ODI analysts suggest that loss and damage from slow-onset events may well be higher in Pacific and AIS SIDS, and they found that attributed loss and damage figures increase slightly if additional data is included for Pacific SIDS from the DesInventar dataset, which includes smaller, mostly low-intensity events that are not included in EM-DAT.[515]

Similar to the problems found in a lack of sex-disaggregated data from Pacific SIDS, the lack of inclusion of Pacific SIDS in major international loss and damage or disaster event databases contributes to a lack of understanding of the actual need in these countries surrounding funding and support for CCA that is inclusive across societies.

Inclusion, Climate Adaptation, and Building Resilience

The accelerated pace of climate change underscores the need to continually ensure that communities and countries respond to challenges and prepare for future impacts. The ability to anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from the effects of potentially hazardous events, including climate change, is vital to ensure peace and prosperity. Therefore, building resilience and adapting to climate change is essential.

Resilience and adaptation are concepts frequently conflated. Resilience to climate change is considered the ability to anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from potentially hazardous events with minimal damage to social well-being, the economy, and the environment.[516] Measures to enhance resilience to climate change can include improved and sustainable city planning, early warning systems, and efficient urban governance.[517] Climate adaptation is a process of reducing vulnerability. People attempt to reduce the vulnerability of their community members and systems by developing strategies and undertaking activities to meet short- and long-term needs. Among those activities are

building roads and bridges to withstand higher temperatures or powerful storms, building sea walls to protect against sea level rise, and installing new irrigation systems to combat water scarcity.[518] However, strategies must go further than hard infrastructure projects and address underlying social and gender inequalities that also increase vulnerability if a whole community is to adapt. Such strategies involve policy shifts, legal changes, and advocacy to ensure that "women's work" is not devalued and that everyone who works or possesses the means of production has recourse to formal reconstruction and adaptation institutions and funds.

Adaptation and resilience should be complementary. Adopting resilience thinking in adaptation projects can help shift thinking and approaches towards long-term, transformative, holistic, and forward-looking resilience building.[519] "Gender-blind" approaches or over-emphases on urban and infrastructure adaptation can miss opportunities to tackle the root causes of inequality and exclusion and may actually exacerbate vulnerabilities as they miss opportunities to integrate marginalized groups – i.e., women. Heightened vulnerability of some, in turn, can potentially aggravate environmental and security threats for all.

Poverty, inequality, and social exclusion, alongside poor infrastructure, inadequate housing, and lack of basic services affect communities across the Pacific region.[520] Due to massive equity gaps, these vulnerabilities are boosted by critical deficiencies in coping and adaptive capacities.[521] Therefore, it is essential for climate strategies to be grounded in understanding how intersecting forms of discrimination and inequality create disparate vulnerabilities and not only hinder people's ability to benefit from climate action but, in some cases, further disadvantage people. The Paris Agreement, in Article 7.5, underscores that CCA should be "gender-responsive" and "participatory" to ensure that vulnerable groups are not targets of but contributors to solutions that integrate both the best and latest science and "traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples, and local knowledge systems."[522]

Adapting to a particular range of shocks without considering new or unknown shocks can undermine resilience. Thus, it is essential to consider a range of solutions to enhance social, human, natural, physical, and financial capacities through forward-looking and anticipatory planning. Those solutions can be developed based on needs assessments, program designs, and implementation plans that rely on a gendered perspective that accounts for the differing impacts that both climate change and solutions have on women, girls, men, and boys. For example, women often possess, cultivate, and share local knowledge and can contribute to the interweaving of scientific and traditional approaches. Thus, the Lima work program on gender, launched in 2014 and enhanced at COP25 in Madrid, Spain, in 2019 laid out a gender action plan to advance the gender balance and integrate gender considerations into the work of the UNFCCC Parties in implementing the Convention. A review of progress is slated to be undertaken in 2024.[523]

As discussed above in the PNG example, U.S. policies, like the GFA, offer opportunities for tackling both gender equality and climate challenges if the programs that come under them insist on inclusion of society's marginalized groups. Three key U.S. strategies try to confront the roots of the issue:

- The 2022 National Security Strategy calls climate change "the greatest and potentially existential" shared problem for all nations.[524]
- The Indo-Pacific Strategy recognizes the region as the "epicenter of the climate crisis."[525]
- The National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality calls for the promotion of gender equity in mitigating and responding to climate change because "tackling the climate crisis requires ambition, innovation, and broad mobilization and will depend on the commitment and participation of all people."[526]

Among other projects potentially spanning the overlap in these strategies is SPC's Pacific Energy and Gender Strategic Action Plan (PEGSAP), which benefits from US$1.5 million in U.S. government funding. PEGSAP seeks to promote women's climate and clean energy leadership and economic security by increasing career and income-generating opportunities for women and girls in 22 PICTs through pilot projects to promote women-owned businesses in the sale, distribution, and maintenance of renewable energy systems, alongside scholarships for women and girls to pursue studies in relevant STEM fields.[527]

The Way Forward

Climate adaptation and resilience-building strategies should include gender-sensitive planning to promote greater equality. The Paris Agreement highlighted the need for adaptation to be a "gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems."[528] Successfully addressing climate challenges requires science-driven data, knowledge sharing, partnerships, and working collaboratively. There is a need to move beyond identifying vulnerabilities and expanding existing coping mechanisms to building inclusive, long-term resilience that creates stability for human systems to better handle and manage future impacts of the climate crisis.[529] Planning and implementing processes should consider the positive and negative links of actions with gender equality goals.

In designing strategies, including women and other marginalized groups is essential to ensure meaningful participation in planning and implementation processes that will address the whole of society. Including women does not mean including a few token women to get a "woman's perspective," but it should involve thinking deeply about gender dimensions of real-world developments.[530] When processes to include women also include empowering women, it needs to be done safely with the involvement of both men and women working together. One way to do this is to facilitate consultation of women and men in participatory risk analyses and generating input from both on resilience-building priorities.

Science and data-driven analysis is an integral part of the adaptation and resilience process. In addition to analyzing the hazards and climate context, it is essential to conduct a gender analysis of the social, economic, political, and natural resource management roles of women and men before starting activities. There is still a need for research into the gendered impacts of climate change by sector and region to identify pathways to better integrate gender into climate-related policies and adaptation plans. Gathering relevant information to gain a better understanding is critical to ensuring that programming is relevant to the needs of at-risk areas.[531]

CONCLUSION

The organizations profiled in this Volume are but some of those who work in CCA and DRR across the Pacific. They are key partners for any extra-regional states, offices, donors, or NGOs who seek to also work in this space. What is more, they are part of a more extensive network that includes untold numbers of other organizations and people who simply were not on the radar of the authors of this Primer. As a first offering, this book seeks to start a conversation about ensuring that the people of the Pacific are the ones who are directing climate change action in their own home and to advocate for the developed world to ensure that the people of the Pacific have the resources to take that action.

There is no one way to build resilience to the impacts of climate change among the 45 million plus[533] people who live in the broader Blue Pacific Continent from Hawaii to New Zealand and from French Polynesia to Palau. However, collective advocacy and action on the part of the people of the region is serving to keep the world's attention on the risks posed if we fail to act.

As part of organizations ranging in size and mission from SPC and SPREP to Climate Tok and the Pacific Climate Warriors, the people of the Pacific are taking local, national, regional, and international action. They work to both stanch global GHG emissions and to foster communities that tend to and rely on the natural and built environments in order to build resilience to the ways that the climate has already changed and will keep changing even under the most conservative emissions scenarios. These people and organizations are diplomatic advocates, scientific networks, information sharers, and everyday laborers whose lives and livelihoods may depend on the success of two key strategies – i.e., pressuring global emitters to reduce and halt emissions and channeling funding to projects that reduce Pacific peoples' exposure to rising temperatures and sea levels.

The Frameworks that the people of the Blue Pacific Continent use to strategize, plan, and implement CCA and DRR range from PIF's 2050 Strategy and PRP Taskforce's FRDP down to the national and local NDCs, NAPs, and even SOPs for planned relocations of whole communities. And to carry out this work, they rely not only on their own knowledge and labor but also on financial resources channeled from GCF, the AF, and others through major partners in SPC, individual Ministries of Finance, and other focal points.

As the impacts of climate change become clearer and, potentially, more deadly and destructive in the coming years, the organizations of the region and the frameworks they have developed to guide their action will be ever more important. Ensuring safe internal, regional, and international mobility for climate affected people will be a global challenge. Other security issues, such as sustainable fisheries, political stability, and even national sovereignty will emerge. The people of the Blue Pacific Continent will propose and promote the solutions that they desire, and the strategies and stances they have taken up through 2023 offer some glimpses of what those solutions will be. However, integration of the people of the Pacific into global climate change discussions, funding mechanisms, and solutions will be the only sure way of building Pacific perspectives and needs into those global plans.

APPENDICES

Acronyms and Abbreviations

°	degree(s) (of temperature - Celsius or Fahrenheit; or latitude/longitude – North, South, East, West)
€	Euro(s)
$	dollar(s) – Australian, New Zealand, or U.S.
AAL	average annual loss
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADF	Australian Defence Forces or Asian Development Fund
ADFD	Abu Dhabi Fund for Development
AF	Adaptation Fund
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AFG	Alliance for Future Generations
AIS	Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea
ANU	Australian National University
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
APCC	Asia Pacific Climate Centre
AR (+number)	Assessment Report (of the IPCC)
ASAP	Adaptation for Small Agricultural Program
ASP	American Security Project
CANCC	Coalition of Atoll Nations on Climate Change
CAP	Climate Adaptation Plan (of the U.S. DoD)
CAPRS	Centre for Asia Pacific Refugee Studies (of the University of Auckland)
CCA	climate change adaptation
CEDAW	Convention for Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
CEPAC	Episcopal Conference of the Pacific
CIF	Climate Investment Fund
CNA	Center for Naval Analysis
cm	centimeter(s)
CNMI	Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
COFA	Compact of Free Association
CoP	Community of Practice
COP	Conference of the Parties
COSIS	Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease – 2019
CRGA	Committee of Representatives of Governments and Administration
CROP	Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific
CSEN	Climate Security Expert Network

CSIRO	Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
CSO	civil society organization
CVF	Climate Vulnerable Forum
DCRA	DoD Climate Risk Analysis
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (of Australia)
DoD	Department of Defense (of the U.S.)
DRR	disaster risk reduction
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EO	Executive Order
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (of the UN)
FAS	Freely Associated State
FFA	Forum Fisheries Agency
FRDP	Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific
FSM	Federated States of Micronesia
GCCA	Global Climate Change Alliance
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GCM	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration
GDP	gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GFA	Global Fragility Act
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction
GFS	Global Fragility Strategy
GGGI	Global Green Growth Institute
GHG	greenhouse gas
HADR	humanitarian assistance and disaster response
ICEDS	Institute for Climate, Energy and Disaster Solutions (of ANU)
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICT	information and communications technology
IDA	International Development Association
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITLOS	International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency

km	kilometer(s)
LDC	least developed country
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund
m	meter(s)
MCST	Micronesian Centre for Sustainable Transport
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (of New Zealand)
MIF	Micronesian Islands Forum
mm	millimeter(s)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPS	Micronesian Presidents' Summit
MSG	Melanesian Spearhead Group
NAMA	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action Facility
NAP	national adaptation plan
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NbS	nature-based solution
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NDS	National Defense Strategy (of the U.S.)
NGO	non-governmental organization
NIE	national implementing entity or National Intelligence Estimate
NIIP	National Infrastructure Investment Plan
NIWA	National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research
NLU	National Liaison Unit
NMHS	National Meteorological and Hydrological Services
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (of the U.S.)
NSS	National Security Strategy
NTS Centre	Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies)
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (of the UN)
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (of the UN)
P-QUAD	Quadrilateral Defense Coordinating Group
PACC	Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change
PaCE-SD	Pacific Centre for Environment and Sustainable Development (of USP)
PASO	Pacific Aviation Safety Office
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund (of the UN Secretary-General)
PCC	Pacific Conference of Churches
PCCC	Pacific Climate Change Centre

PCCFAF	Pacific Climate Change Finance Assessment Framework
PCCMHS	Pacific Climate Change Migration and Human Security
PCCOS	Pacific Community Centre for Ocean Science
PCSN	Pacific Climate Security Expert Network
PCW	Pacific Climate Warriors
PDAP	Pacific Power Association Disaster Assistance Program
PDD	Platform on Disaster Displacement
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PEGSAP	Pacific Energy and Gender Strategic Action Plan
PFC	Pacific Fusion Centre
PFM	public financial management
PFTAC	Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre
PI-CASC	Pacific Islands Climate Adaptation Science Center
PIANGO	Pacific Islands Association of NGOs
PICAN	Pacific Islands Climate Action Network
PICL	Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders
PICT	Pacific Island Countries and Territories
PIDF	Pacific Islands Development Forum
PIDP	Pacific Islands Development Program
PIEMA	Pacific Islands Emergency Management Alliance
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
PIFWLM	Pacific Islands Forum Women Leaders Meeting
PIPSO	Pacific Islands Private Sector Organisation
PIRCA	Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment
PISFCC	Pacific Island Students Fighting Climate Change
PIURN	Pacific Islands Universities Research Network
PLG	Polynesian Leaders Group
PLGED	Pacific Leaders Gender Equality Declaration
PMC	Pacific Meteorological Council
PMDP	Pacific Meteorological Desk Partnership
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PPA	Pacific Power Association or Pacific Platform for Action on Gender Equality and Women's Human Rights
PRIF	Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility
PRM	Pacific Resilience Meeting
PRP	Pacific Resilience Partnership
RCC	Regional Climate Centre

RISA	Pacific Regional Integrated Sciences and Assessments
RMI	Republic of Marshall Islands
SAMOA Pathway	SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action Pathway
SCCF	Special Climate Change Fund
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SIDS	Small Island Developing State
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SPC	Pacific Community
SPDMM	South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting
SPREP	Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental Programme
SPTO	Pacific Tourism Organisation
STEM	science, technology, engineering, and maths
TTPI	Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
TWG	Technical Working Group
U.S.	United States
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNA	United Nations Association - Fiji
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPNG	University of Papua New Guinea
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAPI	United States-Affiliated Pacific Islands
USGCRP	United States Global Change Research Program
USGS	United States Geological Survey
USP	The University of the South Pacific
V20	Group of 20 Finance Ministers of Vulnerable Countries
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WPS	Women, Peace, and Security
WRP	Weather Ready Pacific

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