Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief



Handbook for Responding Forces

30 June 2021

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Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) consists of DOD activities conducted outside the U.S. and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.

The Department of State (DOS) and the Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) within the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are the designated United States Government (USG) leads for coordination of foreign disaster response (FDR).

The joint force will work with interagency partners and the Host Nation (HN)/Affected State (AS) and often works with international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Partner Nations (PNs), and the private sector during FHA operations. The tenets of multinational unity of effort (i.e., respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, and coordination) applied during an FHA mission cannot guarantee success; however, ignoring them may lead to mission failure.

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Front cover photo: "U.S. Marines and Nepalese soldiers unload tarps off of a UH-1Y Huey at Orang, Nepal, during Operation SAHAYOGI HAAT, May 19, 2015."

Credit: U.S. Marine Corps photo/Cpl. Isaac Ibarra

Source: U.S. Air Force website https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/589300/joint-task-force-505-begins-drawdown-in-nepal/

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Defense (DoD) has long played a significant role in U.S. efforts to assist foreign populations, militaries, and governments. The U.S. Government (USG) responds to 50 to 60 international disasters each year; however, the DoD assists with less than 10 percent of those foreign disaster relief (FDR) operations. In FDR, the USG periodically leverages the DoD's ability to rapidly project critical expeditionary capabilities to save lives and alleviate suffering. The USG provides foreign assistance bilaterally and, importantly for the DoD, coordinates multilaterally during FDR.

While the DoD is normally a supporting effort in FDR, the military provides critical expeditionary capabilities when called to support. Additionally, DoD is often called on to support large-scale, complex, and unprecedented disasters. In fact, the first version of this handbook, the *Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief: Handbook for the Joint Task Force Commander and Below*, was inspired by after-action reviews and observations from the 2010 Haiti earthquake. While the U.S. military has a long history of supporting FDR that dates back to the early 19th century, predating even the international aid system and U.S. foreign assistance architecture as we know them today, observations during the Haiti earthquake identified an information gap among military responders in FDR operations.

In the decade since the publication of the first DoD handbook on FDR, the USG process and architecture and the international response system have strengthened and matured. During the 5-year period after Haiti, 2010 to 2015, every year brought an unprecedented foreign disaster such as the 2010 Pakistan floods, Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the strongest Typhoon on record to strike the Philippines (Super Typhoon Yolanda) in 2013, the West Africa Ebola Outbreak in 2014, and the Ghorka Earthquake in Nepal in 2015. The DoD provided significant capabilities in all of these responses and key observations were captured and are woven throughout this handbook.

The second half of the decade offered a different norm and complexion in DoD FDR. Beyond the unprecedented global health disaster of COVID-19, there were no mass casualty events like the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami (227,000 deaths), 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (208,000 deaths), and the 2010 Haiti Earthquake (222,500 deaths). DoD responses were typically composed of smaller, tailored capabilities and response forces for smaller disasters like Haiti 2016, Indonesia 2018, Mozambique 2019, the Bahamas 2019, and the Latin American storms in 2020.

While the last few years have experienced some relief from mega disasters and high casualty producing earthquakes, 2020 rivaled the hottest year on record and had a higher-than-average number of hurricanes, wildfires, and floods and economic losses from disasters. The trends of increasing frequency and intensity of disasters like storms, floods, heat waves, and wildfires are expected to continue. Climate Change and FDR operations have significant implications for regional and global security and great power competition.

DoD and USAID are more interconnected today than ever before. There has been a strengthening of regional and international response capacity, an unprecedented amount of educational content and guidelines developed, and thousands of civil-military and multinational exercises and activities focused on strengthening FDR.

This handbook offers details on the USG FDR process and roles, international norms and stakeholders, information sharing and coordination, planning considerations, mission execution, and DoD capabilities. It serves as a quick reference guide for U.S. military members planning and/or executing FDR operations. Beyond the DoD audience, this handbook also offers a reference to U.S. agencies and international response partners, such as the United Nations, that is critical to unified and coordinated disaster response.





Joseph D. Martin, SES
Director

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This handbook serves as a quick reference guide for U.S. military members participating in a FDR mission in permissive environments, in a country that still has a functioning government. It is not intended for use in complex emergencies; however, some information may have utility for DoD support in such instances. Additionally, this handbook will be useful for DoD support to international chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response (ICBRN-R), also referred to as technological disasters.

Throughout this book you will see examples of U.S. DoD foreign disaster operations that offer a review of the operations and illustrate the evolving U.S. and international systems for disaster response. While the most valuable capabilities the DoD brings to FDR are largely the same, i.e., logistics, sealift and airlift (fixed-wing and rotary), material and cargo handling, engineer assessments and repairs, support with airports and seaports, search and rescue support, and medical, the international response framework and USG process have evolved significantly over the last decade.

CFE-DM OVERVIEW

This guide is intended for operational and tactical commands such as a Joint Task Force and supporting, tactical level organizations tasked with planning and execution of FDR missions.

This publication was sponsored by the OSD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs. The proponent for this document is the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM). Please remit all comments, recommendations, and proposed changes to this handbook to CFE-DM.

CFE-DM is a U.S. DoD organization established by Congress in 1994. It is a direct reporting unit to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and is located on Ford Island, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii.

CFE-DM was founded as a result of the efforts of the late Hawaii Senator Daniel K. Inouye. Witnessing the effects of Hurricane Iniki and the problems with civil-military coordination in the storm's aftermath, the Senator set out to establish CFE-DM to help bridge understanding between civil and military responders, and to provide a DoD-focused platform to build disaster management and humanitarian assistance expertise among DoD and partner nations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Maintaining a global mandate, CFE-DM's priority of effort is the disaster-laden Indo-Asia-Pacific region with collaboration as the cornerstone of our operational practice.

Vision. The Joint Force, allies, and partners are fully prepared to conduct and facilitate foreign humanitarian assistance.

Mission. CFE-DM builds crisis response capacity in U.S. and partner militaries, enhances coordination and collaboration with civilian and foreign partners, and strengthens those relationships to save lives and alleviate human suffering before, during, and after humanitarian crises.

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CHAPTER 1 – BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

This chapter offers a brief history of U.S. support to foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) and disaster relief. It examines the history of U.S. foreign assistance policy and architecture. The goal is to foster a balanced perspective on current joint force doctrine and civil-military relations and to inform future responses. Moreover, current U.S. policy and joint doctrine are tied to historical operations and lessons.

It is important to understand how Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR) fits into current DoD policy and joint doctrine on FHA. FHA includes FDR operations and other DoD activities conducted outside the U.S. and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. It may also be conducted concurrently with other DoD support missions and activities such as dislocated civilian support; security operations; and international chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (ICBRN) response.[1] According to *Joint Publication (JP) 3-29*, FDR is assistance that immediately alleviates the suffering of foreign disaster victims that normally includes the provision of technical capabilities, rescue and evacuation of victims, lift/transportation support, and making repairs to essential services. DoD support to FDR is not a recent phenomenon; it dates back to the 19th century, predating the modern international aid system and U.S. foreign assistance policy.

1.1 Organized Humanitarian Assistance and Early U.S. Disaster Relief

One of the first recorded instances of the U.S. conducting FDR was the provision of aid to Venezuela after the March 1812 Caracas earthquake, which killed approximately 20,000 people. In response, the U.S. Congress passed a bill authorizing President James Madison to purchase provisions not to exceed $50,000 to send to Venezuela.[2] The U.S. provision of aid to the Caracas earthquake victims predates what many see as the beginning of modern humanitarianism; the Red Cross movement started in the 1860s by a travelling Swiss businessman, Henry Dunant. In reality, there were many examples of humanitarian action and advocacy before Henry Dunant and the Red Cross.[3] Examples from the 18th and 19th centuries include responses to the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, action to address famines in India (1837-1838) and Ireland (1845-1849), and efforts to respond to rapid societal transformation and economic dislocation.[4]

Progress in humanitarianism continued through the period between Henry Dunant's activism in the 1860s and World War II (WWII). However, the modern international system and U.S. foreign assistance architecture were largely developed after WWII and have evolved significantly over the past two decades.

WWII had a significant impact on the modern humanitarian system, and this chapter uses it as a starting point to examine U.S. foreign assistance and the establishment of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as the U.S. lead federal agency for FDR and FHA.

Europe had been devastated during WWII and by 1941, there were 21 million refugees, mass food shortages, and demolished economic and public infrastructure.[5] To help alleviate the suffering, allied military forces employed military capabilities to assist the civilian population including "the construction of refugee camps; distribution of food, blankets, and cots; and a massive inoculation against typhus and cholera."[6] By the end of WWII, there were around 8,000 Army Civil Affairs soldiers and 1,400 civilians providing aid under the Marshall Plan.[7]

The 1947 Economic Recovery Program, known as the "Marshall Plan," and The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (P.L. 80-472) were intended to stabilize Europe and the world economy and prevent the spread of Communism. Between 1948 and 1951, the U.S. spent $13 billion ($146 billion in 2021 dollars).[8] The Marshall Plan provided dollar grants to purchase commodities (fuel, food, and machinery) and rebuild infrastructure, provided technical assistance to promote productivity, offered guaranties to encourage U.S. private investment, and approved the use of local currency matching funds.[9] Perceived as a huge success, the Marshall Plan offered an example of going beyond life-saving relief to broad reconstruction and stabilization in a post-war environment. The Marshall Plan was the beginning of modern U.S. foreign assistance policy.

Beyond the successes of military support to civil administration and humanitarian assistance at the end of WWII, there was likely no other event that fostered acceptance of military support to foreign disaster relief as the Berlin Airlift.[10] The crisis started June 24, 1948, when the Soviet Union cut off all access to Allied-controlled Berlin. Some 2.8 million Germans in Berlin were left with limited food in a war-ravaged city. The U.S. initiated Operation Vittles on June 26, and the United Kingdom (UK) followed with Operation Plainfare to fly aid into West Berlin. At the peak of the airlift, one Allied plane landed in Berlin every 45 seconds.[11] At the conclusion of the airlift when the Soviet blockade ended, U.S. Air Forces in Europe reported the airlift had conducted 277,569 flights and delivered 2,325,509 tons of cargo.[12] The airlift also served as an early example of civilian-military cooperation when volunteers with CARE (then known as Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe) packed and provided 500,000 "CARE Packages" to the airlift.[13] The blockade proved disastrous for the Soviet Union's Joseph Stalin as the optics made clear the ruthlessness and inhumanity of the Soviet Union while demonstrating U.S. resolve and commitment to Europe.[14]

1.2 U.S. Foreign Assistance and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Following the humanitarian and economic assistance successes of WWII, President Harry S. Truman's 1949 inaugural address solidified a vision and support for foreign service and aid.[15] The speech had four main points. The first two points pledged continued support to the United Nations (UN) and the Marshall Plan. The fourth point, which spoke to foreign assistance for developing nations, became known as the "Point Four Program." Its intended purpose, like assisting Europe with the Marshall Plan, was more about halting the spread of Communism than it was altruism. This trend of securitizing aid for broader U.S. foreign policy objectives has been a constant since WWII. In fact, foreign aid as we know it today began as a diplomatic tool to undermine Communism.[16]

While the Marshall Plan was a major success, by 1960, U.S. support for foreign assistance programs was in steady decline and the structure of multiple organizations delivering U.S. assistance had become inefficient and ineffective.[17] President John F. Kennedy, soon after coming into office in 1961, made it clear to the Congress that his vision for America was one that included the opportunity to realize a 'Decade of Development.'[18] President Kennedy signed the Foreign Service Act in November 1961, the primary legislative basis of foreign aid programs, which created the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

In 1964, USAID's Administrator, David E. Bell, appointed the first Foreign Disaster Relief Coordinator, whose office eventually became the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), to lead and coordinate the U.S. government's foreign disaster relief efforts. As USAID OFDA responded to disasters from the 1960s through the 1980s, U.S. legislation and OFDA were evolving. OFDA's unique funding capability, known as the "notwithstanding" clause, came from the Foreign Assistance Act amendment of 1975.[19] In 1981 Congress granted USAID the authority to spend up to $50 million annually for disaster assistance from "other AID accounts," which became known as OFDA's "borrowing authority."[20] In 1984, OFDA established its first regional office in San Jose, Costa Rica, and developed the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in the late 1980's after disasters in Mexico City (1985), El Salvador (1986), and Armenia (1988).[21] OFDA's DART was fully operational by 1989, and its first official deployments were to the Caribbean (Hurricane Hugo), Romania, and the Philippines.[22]

When Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (northern Iraq) began in 1991, a DART was deployed as part of the operation. In previous years, OFDA deployed personnel with DoD Disaster Area Survey Teams (DAST), but the DART was considerably different as it was OFDA's own self-sustaining operational team.[23] It was noted in later analysis that "one of the keys to success for Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT was that the OFDA DART managed the situation and the strategy and the command recognized their expertise."[24] After experiences working with U.S. military forces during operations in Bangladesh, Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda, OFDA placed more emphasis on supporting military training exercises, and in 1996, established its Military Liaison Unit.

Even with numerous successes in the 1990s, USAID faced strong headwinds when one of the key inspirations and rationales for foreign aid, combating the spread of Communism, declined with the fall of the Soviet Union. Significant changes in the Congress in 1994 ushered in a new focus on balanced budgets and cutting government spending. By nearly all measures, average annual foreign aid had fallen gradually over several decades from the historical high levels of the late 1940s and early 1950s. As a snapshot, OFDA reported annual expenditures of $189 million a year and a modest staff of 25 regular and 25 contract employees in its 1993 annual report.[25] Between 1995 and 2000, USAID lost 29 percent of its staff and had retained just half the direct hire staff it had twenty years earlier.[26] By the time the U.S. launched Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan, October 7, 2001, USAID staffing had declined to about 2000.[27]

At the end of the Cold War and into the 1990s, U.S. military practitioners were considering the new global strategic landscape and new challenges like Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC) and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Still, even for those focused on the emerging chaos, the 1990s were unprecedented for crisis operations in war-torn countries and regions throughout the world. As a result, the international response system and humanitarian community expanded rapidly and significantly. Multinational peacekeeping missions also increased dramatically placing more emphasis on the need for improved civil-military coordination mechanisms.

While USAID experienced declining budgets throughout the 1990s, OFDA continued to grow. From 1989 to 2017, OFDA's annual budget grew from $20 million to $1.6 billion.[28] Following this growth, DoD awareness and familiarity with USAID increased significantly through mutual exposure during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2003, OFDA established the Military Liaison Team (MLT) and deployed Military Liaison Officers (MLO) during the Iraq invasion. MLOs embedded with the DART, field teams, and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Forward during the invasion.

Interagency familiarity continued to grow with the use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, and later Iraq (2005); these were interagency teams comprised of DoD, Department of State (DoS), USAID, and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). In 2004, OFDA's MLT created the 2-day Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) to instruct U.S. DoD forces. Between 2008 and 2012, USAID and OFDA placed liaison officers at DoD Combatant Commands (CCMD) and with forward deployed units in an attempt to further improve coordination with DoD.

By the 2010s, complex and protracted crises had become the most frequent type of disaster to which OFDA responded. Complex emergencies like Syria, Iraq, South Sudan, and Yemen required ongoing DARTs that remained active for multiple years. These long-running conflicts receive the majority of OFDA's disaster assistance every year. While this may seem like a fairly recent trend, the USAID FY2000 annual report named OFDA's "Top Five Programs" from 1990-2000 as complex emergencies in the former Yugoslavia, Sudan, Angola, Somalia, and Rwanda.[29] In 2018, USAID joined with the Departments of State and Defense to conduct a Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), which offers lessons learned and best practices for working in conflict-affected areas.

From 2017 to 2020, USAID began a series of internal reforms, branded as "USAID Transformation," and in July 2018, USAID notified Congress the intent to merge and restructure OFDA and the Food for Peace (FFP) office to form the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA). In 2020 FFP and OFDA merged with the establishment of BHA.

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CHAPTER 2 – U.S. GOVERNMENT FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

"We Aren't the Lead Sled Dog"

– Major General Gary Volesky, JFC–United Assistance,
2014 West Africa Ebola Response



Figure 2-1. *From left, Sergeant Major Kirk Hines, JFC-UA SGM, Major General Gary Volesky, JFC-UA commander, William Berger, USAID DART team leader, U.S. Public Health Service Rear Admiral Scott Giberson, commander of the Commissioned Corps Ebola Response, and Ambassador Deborah Malac, U.S. Ambassador to Liberia, before opening ceremony of the Monrovia Medical Unit, USAID MITAM #1 for JFC-UA. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Nathan Hoskins, JFC-UA – United Assistance Public Affairs/RELEASED)*

This chapter provides information on U.S. foreign assistance, the USG FDR architecture, and U.S. military support to FDR. The primary focus is the DoS, USAID, and DoD and their roles and responsibilities in FDR.

2.1 U.S. Government Foreign Disaster Relief Roles and Responsibilities

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195) authorizes the U.S. to participate in disaster relief efforts and gives the President flexibility to respond to disasters with a wide range of government-funded humanitarian assistance (see Chapter 7.5, "Foreign Disaster Response Funding"). The President and the National Security Staff determine the degree to which USG officials and organizations will be involved in FDR operations, based on strategic considerations delineated in documents like the National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review.

The President and/or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) provide guidance and objectives and task the Combatant Commands (CCMD) to respond to contingencies or conduct military engagement and security cooperation activities or operations.

Presidential Executive Order 12966 governs the implementation of §404 (Foreign Disaster Assistance) of Title 10, United States Code (USC), which directs the SecDef to respond to man-made or natural disasters when the SecDef determines that such assistance is necessary to prevent loss of lives.[30] The Executive Order directs the SecDef to provide disaster assistance only:

- At the direction of the President
- With the concurrence of the Secretary of State, or
- In emergency situations in order to save human lives, where there is not sufficient time to seek the prior initial concurrence of the Secretary of State, in which case the Secretary of Defense shall advise, and seek concurrence of, the Secretary of State as soon as practicable thereafter

Figure 2-2 illustrates the U.S. interagency architecture, relationships, and coordination for FDR operations from the strategic to tactical level. Key relationships between the DoD response force and USAID DART, at bottom of the figure, are detailed later in this chapter and chapter 7. Also, note the elements to the left of the DoD response force, "Crisis Action Team, HAST, HACC, and JLOC," may or may not be established and used during DoD FDR operations. For example, III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) typically establishes a Crisis Action Team (CAT) when conducting FDR mission planning and analysis in the USINDOPACOM AOR and JTF-Haiti established a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) in the 2010 Haiti earthquake response. However, these organizations are not always required or utilized.

2.2 U.S. Department of State (DoS)

The DoS is the lead federal agency for foreign affairs. DoS is responsible for planning and implementing foreign policy. DoS manages America's bilateral diplomatic relationships with foreign governments, known as the diplomatic mission. Missions are organized under DoS regional and functional bureaus.




Figure 2-2. U.S. interagency architecture, relationships, and coordination for FDR (Source: JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 2019. Modified here to focus on FDR)

(a) Key Functional Bureaus for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

The functional bureaus most often involved in foreign disaster relief (FDR) are the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and the Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU). Depending on the disaster, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; and the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) may become involved.

- **Political-Military Affairs** is the principal policy link between DoD and DoS. PM works closely with the National Security System (NSS), Geographic Bureaus, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, and USAID to coordinate crisis management and complex contingency operations. PM also works with DoD by embedding Foreign Policy Advisors with Service branch chiefs and CCMDs. (http://www.state.gov/t/pm/)
- **Bureau of Consular Affairs.** Following a major foreign disaster, Consular Affairs is responsible for the health and safety of U.S. citizens with regards to the provision of information on the disaster, and assistance with government assisted evacuation, notification of next-of-kin in the event of death, and disposition of remains and personal effects.[31] (https://hiu.state.gov/products/)

- **Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU).** Within the Bureau of Intelligence and Research is the HIU office. The mission of the HIU is to serve as a USG interagency center to identify, collect, analyze, and disseminate all-source information critical to USG decision makers and partners in preparation for and response to humanitarian emergencies. Its staff is composed of personnel from DoS, USAID, DoD, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and others. (http://www.state.gov/s/inr/)
- **Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)** focuses on the formulation of humanitarian policies and providing HA in conflict situations and complex emergencies. PRM promotes its policies through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and it works closely with USAID. PRM administers and monitors U.S. contributions to international and non-governmental organizations to assist and protect refugees abroad. (http://www.state.gov/j/prm/)

(b) Diplomatic Mission, Ambassador, Chief of Mission, and Country Team

U.S. embassies (USEMB) are headed by a Chief of Mission (COM), normally an ambassador, who is the President's personal representative to the government of the foreign country. By law, COMs coordinate, direct, and supervise all USG activities and representatives posted in the foreign country to which they are accredited. The COM may not always be an ambassador. For example, in 2019, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Stephanie Bowers declared a disaster in The Bahamas in response to Hurricane Dorian.

The USEMB/Country Team is comprised of the COM and all agencies represented in the country, such as USAID, Foreign Agricultural Service, Foreign Commercial Service, Peace Corps, military groups, law enforcement, and Defense attachés, as well as the traditional State Department functions concerned with political, economic, consular, management, and public diplomacy issues. In almost all bilateral missions, the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) is the principal DoD official and representative on the Country Team. In locations with no SDO/DATT, the chief of the security cooperation organization (SCO) may act as the Senior Defense Official. The Mission Disaster Relief Officer (MDRO) serves a key role in FDR because this individual is the primary point of contact for BHA at the onset of a disaster, drafts the annex of the Emergency Action Plan that focuses on support to the affected state during a disaster, and is the point person for drafting the Disaster Declaration Cable (described later).

2.3 United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

USAID is an independent agency that provides economic and development programs, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief around the world in support of U.S. foreign policy goals. Although a separate agency from DoS, it shares certain administrative functions with DoS and reports to and receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. The USAID Administrator serves as the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. USAID's work advances U.S. national security and economic prosperity, demonstrates American generosity, and promotes a path to recipient self-reliance and resilience.

USAID maintains more than 60 country and regional missions that design and manage a range of projects; most are intended to meet specific development objectives as outlined in a Country Development Cooperation Strategy. It administers and directs the U.S. foreign economic assistance program and acts as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for USG FDR. BHA is the bureau within USAID that conducts disaster responses and is the bureau that interacts with DoD during FDR operations.

(a) USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA)

The Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) – formerly the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance – is the USG lead agency for organizing and managing foreign disaster assistance. BHA's mandate is to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the economic and social impact of disasters. BHA has a full-time presence in over two dozen countries and five regional offices with senior regional advisors in San Jose, Costa Rica; Bangkok, Thailand; Dakar, Senegal; Nairobi, Kenya; and Budapest, Hungary.

BHA responds to 50-60 international disasters annually. BHA and its implementing partners responded to 49 disasters in FY2019 and provided approximately $1.7 billion for disaster response activities.[32] Typically, DoD assists BHA with less than 10% of its annual FDR operations; indeed, the annual average for DoD support is 3 to 8%. In recent years, complex emergencies and protracted conflicts have been BHA's most frequent international disaster response.

BHA has advisors and liaisons permanently posted to all CCMDs, most often supporting the J3, J4, J9, and Operational Planning Teams (OPT) that conduct crisis action planning for FDR. In serving as the USG lead when a disaster is declared, BHA develops overall response strategies, provides on-scene management in support of the COM, provides USG funding to implementing partners, collects and analyzes humanitarian information on the response, serves as the primary reporting source for the total USG response, and requests support from other USG agencies (including DoD).

(b) USAID BHA Civil Military Operations Division (CMD)

Located within BHA's Office for Field and Response Operations (FARO), CMD is USAID's primary point of contact with DoD concerning FDR. Civilian-Military Cooperation (CMC) staff deploy as a part of DARTs and RMTs and are posted to CCMDs and other organizations as FDR subject matter experts and advisors. The CMC staff at CCMDs are called Humanitarian Assistance Advisor/Military (HAA/M). HAA/Ms also serve on staff rotations at the Joint Staff and State Department. HAA/M roles and responsibilities include:

- Participate in FDR strategy and contingency planning activities, training, and exercises
- Assist in developing the FDR aspect of the CCMD's strategic plans and crisis action planning
- Participate in the CCMD Crisis Action Team
- Recommend appropriate components/capabilities in FDR operations
- Provide information briefings to CCMD regarding USAID/BHA activities and engagements
- Teach the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course at military training & education courses, CCMDs, deploying units, embassies and other locations requiring training on FDR
- Participate in After Action Reviews (AAR)
- Deploy as a member of a DART or with CCMD forces in FDR
- Advise on established methods of support to FDR and best practices
- Coordinate with USAID staff, and members of the Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group
- Coordinate with the humanitarian relief community

(c) USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)

The DART is BHA's most recognized and least used option for foreign disaster relief. The DART is well known among senior leaders and policymakers, and its deployment requires a significant commitment of resources. The DART is a rapid response team that is flexible and scalable. However, it is not a standing organization within BHA. It offers BHA command and control functions in a response. The DART task organization includes a team leader, information officer, operations coordinator, planning coordinator, communications officer, press officer, sectoral experts, civ-mil advisor, and logistics officer. The list below outlines the DART's functions:

- Manage USG relief efforts in the field in support of the ambassador
- Develop and implement USG response and transition strategies

- Assess, report, and recommend actions
- Manage movement and consignment of relief commodities
- Provide technical assistance to the U.S. Ambassador in formulating and executing an appropriate USG response to the disaster
- Continue to assess and report on the disaster situation and recommend follow-up actions, including suggested funding levels
- Produce and distribute official USG reporting on humanitarian crisis and response operations
- Coordinate the movement and consignment of relief commodities
- Conduct needs analysis and assess existing capacity of the AS and international response
- Monitor and evaluates USAID-funded relief activities
- Arranges for the deployment of search and rescue teams

A DART may range from just a few personnel to a few hundred members. For example, the DART that supported the initial response to the 2014 West Africa Ebola Outbreak comprised 15 staff from various USG agencies, including USAID/BHA, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), DoD, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the U.S. Forest Service.[33] In fact, the DART for the 2014 Ebola response included a U.S. Army civil engineer officer tasked with designing Ebola Treatment Units (ETU) to isolate and care for people infected with the virus. As another example, the DART that deployed for the 2015 Ghorka Earthquake in Nepal included 128 personnel, 14 BHA personnel, and 114 Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) team members.

The DART for the Nepal earthquake highlights a key capability: BHA agreements with the internationally certified USAR teams in Fairfax, VA, and Los Angeles County, CA. Both teams are classified as Heavy USAR Teams and can deploy internationally within four hours. BHA has a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with DoD for transport of USAR teams, which travel military air or commercial air depending on which is faster.

(d) USAID Response Management Team (RMT)

When a DART is deployed, a RMT is established at the USAID headquarters operations center in Washington, DC. For example, during the Hurricane Dorian response to The Bahamas in September 2019, USAID established a RMT with 26 personnel in Washington, DC, while deploying a 26-person DART.[34] Like the DART, the RMT is event-specific and not a standing organization. The RMT provides support to the DART and coordinates USG disaster response strategy and activities. The DART relays information on activities and needs and makes recommendations for appropriate USG assistance to the RMT.

The RMT is organized into three major functional areas (management, planning, and operations) and serves as the primary liaison between the DART, other USAID entities, federal agencies, and Congress.

USAID/BHA has MOUs/Agreements with various government agencies that are capable of contributing to FDR operations.

(e) Civil-Military Cooperation (CMC)

CMC serves as USAID's primary point of contact with DOD for developmental matters and provides liaison to major military commands, trains USAID and U.S. military personnel, and plans and coordinates assistance in support of all programs of interest to both USAID and the military. It addresses areas of common interests between defense and development, with a focus on improving civilian-military field readiness, programs, and coordination. CMC has assigned senior development officers to each GCC and has received LNOs in return.

2.4 U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)

As illustrated by Major General Gary Volesky's quote at the beginning of this chapter, U.S. military forces are not the primary USG means for FDR. DoD normally supports the activities of DoS and USAID. USAID is the principal agency for bilateral development support and humanitarian assistance to foreign countries.

While the "unique capabilities" DoD typically provides during FDR operations have not changed much over the years, the operational landscape has changed considerably. As a comparative example, in 1991, when Major General Henry Stackpole, USMC, III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) commander, deployed to Bangladesh to assist with Cyclone Marian in 1991, there were no DoD or international guidelines or handbook for military support to FDR, no BHA representative traveling with his forward command element to Bangladesh, and no 20-person USAID DART deployed to coordinate and manage the U.S. response. The response did not include dozens of NGOs, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (the predecessor of today's UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA]) civil-military coordination officers, dozens of international medical teams or search and rescue teams, or other foreign militaries. There was no well-worn Request for Assistance (RFA) process or mechanism used by the aid actors, USAID, or Bangladesh government. In fact, Bangladesh lacked a comprehensive national disaster response plan and did not have a national disaster management office (lead agency).

In contrast, when Brigadier General Paul Kennedy, USMC, 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3rd MEB) commander, deployed to the Nepal earthquake in 2015, there was a robust international system with a fine-tuned U.S. process. There were numerous publications on U.S. doctrine on FDR and civil-military coordination. There were UN guidelines for humanitarians and militaries on how to coordinate and coexist in the same operating space. UN OCHA sent civil-military coordination officers to assess and assist humanitarians, foreign militaries, and the Nepalese. There was a USAID BHA subject matter expert (SME) that traveled with Brigadier General Kennedy's forward command element (FCE), called a Joint Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (JHAST), and additional BHA surge SMEs activated to support the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM – now U.S. Indo-Pacific Command [USINDOPACOM]) J35 operational planners and J4 logisticians in Hawaii.

Additionally, as part of ongoing security cooperation activities in the region, Brigadier General Kennedy's team conducted FDR-themed table-top exercises with the Nepalese in the years leading up to the disaster. His Marines attended BHA's Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) and the CFE-DM Humanitarian Assistance Response Training (HART) course. Meanwhile, the Nepalese military established a military-to-military coordination center (Multi-National Military Coordination Center [MNMCC]), humanitarians activated the Cluster System to facilitate humanitarian-to-humanitarian coordination, and the UN established a Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Centre (HuMOCC) to support civil-military coordination. Within a week, 22 countries sent 54 search and rescue teams and 9 military teams. Within 24 hours, USAID BHA sent a 128-person DART (BHA and USAR personnel) to manage and coordinate the U.S. response.

This chapter and the following chapters will review in detail the U.S. and other organizations and their roles, U.S. policy, DoD doctrine, international norms, and the international response architecture that Brig Gen. Kennedy and 3rd MEB encountered in Nepal in 2015.

2.4.1 U.S. Process for the use of DoD in FDR

The Secretary of Defense, either at the direction of the President or with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, directs DoD support to USG humanitarian operations or establishes appropriate command relationships. Within DoD, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) coordinates DoD and FDR policy. Figure 2-3 describes OSD Policy guidance and its framework for the role of DoD in FDR operations.

DoD Mission in Foreign Disaster Relief

POLICY

- **USAID/BHA = Lead federal agency for USG FDR (~$6.2B/year)**
  - DoD = Supporting agency
    - Authority/Funding: Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, & Civic Aid (OHDACA), ~$30M/year set aside for DoD FDR contingency operations

- **U.S. military may be involved when:**
  - Civilian authorities request assistance and
  - Civilian response capacity is overwhelmed; and/or
  - The military provides a unique service.

- **When the U.S. military does become involved:**
  - The military mission should be clearly defined
  - The risks should be minimal
  - Other core DoD missions should not be affected

DoD Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR) is assistance that can be used immediately to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims.

DoD Directive 5100.46, FDR

Figure 2-3. *The OSD(P) guidance and framework for the role of DoD in FDR operations (Source: OSD(P))*

DoD supports USAID with FDR missions every year. Table 2-1 below offers a snapshot of DoD support to FDR missions, FY2013 to FY2019.

Year	Response	Cost
FY13	Philippines Typhoon Bopha	$541K
FY14	Philippines Typhoon Haiyan	$34.4M
FY14	Slovenia Ice Storm	$800K
FY14	Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 Search & Rescue	$3.1M
FY14	Korea Ferry Disaster Search & Rescue	$507K
FY14	Sinjar Iraq	$4M
FY14	Amirli Iraq	$709K
FY15	Operation United Assistance – West Africa Ebola Outbreak	$465M
FY15	Nepal Earthquake	$19.6M
FY15	Rohingya/Bangladesh Migrant Support	$1.3M
FY15	Iraq/Syria Humanitarian Assistance	$115M
FY16	Ecuador Earthquake	$6.5M
FY17	Haiti – Hurricane Matthew	$13.1M
FY17	Peru Floods	$1.57M
FY17	South Korea M/V Stellar Daisy Search & Rescue	$473K
FY17	Sri Lanka Flood Relief	$8M
FY17	Syria Complex Emergency	$20M
FY18	Thailand Cave Rescue – Search & Rescue	$750K
FY19	Indonesia – Sulawesi Earthquake & Tsunami	$2.95M
FY19	Mozambique Cyclone Idai Relief	$15M
FY19	Hurricane Dorian	$8.49M
FY21	Latin America Storms	$7.31M

Table 2-1. *DoD support to FDR missions, FY13 to FY19 (Source: OSD(P) briefing; modified by CFE-DM)*

With FDR operations in permissive operating environments, DoD and policymakers are often caught between USG, the UN, and humanitarian concerns about the politicization and militarization of FDR, and political and strategic objectives to use military assets as visible USG assistance. Challenges for policymakers and DoD to consider when supporting FDR operations:

- The failure to respond and arrive quickly to a disaster may result in the loss of the critical window to engage (arrive early or not at all)
- Leaders should balance the desire to demonstrate USG support to an AS with on-the-ground needs
- Pushing unnecessary and unwanted capabilities and commodities could unduly burden the AS government and response system
- Scrutiny that comes with the use of the military in nonessential situations from multiple stakeholders, such as the U.S. Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), UN, and humanitarians
- The constant need to avoid mission creep once deployed for FDR (this is a key topic of Chapter 6.2, "Role of the Military in FDR")

(a) The Joint Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) recommends military capabilities and appropriate relationships for FDR operations to the SecDef. Once these relationships have been established, the Joint Staff coordinates detailed staff planning under the cognizance of CJCS. The Joint Staff J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate) has the primary responsibility for the concept review of operation plans (OPLAN) in support of FDR. It also coordinates policy and represents the CJCS in interagency forums related to FDR.

Within the Joint Staff J-5, the Deputy Directorate for Global Policy and Partnership also provides oversight for Geographic Combatant Command's (GCC) Humanitarian Civic Assistance programs. Through the joint logistics operations center (JLOC), the Joint Staff J-4 (Logistics Directorate) oversees joint logistics support for FHA operations. The Joint Staff J-3 (Operations Directorate) will also be involved when a military force is deployed to a foreign country as part of a U.S. FDR operation.

(b) The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The DSCA is the central DoD agency that synchronizes global security cooperation programs, funding, and efforts across the OSD, Joint Staff, DoS, CCMDs, the services, and U.S. civilian industry. Under DSCA oversight, the Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action (HDM) manages DoD humanitarian assistance programs funded with the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriations in all GCCs. This includes humanitarian projects, transportation of DoD and privately donated humanitarian material, humanitarian mine action programs,

and foreign disaster relief. DSCA publishes guidance to DoD on the use of OHDACA for FDR in SAMM Chapter 12.8, found online: https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-12.

The OHDACA appropriation supports the SecDef and the Combatant Commanders' (CCDR) national and theater strategies to build partner nation capacity and expand and strengthen alliances and partnerships while advancing DoD access, influence, and visibility. OHDACA funded programs include Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Humanitarian Mine Assistance (HMA), and the Foreign Disaster Relief Program. For perspective, OHDACA budget appropriations were $117 million in FY2019 and $135 million in FY2020.[35] The FY2021 Presidential Budget Request for OHDACA was $109 million. It is worth noting the relatively small size of the OHDACA appropriation, normally $100-$140 million annually, with $20-30 million set aside for FDR missions, compared to the FY2021 budget request for USG global humanitarian assistance of $6.27 billion.

(c) Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC). Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) direct military operations, including FDR, within their areas of responsibility (AOR). FDR missions are undertaken in response to requirements identified by the COM in an AS. U.S. military operations should be executed with the concurrence of the COM.

GCCs develop and maintain commanders' estimates, base plans, concept plans (CONPLAN), or OPLANs for FDR operations. GCCs articulate the general framework that allows for development options for any situation specific to the GCC response/DoD support to USG FDR operations. This allows the GCC to provide a timely, relevant, and appropriate response that addresses the immediate crisis. When it is necessary to establish a Joint Task Force (JTF), the establishing authority is normally a Combatant Commander (CCDR). If the requested requirements are beyond the scope of the forces allocated to the GCC, the GCC will submit a Request for Forces (RFF) to the Joint Staff J-3.

Combatant Commands can also request and receive the transfer of forces from the Services or other Combatant Commands for Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR) Operations for up to 30 days in accordance with the SecDef-approved FDR Force Sharing authorities detailed in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG). Combatant Commands will submit a message in RFF format to account for this force transfer in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP).

(d) U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). USTRANSCOM is a unified, functional combatant command (FCC) that offers strategic deployment and distribution capabilities for the movement and sustainment of GCC forces. The presence of a USTRANSCOM liaison within GCC headquarters allows for immediate planning and coordination integration.

Multinational and interagency synergy is achieved through use of the Coalition Mobility System (CMS) (https://www.coalitionmobility.com). CMS is an unclassified, internet-based USTRANSCOM-developed tool that provides a worldwide accessible platform to facilitate multinational and interagency information sharing in support of humanitarian and coalition logistics operations.

USTRANSCOM also has a JTF-Port Opening capability that consists of both aerial port and seaport capabilities. USTRANSCOM's Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) has personnel ready to provide staff and planning augmentation support. Early consideration of JECC support is encouraged as a key enabler for command and control. USTRANSCOM capabilities are detailed in Appendix B.

(e) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). DTRA serves as the focal point for DoD's National Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Technical Reach-back Enterprise and is a support element for national countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD); it provides time-sensitive access to a broad range of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) SMEs in a collaborative environment capable of supporting an FDR effort with CBRNE implications. During a crisis involving CBRNE materials, at the request of a CCDR, and in coordination with the Joint Staff, the DTRA Director may direct the immediate deployment of a CBRNE military advisory team. These teams provide task-organized, deployable, doctrinal, and technical expertise, support, advice, and hazard prediction modeling assistance for DoD and other federal agencies during all phases of International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response (ICBRN-R) accidents or incidents. See Appendix C for more information on ICBRN-R.

(f) The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM). CFE-DM, established by congressional legislation in 1994, operates under the authority of SecDef and fulfills a worldwide mission to enhance civil-military coordination through collaborative partnerships, education and training, and applied research. While the Center has a global mandate to provide support to all CCMDs and professional military education (PME) organizations, CFE-DM is a direct reporting unit to USINDOPACOM. CFE-DM efforts focus on the operational level, supporting the CCDR's common operational picture (COP) and

preparing JTF commanders and staffs for FDR operations. Education, training, and applied research activities are designed to improve civil-military performance across the spectrum of humanitarian response from natural disasters to conflict. CFE-DM has numerous downloadable FDR case studies, country studies, and other products on its website. Further, it has the capability to conduct just-in-time pre-deployment education activities for deploying units.

(g) The Center for Global Health Engagement (CGHE). CGHE is a DoD organization with the expanded mission to integrate, lead, and synchronize contributions of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences to DoD global health engagement and national security objectives. It provides a hub for global health engagement thought leadership and knowledge; communications; operational support; training and professional development; research; and assessment, monitoring, and evaluation. For more information, visit https://www.usuhs.edu/cghe.

(h) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The NGA provides direct analytical support for FDR through the LFAs and GCCs primarily through the deployment of team specialists in response to natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and wildfires. The standard production includes initial damage or recovery mitigation assessment derived from imagery and analytical imagery assessments, analytical reporting through NGA intelligence briefs, and geospatial situational awareness products.

2.5 Other U.S. Agencies and Organizations

(a) U.S. Department of Energy/Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The mission of the Department of Energy is to ensure U.S. security and prosperity by addressing energy, environmental, and nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology solutions. A predictable cascade to large-scale international disasters is damage to national power infrastructure systems and nuclear reactors. The Department of Energy and its subordinate agency the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, play key roles in advising an AS in energy infrastructure restoration and in controlling damage that has occurred to nuclear power infrastructure.

(b) U.S. Department of Commerce/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is a subordinate organization within the U.S. Department of Commerce and functions as a supplier of environmental information products pertaining to the state of the oceans and the atmosphere through the National Weather Service. Specifically, NOAA seeks to understand and predict changes in climate, weather, oceans, and coasts; to share that knowledge and information with others who require this information

for strategic decision- making; and to conserve and manage coastal and marine ecosystems and resources.

(c) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the USG's principal agency for protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential human services, especially for those who are least able to help themselves. During an international disaster response, HHS will support USAID in cooperation with other USG agencies and international partners. Depending on the nature of the request, HHS personnel may provide technical assistance or implement the response in a supporting role.

By law (Title 42, U.S. Code, Section 1313) and Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, HHS is the LFA for the reception of all evacuees in the U.S. HHS personnel meet and assist evacuees at the U.S. port of entry. Their plans rely on state and local governments to carry out the operational responsibilities of repatriation. While HHS is responsible for National Emergency Repatriation planning and implementation of the emergency plan, state and local governments have operational responsibility for the reception, temporary care, and onward transportation for the noncombatant evacuee.

The Commander of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is responsible for receiving evacuees in the continental U.S., Alaska, and the U.S. territories within the Caribbean during repatriation. The Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) is responsible for receiving evacuees in Hawaii and U.S. territories within the Pacific during repatriation. For further details on HHS and Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), refer to *JP 3-68*, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.

(d) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Working with U.S. states and other partners, the CDC provides a system of health surveillance to monitor and prevent disease outbreaks (including bioterrorism), implement disease prevention strategies, and maintain national health statistics. The CDC also provides for immunization services, workplace safety, and environmental disease prevention. Among the most important components with international responsibility is the Coordinating Office for Global Health, which provides national leadership, coordination, and support for CDC's global health partners.

(e) U.S. Department of the Interior/United States Geological Survey. The Department of the Interior/U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) supports FDR in two ways. First, with the Volcano Disaster Assistance Program (VDAP). VDAP teams can be quickly mobilized and deployed worldwide (in support of USAID/BHA) to assess and monitor hazards associated with volcanoes threatening to erupt. Second, the USGS Earthquake Hazards

Program produces ShakeMap in conjunction with regional seismic network operators. ShakeMap sites provide near-real-time maps of ground motion and shaking intensity following significant earthquakes. Those maps are used for post-earthquake response and recovery, for public and scientific information, and for preparedness exercises and disaster planning.

(f) The Pacific Disaster Center (PDC). PDC is an applied science, information, and technology center working to reduce disaster risks and impacts to people's lives and property. Established by the USG in 1996, the PDC is congressionally mandated and funded [sponsored through OUSD(P)] and is currently managed by the University of Hawaii. PDC's mission is to provide applied information research and analysis to support the development of more effective policies, institutions, programs, and information products for the disaster management and HA communities. Through the use of PDC-developed and PDC-hosted web-based information systems, disaster managers can develop both situational awareness and appropriate responses before, during, and after disaster events.

2.6 Department of Defense Foreign Disaster Relief Policy

DoD'S role in disaster response is part of a comprehensive U.S. Government (USG) approach in which the USAID/BHA is the lead agency. In this capacity, BHA is responsible for determining appropriate USG contributions and coordinating overall USG FDR activities. Prior to the Combatant Commands' commitment of resources to the response, BHA validates the humanitarian requirements, and the office of the Secretary of Defense approves specific requests for DoD support.

The DoD Directive (DODD) 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, July 6, 2012 provides policy and responsibilities for FDR operations. Key points from DODD 5100.46 are quoted below:

1. "DoD shall respond to foreign disasters in support of USAID
2. DoD Components shall provide disaster assistance in support of U.S. FDR efforts only:
   - At the direction of the President
   - When the Secretary of Defense or a designee approves, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, a request for assistance from another Federal department or agency; or
   - In emergency situations in order to save human lives, where there is not sufficient time to seek the prior concurrence of the Secretary of State, in which case the Secretary of Defense shall advise and seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State as soon as practicable thereafter

3. DoD Components may provide non-reimbursable FDR as humanitarian assistance using available Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds, Presidential drawdown authority in accordance with section 506 of Public Law 87-195, or other available authorities. Additionally, DoD Components may provide reimbursable FDR assistance when requested and funded by other U.S. Government (USG) departments and agencies.
4. Interagency requests for DoD assistance to disaster relief efforts shall be transmitted in an official request from the appropriate departmental or agency Executive Secretariat to the DoD Executive Secretary.
5. DoD shall consider FDR assistance based on the:
   - Appropriate international organization assessment(s) of the disaster
   - Availability of requested assistance
   - Impact on ongoing or potential military operations of providing such assistance
   - Effect on security cooperation objectives
6. Nothing in this Directive shall be construed as preventing a military commander with assigned forces at or near the immediate scene of a foreign disaster from taking prompt action to save human lives. In cases in which this authority is invoked, the commander should obtain the concurrence of the AS and U.S. Chief of Mission of the affected country before committing forces. Also, the Combatant Commander shall follow up as soon as possible, but no later than 72 hours after the start of relief operations, to secure Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense approval for continuing assistance. Combatant Commanders must also obtain Secretary or Deputy Secretary approval in order to obtain reimbursement with OHDACA funds. Such assistance during the first 72 hours does not include the authority to provide military assistance that does not contribute to urgent life-saving efforts."

This policy is explicit that DoD supports USAID. Second, DoD provides support to USAID on a reimbursable and non-reimbursable basis which is tracked by a USAID coordinating process called the Mission Tasking Matrix ("MITAM"), covered in Chapter 7. Third, note that number (5) above provides DoD a caveat to assess and evaluate the operational impacts of supporting FDR operations. DoD balances requests to support FDR operations with other DoD operations, including potential operations, and security cooperation objectives.

DoD Directive (DODD) 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, does offer an exception called, "Prompt Action," to the process outlined here, colloquially called the "life and limb clause" or the "72-hour authority." Commanders with assigned forces at or near the immediate scene of a foreign disaster may take prompt action to save human lives.

Commanders should obtain the concurrence of the PN and the Chief of Mission before committing forces. In taking prompt action to save lives, commanders may use or pre-position the commander's own resources, but may not transfer equipment or supplies to a PN unless they have a separate authority to do so. The GCC shall follow up as soon as possible, but no later than 72 hours after the start of relief operations (life-saving assistance), to secure SecDef or Deputy SecDef approval for continuing assistance. A CCMD may seek SecDef approval for OHDACA reimbursement of the cost of prompt action activities by submitting a request in writing to DASD/SHA with copy to DSCA.

While DoD Directive (DODD) 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, speaks to 10 USC 404, DoD has legal authority to initiate FDR operations and to provide "other humanitarian assistance worldwide" in accordance with 10 USC 2561 (see Ch. 7 for details on 10 USC 404 and 10 USC 2561). For example, in response to the Beirut explosions in 2020, SecDef authorized FDR before receiving a request from USAID.

2.7 U.S. Government Interagency Process for FDR

When a disaster occurs in a foreign country, the U.S. Ambassador/COM may issue a disaster declaration. Depending on the scale of the disaster and the capabilities of the AS, the AS may request U.S. assistance. However, depending on the political dynamics, the U.S. Ambassador often offers U.S. assistance instead of it being requested by the AS government. In recent years this offer of assistance over a request for assistance has been a regular occurrence.

The U.S. Ambassador is assisted in disaster assessment and validation of need by the Country Team (U.S. embassy), which includes, among other important advisors, a Mission Disaster Relief Officer (MDRO). The MDRO is familiar with AS disaster authorities and capabilities and other potential humanitarian partners in-country, and continually liaises with the USAID BHA Regional Advisor, DoD staff on the Country Team, and the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM).

The disaster declaration is required for USAID to have the legal authority to expend funds for FDR. For a USG response, the COM uses the following criteria to validate USG support:

- AS requests or will accept USG aid
- AS is overwhelmed
- Responding is in the interest of the USG

After a disaster has been declared, the MDRO is responsible for drafting the Disaster Declaration Cable and submitting it to the COM for approval. The U.S. government provides bilateral assistance to the AS in a direct relationship. Further, other assisting nations typically support the AS under their own bilateral agreements. In fact, the bilateral nature of assisting states means a combined task force or multinational command structure is a rare occurrence in FDR operations.

Once the Disaster Declaration Cable is drafted and the USG has agreed to provide support, USAID BHA, as LFA, may request DoD support. USAID BHA begins to formulate the USG response based on its assessment of the disaster and the needs of the AS and its population. BHA has three categories of response options:

1. **Funding.** BHA provides an initial cash payment, traditionally $50,000 to $200,000, to support local response operations, normally to the AS Red Cross. BHA provides grants to its implementing partners (UN Relief Agencies, International Organizations, or Non-Governmental Organizations [UN/IO/NGO]).
2. **Provide Relief Commodities.** BHA maintains four regional warehouses (Miami, Florida; Pisa, Italy; Dubai, United Arab Emirates) that stockpile plastic sheeting, blankets, water bladders/containers, water treatment units, hygiene kits, kitchen kits, and other items.
3. **Personnel and Services.** BHA has a range of options from deploying BHA regional advisors, assessment teams, and a DART to requesting support from its USG interagency partners, such as the DoD.

These response categories and options illustrate that USAID has a range of options and resources to support foreign disaster relief before requesting support from the interagency or DoD. As stated earlier, most FDR support provided by USAID does not involve DoD.




Figure 2-4. *USG FDR Interagency Coordination.*

Figure 2-4 outlines the interagency coordination flow from the U.S. Ambassador's Disaster Declaration to an Executive Secretary Memo (EXECSEC Memo) from USAID to DoD requesting DoD support for FDR. The grey boxes represent key actions and documents:

1. Disaster Declaration Cable
2. USAID EXECSEC Memo to DoD requesting support
3. CJCS issues an EXORD to the GCC to conduct FDR

The EXECSEC Memo is the formal request from DoS and USAID to the DoD to request FDR assistance. The formal process at the strategic level ensures the request is vetted and validated through senior leaders with DoS, USAID, and OSD on the use of DoD assets and personnel. The EXECSEC Memo covers whether DoD support is reimbursable/non-reimbursable and may offer details on desired capabilities, e.g., "transportation support."

Once DoD approves the EXECSEC Memo, the SecDef tasks the GCC to provide support for the disaster response via a SECDEF Memo to the Commander or a JCS Execute Order (EXORD). The EXORD authorizes GCC support to USAID. It may also authorize a specific level of OHDACA funding use for the operation and the authorized operation timeframe or termination date, e.g., "An initial expenditure of up to $10M and up to 14 days of relief operations will be used by USINDOPACOM or subordinate commands for disaster response operations." (quote from the DoD EXORD for the Philippines, signed by Secretary Chuck Hagel, November 12, 2013, Operation DAMAYAN).




Figure 2-5. *Process for SecDef authorization and DoD execution of FDR activities*
Source: DSCA Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)
https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-12)

Figure 2-5 shows the process flow chart that supports the interagency chart in Figure 2-4. The chart includes four key questions for DoD support to FDR:

1. Does the U.S. Ambassador (COM) issue a Disaster Declaration?
2. Does USAID require support from the USG interagency (specifically DoD)?
3. Does the DoD have "unique" capabilities?
4. Does the SecDef determine DoD support is feasible and appropriate?

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CHAPTER 3 – HUMANITARIAN ACTION, ORGANIZATIONS, AND GUIDELINES

This chapter focuses on civilian response organizations, the history of humanitarianism and humanitarian action, international guidelines, and the roles and responsibilities of international organizations during disaster response.

> *JP 3-29* states that the "tenets of multinational unity of effort (i.e., respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, and coordination)" must be applied during FDR to help ensure mission success. Ignorance of the roles, responsibilities and guidelines of humanitarian actors can lead to mission failure.

During FDR operations, U.S. military response forces encounter a diverse group of humanitarian organizations. It is important to understand that civilian stakeholders have different mandates, organizational cultures, and perspectives. It is unwise and counterproductive to generalize NGOs, the UN, Red Cross, and donor organizations. Revisiting the quote from *JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* at the beginning of this handbook is useful, "The tenets of multinational unity of effort (i.e., respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, and coordination) applied during an FDR mission cannot guarantee success; however, ignoring them may lead to mission failure." Having a basic understanding of civilian humanitarians and their background is a solid foundation for success.

3.1 Humanitarian Action

Every day, thousands of humanitarian actors are working tirelessly to assist vulnerable and affected populations globally. Their efforts are intended to help affected populations with their essential needs, mitigate suffering, and reduce death, all while working to maintain the human dignity of those affected by disasters.[36] Central to their work is a shared set of principles established by one of the forefathers of humanitarian action and founder of the Red Cross, Red Crescent Movement, Henry Dunant.[37] Dunant's principles of humanitarian intervention have become the foundation upon which modern humanitarianism was built.[38]

3.1.1 Humanitarian Principles

Today, there are four internationally recognized principles that govern the provision of humanitarian aid: humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Derived from the Core Principles established by the ICRC and the National Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies in 1965, these basic principles were formally endorsed by the UN General Assembly

(GA) resolution 46/182 in 1991 (humanity, neutrality, and impartiality) and resolution 58/114 in 2004 (independence).[39] The four primary principles are:

- **Humanity.** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found; the purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.
- **Neutrality.** Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature.
- **Impartiality.** Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, socio-economic class, or political affiliation.
- **Independence.** Operational independence of humanitarian action is imperative. Humanitarians must operate autonomously from any political, economic, military, or other objectives that actors may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

The other facet of humanitarian action is international humanitarian law, which provides a legal framework for the protection of civilians and the provision of humanitarian aid.[40] Similarly, the Humanitarian Code of Conduct and concept of "Do No Harm" reinforce the principles and seek to safeguard high standards of humanitarian behavior and the protection of affected populations. "Do No Harm" is the consideration of potential negative second and third order effects as a result of humanitarian aid. Improperly delivered aid can divide communities, fuel conflicts, force displacement, and build cultures of dependency.[41] For this reason, humanitarian actors must retain the lead role in undertaking and directing disaster relief activities.[42]

In 1994, the humanitarian challenges faced during the Rwanda Genocide inspired the multi-donor evaluation called the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR) to assess the humanitarian response.[43] The evaluation determined that there were significant failings, including poor work, and a lack of professionalism amongst some aid agencies.[44] The assessment and its recommendations led to the Sphere Project and the launch of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). The Sphere project was started by a group of humanitarians with a goal to improve the quality of humanitarian work during disaster response. Published in 2000, the Sphere Handbook frames the Humanitarian Charter and humanitarian standards to be applied in humanitarian response.

The international humanitarian system continued responding to disasters and evolving through the 2000s. Several large-scale disasters including the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami, the Pakistan earthquake of 2005 (Operation LIFELINE), and the Haiti Earthquake in 2010 led to significant improvements in guidelines, coordination, and civil-military relationships.[45] Additionally, these disasters caused international disaster engagement to focus more on local and regional capacity and response preparedness, a trend that would carry through the 2010s.

From a DoD FDR perspective, understanding the humanitarian principles, concepts, and guidelines not only helps civilian-military coordination, but just as with humanitarians, it helps prevent negative second and third order effects stemming from DoD actions in support of humanitarian assistance.

Humanitarian assistance is aid provided to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. For the purposes of this handbook, humanitarian assistance is divided into three tasks outlined below, based on the degree of military contact with the affected population (more details on this framework and how it influences the role of DoD in FDR is in Chapter 6).

- **Direct Assistance** is the face-to-face distribution of goods/services.
- **Indirect Assistance** is at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel.
- **Infrastructure Support** involves the provision of technical or infrastructure support such as road or port repairs, airspace management, and power generation that facilitate disaster relief.[46]

These tasks are important because they help define (based on the operating environment) which types of international disaster relief assistance (IDRA) activities are appropriate to support with international military resources. In the context of international guidelines, IDRA refers to material, personnel, and services provided by the international community to an Affected State (AS) to meet the needs of those affected by a disaster. It includes all actions necessary to grant and facilitate movement over a sovereign territory, including the territorial waters and the airspace of a Transit State.

3.1.2 International Disaster Guidelines

The following is an overview of international guidelines considered to be the most relevant to DoD forces responding to FDR. In addition to these guidelines, it is highly recommended that all DoD forces who could potentially support FDR become familiar with the *JP 3-29*.

The 1990s saw a significant increase in complex emergencies (such as the Rwanda Genocide and Bosnian War), which inspired efforts to standardize and professionalize the international humanitarian response system. In response, institutions and organizations in international humanitarian relief, from UN agencies to military forces, recognized the need for standards.




Figure 3-1. *Oslo Guidelines (Source: UN OCHA, 22 November 2007)*

In 1991, the UN GA Resolution 46/182 established the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) ; it was later renamed in 1998 as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). UN OCHA supports effective humanitarian response through coordination, advocacy, policy, information management, and humanitarian financing tools and services. UN GA Resolution 46/182 established the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) as a means of strengthening the international response system that includes both UN and non-UN responders. To address the increasing presence of foreign military forces during FDR, the UN OCHA, in its capacity as the designated Focal Point for Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) within the UN System, published the Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (known as the Oslo Guidelines) in 1994.

The Oslo Guidelines offer key concepts and principles on the use of foreign military and civil defense assets in disaster relief, specifically disasters in a permissive operating environment. The next year, 1995, the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) organization was created to help the UN and governments of disaster-affected countries during the first phase of a sudden-onset emergency.

(a) Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief (referred to as the Oslo Guidelines). The Oslo Guidelines establish the basic framework for the use of foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA) during international disaster relief operations.[47] MCDA are comprised of relief personnel, equipment, supplies, and services provided by foreign military and civil defense organizations for IDRA. The UN IASC, UN humanitarian agencies, and Member States developed and endorsed these guidelines.

These guidelines:

- Address the use of MCDA following natural, technological, and environmental emergencies in a permissive environment (so this is not the guideline for FDR in conflict).
- Cover the use of MCDA resources requested by UN humanitarian agencies and deployed under UN control specifically to support humanitarian activities as well as other foreign MCDA that might be available.
- Provide principles, concepts, and procedures for requesting and coordinating MCDA when the resources are deemed necessary and appropriate, and for interfacing with foreign military forces who are conducting activities which impact on UN humanitarian activities.
- Are primarily intended for use by UN humanitarian agencies, their implementing and operational partners, Humanitarian Coordinators, and other foreign military forces supporting UN humanitarian activities.

According to these guidelines, foreign MCDA should be used as a "last resort." The concept of last resort means that foreign MCDA should be requested only when there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of MCDA can meet a critical humanitarian need. The MCDA must therefore be unique in both capability and availability. A copy of these guidelines can be found on online at: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/guidelines-use-military-and-civil-defence-assets-disaster-relief-oslo-guidelines.

As a complimentary guide to the Oslo Guidelines, UN OCHA published the UN Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies ("MCDA Guidelines") in 2003. At the opposite end of spectrum from the Oslo Guidelines, these guidelines were for the use of foreign military assets in less permissive operating environments. The guide can be found at: https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/01.%20MCDA%20Guidelines%20March%2003%20Rev1%20Jan06.pdf.

(b) The UN Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) Field Handbook. In 2004, the UN IASC published a concept paper on UN-CMCoord that proposed when and how UN-CMCoord officers would be mobilized, deployed, and employed in disasters that will likely require civil-military coordination.[48] Published in 2007 and last updated in 2018, the Civil-Military Coordination Field Handbook, is a toolkit for UN-CMCoord officers, humanitarians, and other practitioners working in the field of UN-CMCoord who generally interact with military and other armed actors. A copy of the guide can be found at: https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/[E-Version]%20UNCMCoord%20Field%20Handbook%202.0%20%282018%29.pdf

(c) United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Guide for the Military. The guide was written by the UN OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS). Published in 2017, the purpose of this guide is "to explain, in simple terms, the humanitarian community, how it operates and how the military can best interact with, support and complement humanitarian action."[49] It provides an overview of the humanitarian eco-system and is intended to improve coordination through an increased understating by foreign militaries of international humanitarian law, humanitarian principles, mandates, roles, responsibilities and operating procedures. The guide can be found at: https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Guide%20for%20the%20Military%20v2.pdf.

(d) Recommended Practices for Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination of Foreign Military Assets (FMA) in Natural and Man-Made Disasters. This guide supplements existing UN-CMCoord Guidelines. Based on lessons learned over two decades, it captures the maturation of civil-military coordination as well as the relationship between civilian and military actors during disaster relief and other humanitarian emergencies.[50] The intent of this guide is to build on that progress and continue to improve coordination to provide a more deliberate, unified, and effective response.[51] Additionally, it serves to enumerate and encourage principled humanitarian action through effective humanitarian civil-military interaction and improve the deployment, employment, and transition of foreign military support to FDR operations.[52] A copy of this guide can be found at: https://cms.emergency.unhcr.org/documents/11982/48574/Recommended+Practices+for+Effective+Humanitarian+Civil-Military+Coordination+of+Foreign+Military+Assets+in+Natural+and+Man-Made+Disasters/b6c934f0-1dec-42ea-9396-5313e3e2f2d3.

(e) IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys. These guidelines provide discussion and considerations pertaining to the use of armed escorts and a framework to assist with decision-making on the use of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys in less than permissive and non-permissive environments. Additionally, for humanitarian actors, these guidelines provide considerations and implications of such use.[53] These guidelines can be found at: https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Armed%20Escort%20Guidelines%20-%20Final.pdf.

(f) Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations (APC-MADRO). Another guide similar to the Oslo Guidelines is the Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for The Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations. The guide, developed by the Asia-Pacific Conference on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC-MADRO), was a regional initiative hosted by the Indian Armed Forces in New Delhi in December 2005 after

the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami.[54] The conferences and guide foreshadowed increasing activities in the 2010s aimed at localizing response and supporting regional response preparedness efforts of National Disaster Management Offices, regional organizations, and regional guidelines and interoperability.

3.2 International Response Stakeholders



Figure 3-2. *UN Flags at NY Headquarters, UNDAC team conducts assessments in Barbados, WFP truck (Photos from multiple sources)*[55]

International response efforts are conducted by a diverse group of organizations and agencies. The independence of those organizations precludes the use of hierarchical command and control (C2) structures traditionally used by militaries. For the most part, there are no C2 structures as humanitarian leadership is typically consensus-based.[56] For those new to FDR operations, the lack of a C2 structure can create a perception of chaos and lack of leadership, but it is important to remember that while humanitarians operate differently from the military, they are experts in their field and should be treated professionally and respectfully. It is highly recommended that military personnel participating in FDR operations familiarize themselves with the international humanitarian eco-system. The major international humanitarian organizations with whom responding military may encounter are outlined in the next section.

3.2.1 International Organizations

An International Organization (IO) is an organization established by a treaty or other formal agreement between two or more governments and governed by international law.[57] IOs are formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. They can be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Examples include the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), WHO, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).[58]

(a) United Nations (UN). The UN is a large and complex international organization, composed of member nations and chartered to facilitate cooperation in international law, international security, economic development, social progress, human rights, and achievement of world peace.

Globally, the UN has the lead role in the international community to respond to natural and man-made disasters that exceed the capacity of national authorities alone. The response to the 1988 Armenia earthquake that killed 25,000 people became a foundational pillar upon which current U.S. and international humanitarian coordination systems were built.[59] The devastating aftermath of this earthquake caused the Soviet Union to request assistance from the U.S. and other countries. The U.S. and 112 other countries responded with various forms of assistance, all on a bilateral basis.

This event would become the genesis for the UN assuming the lead for coordination of international assistance resulting in the establishment of the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group, the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC), and the On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC). As a major provider of emergency relief and long-term assistance, the UN is a facilitator for action by governments and relief agencies. Brief descriptions of the key disaster relief UN positions and agencies of relevance to DoD support to FDR follow.

(b) Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). The IASC is an inter-agency forum for coordination, policy development, and decision-making that involves key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. The committee is chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), who is also the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Head of OCHA.

(c) UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). The ERC is responsible for the oversight of all emergencies requiring UN humanitarian assistance. The ERC is the central focal point for the coordination of governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental disaster relief efforts.[60]

(d) UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator. Under UN GA Resolution 46/182 of December 19, 1991, the Affected State (AS) has the primary responsibility for the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory. At the behest of the AS, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) is the lead for the coordination of international relief efforts in the AS.[61] Accountable to the ERC, the HC is the link between the operational (in country) and the global (headquarters) level. In consultation with the AS, the HC will initiate requests for and approve the use of MCDA. The HC ensures that appropriate civil-military coordination mechanisms and guidance are in place to ensure the assets are utilized effectively.[62] The HC also serves as the chair of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).

UN OCHA refers to the HCT as the centerpiece for humanitarian coordination in the AS.[63] In support of, and in coordination with the AS, the HCT is responsible for ensuring that the delivery of humanitarian aid is "coordinated, principled, timely, effective, efficient, and contributes to longer-term recovery."[64]




Figure 3-3. Organizational chart of the Humanitarian Country Team and the UN Country Team (Source: United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Guide for the Military 2.0, 101 Series. May 2017)

HCT composition includes representatives from the UN, international NGOs, and the Red Cross/ Red Crescent Movement. Figure 3-3 shows the composition of the HCT and UN Country Team.[65]

(e) UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA is part of the UN Secretariat and assists governments in mobilizing international assistance when the scale of a disaster exceeds national capacity. Some functions for which OCHA is responsible include:

- Coordinating the efforts of international humanitarian response participants.
- Ensuring appropriate and efficient use of MCDA during humanitarian response operations by facilitating the relationship between the humanitarian and military response organizations.[66]
- Acting as a central repository for humanitarian information. OCHA collects, analyzes, and shares information via their ReliefWeb and Humanitarian Response websites thereby providing a "big-picture" view of the response environment.[67] OCHA's information products include maps, infographics, situation reports, and humanitarian bulletins.[68]

(f) OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Service (CMCS). The focal point for UN-CMCoord in the UN System is the CMCS of OCHA. During international disaster relief operations, CMCS may deploy UN-CMCoord Officers to facilitate humanitarian civil-military coordination activities on the ground. Additionally, CMCS also provides UN-CMCoord training and supports military exercises with significant HADR components. See Chapter 6 for in-depth information on humanitarian civil-military coordination.

(g) UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) Team. UNDAC teams can deploy to an AS with 12-48 hours' notice. During the critical few days following a major disaster, these teams support governments, UN agencies, and partners by setting up reception and coordination centers for all incoming international relief organizations. UNDAC teams are often the first on the ground, and their role is key in ensuring that a solid response foundation is put in place to support the response.[69]

(h) The World Food Programme (WFP). Jointly established by the UN and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), WFP is one of the largest humanitarian organizations in the world. Providing food, logistics support, and other assistance, they are typically one of the first organizations to respond following a large-scale disaster. WFP coordinates response efforts on behalf of the wider humanitarian community, as the lead for the Logistics Cluster and the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster, and as the co-lead for the Food Security Cluster.[70] See Chapter 5 for more information on the Cluster System.

WFP operates and maintains the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) Network. UNHRD enables humanitarian actors to pre-position and stockpile relief items and support equipment for swift delivery in emergency situations. Hubs are strategically located in Italy (Brindisi), Ghana (Accra), Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), Panama (Panama City), Spain (Las Palmas), and the United Arab Emirates (Dubai).[71] For more information on the UNHRD including types of commodities stored, visit the WFP website at: https://www.wfp.org/unhrd. On a typical day, WFP has approximately "5,600 trucks, 30 ships and 100 planes on the move" providing relief supplies to affected populations around the world.[72]

Additionally, WFP's Humanitarian-Military Interaction Unit (HMI) deploys HMI officers to humanitarian emergencies to coordinate humanitarian-military logistics and access requirements.

(i) UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS). The UNHAS is managed by the WFP and offers safe, reliable, cost-efficient, and effective passenger and light cargo transport for the wider humanitarian community to and from areas of crisis and intervention. It is the only humanitarian air service that gives equal access to all humanitarian entities. UNHAS responds to the

need for access to the world's most remote and challenging locations, often under precarious security conditions, where no safe surface transport or viable commercial aviation options are available. Sometimes natural disasters leave air transport as the only mean of access; at other times, it is conflict that puts entire areas beyond the reach of land transport or commercial flights. Created precisely for such scenarios, UNHAS provides access for humanitarian workers and cargo, allowing life-saving projects to be implemented and monitored.[73]

3.2.2 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)

The *JP 3-08* defines an NGO as a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization. The term NGO is usually applied only to apolitical organizations that pursue wider social or humanitarian aims. NGOs typically receive funding from sources such as individuals, private companies, corporations, or governmental/intergovernmental or UN agencies. NGOs exist at the local, national, and international levels. Their size, reach, mandates, capabilities, and professionalism vary significantly. During FDR operations, USAID BHA, as the U.S. LFA, will coordinate with NGOs. As one of their frequently used response options, USAID BHA will provide funding directly to their partner NGOs for disaster relief supplies.

Although NGOs may have philosophical differences and divergent agendas from military forces, short-term objectives are frequently similar. Identifying common ground with NGOs can be mutually beneficial, although NGOs often object to any sense that their activities have been co-opted for military objectives (do not use the term "force multiplier"). DoD should exercise due diligence when dealing with NGOs. Some do not adhere to accepted professional standards, and although not common, terrorist organizations and other criminal groups have created NGOs as fronts for money laundering and other illicit activity.

3.2.3 Private Corporate Organizations

Private corporate companies such as DHL, UPS, Google, and others are becoming more involved in disaster relief operations, often as part of their commitment to a corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategy.

3.2.4 International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement



Figure 3-4. *International Disaster Relief Stakeholders*
(Source: Asia Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference)

The Red Cross Red Crescent Movement (RCRC) is the largest network of humanitarians – volunteers, staff, and supporters – in the world. During FDR operations, the U.S. military may interface with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and/or national Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies depending on the operating environment.

Used by the National Societies of the IFRC, the red cross (taken from the Swiss flag), red crescent, and red crystal are intended to be symbols of neutrality and are codified in law at both international and national levels. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement consists of three separate and distinct entities, each with its own specific mission:

(a) International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Established in 1863 and based in Geneva, Switzerland, the ICRC is an impartial, neutral, and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance in accordance with international humanitarian law.[74]

(b) International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Also based in Geneva, the IFRC is a global humanitarian organization, which coordinates and directs international assistance following natural and man-made disasters in non-conflict situations. The IFRC works with and supports National Societies in response to disasters around the world.[75] During disaster relief operations, IFRC can supply Emergency Response Units (ERU), which are packages of personnel and equipment focused on logistics, information and communications technology (ICT), water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), health, rapid deployment hospitals, relief supplies, and base camps. IFRC also sets forward policy for National Societies, such as Civil-Military Relations.

(c) National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. National Societies serve as auxiliaries of their governments and provide assistance during response to disasters and conflict situations.[76] As of publication, there are 192 National Societies with over 13.7 million volunteers.

3.3 Regional Disaster Relief Organizations

This section provides an overview of regional humanitarian and disaster relief organizations.

3.3.1 Indo-Asia-Pacific Region

Continuing with regional developments on disaster response, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) established the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) in 2011. The AHA Centre is an inter-governmental organization which aims to facilitate cooperation and coordination among ASEAN Member States and with the UN and international organizations for disaster management and emergency response in the ASEAN region. In 2014, Singapore established the Regional HADR Coordination Centre (RHCC). The RHCC seeks to facilitate military-to-military coordination in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and to support the military of an AS in coordinating assistance provided by foreign militaries. In 2016, at the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), with 173 member states attending, support for localized humanitarian action was a priority outcome, reinforcing trends in humanitarian action where the expectation is that the international community's role in response is to complement national capacity.

(a) Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre (AHA Centre). With the motto of "One ASEAN, One Response," ASEAN Member States respond to disasters in accordance with the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). This legally binding disaster response framework ensures joint ASEAN response and resource mobilization in the event of a large-scale disaster within ASEAN. In the event of a large-scale disaster, the ASEAN Secretary-General will assume the role of ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator and, on behalf of ASEAN, mobilize additional resources and coordinate with ASEAN Leaders and partners worldwide. As part of the agreement, the Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP) was developed.[77]



The SASOP operationalizes the AADMER response mechanisms, providing guides, templates for relief operations, and procedures for requesting and use of military and civilian assets. The coordinating arm is the AHA Centre. Established in 2011 and based in Jakarta, Indonesia, the AHA Centre is an IGO that facilitates cooperation and coordination amongst ASEAN Member States.

The AHA Centre works with the National Disaster Management Offices (NDMO) of ASEAN Member States by assisting with coordination of relief efforts, writing situation reports, and providing disaster relief commodities. The AHA Centre partners with IO, the private sector, civil society organizations such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and with the UN. Multilateral cooperation can take place with ASEAN Dialogue/ Development/Sectoral Partners, including Australia, China, the European Union, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the U.S.[78]

(b) Asia-Pacific. Changi Regional HADR Coordination Centre (RHCC). Established in 2014, at Singapore's Changi Command and Control (C2) center, the Changi RHCC was established to assist military to military coordination during disaster relief operations. The RHCC collaborates with like-minded partners such as the CFE-DM and supports and complements the efforts of existing disaster relief organizations such as UN OCHA and the AHA Centre, both of which support the overall coordination efforts of the AS's national disaster management authorities. The RHCC provides military-to-military support in three ways:

- Provides partner militaries with a comprehensive situational picture through their OPERA Computer Information System (CIS). This situation picture fuses together information on the assessed needs, specific requests for assistance, status of pledges/deployments, and key military logistics (e.g., points of entry or availability of airfields/seaports).
- Its network of International Liaison Officers (ILO) and operational centre links with partner militaries enhances information sharing and operational coordination for a multinational military response.
- With the consent of the AS, RHCC can forward deploy mobile coordination units to help the AS military coordinate relief efforts on the ground. Coordination of foreign military efforts takes place in the Multinational Coordination Centre (MNCC) or other structure established by the AS military.[79]

3.3.2 Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA)

Located in St. Michael, Barbados, CDEMA is a regional inter-governmental agency for disaster management in the Caribbean Community. Transitioning from the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency in 2009 to become CDEMA, the agency mobilizes and coordinates disaster relief efforts for Participating States including Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Cayman Islands, Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Republic of Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, and the Virgin Islands.[80]

3.3.3 NATO Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC)

Part of the Operations Division at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, the EADRCC serves as a coordination hub for both requests and offers of assistance. In close cooperation with UN OCHA, EADRCC helps facilitate civilian and military support to Allied and Partner Nations in response to natural and man-made disasters. It is NATO's principal civil emergency response mechanism in the Euro-Atlantic area.[81]

Established in 1998 by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, EADRCC is a NATO partnership tool for civil emergency planning for international disaster relief. Also, it complements the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit, a non-standing, multinational force of civilian and military forces that can be deployed as necessary in response to a large-scale disaster.[82]

The Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) is a group of 10 NATO Allies (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and the U.S.) and two NATO partner nations (Finland and Sweden) who have pooled aircraft with a heavy lift capability. The SAC can be allocated to support in the event of a major disaster. For example, it was utilized for humanitarian relief efforts in Haiti and Pakistan, and more recently, in Barbados and Guadalupe in the aftermath of Hurricane Irma (2017). During the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, participating nations used the capability to airlift urgent medical supplies and equipment.[83]

3.3.4 European Union (EU) – Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)

Established in 2001 and located in Brussels, Belgium, the ERCC supports the rapid deployment of disaster assistance, such as relief items, humanitarian experts, and specialized equipment. Following a major disaster, the ERCC serves as a coordination hub for EU Member States and six additional Participating States. Upon request from an AS or the UN, the ERCC provides disaster assistance to any country – inside or outside the EU.[84]

As evident from this chapter, the International Humanitarian Community is not a constituted system with defined membership, and the provision of aid differs considerably depending on individual roles and mandates. The following chapter provides an overview of AS, national, and international coordination structures.

CHAPTER 4 – COORDINATION



Figure 4-1. *Photo 1: U.S. Marines unloading over 12 tonnes of food items from a World Food Programme (WFP) truck onto helicopters to be sent to Jeremie, Haiti, which was severely hit by Hurricane Matthew. Source: UN/MINUSTAH/Frederic Fath. Photo 2: U.S. military forces support disaster relief. Source: NWC Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Program photo.*

4.1 Response Coordination

International response efforts are conducted by a very diverse group of organizations. Following a large-scale disaster, hundreds if not thousands of response personnel converge in the affected area to render assistance. This creates an incredibly complex and challenging relief environment. Several variables play into how coordination will occur including the condition of the AS's leadership and coping capacities, existing AS frameworks, the level of mutual trust among responders, the utilization of coordination platforms, and, finally, the willingness of responders to share information and resources. This chapter provides information on the AS, national and international coordination structures, information sources available, and coordination best practices to help create a synergistic approach to FDR.

> The joint force will work with interagency partners and the HN and often works with international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), PNs, and the private sector during FHA operations. The tenets of multinational unity of effort (i.e., respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, and coordination) applied during an FHA mission cannot guarantee success; however, ignoring them may lead to mission failure.
>
> *– JP 3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*

To those new to FDR operations, the dynamic and complex environment can create a perception of chaos often referred to as the "fog of relief." Chaos can be quelled when roles, responsibilities, frameworks, and processes are understood and maintained. Chaos Theory suggests that when responders lack an understanding of the environment and where they fit into it, they feel a lack of control and can quickly become overwhelmed.[85] The response environment is not random; rather it is an interconnected system where one action influences the next.[86] In other words, the actions of each organization working the response do so as a single system, but each individual action causes a response and reaction from the entire system – either positively or negatively. Therefore, adhering to coordination mechanisms and understanding with whom to coordinate

are critical to ensure unity of effort in the delivery of aid.
When conducting FDR, questions that may help mitigate an atmosphere of chaos include:

- With whom should we coordinate?
- How are we coordinating with them?
- How is this information getting into our staff processes?
- How are we supporting our partners such as BHA and the AS?
- Are we providing unique capabilities?

Figure 4-2 illustrates a framework which lays out the above questions to drive coordination.[87] The first step is to identify partners and other response stakeholders. Due to the complexity of the response environment and a lack of knowledge on who is working the problem, these questions often go unasked. Understanding coordination frameworks and how DoD fits into them drives efficiency of mission.




Figure 4-2. *Organizational and Process Challenges (Source: DoD Joint Staff J7)*

Unified action starts with the AS. As a sovereign nation, it has the primary responsibility for coordination, implementation, and monitoring of relief operations, including security for all response personnel.[88] Of these responsibilities, by far the most challenging is coordination among the many different entities, civilian and military, that must coordinate with each other in order to provide a timely and effective response. The AS leads disaster response. Understanding how international responders work in support of the AS is critical to unity of effort. The following sections address coordination and best practices from the perspective of the three main tasks of international coordination: civilian-to-civilian, civilian-to-military, and military-to-military.

4.2 Affected State

The AS is an independent nation whose sovereignty and integrity must be respected. Therefore, international relief operations shall be conducted only at the request or consent of the AS. The AS's national disaster management structure and processes provide the primary framework for the response effort. However, it is important to recognize that capabilities, frameworks, and procedures can vary significantly country.[89]

Affected State Frameworks. Responding military personnel should familiarize themselves with the AS's disaster response framework. Information on AS response frameworks and mechanisms may be found on the country's national disaster management agency website, via ReliefWeb, or in CFE-DM's Disaster Management Reference Handbook (if published). The title of the AS lead disaster relief organization varies from country to country. For example, emergency lead agency titles include National Disaster Management Office (NDMO), National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA), National Disaster Management Council (NDMC), and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). For the purposes of this Handbook, the acronym "NDMO" will be used.

While the location of the NDMO within the national structure can vary significantly, the structure generally falls into one of three main groups: NDMO located in the Prime Minister's Office; NDMO located in a line ministry/government agency; or no single NDMO, but disaster management functions reside in different units or departments. Some countries have National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Councils/ Committees chaired by the Prime Minister and comprised of select ministries. For example, Figure 4-3 depicts the Bangladesh framework, the NDMC is headed by the Prime Minister.




Figure 4-3. *National Disaster Management Officer organization of Bangladesh (Source: Bangladesh government)*

Regardless of the name of the structure, the AS's disaster management framework typically includes the national, regional, and local levels. Even with all national capacities activated, a large-scale disaster can overwhelm a country's capacity to respond. As a result, international assistance may be requested or accepted if offered. Figure 4-4 offers a conceptual template of the organizational architecture for international relief operations.




Figure 4-4. Conceptual organizational architecture for international coordination (Source: CFE-DM)

Note that at the center of coordination is the AS. On the right side is the humanitarian community with the UN's On-site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) as their in-country coordination mechanism. At the bottom is the UN Cluster System to help humanitarians organize and coordinate based on their sector or mission area (logistics, medical, telecommunications, etc.). On the left side are the assisting states and their militaries. Foreign militaries coordinate bilaterally, military-to-military, with the AS military on support, and multilaterally with other supporting militaries for operational coordination.

The coordination platform for numerous foreign militaries conducting operational coordination is established and led by the AS military. Over the years, the coordination construct in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region has become the Multi-National Coordination Center (MNCC). Civil-military coordination (CMCoord) supports the AS civilian-to-military coordination function as needed and is facilitated by UN CMCoord Officers.

These coordination mechanisms and concepts will be addressed later in this chapter. Figure 4-4 above presents a general coordination structure; however, some countries will modify the architecture to better fit with their national response structures. Figure 4-5 shows Indonesia's coordination framework for international assistance.[90]




Figure 4-5. *UN Regional Consultative Group Graphic showing Indonesia's coordination framework for international responders (Source: CFE-DM)*[91]

Even with coordination structures in place, the synchronization of international relief is challenging due to the enormity of the humanitarian response community.

4.3 Civilian-to-Civilian (Civ – Civ) Coordination

With perceived protection failings in Darfur (Sudan), the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Liberia, and coordination challenges in the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami, the UN conducted an independent report, the Humanitarian Response Review, in 2005.[92] The review was inspired by the perception that humanitarian response does not always meet the basic requirements of affected populations in a timely fashion and that the response provided can vary considerably from crisis to crisis.[93] The analysis noted weaknesses in humanitarian staff and their training, humanitarian coordination, and organizational and sectoral capacities. The recommended improvements focused on improving leadership (more effective leadership by Humanitarian Coordinators), humanitarian coordination (the "Cluster approach"), and flexible and timely funding in disasters (the Central Emergency Response Fund). The "Cluster approach" became the humanitarian-to-humanitarian operational coordination framework.

4.3.1 Humanitarian Cluster System

In 2005, the Cluster System was rolled out by the IASC during the Pakistan earthquake response operations. The Cluster System is the main functional coordination mechanism of the humanitarian community. It works around humanitarian areas (sectors), to prevent gaps in humanitarian response and ensure a coherent approach. A cluster is a grouping of humanitarian organizations that work in a specific sector. Clusters support the delivery of humanitarian assistance by coordinating, implementing and monitoring

projects, and conducting joint needs assessments and gap analyses in the field. They also inform strategic decision-making of the HC/HCT, through sectoral planning and strategy development. Each cluster is represented at the inter-cluster meetings. Many cross-cutting topics are not dealt with in separate clusters, but as inter-cluster functions, such as gender issues, psycho-social support and mental health, HIV/AIDS, and early recovery. The clusters are not command and control structures. Action is agreed upon through consensus, cooperation and information sharing, to gain a clear picture of the situation and prioritize resources to address needs and avoid duplication of effort. Equally, cluster leadership does not include command and control.

There are 11 global clusters (see figure 4-6 below). At the operational level, clusters are activated according to need. The global level clusters may be merged or further sub-divided for specific needs in a country and are established from the operational to the sub-national level as required. The cluster activation is time-limited and is agreed by the HC and HCT, in consent with the national Government, and approved at the global level through the ERC and IASC.

Information on country specific cluster systems can be found at www.humanitarianresponse.info.




Figure 4-6. *Cluster system coordinating structures (Source: UN OCHA)*

Similar to the military-to-military coordination construct, Cluster leads do not have command and control or tasking authority and must meet response requirements through cooperation and consensus. If urgently needed goods and services cannot be met within the cluster system during the critical period of delivery due to capacity gaps, a request for assistance (RFA) may go to responding militaries (more on this in Chapter 6, "Planning Considerations"). In situations like this, the Humanitarian-Military Operational Coordination Concept becomes appropriate.

Some clusters have similar capabilities as typical DoD unique response capabilities such as the Logistics (log) or the Emergency Telecommunications (ETC) Cluster. Due to the frequent interaction with responding military forces, the Logistics Cluster, and Emergency Telecommunications (ETC) Clusters are outlines below:

4.3.2 The Logistics Cluster

The Log Cluster provides coordination and information management to support decision-making and improve the predictability, timeliness, and efficiency of logistics response capabilities.[94] In its role as the Logistics Cluster lead, WFP provides logistics capabilities to the humanitarian community members during disaster response. In this way, the WFP is sometimes referred to as "the humanitarian community's J4." In cases when Foreign Military Assets (FMA) are deployed, the Logistics Cluster will coordinate with humanitarian and military actors to ensure the effective and efficient use of these assets to fill identified gaps in logistics capacity. It is common for U.S. military response forces to work closely with the WFP as has been seen in Haiti, Nepal, Philippines, and Liberia. Logistics Cluster and the military will focus on the following key areas:

- Use of military assets to assist in relief delivery
- Use/exchange of transport assets (aircraft/helicopters, trucks, boats)
- Provision of services and equipment (fuel for aircraft, vehicles or bulldozers, maintenance of assets and equipment)
- Safety and evacuation (security evacuation, medical evacuation, shared medical facilities and services)
- Trainings and exercises prior to a humanitarian emergency
- Contingency planning efforts for military response activities

4.3.3 The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster

The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) is also headed by WFP. ETC is a global network of organizations that work together to provide shared communications services in international disaster responses. Within 48 hours of a disaster, ETC can provide information and communications

technology services such as secure communications services and voice and internet connectivity. These vital services not only connect the affected population with humanitarian responders who are attempting to reconnect families separated by the disaster, but they also speed the delivery of timely, deliberate, and prioritized life-saving aid.[95] This is accomplished through the provision of technology and infrastructure data connectivity, calling services, power supplies for device charging, and technology solutions for local radio broadcasters.[96] As with the comment on logistics above, the WFP is also referred to as "the humanitarian community's J6." Further, as logistics and communications are critical operational functions, it is common to find WFP cadre at combined multinational military exercises and civil-military humanitarian training, conferences, and academic activities. Additional information on the ETC can be found at: https://www.etcluster.org/about-etc.



Figure 4-7. *Emergency Telecommunications Cluster. Photo: UN OCHA*

Other Clusters and their leads are:

- Camp coordination and management – IOM and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- Shelter – IFRC and UNHCR
- Water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) – UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- Education – UNICEF and Save the Children
- Health – UN World Health Organization
- Nutrition – UNICEF
- Protection – UNHCR
- Early Recovery – UN Development Programme (UNDP)-lead for
- Food security – WFP and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

In addition to the predictable coordination structure that the Cluster System provides, the On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) helps facilitate response efforts of the international humanitarian community.

4.3.4 On-site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC)

The OSOCC is a scalable and flexible physical platform that serves as a rapid response tool to facilitate international relief activities at the disaster site.[97]

The OSOCC does this by:

- Serving as a link between international responders and the AS
- Establishing a reception and departure center to facilitate the arrival and departure of international relief teams. It also helps coordinate their deployment to field locations



Figure 4-8. *On-site Coordination Center. Photo: UN OCHA*

- Providing a platform for cooperation, coordination, and information sharing amongst international humanitarian responders[98]

In addition to the physical OSOCC, the Virtual OSOCC (VOSOCC) is an UN OCHA-run, on-line information portal for the facilitation of information exchange between responders and affected counties before, during and after sudden-onset disasters. A component of the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS), the VOSOCC allows responders to exchange information such as baseline country information (including relevant socio-economic and demographic information), entry points and other logistical aspects, relief team status, assessment information, cluster activities, civil-military coordination arrangements, environmental risks, and security.[99] Most Situation Reports (SITREPS)/Fact Sheets (including USAID BHA) can be found on VOSOCC. Access to the VOSOCC is password restricted to disaster managers from governments and disaster response organizations. The web-based information-sharing portal can be found at: https://vosocc.unocha.org/. GDACS is the most widely used site for information exchange and coordination immediately following a large-scale sudden-onset disaster. In addition to the VOSOCC, the site provides disaster alerts, maps, and satellite imagery. See Chapter 5, "Information Sharing," for more websites and resources for planning and executing FDR.

4.4 Humanitarian Civilian-to-Military (Civ – Mil) Coordination

In the initial period of disaster response, the International Humanitarian Community may not have adequate capability to meet the immediate needs of the affected population in support of the AS. As a result, either the AS or the HCT through the Clusters may request support from foreign militaries. UN OCHA defines Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) as the "essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals."[100]

The intent of UN-CMCoord is to enable humanitarian actors to better respond to the needs of people-in-need following a natural, man-made, or technological disaster, while supporting and promoting effective and principled humanitarian action. This enables efficient and effective delivery of aid and supports informed decision making. This is accomplished through the deployment of UN OCHA CMCoord Officers.

UN-CMCoord Officers play a critical role in liaising with military actors on behalf of the humanitarian community. While USAID BHA vets, validates, and prioritizes requests for DoD support, UN-CMCoord officers focus on the appropriate interaction n between humanitarian actors and militaries of Affected and Assisting States. When numerous foreign militaries are deployed to support relief efforts, there may be a need for a focused coordination mechanism between humanitarian actors and military responders to better support the AS. This specific coordination process - where the humanitarian priorities and capacity gaps of humanitarian actors, coursed through the relevant Clusters, are matched by available military capacity during the critical period required – gave birth to the Humanitarian-Military Operational Coordination Concept (HuMOCC). As a concept, it can be adjusted to the ground realities, including plugging into existing NDMO-led coordination mechanisms.

4.4.1 The Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)

The CMOC is a U.S. military-centric enterprise. It was utilized for the first time in 1991, during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, which provided humanitarian assistance to the Kurds in northern Iraq.[101] Since then, it has become the most well-known civil-military coordination platform in the U.S. military. Over the last 20 years, it has become the “go-to” coordination platform in Civil Affairs (CA) doctrine and training. The CMOC supports civil-military coordination between U.S. DoD and civilian stakeholders. The CMOC was embedded and became the heartbeat of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, and it was later employed in the PRT concept in Iraq.

In concept, the CMOC is formed to provide the joint force a forum to coordinate, receive, and validate requests for support from civilian organizations who wish to maintain their neutrality. In reality, the CMOC has become synonymous with combat operations and non-permissive operating environments.

An important concept in all disaster response operations is to not create a dependency. This applies particularly to military-led coordination mechanisms. Responding nations will support AS and UN coordination platforms and solutions. This is due to the maturation of civilian-led coordination structures and the growth of civil-military coordination officers from the humanitarian community such as UN OCHA and WFP.

Furthermore, recent examples of civilian-led coordination platforms in less than permissive environments such as the Humanitarian Military Coordination Cell (HuMICC) in Syria, demonstrate the same trend toward more sophisticated coordination architecture from international response stakeholders. However, another aspect of coordination necessary to support civilian-led humanitarian assistance operations is the coordination between responding militaries.

4.5 Military-to-Military (Mil – Mil) Coordination

The challenge and necessity of military-to-military coordination varies with the size and scale of the disaster, AS capabilities, and the number of foreign military forces that deploy to support the response. As response operations become complex with more assisting militaries sharing the same operational space, mil-mil coordination becomes more critical. Coordination and interoperability considerations and the identification of an AS mil-mil coordination process, mechanism, and capacity are key questions for crisis action planning and an early-entry C2 node, Forward Command Element (FCE), or Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST). See chapter 6 for planning considerations and details on a HAST and operational assessments.

For relatively small disasters and limited, tailored U.S. DoD response capabilities, such as a small U.S. Air Force Contingency Response Group (USAF CRG) and material handling equipment (i.e., forklifts to load/unload aircraft) and a few aircraft supporting an international airport, the mil-mil coordination requirements may be simple and limited in scope. For example, there was no established mil-mil coordination center during the 2014 Ebola response. However, Major General Gary Volesky (JFC Operation United Assistance commander) placed military personnel in the civilian-led Emergency Operations Center and met with Liberian military senior leaders on a daily basis during the response.

For large complex disasters that require a joint force with numerous air assets, mil-mil operational coordination with the affected state military and other assisting foreign militaries may require a dedicated coordination center to enable safe and efficient support operations. For example, the 2015 Nepal earthquake response included 8 foreign militaries with 25 military aircraft conducting operations from the main Kathmandu airport (TIA). The international response to Hurricane Dorian in the Bahamas in 2019 included 68 military assets from 8 foreign militaries. Figure 4-9 offers a snapshot of 21 foreign militaries sharing operational space and conducting operations in the Philippines during the 2013 response to Typhoon Haiyan.

While the next section offers information on the evolving norm on mil-mil coordination in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, called the Multi-National Coordination Center (MNCC), it is just one solution that may or may not work for various contexts and disasters.




Figure 4-9. *Foreign Military Deployed Assets infographic for the Philippines, 2013 (Source: UN OCHA)*[102]

4.5.1 Multi-National Coordination Center (MNCC)

The MNCC is a Mil-Mil coordination platform used typically in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region to enable Mil-Mil coordination during disaster response. The frequency of disasters in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region inspired the development of the MNCC concept to support efficient and effective coordination of assisting state military support to DR. While the MNCC concept is not part of DoD joint doctrine, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and ASEAN support the MNCC concept through the Multinational Force Standard Operating Procedure (MNF SOP) and the ASEAN Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP).[103]

In the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Nepal all have formal doctrine and standards for establishing and operating their versions of the MNCC during domestic DR operations. However, the MNF SOP and ASEAN SASOP offer standards and guides for all assisting states in the region to support an MNCC during large-scale disaster response operations. Regionally, the Changi Regional HA/DR Coordination Centre (RHCC) in Singapore has developed the capability to forward deploy a mobile coordination unit to support the establishment and operations of the MNCC. Beyond the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, the United Kingdom, Netherlands and France established the Multinational Caribbean Coordination Cell (MNCCC) to enhance the coordination of military assets, including ships and aircraft, delivering emergency aid to affected countries in the Caribbean.[104]

The MNCC does not command forces and has no tasking authority over foreign military forces as each nation responds bi-laterally under their respective National Authorities and foreign disaster relief constructs.[105] Like other coordination structures, the AS may modify the structure to better align with their national response structures. Foreign militaries working in the MNCC represent their military commander and respective nation for operational and high-level tactical level planning, coordination, and execution.[106] DoD liaison staff support will typically consist of planners and staff support/SMEs in functional areas. Worth noting, the MNCC supports mil-mil operational coordination, requests for assistance (RFAs) generated in the MNCC forum still need to be validated, approved, and prioritized by USAID BHA.




Figure 4-10. Military-to-Military Coordination, the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) organizational structure. (Source: INDOPACOM MPAT MNF-SOP).

USG Coordination. Even when working within the MNCC, USAID BHA must still validate all RFAs sent to DoD for the associated costs to be reimbursable. The figure below shows the actual DoD RFA process used by JTF-505 during the 2015 Nepal earthquake response. Notice how the MNCC fits into the process:




Figure 4-11. JTF-505 RFA process for Operation SAHAYOGI HAAT, Ghorka earthquake, Nepal, 2015 (Source: III MEF)

Requests for DoD support from the AS military do not require validated MITAMs as costs are typically not reimbursable. However, all DoD support to the AS military should be communicated to USAID BHA for DoD asset use deconfliction. Mil-Mil support may be facilitated by an Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreements (ACSA) (see Chapter 7, "Mission Execution," for more on ACSAs). Also, while strong military-to-military relationships may exist between U.S. DoD forces and an AS military, be mindful not to get ahead of the U.S. country team and USAID.

4.6 Coordination Best Practices

While information sharing and maintaining a transparent common operational picture are important elements of cooperation during FDR operations, so too is being culturally aware, understanding international partners' roles and responsibilities, and building/maintaining relationships. Moreover, internal and external communications are vital for creating and maintaining a favorable public perception of DoD.

(a) Relationships

> The close relationship between the U.S. deputy commander and General Peixoto, the head of MINUSTAH, was an important source of JTF-MINUSTAH cooperation.
>
> – Independent Review of the 2010 Haiti Earthquake
>
> "The commanders of assisting military forces, affected state military forces and relief agencies must work to maximize information sharing. Maintaining transparency in the information gathering and dissemination process will help foster trust and confidence between the assisting military forces and the humanitarian community."

Personal relationships and building mutual trust are often more important than formal command relationships, particularly in the FDR environment. Interoperability with both civilian and military partners during FDR is dual-faceted: a human dimension based on trust, transparency, and inclusion; and a technical aspect. "One cannot overlook the importance of developing personal relationships… The better we understand each other in terms of culture, language, and operability, the better we will be able to work together."[107]

The relationship between Major General Peixoto, the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) force commander, and Lieutenant General Keen, the U.S. JTF-Haiti commander, exemplifies this point. In 1984, then-Captain Keen participated in a one-month exchange program with the Brazil Airborne Brigade in Brazil. During the exchange, Keen met then-Captain Peixoto, assigned to the Airborne Brigade as an instructor.

During this training, the two formed what would become a long-standing relationship. In the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, they would work together as general officers to provide relief and assistance to the earthquake-stricken people of Haiti.[108]



Figure 4-12. *LTG Keen (left), deputy commander of USSOUTHCOM, speaks to Brazilian Army MG Peixioto (center), commander of United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, and Colonel McAteer, commander 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, 16 January 2010 (Photo taken by USN MC2 Stumberg)*

(b) Cultural Awareness

While building strong relationships during FDR may seem simple in theory, it can be difficult. One of the friction points to building relationships is a lack of cultural awareness. Cultural awareness involves understanding the religious and civil customs and social norms of the AS and assisting organizations. Culture can drive perceptions and expectations of communication, coordination, and roles and responsibilities. Another way to explain why cultural awareness is important during FDR is through the "Individualism vs. Collectivism" paradigm.

In this paradigm, different sensitivities to reasoning modes (e.g., holistic vs. analytic thinking) between members of East Asian and Western cultures stem from fundamental differences in philosophy and cognitive architecture formed over thousands of years of cultural development.[109] For example, East Asian cultures tend to be more holistic, while Western ones tend to be more analytical. As a result, East Asian culture will tend to retain "basic elements of opposing perspectives," will seek compromise, seeking middle ground to keep peace and harmony in the group. Westerners, on the other hand, focus more on individuals and use analytical reasoning, not concerning themselves with the effect on the group.[110] Using this paradigm to understand differences in conflict resolution, then, Asian societies would typically resolve disputes informally using mediation or bargaining in an attempt to reduce friction, whereas Western groups would tend towards adversarial methods of conflict resolution.[111]

Understanding the regional culture and how the AS and other participants perceive U.S. military actions and those of the U.S. in general is a key element of situational awareness. Participants in relief operations should be prepared to convey a non-judgmental attitude toward local customs, beliefs, and practices.

The following is a list of resources that can help U.S. military forces enhance their cultural understanding:

- U.S. Embassy Country Team
- Regional and/or country desk officers of the GCC or Component Commands
- Foreign Area Officers (FAO)
- Civil Affairs Teams (CAT)
- USAID permanent party, HAA/M, or DART members
- Unit chaplains: many cultures hold religious leaders in high esteem; accordingly, chaplains may serve particularly well as a liaison to indigenous religious leaders

(c) Language

Language differences can pose formidable challenges. Even in the same language, words have different meanings to different people in different cultures. Select words carefully, avoid acronyms or initialisms, and confirm understanding early rather than risk confusion later. Linguists provide a critical language and cultural awareness capability to ensure strategic messages reach the local audience. Responding Commanders should ensure assigned units have adequate linguistic support by:

- Requesting the deployment of linguists as early as possible
- Co-locating linguists with liaison officers and DoD detachments
- Drawing upon the language skills and local area familiarity of personnel attached to the responding units or subordinate commands
- Foreign Area Officers (FAO)
- NGOs and universities can be leveraged to provide linguists

(d) Other best practice considerations include:

- Clearly articulate the role of the military to NGOs and IOs; It is imperative these organizations understand the military mission, the level of support it can provide, and the process to receive support[112]
- Responding military forces should be sensitive to the use of military jargon; Some terms commonly used in military operations may have meanings or connotations that may be misinterpreted by individuals within AS and the humanitarian community
- Political considerations, directed authorities, and national caveats will heavily influence operations; Understand the geopolitics of the AS and participating nations to gain awareness of factors influencing national objectives, capabilities, and limitations

- Understand the speed at which your partners can plan and operate
- Leverage relationships to overcome potential technical interoperability challenges
- Do not over-classify information, share information with civilian counterparts to the maximum extent possible

While disaster relief operations are human based, do not allow technical limitations of information sharing networks, tools, and databases to fracture relationships. The last bullet above, information sharing and classification of information, is one of the most cited lessons learned during FDR.[113] Information-sharing and resources will be discussed in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 5 – INFORMATION SHARING AND RESOURCES

> "The basis for coordination in relief operations is information sharing. If information is properly shared and tasks are appropriately divided, a foundation can be laid for collaborative planning, if appropriate. If the basis for respect and understanding between military and civilian actors has been established through information sharing and appropriate task division in the relief phase, the planning process then provides the bridge from relief to recovery."
>
> *– UN-CMCoord Field Handbook*

5.1 Information Sharing

While the international response architecture has progressed significantly over the years, challenges persist, particularly those associated with sharing information. As described in the previous chapter, the operating environment during disaster response can seem chaotic, even with experienced disaster response professionals. The AS is managing a challenging operation while also coordinating a surge of outside support from foreign governments and aid organizations. Prioritizing wisely, efficiently matching foreign resources to critical needs, and supporting rapid decision making and agile operations requires excellent coordination. Successful information sharing undergirds excellent coordination.

Information sharing is defined as making information available to participants (people, processes, or systems). Access to timely and accurate information is crucial for civilian and military entities responding to a disaster. It helps create a shared understanding of the environment (common operating picture [COP]) while improving response efforts, increasing unity of effort, and helping to foster trust.[114]

Over the years, the DoD has used a wide range of capabilities and practices to share information during disaster response. In Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE (Indonesia, 2005/2006), DoD response forces shared with NGOs products from P-3 Orion aircraft and photographs taken by helicopter crews. In Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE (Haiti, 2010), operations within the unclassified domain enabled a high degree of information sharing across agencies. JTF-Haiti made imagery products, maps, photos, assessments, situation reports, COP reports, and requests for information (RFI) all available to the public on the All Partners Access Network (APAN). The use and exchange of Liaison Officers (LNO) between DoD response forces and USG agencies, the AS, and international aid organizations are constants in FDR operations.

Before being overly aggressive or decisive, it is wise to gather an assessment of existing coordination structures and platforms, important battle rhythm events and daily meetings, and the preferences and protocols already being observed by USG agencies and response partners. For example, the UN has international guidelines on civil-military coordination posture and strategies, and USAID BHA may have established a protocol or dynamic that is not immediately apparent but should be observed.

5.2 Best Practices

(a) Leadership for information sharing. DoD response forces should support a climate of cooperation among response stakeholders and partners that is inclusive instead of exclusive with military and non-military partners. Past FDR operations have been successful when commanders emphasize an atmosphere of inclusivity and collaboration. DoD forces should consider organizing the headquarters (HQ) to include mission partners and stakeholder perspectives, authorities, capabilities, and limitations in planning, execution, and assessment. While working well with aid actors is the norm, DoD forces should also be respectful and maintain good rapport with NGOs and aid actors that are not interested in working closely with military forces.

(b) Develop an information sharing strategy and plan. The military enterprise is very capable of gathering data and information with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. However, these capabilities and the information gathering apparatus need to turn it into shareable and useful information that supports coordination and decision making. DoD response forces should designate an individual or staff section that is responsible for information sharing. Early planning for information sharing should consider liaisons, networks, portals, interpreters, command guidance on disclosure, RFI management, and other considerations offered here.

Utilize Information Technology/Network/Communications Personnel. Military forces must have the support of an unclassified network configured to access the World Wide Web and have connectivity with entities outside of the Federated Mission Network (FMN) environment. JTFs should leverage net-centric support tools and develop architectures and processes that enhance coordination with the FDR response community. Knowledge Management (KM) and Information Management (IM) personnel can develop plans for the management of information.

During the 2015 Nepal earthquake planning and response, many humanitarian websites were blocked by INDOPACOM cyber security staff. Key information needed for problem framing and situational awareness such as www.logcluster.org and www.reliefweb.int could not be viewed from Non-classified Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) terminals.

(c) Foreign Disclosure Officers (FDO). Perhaps one of the most overlooked requirements during DoD support to FDR is the use of FDOs. They oversee the control, coordination, and approval of specific disclosures of classified and unclassified information to include controlled unclassified information (CUI). An example of CUI could be information (PII) such as names, dates of birth, service or identification numbers, and personal mailing addresses. The FDO will make disclosure decisions on behalf of the JTF Commander.

It is recommended that the FDO be a part of the military-to-military operational coordination center, such as the MNCC discussed in Chapter 4. Many types of information collected by DoD are sensitive issues for the AS and therefore cannot be released without their approval.[115]

(d) Keep information unclassified. USAID staff and other humanitarian actors do not have access to classified networks often used during the planning and execution phases of FDR. DoD personnel have a responsibility to share information with USAID on unclassified networks or via open-source sites such as Relief Web; therefore, ensuring the lowest level classification of information is crucial.

Ensuring critical information is widely available to multiple civilian and military elements helps to reduce duplication of effort and to enhance coordination and collaboration. Commanders at all levels should provide guidance on information sharing outside of the USG. The organizational habit of overly classifying information is a persistent observation in FDR operations. Operational AARs also show a recurring challenge of an overreliance on classified information systems. The humanitarian community works in an open, unclassified environment that allows them to quickly share information across organizations.

The Joint Staff J7 recommends in its best practices for information management to "write for release."[116] As noted above, one of the greatest information sharing concerns in an FDR environment is the tendency to over-classify documents. One of the most effective methods for mitigating these information-sharing concerns is writing for release. Writing to our partners' level of classification and, if required, segregating higher classification information, gives the ability to "tear off" the releasable information for dissemination to coalition and interagency partners. Include the FDO during product development to promote rapid information sharing.

(e) Prepare to operate in austere and degraded environments. Plan and exercise communication methods that are not reliant on advanced technology and network operations, such as increased human interaction (e.g., face-to-face, telephonic meetings), to communicate and share information in a complex FDR environment with non-DoD partners.

(f) Liaisons. Liaisons are an essential part of complex operations. The DoD response force should develop a liaison officer (LNO) plan. LNOs know and share commander's intent, priorities, and capabilities of their home organization while relaying the atmospherics (i.e., concerns, problems, intentions) of the gaining commander. LNOs should be the best qualified personnel with the most experience in complex operations, not those seen as the most expendable. Credibility is paramount. Trust equals access. Likewise, LNOs that are gained by other organizations such as the USG interagency and the AS, must have access to key leaders and the staff.

The joint force should place LNOs with the U.S. Embassy, USAID DART, and other DoD organizations. LNOs for the U.S. Embassy and USAID should be on the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) or early-entry command post. Information sharing also begins with including the USG interagency partners, via their LNOs, in planning as early as possible. In the 2014 Ebola response in Liberia, Joint Force Command United Assistance (JFC-UA) placed LNOs with U.S. Army Africa in Italy, the DART in Liberia, and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in Germany.[117] Beyond LNOs with USG entities, JFC-UA placed LNOs with the Liberia Ministry of Health established National Ebola Command Center (NECC), Government of Liberia, and UN. JFC-UA placed Army Civil Affairs LNOs with the NECC to collaborate and share information.

> In the initial weeks of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, following the Haiti earthquake, text messages became the primary means of communication. Those messages were the simplest and most reliable means of coordinating relief efforts. The common operating picture was based upon a spreadsheet containing over 1500 data points, on everything from Internally Displaced Person camps to medical facilities to ration distribution sites. Utilizing that simple, near-universal format allowed the UN OCHA to display the information on a Google Earth-based website, where anyone with internet connectivity could access the information.

JFC-UA sent approximately 24 LNOs to other DoD headquarters, USG agencies, and response organizations in Liberia. In turn, JFC-UA received 12 LNOs from various other organizations.[118] While this example may include more exchanges than usual, it demonstrates the broad use of functional LNOs.[119]

In Operation SEA ANGEL II (Bangladesh, 2007), the Bangladeshi Armed Forces Division (AFD) LNOs to U.S. forces assisted by coordinating force protection during all ground activities and helped to better determine key areas for relief operations and the nuances of execution in local areas. The U.S. forces reliance on the AFD demonstrated U.S. faith in that military's operational ability and helped create a strong partnership with the AFD.[120]

After USNORTHCOM and USAID BHA experienced friction in the MITAM and RFA process during the response to Hurricane Dorian in 2019, the USNORTHCOM and USAID MLT AAR recommended that USAID deploy LNOs to USNORTHCOM early in the response. Further, the AAR recommended that USG interagency LNOs be identified and staffed until the response has concluded. USNORTHCOM recommended that DoD LNOs be co-located with operational decision-making authority to improve coordination and communication.[121]

(g) Request for Information (RFI) Manager. The RFI manager typically operates on the joint force current operations floor, and receives, assigns, and tracks the status of RFIs among the staff, subordinate units, and headquarters. The RFI management process is key to the flow of information beyond the organization; therefore, the RFI manager serves in an advisory role to knowledge managers. Proven best practice is for the JFC J2 to maintain a separate intelligence oriented RFI process.

(h) Networks with interagency, multinational partners, and NGOs. Many stakeholders during FDR have their own virtual networks and may not have access to U.S. military networks such as Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), and CAC-enabled NIPRNET systems. Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems, and (CENTRIX) enhance sharing across the military and some interagency partners. However, DoD still has challenges in sharing information with stakeholders such as NGOs. Other agencies may not always accept U.S. military-developed online collaboration and sharing tools such as APAN because they have their own systems. The Center for Army Lessons Learned "finds that the best means to share unclassified information with these organizations is often through their own systems that may have broader acceptance across their peer organizations – so we use them."[122]

(i) Information management tools. DoD forces leverage Current Operations management tools like synchronization matrices and a Common Operational Picture (COP) to facilitate information sharing with the USG interagency and operational partners. Best practices are the use of such tools and the hosting and sharing of them in an unclassified environment. These tools help with sharing real-time information and in reducing confusion.

A synchronization matrix is a powerful tool that, in a single view, conveys the status of each element of an activity with respect to other elements and the overall goal. It is a tool that can help to reduce confusion as unforeseen challenges arise.[123] This tool also contributes to transparency. In the 2014 Ebola response, the USAID DART adopted the synchronization matrix in Liberia, and quickly started using it for themselves, and as a common basis to be able to talk to nongovernmental organizations.[124]

An established synchronization matrix also facilitated the development of a map-based COP, another common tool that provides a visual depiction of units and activities on a geographic display. *JP 3-0* defines the COP as, "A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness." Almost every staff directorate maintains some form of COP derivative (often in the form of PowerPoint slides) which depicts functionally relevant data. When utilized HQ wide, a COP can help decision makers and action officers visualize, plan, and de-conflict operations in the battlespace in near real time.

In Liberia, JFC-UA developed an analog map-based COP and a digitized COP that was shared with response partners on APAN. CALL finds that Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) can provide a focus for the COP and that units should rehearse procedures for drilling down into the COP to support contingencies such as natural disasters, migrant flows, noncombatant evacuation operations, flight tracking, missile launches, etc.[125]

5.3 Other Information Sharing Recommendations

- Apply the three rules: "What do I know; who else needs to know it; how do I get it to them?"
- Know counterparts at other organizations; establish and maintain networks
- Balance "need-to-share" with "need-to-know" thinking within a culture of inclusion
- Always consider "writing for release"
- Integrate FDOs into the staff to help mitigate risk while encouraging the maximum amount of information sharing
- Address information sharing and collaboration requirements with mission partners
- Develop processes to share information with all stakeholders who are not on your communications network
- Interoperability is more human based than technical
- Identify and promulgate the primary communications network to be used by the command

- Alert users when critical information must be passed on another network
- Develop and practice realistic information sharing and information management during training exercises and security cooperation activities
- Provide information management tools training to staff and enforce standardized practices
- Codify the public and foreign disclosure management process
- Codify information sharing requirements and general procedures including COP management, CCIR development and refinement, and employment of LNOs
- Codify information systems tools and procedures (to include collaborative planning tools)
- Codify roles and responsibilities for use of collaboration tools
- Codify billet turnover procedures
- Codify RFI management procedures
- Address information sharing and collaboration requirements with interorganizational agencies and coalition and mission partners
- Codify processes to gain and share information with all stakeholders who are not on your communications network
- Insert "current as of (CAO)" time, and Point of Contact (POC) full name, email, and phone number on PPT slides and products
- Plan for the use of interpreters

5.4 Online Information Sources

> The sharing of information is particularly critical because no single responding entity—whether it is the Affected State, an NGO, IGO, Assisting State, or Foreign Militaries—can be the source of all of the required data and information.
>
> *– JP 3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*

Multiple networks and web portals exist for sharing information and gaining situational awareness. DoD response forces utilize or monitor these networks, ensuring their staffs have access to and are aware of the information available on them. While some AS have their own national disaster management website, humanitarians and other international response agencies predominantly share information on portals such as GDACS, VOSOCC, and ReliefWeb. This section provides an overview of websites most relevant to DoD forces planning and executing FDR. It is important for military responders to be familiar with information sharing platforms civilian responders use to communicate and share information.

(a) USAID. (http://www.usaid.gov). When USAID BHA supports a crisis, they produce situation updates called Fact Sheets. Figure 5-1 shows a Fact Sheet for response efforts after Hurricanes ETA and IOTA in Latin America in 2020. Also on the website, you can find information on all USAID humanitarian and development programs, including country specific information.

USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Fact Sheet #5
Fiscal Year (FY) 2021

Latin America – Storms

DECEMBER 1, 2020

SITUATION AT A GLANCE

189	5.2 MILLION	404,500	225,000
Reported Deaths in Latin America due to Eta and Iota	Estimated People Affected by Eta and Iota in Central America	Estimated People in Official and Unofficial Emergency Shelters in Guatemala and Honduras	Estimated People Isolated From Humanitarian Access in Honduras
UN – Nov. 24, 2020	*UN – Nov. 20, 2020*	*CONRED, COPECO – Dec. 1, 2020*	*COPECO – Dec. 1, 2020*

- As the 2020 Atlantic hurricane season comes to an end, floodwaters remain in areas of Guatemala and Honduras affected by Hurricanes Eta and Iota.
- Storm damage to health care facilities in Honduras risks increased spread of COVID-19, PAHO reports.
- USAID/BHA is providing emergency shelter materials to assist communities to repair damaged structures in Honduras.
- USAID/BHA supports UNICEF to scale up protection and WASH assistance in Nicaragua.



TOTAL U.S. GOVERNMENT HUMANITARIAN FUNDING For the Latin America Storms Response in FY 2021		
	USAID/BHA[1]	$14,833,073
	DoD[2]	$6,060,000
For complete funding breakdown with partners, see detailed chart on page 6	**Total**	**$20,893,073**

[1] USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/BHA). Funding figures reflect committed and obligated funding as of December 1, 2020. Total comprises a subset of the more than $17 million in publicly announced USAID/BHA funding to the Latin America and Caribbean storms response.
[2] U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Funding figures reflect funding as of November 30, 2020.

Figure 5-1. *USAID BHA Factsheet for Hurricanes Eta and Iota, December 2020 (Source: USAID)*

(b) Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS). (https://www.gdacs.org/default.aspx) Hosted by UN OCHA, GDACS provides real time alerts (users can subscribe to receive alerts), satellite imagery, hazard assessments, impact estimates, and the virtual OSOCC. The overall intent of the site is to provide a platform for information exchange and coordination immediately following a sudden-onset disaster.

(c) Virtual OSOCC (VOSOCC). (https://vosocc.unocha.org/). A component of the GDACS, the VOSOCC allows responders to exchange information such as baseline country information (including relevant socio-economic and demographic information), entry points and other logistical aspects, relief team status, assessment information, cluster activities, civil-military coordination arrangements, environmental risks, and security.[126] Access to the VOSOCC is password restricted to disaster managers from governments and disaster response organizations.

(d) Humanitarian Response. (https://www.humanitarianresponse.info). Another UN OCHA website that compliments the VOSOCC portal, Humanitarianresponse (HR) serves as a landing for all information related to a given event. As VOSOCC is very active at the start of an event, HR becomes active 7-10 days after the event takes place and relief agencies begin their work. Access to HR is via user ID and password.

(e) UNOSAT. (https://www.unitar.org/sustainable-development-goals/satellite-analysis-and-applied-research). The United Nations Institute for Training and Research Operational Satellite Applications Program provides a rapid mapping capability based on analysis satellite imagery. This capability is provided to UN agencies and humanitarian entities operating in line with UN policies for all disasters. These maps are often posted to VOSOCC and HR and can be downloaded to APAN.

(f) Relief Web. (https://reliefweb.int/). Another UN OCHA web site, ReliefWeb is the leading humanitarian information source on global crises and disasters. It serves as an informational "one-stop shop" to share information such as situation reports, UN OCHA infographics, maps, etc. USAID BHA uploads their factsheets to ReliefWeb.

(g) Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX). (https://data.humdata.org/). Another UN OCHA platform, HDX is a resource for raw data. It is an open-source platform for sharing data across crises and organizations. It is easy to navigate and can help build situational awareness before a disaster. Data includes information on key infrastructure for most countries such as detailed spreadsheets on airports with their Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates, dimensions, and other key data. HDX is known for its interactive maps and charts of humanitarian events based upon the data within its data files.

(h) Logistics Cluster. (https://logcluster.org/). Hosted by WFP as the Logistics Cluster lead, this site provides critical information for logisticians and humanitarians responding to humanitarian crises. This site provides three sections that are critical for successful planning and execution of FDR operations:

- The Logistics Operational Guide (LOG) provides a collection of information such as best practices, templates, guidelines, and SOPs for logisticians operating in crisis environs
- The latest Log Cluster updates, meeting minutes, maps, concept of operations, and SOPs
- The Logistics Capacity Assessment (LCA) tool (https://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/LCA+Homepage) is the only website where all humanitarian logistics-related information is consolidated in one location. Information found on this site includes customs requirements; assessments on airports, seaports, roadways, railways, and waterways; and services and supply such as fuel, telecommunications, and points of contact throughout the country.[127] Assessments are updated every two years

(i) IFRC GO. (https://go.ifrc.org/emergencies). This IFRC website provides an array of disaster information including IFRC disaster relief field reports. The field reports provide a situational update including assessment information, needs analysis, an overview of the Red Cross Red Crescent (RCRC) response efforts and with whom RCRC is partnering.

(j) DisasterAWARE, Disaster Alert, and EMOPS. (https://www.pdc.org/apps/disasteraware/). Managed by the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC), DisasterAWARE is an early warning and decision support platform that integrates information, modeling, and mapping technologies to provide situational awareness and decision support. DisasterAWARE monitors data sources for events deemed potentially hazardous to people, property, or assets, and posts these incidents as "Active Hazards." These postings are accessible to decision makers and to the public through early warning and decision support tools such as the Disaster Alert mobile app, which is a free, subscription-based system that provides a customizable version of DisasterAWARE. Emergency Operations (EMOPS) is primarily for disaster management practitioners and senior decision makers. It boasts the largest collection of scientifically verified geospatial data and modeling tools to assess hazard risks and impacts.[128] The system is free for all disaster management practitioners (https://emops.pdc.org). To receive PDC email reports, subscribe to response@pdc.org.

(k) Changi RHCC. Changi RHCC provides disaster spot reports for disasters occurring in the Asia-Pacific region (See Figure 5-2 and 5-3). It also provides weekly update reports. To subscribe to the reports, email a request to: CHANGI_RHCC@defence.gov.sg

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21 Jan 2021

CHANGI RHCC'S SPOT REPORT 01/21 FOR 7.0 MAGNITUDE EARTHQUAKE 210KM SE OF PONDAGUITAN, PHILIPPINES (CAA: 21 JAN 2021, 2300HRS)

BACKGROUND

1. On 21 Jan 2021, at about 2023hrs (Singapore Time), a Richter Scale (RS) 7.0 magnitude under sea earthquake struck 210km SE of Pondaguitan, Philippines at a depth of 95.8km. The epicentre of the earthquake was 1280km SE of capital Manila and 2,664km ENE of Singapore. See **Figure 1** for the epicentre of the earthquake.

Figure 1: Epicentre of Earthquake (Source: USGS).




Figure 5-2. Changi RHCC spot report for Philippines, January 2021 (Source: Changi RHCC)

ASSESSED IMPACT OF THE DISASTER

2. No immediate casualties or damages were reported. There is no exposed population within 100km to the epicentre. The nearest population centre (211.5km away from the epicentre) is in Pondaguitan, with a population of approximately 2,143. Francisco Bangoy International Airport and Davao Port are possible Airport of Disembarkation (APOD) and Sea Port of Disembarkation (SPOD) respectively.

Figure 2: Population Centres near the Earthquake (Source: USGS, Google Earth).



3. According to United States Geological Survey (USGS), there was a low likelihood of casualties and USGS gave a **GREEN** alert for shaking-related fatalities and economic losses.

Figure 3: Estimated Fatalities and Economic Losses (Source: USGS).




Figure 5-3. *Additional Changi RHCC spot report for Philippines, January 2021 (Source: Changi RHCC)*

(l) All Partners Access Network (APAN). (https://www.apan.org/). APAN is a DoD unclassified network designed for partner nations to interface with each other and civilian communities during crisis response and DoD exercises. Within APAN there is a USINDOPACOM Public HADR portal https://community.apan.org/hadr/pacom-hadr/.

APAN is the Unclassified Information Sharing Service for the DoD. APAN provides DoD and mission partners community space and collaboration tools to leverage information to plan and respond to disasters. It is a repository for information. APAN also utilizes various mapping products.

Because APAN is a DoD platform, the civilian response community will typically not use APAN, relying instead on the UN and RCRC websites listed above. Links between APAN, VOSOCC, and HR can be established to aid in the free flow of information between the three portals thus improving information sharing among responders.[129]

(m) Department of State (DoS). (https://www.state.gov/). Country specific geo-political fact sheets can be found via the DoS public website.

(n) The NOAA U.S. Tsunami Warning Center (https://www.tsunami.gov/) is a world-wide tsunami warning system.

(o) The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/) earthquake information, history, and shake maps. This site provides the most accurate earthquake related information.

5.5 Social Media

The humanitarian community frequently uses Twitter, WhatsApp, and other social media platforms to track natural disasters in real time and alert first responders to areas that need assistance. In several countries, these are important tools for people to communicate with each other, access critical information, and organize relief efforts in times of crisis. For example, following a disaster, the local Red Cross/Crescent society will Tweet out locations of distribution points, clinics, or family meeting points.

Social media can be an excellent tool for accelerating information sharing in a non-traditional manner. For example, JTF partners can use Twitter or Facebook to disseminate short situational reports and status updates. However, military practitioners using social media to gather and analyze information should be mindful that it is unverified information. During emergencies, antagonists have posted inaccurate information on needs assessments, Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps, hospital locations, etc. For example, a false story was widely circulated about an informal IDP settlement in southwest Syria devastated by a snowstorm. After further investigation, it was confirmed that it never snowed, and only one tent was destroyed by a rainstorm.

The JTF must be prepared to respond in an effective and timely manner to inaccurate reports, rumors, and fake news. Minimizing inaccuracies requires integration of information activities among the Embassy, USG agencies, and the JTF.

> From the strategic to the tactical level, it is imperative that the USG speak with one voice and acts as a catalyst to facilitate unity of effort. This effort strengthens and preserves conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests and objectives, including effective FDR operations.

5.6 Communication Synchronization

JTFs must be ready to utilize traditional and non-traditional media to convey strategic communications messages. Traditional communications include embedding the news media to provide independent reporting to the public.

JTF Commanders may choose to establish a Joint Interagency Information Center (JIIC) to support FDR operations. Working closely with the U.S. Embassy Public Affairs Office, the JIIC will coordinate and synchronize USG communications to ensure that they are integrated, cohesive, and timely.

The commander's communication synchronization (CCS) process is the formal means to synchronize themes, messages, images, and actions (i.e., planning, deployments, operations) during an operation. *JP 3-33*, Joint Task Force Headquarters, sees the J-3 as a facilitator of CCS as the integrator/supporter of information-related capabilities (IRC) due, in part, to the key role of Information Operations (IO) (see below). *JP 3-61*, *Public Affairs* (PA), states that the CCS process "aligns communication concerning the joint force's mission with the broader national strategic narrative." In addition to PA, the IO cell has a key role. *JP 3-13*, *Information Operations*, vests the IO cell with responsibility for integrating IRC to achieve the commander's objectives. It requires that PA and IO deconflict their efforts, often via the IO working group. In its simplest form, communications planning during FDR serves several purposes:

- Management of public expectations
- Provides public safety information
- Serves to increase the AS government's credibility of response
- Provide information on the USG relief effort

It is important to note that neither the USG civilian agencies nor the military have control over elements of the global information environment, including:

- Mainstream broadcast
- Print journalists
- Someone on the street with a smartphone
- Blogger with Internet service

Managing expectations of the public regarding the roles and capabilities of military forces in response to disasters is a critical informational task. It requires awareness by U.S. military leaders of the role, methods, and techniques of media; the news cycle; the competitive orientation of media outlets; the information environment; and non-traditional news sources.

In order to manage the information environment, it is essential that the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) maintains situational awareness regarding the actions and locations of forces and be able to communicate their roles and missions to the media. In that way, PAOs can keep reporters informed.

Deployment of U.S. military forces can introduce unexpected perceptions and expectations. Inexperience with military-media relationships risks antagonism despite the fact that crises create the shared purpose for both military and media representatives to help guide and safeguard affected populations.

Military leaders can improve unit effectiveness by considering non-verbal messages. For example, service-members working in individual ballistic armor with helmets and protective eyewear, even if unarmed, may send an unintended message to the populace. The same personnel in soft caps and t-shirts convey a different impression. There is no standard formula and commanders must weigh force protection requirements against public perception.

As the primary communicator, the role of JTF Commander has a greater significance in a disaster relief operation. Emergencies create crises, crises demand resolution, and the engaged military leader speaking early and accurately can become a powerful symbol of positive action and crisis resolution in managing expectations and instilling confidence. At the national level, AS and GCC strategic themes should provide the guidance from which a JTF Commander can craft strategic messages. Chapter 7, "Mission Execution," offers examples of PA strategic messaging.

5.7 Communications

In an FDR environment, DoD missions may require use of multiple communication systems. Communication systems will be provided by the GCC in accordance with AS requirements. Specific requirements may span the full capability of DoD communications, including line of sight, over the horizon, and satellite communications systems for voice, video, and data. In some cases, DoD organic communications capabilities may be the only communications infrastructure in the area of operations. These assets, whether terrestrial or satellite based, may be heavily relied upon by AS and humanitarian responders. Interoperability is important for successful disaster relief operations.

> USTRANSCOM's Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) plays a key role in ensuring communications are established and maintained. The JCSE is capable of providing both NIPR and SIPR communications, and Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS). See Appendix B for additional information on the JECC capabilities.

Depending on the type and magnitude of the disaster, a large percentage of the commercial communication system may be degraded or destroyed. Power to cell phone towers may be problematic for an extended period. DoD cannot assume that commercial wired (landline phones, etc.) or wireless communications will be functional during the relief effort and must plan for alternate forms of communication and power. DoD should consider bringing additional satellite telephones (including dialing instructions, directory, battery charger, and case) to support civilian partner communications needs until the civilian communications grid is restored. Providing satellite telephones (with training to use them) to key civilian leaders can greatly enhance communications and coordination.

Most communications will travel via commercial telephone networks or the internet. Signal planning must include the ability to access commercial internet, commercial telephone, and video teleconference networks. With internet access (wireless or landline) and virtual private network (VPN) software, units can create a C2 network able to handle almost all requirements.

Service personnel that support civilian response efforts (e.g., medical, logistics, and aviation) must be able to communicate with AS and international humanitarian community responders in order to coordinate relief efforts.

Units responding to support civilian responders must be prepared to integrate communication systems with civilian agencies. Because of equipment differences, spectrum requirements, and the geography at the incident, commanders should not assume that tactical radio equipment is interoperable with civilian equipment. Interoperability planning should include radio bridging devices that can connect varied devices – such as tactical radios to cell phones – and sharing data through a common information management plan.

5.7.1 Communications Planning Considerations

Communications planning should commence in the early stages of FDR operations. That planning must provide for an interoperable and compatible communications network that leverages organic military and commercial capabilities to support the communications requirements of the operation. Commercial telephone networks, military satellite channels, and conventional military C2 systems will support communication of directions, orders, and information. Information protection for non-secured communications must be implemented.

Planning considerations include:

- Standardize Reports to increase efficiency of operations

- Interoperability – U.S. operating forces may have to adapt to AS information systems requirements to participate effectively in FDR operations; interoperability will necessitate using unclassified communications
- Determining communications requirements to provide basic and mission essential services
  - Employ additional equipment and reconfigure connectivity to provide direct routing to principal destinations
  - Add equipment to provide multiple routes to prevent site isolation
  - Have sufficient equipment to support airborne capabilities, respond to new missions, and avoid critical shortages
  - Build in redundancy to reduce system failures

5.7.2 Radio Frequency Communications for FDR

The next section offers Radio Frequency (RF) communications planning considerations specific to FDR operations. It relies on national and international laws and regulations. Typically, in the aftermath of a large-scale disaster, the normal lines-of-communications (landlines, cellular, radio, and television) have been degraded or compromised. It could be hours, days, or weeks for these communication systems to be restored. During the initial 24 to 72 hours of a disaster, communications are often degraded. Normally, communications systems continue to improve and return to normal capacity and function as the response and repairs continue.

RF communications can be considered a response force enabler. RF communications can be used for voice and chat communications enabling the responders to better collaborate, coordinate, and cooperate thereby improve response efficiency.

(a) Affected State RF Capabilities. The RF spectrum of a given nation is considered sovereign. This spectrum is controlled by a nation's spectrum manager. Most nations have only one or two individuals that manage this spectrum and in times of a disaster they are often overwhelmed. Frequency Management will help allocate finite frequencies and accommodate multinational forces and non-military agency integration into the frequency management program. Considerations include:

- Multinational forces and non-military agency integration into the frequency management program should be addressed at the GCC level
- Telecommunications requirements for the AS should be considered
- The AS may have frequency managers who control their allocations, and, therefore, FDR forces may not have access to some of the frequency spectrum within the AS

- The AS may have existing relationships with commercial vendors
- Consider providing liaison teams with unit compatible communications

(b) Amateur Radio Operators (HAMs). All nations have what are referred to as HAMs or amateur radio operators in their country. These radio operators are individuals that are radio hobbyists and volunteer their time in various clubs and organizations. Usually, within minutes or hours after a disaster event these individuals will use their organic resources to broadcast what can be considered situation reports. These reports are transmitted on high frequency (HF) radios. A DoD HF communicator can monitor/copy these SITREPs which then can be used by a response planner to ascertain the extent of damage and plan the response force accordingly.

(c) International Amateur Radio Union (IARU). The IARU is a sub-organization of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). As the ITU sets international RF policy for the globe, the IARU sets RF policy for the global Amateur Radio Operators in emergency operations (https://www.iaru.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/emcommguide_1sept2016.pdf). In this respect the IARU has divided the globe into three RF zones. Within these zones the IARU has set aside certain frequencies that are called "quiet frequencies" that are to be used only for emergency or disaster communications. Emergency Communications Frequencies | International Amateur Radio Union (IARU) (iaru-r1.org). DoD RF communicators can monitor these frequencies for additional disaster related situational awareness.[130]

5.7.3 Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC)

As mentioned in section 4.3.3 of this Handbook, the ETC provides communications technology to various UN agencies and others in a disaster. They also provide another extremely important service during the initial weeks of a disaster.

As previously mentioned, most nations only have one or two individuals that work spectrum management. During a disaster, these individuals are overwhelmed by events as responders enter the disaster with their RF gear. The ETC will work with the AS spectrum managers as well as the response communicators to ease in-country processing. The ETC will also work to assist in resolving frequency conflicts and provide callsigns and other information to the responders.

It is imperative that the DoD Force Response Commander assign one or two of RF communicators to attend the ETC meetings. The purpose is to gather information on the RF response and to get assigned frequencies and callsigns that the DoD Response Force can use to communicate with other responders. Also, DoD Instruction (DODI) 8220.02 states that the DoD Commander can offer the use of DoD bandwidth to responders.[131]

As discussed throughout this chapter, sharing of information is a foundational pillar of collaboration during disaster relief. Access to timely and accurate information is crucial for timely decision making as well as building shared situational awareness of the operating environment. The next chapter will provide important planning considerations for FDR information sharing and sources.

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CHAPTER 6 – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF

6.1 Introduction

This chapter offers planning considerations specific to FDR operations. It relies on U.S. policy, joint doctrine, and international norms to frame the operational construct for planning FDR operations. The chapter is not intended to be a review of the joint planning process.

FDR operations are conducted outside the U.S. and its territories. They are normally led and coordinated by USAID, and the DoD provides "unique capabilities" that are limited in time and scope. U.S. military forces are not the primary USG means for the provision of FDR. U.S. military forces plan, coordinate, and execute FDR operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to support national security interests. FDR operations typically depend on a whole-of-government approach wherein excellent civil-military coordination and achieving Unity of Effort are critical for success.

Key references on policy, joint doctrine, and international norms that frame FDR operations:

- Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.46 *Foreign Disaster Relief* (FDR), 06 July 2012
- *JP 3-29*, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, 14 May 2019
- UN OCHA Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines), November 2006 with Revision 1.1 in November 2007

Key points on FDR from the above references:

- The AS has primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance on its territory
- U.S. FDR operations are normally civilian-led, and within the USG Strategic Response Framework, USAID is assigned as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA)
- The Oslo Guidelines provide that foreign military assets should be requested as a "last resort" and only where there is no comparable civilian alternative

When a disaster occurs, the AS may request foreign assistance, or the U.S. embassy (USEMB) may offer support. While the USEMB is working through that process, USAID and the GCC are conducting preliminary assessments

and analysis of the disaster and available capabilities within the AS. It is common practice that USAID advisors at the GCC provide early input and an initial assessment on the possibility of a USG response and whether it might involve a request for DoD support. If the USEMB issues a Disaster Declaration, USAID is normally the USG LFA and may or may not request DoD support.

6.2 Role of the Military in Foreign Disaster Relief

The Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief (see also Chapter 3) have shaped current USG policy and DoD doctrine and established the basic framework for formalizing and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of foreign military assets in FDR. The USG participated in the development of the Oslo Guidelines and endorsed their use. However, they are not binding.

The Oslo Guidelines provide that foreign military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only when the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset, therefore, should be unique in capability and availability. The Oslo Guidelines divide humanitarian assistance into three tasks based on the degree of contact with the affected population.

- **Direct Assistance.** The face-to-face distribution of goods and services.
- **Indirect Assistance.** This involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel and other activities that are at least one step removed from the population.
- **Infrastructure Support.** This involves services such as road repair, airspace management, and power generation that facilitate relief but are not necessarily visible to the affected population.

While there are exceptions and temporary situations where military forces may conduct direct assistance during the initial stages of a crisis, ideally, military forces should avoid conducting "direct assistance." With this as a starting point for the role of military support, it becomes clear why FDR operations are often called "logistics operations." In fact, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, Michael Lumpkin, offered this feedback on the 2014 Ebola response in Liberia. "I traveled to the region thinking we faced a healthcare crisis with a logistics challenge. In reality, we face a logistics crisis focused on a healthcare challenge. The shortage of local transportation, passible roadways, and inadequate infrastructure to facilitate the movement of essential supplies and equipment are hindering the overall global community response to contain and combat the Ebola outbreak."[132]

The graph in Figure 6-1 highlights the relationships between the AS, international humanitarian actors, and foreign militaries in disaster response. First, foreign military support is a "last resort" or often utilized only when/if the AS and civilian responders need additional capabilities. Second, foreign military support is a small part of disaster response and typically lasts a short time during the emergency relief phase. The emergency relief phase supports the provision of basic survival needs (shelter, food, water, medical treatment) and search and rescue efforts. This also implies that speed of response is a critical element of success. Third, the "transition point" for foreign militaries to handover tasks to the AS and other appropriate civilian responders arrives well before the disaster response and recovery is complete. This implies that speed of response should be balanced with strong assessments and clear objectives which enable a smooth transition. Finally, "time" being on the horizontal axis implies that many capabilities, such as personnel or common equipment and resources provided rapidly in mass and at scale, become "unique" in availability if they are needed in a short time.




Figure 6-1. *Relationships among the Affected State (AS), international humanitarian actors, and the military community (Source: UN OCHA, modified by CFE-DM)*

In practice, response activities of the AS, aid organizations, and foreign militaries (see all shaded areas in Figure 6-1) may occur concurrently or overlap as they assess that international assistance and foreign military support are needed based on the scope and scale of the disaster and the operating environment.

The same is true for the USG response process, many activities and conversations are occurring simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. For example, during the Ghorka Earthquake in Nepal, which struck on April 25, 2015, USAID requested support from DoD on April 26, 2015, and the USAID DART departed Dover Air Force Base (AFB) on military aircraft the same day. The III MEF Crisis Action Team completed Problem Framing (Mission Analysis) on April 27, 2015, and the USINDOPACOM J3 issued an execution order (EXORD) to U.S. Marine Forces Pacific on April 29, 2015.

The Commander's Guidance to JTF-505 for Operation DAMAYAN (see Figure 6-2) during the response to Super Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013 provides an excellent outline of the military's role and key planning considerations in FDR. First, "Do No Harm," speaks to considering second-order effects of operations and implicitly warns that FDR is not a DoD core competency. Other key considerations are that DoD conducts FDR in support of the USG and AS, conducts indirect assistance by enabling the Armed Forces of the Philippines, provides "unique capabilities," considers Transition early, is self-sustaining, operates in an UNCLASSIFIED environment, and shares information to support Unity of Effort. These are the recurring keys to success in FDR planning and execution.



UNCLASSIFIED

Commander's Guidance

- HADR Rule Number 1: Do no harm.
- Stay unclassified and share information.
- Bring no more than is required/Stay no longer than is needed.
- Critical to the success of this mission is Unity of Effort.
- 3d MEB, as III MEF Main Effort, provides flexible, responsive and unique military capabilities as requested by the GRP and coordinated through USAID and executed by the AFP.
- As the supported tactical headquarters ashore, 3d MEB will direct a coordinated effort amongst all participating U.S. military units.
- 3d MEB headquarters will ensure the GRP, U.S. government agencies, and NGOs understand the U.S. military capabilities and supporting assets that can be integrated into the overall GRP led HADR effort.
- U.S. military response forces must execute nearly self-sustaining operations in order to minimize impact of the heavily damaged host nation infrastructure.

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 6-2. *Commander's Guidance to JTF-505 for Operation DAMAYAN, Philippines, 2013 (Source: III MEF)*

6.3 Operating Environment

Joint planning is end state oriented. One of the key ways the commander and staff derive their understanding of the end state is from analysis of the operating environment. The operational environment (OE) is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Important aspects of the OE for FDR are the type of disaster, the current political and security situation in the AS, the strength and capacity of the AS government and its disaster response mechanisms, and the presence and capacity of the international disaster response system.

Gaining an adequate understanding of the OE during planning can be challenging and consequential. For example, in the Ebola response in Liberia in 2014, it was found that "an inadequate understanding of the operational environment resulted in plans being developed based on worst case scenario(s)," with the impact being USAFRICOM planners developed a much larger Request for Forces (RFF) than what was required.[133] Further, the DoD Joint Staff Ebola AAR found "the unique aspects of the mission, evolving DoD roles, and lack of understanding of the operational environment complicated crisis action planning efforts."[134]

The considerations presented here are FDR focused.

6.3.1 Types of Disasters

JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, categorizes disasters into three "types":

- **Slow Onset.** Epidemic, flood, famine, and drought
- **Rapid Onset.** Storm, flash flood, earthquake, tsunami, and landslide
- **Complex Emergencies.** Famine and conflict

The type of disaster impacts the information and analysis needed during planning, the need for different capabilities, and the time available for planning and deployment.

Slow onset disasters like the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa may not have a well-defined triggering event to inspire planning or a response. Planners should be mindful not to watch a slow developing crisis unfold while also not conducting initial analysis only to eventually be called to respond. The presence of USAID advisors at GCCs and key forward deployed units like III MEF in Okinawa, Japan, or JTF Horn of Africa in Djibouti can help planners anticipate whether DoD will be asked to respond.

Rapid onset disasters like earthquakes require excellent crisis action planning and execution, particularly in ensuring that strong assessments and excellent coordination with USAID and the AS undergird the response. Having a deliberate Concept of Operations (CONOP) or CONPLAN facilitates rapid course of action (COA) development for most likely disasters in high probability countries.

Additional response preparedness comes from security cooperation activities with partner nations and support to regional organizations. These activities often prove invaluable for building trust and multinational interoperability that support response in rapid onset crises. For example, Indo-Asia-Pacific stakeholders and USINDOPACOM began the Regional Consultative Group (RCG) on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific to increase response preparedness for five high risk countries in the region.

Comparing the 2014 West Africa Ebola Outbreak and the 2010 Haiti Earthquake offers insight on the differences in disaster type and response. In the 2010 Haiti earthquake response, Defense Secretary Gates, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), and Lieutenant General Keen, JTF Haiti commander, issued Verbal Orders of the Commander (VOCO) to enable immediate requests for military forces to be expedited before a thorough needs assessment was conducted, requests for assistance from USAID were received, or strong military objectives and transition criteria were developed. While the rapid response resulted in the delivery of life-saving aid and critical capabilities to repair and open sea and air ports, it also made transition planning challenging and extended JTF-Haiti operations months longer than needed.

In contrast, the U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), following behind U.S. Army Africa as the core of JFC UNITED ASSISTANCE (JFC-UA), conducted a 2-day "Academics Seminar: Operational Environment Training" that was instructed by the UN, Médecins Sans Frontières, DoS, USAID, and the JTF-Haiti commander, Lieutenant General Keen, two days before its advance party deployed to Liberia. The result was that JFC-UA collaborated with USAID in developing their Lines of Effort, Key Tasks, and Transition plan and criteria. Additionally, even a slow-moving typhoon might offer organizations like USAID and the UN opportunity to insert advisors before a storm makes landfall to accelerate assessments and response coordination.

It is worth considering slow onset disasters and the framework in Figure 6-1. If we return to the time dimension on the horizontal axis, it implies that slow onset disasters offer more time for local responders and international civilians to mass capabilities with slower growing requirements than an earthquake strike to a densely populated city.

The implication being that slow onset disasters may not require foreign military support unless the OE is less than permissive, or the risks of the hazard constrains the access of civilian responders like the West Africa Ebola outbreak. Also, as offered previously, speed of response is critical for success with rapid onset disasters. These considerations may guide joint and combined exercise planners to use rapid onset disasters, mega disasters, or unprecedented disasters like the Haiti earthquake or Ebola epidemic as scenarios to best challenge and prepare military units.

6.3.2 Types of Operating Environments

The OE can be characterized by the degree of control AS forces have to support and assist in the operation. There are three types of operating environments: hostile, uncertain, or permissive. "Permissive" environments are those that the AS government, police, and military maintain control and stability during the disaster. In most FDR missions, the USG responds to disasters in a permissive environment where the AS government maintains control and is willing to conduct disaster relief. However, DoD forces have occasionally responded to natural disasters in uncertain and less than permissive environments, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami, Kashmir Earthquake in Pakistan in 2005, and Haiti Earthquake in 2010. Complex emergencies involve internal conflict that may include a complete breakdown in authority and governance; they are quite different than military support to a natural or man-made disaster and are beyond the scope of this handbook.

6.3.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)

JIPOE is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the commander's decision-making process. FDR operations require a slightly different lens and approach that is less enemy focused with more attention on the effects of the disaster, key response organizations and their capabilities, key infrastructure, keeping track of needed capabilities, and supporting transition planning and decision making. Further, through the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process, intel can describe what "normal" looks like and continually monitor and update information on the situation and capabilities of the AS, international response community, and other foreign militaries assisting the operation. In this effort, IPB supports timely and appropriate transition and redeployment.

With inadequate initial assessments, the response force may generate an overly robust RFF and larger than needed operational footprint. Also, initial Priority Information Requirements (PIR) may be too focused on

security-related issues such as force protection and protection of American citizens instead of more relevant information like in-country capabilities, resources, and contracting availability to support the response.

Inspired by the frequency of disasters and multinational responses in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, the Directors of Military Intelligence (DMI) for 27 nations agreed at the 2010 Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC) to develop the APICC Multinational Guidelines for Information Support to Military Disaster Relief Operations. The document can be found online at: https://community.apan.org/hadr/pacom-hadr/m/fha-files/181998.

The document is an excellent guide for FDR planning, information sharing, damage assessments, FDR PIR, critical infrastructure, disaster critical needs checklists, and open-source information. An abbreviated list of FDR-specific considerations for planning follows:

(a) People

- Affected areas and affected population (casualties, injured, types of injuries)
- Internally displaced persons (numbers, disposition, location, camps/spontaneous sites)
- Missing persons and current search and rescue operations
- Current humanitarian needs

(b) Affected State

- Current political and security situation, current government response effort
- Status of essential public services (water, electricity, communication, sanitation, healthcare)
- National Disaster Management Office functioning and coordinating response, location
- Military status, operations, and capabilities
- What coordination structures are in place; Civ-Mil and Mil-Mil coordination mechanisms
- Geopolitical conditions

(c) Infrastructure

- Airfields and Ports (location, status, civil aviation C2 and management, size, activity, fuel)
- Material handling equipment at ports (status, capabilities)
- Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZ)
- Status of key road networks, bridges, medical facilities, telecommunications infrastructure

(d) International Response

- Current humanitarian situation and response, organizations present, capabilities
- Other foreign militaries and geo-political situation
- UN agencies, current civil-military coordination structure and mechanism
- UN Cluster System (humanitarian civilian-to-civilian coordination)
- Number of NGOs and humanitarian organizations, general location, and capabilities
- Current UN situation reports, funding appeals, foreign military asset situation report

(e) U.S. Interagency and Situation

- American citizens present (number, location, status, casualties, injured)
- Possible evacuation or departure of American citizens
- USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) already deployed/ present
- U.S. military in the vicinity or already responding

6.3.4 Information Sources for Understanding the Operating Environment

While there is a chapter dedicated to information in this handbook, this is a brief list of possible sources to assist with gaining an understanding of the operating environment:

- USAID situation reports, typically titled "Fact Sheet" with a number and date
- UN OCHA Reports; Relief Web website
- GCC security cooperation programs
- The National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program
- U.S. Embassy, DATT, and security cooperation functions
- CFE-DM Country Books
- Pacific Disaster Center
- Special Operations Forces (SOF)/Civil Affairs teams already in country
- DoD regional centers (African Center for Strategic Studies, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies)

GCC security cooperation activities and the SPP can be invaluable for gathering information. Frequent feedback after FDR operations speaks to the value of relationships gained from security cooperation programs and bi-lateral and multinational exercises.

Beyond the relationship between Lieutenant General Keen, JTF-Haiti commander, and Major General Floriano Peixoto, commander of UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), offered in the previous chapter, there are countless examples of the value of networking and relationship building from combined exercises and security cooperation activities.[135] For example, assessments found that the USMC Operation ONWARD LIBERTY Strategic Communication (SC) program proved invaluable in gaining traction in Liberia. "[A] USAID official observed that the relationship between the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and DoD, forged before the Ebola crisis, enabled the AFL and U.S. military to work together with logistics and building Ebola treatment units."[136] Further, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) leveraged the Michigan National Guard's experience in Liberia to gain insight into the OE as one staff officer said, "the Michigan adjutant general spoke with our commanding general which was a huge homerun."[137] Nepal in 2015 offers another example, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) had conducted FDR table-top exercises with the Nepalese in 2013 and had developed an FDR CONPLAN for Nepal.

6.3.5 Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST)

The supported commander in an FDR mission may send an assessment team to gather information required for planning. *JP 3-29* offers two types of assessment teams, a JTF Assessment Team and the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST). The teams differ in size and capabilities. Both can add significant value during crisis planning, particularly the mission analysis process and gathering of capability and force requirements.

The HAST works in close coordination with the USEMB and USAID DART to gather future support requirements, assess likely capabilities needed to support USAID, and prevent duplication. Worth noting, the DART gathers an assessment of the disaster and humanitarian needs. The DoD HAST conducts an assessment of the requirements to support the DART and DoD operations. The HAST composition should include SMEs from service and functional components expected to participate in the actual operation. For example, if requested to provide transportation support to USAID, assessment teams will survey airfields, fuel capabilities, and other areas necessary to support transportation and logistics operations.

Once deployed, the HAST, working with the country team and USAID, may be asked to assess the ability of the AS government to respond to the disaster; identify primary points of contact for coordination and collaboration; determine the threat environment for force protection purposes; survey facilities and infrastructure that may be used to support FDR operations, including aerial port of debarkation, seaport of

debarkation, and forward operating base; conduct health and medical assessments; and coordinate specific logistical support to assist with the relief effort.



Figure 6-3. *Port-au-Prince - U.S. Marines with Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Southern Command, deployed in support of Joint Task Force Matthew, off load supplies for locals affected by Hurricane Matthew at Jeremie, Haiti, Oct. 9, 2016. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Ian Ferro)*

Given the frequency of disasters and FDR responses in USINDOPACOM's AOR, the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), forward deployed in Okinawa, Japan, maintains a HAST that is ready 24/7 and can be deployed in fewer than 12 hours in order to establish an initial assessment of required support for follow-on assistance. However, other GCCs may not maintain an organized, trained, and equipped HAST. It is worth noting that the function and role of the HAST can be performed by an already standardized and organic team like a USMC light Forward Command Element (FCE) of the Air Contingency Marine task force or a scaled version of a U.S. Army Early Entry Command Post or Contingency Command Post (CCP). An important function not listed below is the need to Receive, Stage, Onward Move, and Integrate (RSOI) follow-on forces that come behind the HAST. Also, while the list offered below is robust, the initial operational survey team could be considerably smaller and refined, situation dependent. HAST composition (20-25 members):

- Officer in Charge/Commander (OIC/CDR)
- USAID BHA (1)
- U.S. Air Force (USAF) (1)
- USAF Contingency Response Group (CRG) (1-2)
- G-1
- G-2
- G-3
- Ops Chief (1)
- Aviation (1)

- Liaison Officer (LNO) – USEMB (1)
- Liaison Officer (LNO) – AS military-to-military coordination (1)
- G-4
- Air/Mobility Planner (1)
- Aerial/Sea Port of Debarkation (A/SPOD)/Arrival/Departure Airfield control group (A/DACG)
- Engineer (structural, mechanical)
- Medical
- Communications
- Contracting capability (Contracting, Disbursing, Comptroller)
- Public Affairs
- Civil Affairs
- Foreign Area Officer/Cultural/Regional SME
- Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) representative
- Interpreters or translators (1-2)

6.4 Key Planning Facts for FDR Operations

- The AS must formally request or be willing to accept USG assistance through the USEMB/DoS
- A Disaster Declaration Cable (DDC) from the responsible USAMB or designated representative is normally required before FDR is provided by the USG
- Requests for DoD assistance will be forwarded as an official request from the appropriate department or agency Executive Secretariat to OSD
- DoD generally does not have the authority to unilaterally initiate emergency FDR operations with one exception: DODD 5100.46 Foreign Disaster Relief, authorizes military commanders with assigned forces at or near the immediate scene of a foreign disaster to take prompt action in emergency situations to save human lives. This is commonly referred to as the "life and limb" clause
- SecDef must approve all DoD FDR operations prior to execution with the exception of those actions taken pursuant to the "life and limb" clause (DODD 5100.46), which the Combatant Commander must report to SecDef or Deputy SecDef within 72 hours of commencement in order to obtain approval for continuing assistance

6.5 Key Planning Assumptions for FDR Operations

- Any DoD deployment will be part of a wider USG response, with the closest U.S. diplomatic mission providing interface and diplomatic support

- Any DoD response will be under a bilateral agreement between USG and the AS but will work in a multilateral fashion with allies and partners and any other NGOs participating in the disaster response
- DoS will facilitate the timely approval of diplomatic agreements (e.g., Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), etc.) and access clearances (e.g., diplomatic clearances for overflights and landings, access, basing) with the AS that should not delay the requested DoD response
- DoD will not normally be the first responder (except where the "life and limb" clause applies described in DODD 5100.46)
- SECDEF authorization will direct the use of unique military capabilities that are not readily available through the AS or international community

6.6 Legal Considerations for FDR Operations

FDR operations include complex legal issues and considerations. International law issues may include the law of war, law of the sea, the status of persons encountered during the mission, rules of engagement (ROE), and AS law. Domestic legal issues include such subjects as fiscal law, military justice, claims, and intelligence oversight.

The list below is intended to be a useful outline. For greater detail on legal issues for FDR operations, consult Appendix A of the *JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, 14 May 2019.

- Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR)*, establishes policy guidance for FDR operations
- Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA)
- Excess Property Program (Title 10, USC, Sec 2557)
- Funded Transportation Program (Title 10, USC, Sec 2561)
- Space Available Transportation Program (Title 10, USC, Section 402, commonly referred to as the Denton Program)
- Presidential Drawdown Authority (Title 22, USC, Sec 2318 [Sec 506{a}{2} of the FAA of 1961)
- Rules of Engagement – (CJCS Standing ROE and Theater Specific ROE)
- Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA)
- Overflight and Law of the Sea (GCCs coordinate with USEMB)
- Landing rights, diplomatic clearances, visa, and passport requirements (DoS coordinates)
- Specified ports of entry, immigration, customs, and exit procedures (DoS coordinates)
- Eligibility for Medical Care
- International Human Rights
- Refugees and Asylum Seekers

6.7 Mission, Lines of Effort, and Command and Control

6.7.1 Mission and Intent

Inputs for a crisis action plan include the mission objectives, the JIPOE, and analysis of lessons learned from past operations of a similar nature. The participation of USAID should occur in the planning process as early as possible. GCCs and response forces consider several factors in developing the mission, including the joint force's role in assisting the LFA, the OE, and security considerations. Early coordination with the LFA supports unity of effort between in-theater USG response elements and ensures transition is considered early.

The two figures here are the joint force Mission Statement and Commander's Intent for the 2014 West Africa Ebola Outbreak (Figure 6-4) and the 2015 Ghorka Earthquake in Nepal (Figure 6-5). First, notice both statements speak to supporting the LFA and AS. Second, both include "alleviating suffering and saving lives." Third, both have a clear End State that focuses on the appropriate transition of activities to the AS and/or other appropriate civilian organizations.

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Mission and Intent

Mission: JFC-UA **supports the United States Agency of International Development (USAID)** in Liberia to assist the U.S Government's Foreign Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) efforts to contain the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) IOT prevent EVD from spreading outside of the region, **alleviate human suffering**, and promote internal and regional stability. O/O **transition** the Joint Force Command (JFC) to designated entities.

Purpose: The purpose of this operation is to support the USG's EVD response effort to increase the ability and capacity of the Government of Liberia (GoL) to educate and care for their citizens and create conditions for the GoL and other stakeholders to assume responsibility for a sustainable EVD response.

Key Tasks:

- Enforce force health protection measures to prevent US personnel in Liberia from becoming exposed to EVD and other infectious diseases.
- Train sufficient Health Care Workers to operate Ebola Treatment Units.
- Provide oversight of construction and resupply of up to 19 Ebola Treatment Units.
- Operate Army Labs to conduct blood sample testing to reduce testing result times of EVD samples.
- Transition support activities to designated entities and redeploy.

Endstate: Conditions are set for USG agencies, host nation, or international organizations to manage Liberian EVD response and to transition all support activities to designated entities.

UNCLASSIFIED Air Assault!

Figure 6-4. *JFC-UA Mission Statement and Commander's Intent for the 2014 West Africa Ebola Outbreak (Source: 101st Airborne Division, Lieutenant General Gary Volesky)*

Mission / Commander's Intent

MISSION: O/O, **JTF- 505 supports US government (USG) efforts,** led by **USAID/OFDA and DOS**, to provide foreign disaster relief to the Government of Nepal (GON) to **save lives and alleviate human suffering**, **transitioning** relief efforts to the GON and governmental/non-governments agencies when appropriate.

Purpose: Prevent loss of life and alleviate human suffering by providing coordinated and validated support tasked by USAID/OFDA.

Method: JTF-505 supports USAID/OFDA and international aid forces performing relief efforts by providing unique Joint military capabilities ISO the GoN. JTF-505 will deploy PACOM approved Joint capabilities to include aviation lift support, airfield operations, and necessary command and control forces to forward staging bases within Nepal and forward deploy fixed wing lift assets to an ISB IOT shorten the lines of communication and increase tempo. We will ensure the ability to maintain our current operation for up to 30 days, providing sustainment and non-military relief capabilities as identified by the GoN and validated by OFDA/USAID. Finally we will conduct a responsible transition to the GON, other US Government agencies and the international community for follow on recovery operations. JTF-505 must ensure relief capabilities are validated with OFDA to ensure responsible funds execution.

Endstate: Lives are saved, human suffering and further damage to critical infrastructure mitigated; the international community has effectively assumed all relief and response efforts; long-term relief and re-construction efforts are responsibly turned over to the GON; a positive perception of USG/DOD efforts is achieved.

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Figure 6-5. JTF-505 Mission Statement and Commander's Intent for the 2015 Ghorka Earthquake in Nepal (Source: III MEF)

6.7.2 Lines of Effort (LOE)

The operational template for most FDR operations is clear from the beginning: deploy to theater, support the DART/USAID using lines of effort (LOE), hand off tasks to the AS or aid organizations when able, and redeploy. This section focuses on the most likely LOE for DoD support to FDR.

The priority LOE must be to support the distribution and delivery of humanitarian assistance to the AS and affected population. Consider Figure 6-6 that offers the four LOE from the USINDOPACOM FHA Operational Framework: Humanitarian Support, Mil-Mil Support, Security Support, and Strategic Communication (SC) coordination. The overall Strategic Imperative throughout the response is the transition of assigned tasks back to the AS or responsible international relief organization.

Any DoD response will align with the established and accepted AS mechanisms for dealing with the response, as coordinated by the LFA and AS military. The on-site commander (OSC) will minimize the footprint of response forces; response forces must be self-sufficient to avoid competing for resources with the affected population and other relief organizations, and DoD relief efforts should not create a dependency on the USG/DoD by the AS or its population.




Figure 6-6. *U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Foreign Humanitarian Affairs Lines of Effort for its FHA CONOP (Source: USINDOPACOM)*

6.7.3 FDR Capabilities

The joint force generally provides logistics capabilities in FDR operations. Not surprisingly, key military capabilities are rotary and fixed wing aircraft for indirect support and support to logistics infrastructure, particularly distribution of humanitarian assistance and support at aerial and sea ports. As part of planning, forces are identified by the capabilities needed to conduct the operations described in the CONOP. This section offers a list of frequently used capabilities in disaster response. While not analyzing each of the Services' capabilities (see *JP 3-29, pg. III-12*) for FDR-oriented capabilities, there are a few notable observations in this section on capabilities and recent FDR operations.

Reopening ports and resuming port operations can be critical for relief operations. Natural disasters—especially heavy weather events and earthquakes—can hamper safe navigation into both sea and aerial ports. The AS and international community can benefit significantly from military capabilities that can rapidly assess, repair, open, and manage port operations. In fact, operations considered decisive during the 2010 Haiti Earthquake and 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake included the U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) 1st Special Operations Wing managing air traffic control at Toussaint Louverture International Airport just 26 hours after the Haiti earthquake, and the 320th Special Tactics Squadron reopening Japan's Sendai Airport in 2011. Both operations enabled hundreds of flights, military and civilian, to deliver critical humanitarian assistance supplies during the crises.

It is worth highlighting USTRANSCOM capabilities for FDR operations. Specific USTRANSCOM capabilities like JTF-Port Opening, the JECC, and Operational Contracting Services for FDR are covered in more detail in Appendix B, "DoD Capabilities."

The inclusion of "Command and Control (C2)" on the list below may raise questions since USAID leads and coordinates FDR. However, DoD's ability to rapidly deploy C2 capabilities to plan and manage complex operations may benefit USAID in mega disasters, like the Haiti earthquake, and unprecedented disasters, like the Fukushima nuclear disaster and West Africa Ebola epidemic. In fact, JFC–UNITED ASSISTANCE had "Command and Control" in Liberia as an LOE, and it supported the USAID DART by providing management tools like a synchronization matrix and COP. JTF–Haiti included in its Mission Essential Tasks, "Conduct Command, Control, Planning, and Coordinate the Response/Relief Effort in support of USAID as LFA."

FDR Capabilities:

(a) Command and Control
- Manage Current Operations (manage COP, decision support matrix)
- Planning support to USG agencies, AS military

(b) Theater Airlift

(c) Rotary Air
- Distribution of humanitarian assistance
- Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC)
- Search and Rescue, evacuation
- Transport USG interagency (USEMB, USAID, others)
- Reconnaissance

(d) Support Search and Rescue
- Coordinate Search and Rescue

(e) Logistics
- Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO)
- Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS)
- Airport and seaport material handling equipment (MHE)
- Conduct Regional Air Movement Control Center
- Water production
- HLZ studies

(f) Engineering
- Conduct structural assessment, technical support, repairs
- Debris clearing, road clearing, expeditionary bridging
- Support to urban search and rescue
- Specialized underwater services, clearing of obstacles, survey of port facilities, and salvage of vessels
- Construction of temporary facilities (for use by AS, joint force, humanitarians, displaced persons)
- Power generation
- Communications support and services
- Critical infrastructure recovery

(g) Air and Sea Port
- Assessment, repair, opening
- Airfield management, MHE
- APOD/SPOD

(h) Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
- Maps, imagery, information sharing and products

(i) Health Service Support
- Medical services U.S. forces, American citizens (AMCITS)
- Care for disaster victims
- Reestablish AS public health resources

(j) Security Operations

- U.S. embassy, American citizens, convoys, humanitarian assistance warehouse, humanitarian distribution points, air and seaports, airfield operations

(k) Communications Support

6.7.4 Command and Control

The joint force organization for FDR is similar to traditional military organizations with a commander, command element, and mission-tailored forces. However, the nature of FDR usually results in combat support and combat service support forces (e.g., engineers, logistics, transportation, legal, civil affairs, public affairs, and medical) serving more prominent roles than combat elements. The DoD deploys tailored, modular, and self-sustaining forces in close coordination with, and support to USAID. Joint force HQ organization structure should support interorganizational cooperation.

Crisis action planning will identify the optimal available military capability and corresponding command and control structure to fulfill the requested support requirement. In recent years, FDR operations have been supported by a range of options from a Single Component to large JTFs. For example, the Air Force's 36th Contingency Response Group (36 CRG) led Operation DHARMA PALU for the Sulawesi earthquake in Indonesia in October 2018. The Ebola response was a Single Component, U.S. Army, with joint enablers from Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and USTRANSCOM (see Figure 6-7). On the other hand, the 2015 Nepal earthquake response had a JTF-Main, intermediate staging base (ISB)/joint air component coordination element (JACCE), and JTF-Forward (see Figures 6-8 and 6-9). The selection of a supporting joint force and command element will be driven by the speed of response, appropriateness of size and scope, alignment of capability to the need and cost. As examples of large forces for complex disasters, JTF-Haiti (2010) and Operation TOMODACHI in Japan (2011) both had JTFs with over 20,000 U.S. personnel.

The Joint Force Commander (JFC) establishes organizational structures, processes, and procedures to consider interagency and civilian relief organization perspectives and positions into its planning, execution, and assessment process. Depending on the type of contingency operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interagency involvement, the focal point for operational-level and tactical-level coordination with civilian agencies may occur at the USEMB, at military-to-military and civil-military coordination platforms managed by the AS, at the JTF HQ, in a Humanitarian Operations Cell (HOC), or via an ad hoc coordination platform.




Figure 6-7. JFC-UA Task Organization for the 2014 West Africa Ebola Outbreak (Source: 101st Airborne Division, Lieutenant General Gary Volesky)




Figure 6-8. JTF-505 Command Relationships (COMREL) for the 2015 Ghorka Earthquake, Nepal (Source: III MEF)




Figure 6-9. JTF-505 JTF Forward Task Organization for the 2015 Ghorka Earthquake, Nepal (Source: III MEF)

6.7.5 Transition Planning

The termination of military FDR operations will normally be conducted by transitioning relief activities to other USG agencies, relief organizations, or the AS. DoD deploys and redeploys by capability. Response forces should consider capabilities and how they influence exit strategy and expedient departure. Termination occurs when the relief efforts have been successfully transitioned, when SecDef directs, or at the discretion of the AS. Transition should be condition-based and calendar-informed.

U.S. response forces usually deploy significant logistics and engineering capabilities that cannot be sustained by the AS or aid organizations. It is easy to accept tasks beyond the prescribed mandate. However, successful transition requires disciplined operations that continually question if operations and capabilities are sustainable. Early and close coordination with USAID will help prevent mission creep and challenges with transition.

USAID considers alternatives and appropriateness as part of its requests for assistance from DoD. It is critical to coordinate closely with USAID to bound operational tasks and develop milestones toward transition. The use of a decision support matrix and continual refinement of handover criteria may be useful tools for disciplined execution.

As the response progresses, some tasks may simply end and not need to be transitioned. However, other tasks that need to be transitioned will require more planning, coordination, and oversight. The DART can find and coordinate with partners to transition tasks. Once identified, the response force should conduct collaborative planning and milestones with USAID, the AS, and transition partners. As appropriate, the response force follows up and monitors task and transition progress. Consider the transition template and graph used in the 2014 Ebola response, (see Figure 6-10).




Figure 6-10. *JFC-UA Transition Plan for the 2014 West Africa Ebola Outbreak (Source: 101st Airborne Division, Lieutenant General Gary Volesky)*

6.8 Other Planning Considerations

6.8.1 Additional Planning Considerations

- Plan for the need to employ an unclassified, accessible, open-source website portal as a primary means for sharing information with the AS, NGOs, interagency partners, and others supporting or participating in FDR efforts.
- Plan for the availability and positioning of trained FDOs to process information for dissemination to the AS, international organizations, and other militaries.
- Plan for a robust liaison network.
- Be prepared to track funding levels, major cost drivers, economic impacts of operations, daily burn rate, and USAID contribution. The GCC must provide daily burn rate reporting to DSCA, per DFAR.
- Plan for an audit. It will happen.
- Disseminate strategic messaging briefing cards for use by commanders and others that detail facts related to the disaster and USG involvement in FDR efforts.
- Plan to be self-sufficient to avoid competing for resources with the affected population and other relief organizations.

6.8.2 Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)

Just over 20 years ago, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on "Women, Peace and Security." The U.S. Congress passed the Women Peace and Security Act in 2017. On June 11, 2019, the U.S. Government released the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security. The four LOEs of the U.S. WPS Strategy are:

- **LOE 1.** Seek and support the preparation and meaningful participation of women around the world in decision-making processes related to conflict and crises
- **LOE 2.** Promote the protection of women and girls' human rights; access to humanitarian assistance; and safety from violence, abuse, and exploitation around the world
- **LOE 3.** Adjust United States international programs to improve outcomes in equality for, and the empowerment of, women
- **LOE 4.** Encourage partner governments to adopt policies, plans, and capacity to improve the meaningful participation of women in processes connected to peace and security and decision-making institutions

As the LOEs above speak explicitly to security cooperation, conflict, crises, and humanitarian assistance, USAID and DoD both published WPS plans

in 2020.[138] While the DoD has an overarching program for WPS, it is at GCCs where the program is crafted to suit the needs of FDR operations and partner nations. As offered by Lt Col Duilia Mora Turner, chief of the USSOUTHCOM WPS program, "when we take into consideration that statistically, about 50% of the world population are women, it's paramount that we include that perspective in everything we do." [139]

While FDR operations are generally short-lived (3-4 weeks), and the role of the military in FDR and FHA is to support indirectly and not engage the populace, there are a wide-range of direct activities in planning and conducting FDR operations that would benefit from a gender lens and WPS considerations. Planners and response forces should engage WPS programs and representatives for input in assessments, crisis action planning and staff estimates, including a WPS representative on the early-entry HAST and command element, and possible deployment during FDR operations.

As an example, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) included gender advisors to field commanders during its FDR response to Tropical Cyclone Winston in Fiji in 2016. It was the first time ADF operational orders specified a gender perspective and required the use of gender advisors with great outcomes.

6.8.3 Information Sharing

Plan to develop an Information Sharing Strategy. FDR operations are information rich environments. Crisis response often includes ad hoc teams, organizations, and coordination structures. Information sharing is making information available to participants (people, processes, or systems). Sharing information helps achieve unity of effort and increase the speed of execution. Organizing the JTF for information sharing should be deliberate. Chapter 5 of this handbook is focused on information sharing.



Figure 6-11. *A civilian evacuee boards a Coast Guard HC-144 Ocean Sentry, Sept. 5, 2019, in the Bahamas, in the aftermath of Hurricane Dorian. Photo: Coast Guard Petty Officer 3rd Class Hunter Medley*

6.8.4 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) are considered Related Operations to FDR operations as they often happen simultaneously and because of the same crisis. A NEO is an ordered departure from a threatened area abroad that is carried out with the assistance of DoD. DoS may also declare a NEO based on the nature of the threat or the lack of availability of alternative forms of transportation.

Evacuations of AMCITS have been conducted during many FDR operations. The 2010 Haiti earthquake required an evacuation of 16,412 U.S. citizens. During the first two weeks following the earthquake, JTF-Haiti evacuated an average of 600 AMCITS daily. During the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake, as part of Operation PACIFIC PASSAGE, USNORTHCOM evacuated 7,322 American military families and over 400 pets from Japan to Air Mobility Command bases and airports in the U.S. During the Nepal earthquake in 2015, U.S. Army 1st Special Forces Group rescued 55 people from 13 different countries in high-altitude conditions (Mount Everest) over 17,500 ft elevation.

6.8.5 Security Considerations

Normally, the AS is the lead for security throughout the disaster area. FDR operations are primarily focused on saving lives and supporting humanitarian assistance. Security remains a supporting effort. AS security organizations maintain responsibility for civil order within the AS; they will normally be charged with security and policing throughout the affected area, including the protection of the humanitarian response effort.

The majority of DoD FDR operations are for a response to a natural disaster within a permissive operating environment. It is far less common that FDR operations are executed when there has been a complete breakdown of authority or governance. In these instances, security will add significant complexity to the USG response. Security of U.S. deployed forces always remains a primary concern, and risk must be constantly evaluated. However, FDR operations do require a different lens when assessing the operating environment.

If requested by the AS, and approved by the USG LFA, the joint force will focus on filling gaps for protecting relief operations and maintaining stability for response organizations to work.

Key considerations for effective security are:

- Coordinating all security requirements with AS security organizations
- Ensuring AS organizations are present for and lead all civil policing and protection activities
- Force protection is adjusted as required but maintains an acceptable national minimum standard
- Any security tasks performed by U.S. forces are transitioned to AS security forces as quickly as possible

Security Planning Considerations:

- Is there a SOFA?
- What is the U.S. Ambassador's direction?
- Rules of Engagement
- Force Protection/Asset Protection
- USG commodities/USAID material
- Airfield/Port security
- Relief Organizations Staff, Sites, Commodities
- Relief Agency Distribution Points
- Relief Orgs Convoy Protection
- Distribution of Relief by U.S. Military
- Camp Security

6.8.6 Deliberate Planning and the INDOPACOM FHA CONOP

Some GCCs have developed deliberate plans for FDR operations, such as USNORTHCOM CONPLAN for International Disaster Response. However, this section provides details on the INDOPACOM *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Concept of Operations* (FHA CONOP).

The INDOPACOM Area of Operations (AO) sees numerous natural disasters every year, many linked to the region's infamous "Ring of Fire." Thus, INDOPACOM developed a comprehensive FHA CONOP. After gathering lessons learned from Operation DAMAYAN (Super Typhoon Haiyan, Philippines, November 2013) and again from Operation SAHAYOGI HAAT (Ghorka Earthquake, Nepal, April 2015), INDOPACOM conducted comprehensive revisions to the CONOP in 2014 and 2017. In fact, the FHA CONOP is so comprehensive that it could be utilized as a hasty education program on DoD FDR.

The FHA CONOP discusses in detail the strategic framework, strategy and policy considerations, mission statement, commander's intent, LOE, various frameworks for each LOE, staff processes, event flow and decision point descriptions, operational planning team processes, transition assessment

templates, and other supporting documents.

The document builds the strategic and operational construct for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing FHA operations, and is applied in situations when U.S. agencies request DoD assistance (for example, foreign disaster relief, pandemic and emerging infectious diseases, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear accidents). This CONOP provides:

- Prescriptive INDOPACOM guidance to military commanders performing FHA operations
- A framework to inform partner nations on INDOPACOM support during FHA operations
- A baseline for the development and conduct of training to prepare INDOPACOM commanders and forces to execute FHA operations

The proponent for the INDOPACOM FHA CONOP is the J35, Future Operations. To obtain an UNCLASSIFIED Microsoft Word and PowerPoint presentation of the FHA CONOP, it is advised to contact the INDOPACOM J3. https://www.pacom.mil/Contact/Directory/J351/

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CHAPTER 7 – MISSION EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS FOR FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF

7.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the execution of FDR operations. The focus is on working with USAID, logistics, public affairs, command authorities, and the USAID MITAM. Two critical functions for success in FDR not covered here, coordination and information sharing, are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

The Commander's Guidance to JTF 505 for Operation DAMAYAN (see Figure 6-2) provides an excellent starting point on DoD planning and execution considerations. However, disasters are always unique and are inseparable from context, factors such as location and geography, timing, geopolitics, and policy. For example, Nepal's harsh geography and location between China and India and Haiti being 700 miles from Miami, FL, were important factors that impacted the complexity of those FDR operations. Still, there are similarities in FDR operations. For example, the average length of deployment for DoD FDR tends to be less than 30 days for a "standard" disaster (Philippines 2013, Nepal 2015, Indonesia 2018, Mozambique 2019, The Bahamas 2019) and 3-6 months for a mega disaster or unprecedented disaster (Haiti 2010, Japan 2011, Liberia 2014). Below is a collection of principles, observations, and best practices gathered from numerous FDR operations.

Framing DoD FDR operations:

- The AS is sovereign and is in the lead
- USAID is the USG LFA for foreign disaster relief; DoD is a supporting effort
- "Don't just do something; stand there." Balance high initiative military culture with assessments and tactical patience; consider the first two bullets above (support AS and civilian solutions)
- DoD provides "unique capabilities" to conduct indirect assistance and infrastructure support
- "Bring no more than is required; Stay no longer than is needed." Manage optics, expectations, and sustainment by maintaining a small footprint
- "HA/DR Rule Number 1: Do No Harm." Be mindful of second order effects with things like providing medical support, contracting, deployment size, getting ahead of the AS and USG LFA, crowding, and resource competition
- Stay Unclassified and Share Information; Pursue Unity of Effort between in-theater USG response elements, USAID/BHA, AS military and lead national disaster management organization, and other assisting militaries

- The U.S. provides foreign support bilaterally and coordinates multilaterally in FDR operations. DoD support for USAID MITAMs requires civil-military and military-military operational coordination, i.e., DIRLAUTH (direct liaison authorized) with UN WFP or other stakeholders
- FDR Strategic Imperative – Do not create a dependency on U.S. support or capabilities; "just because you can do something doesn't mean you should"
- Begin planning transition immediately; Collaborate with the USG interagency, AS, and humanitarian stakeholders early to establish transition conditions and proactively manage the process, continually assess, and reassess; Transition and redeploy by capability
- "Focus on the problem." The real transition for foreign militaries is the Emergency Relief Phase to the Recovery Phase; DoD FDR operations do not transition to building disaster resilience

Below is a snapshot of lessons from the JFC UNITED ASSISTANCE commander, Major General Gary Volesky, on the 2014 West Africa Ebola outbreak.




Figure 7-1. *Joint Force Command United Assistance: Joint Flag Officers Warfighting Course, 27 Feb 2015 (Source: Lieutenant General Gary Volesky, Commander, JFC UNITED ASSISTANCE)*

7.2 Command and Control

In any operation, command and control is paramount in establishing

the conditions for execution. As described in the previous chapter, DoD response forces have varied from a small-scale response executed by a single service component or a medium-scale response executed by a single service with joint enablers and command element augmentation to major disasters that require formation of a JTF. The JTF is task organized according to mission requirements defined by joint operational planning and the on-scene commander.

While DoD is usually in a supporting role in FDR, DoD may have the most capabilities. Additionally, DoD response forces will most likely not have command and control of the area of operations. As Lieutenant General Keen offered in his observations on leading JTF-Haiti, "Leaders need to be adaptive, comfortable sharing authority, skilled in eliciting ideas from the team (the team goes beyond DoD), very active in developing relationships outside the military structure, should be oriented toward collaboration in developing solutions, and communicate internal and external."[140]

The U.S. provides foreign support bilaterally and coordinates multilaterally in FDR operations. While it is essential to understand the command relationship with USAID (next section), excellent coordination and collaboration at all levels and with all stakeholders is critical for success. This places emphasis on having an organizational structure that is as flat as possible and as open and transparent as possible.[141]



Figure 7–2. *U.S. Army Maj. Gen. James D. Craig, right, commanding general, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, and Jeff Miller, USAID civil military affairs coordinator, meet with aid volunteers in Beira, Mozambique, March 26, 2019, during the response to Cyclone Idai. Photo: Tech. Sgt. Chris Hibben.*

7.2.1 Supporting USAID

While neither the DART nor the U.S. military force works for the other in typical military command authorities during FDR, the military force, whether it is a single service or JTF, supports the DART and/or the USAID advisor on the ground. Figure 7-3 illustrates a critical point on the operational and tactical relationship between the DoD response force and the DART during FDR operations. This relationship between the military force and USAID personnel on-the-ground is referred to as "Supporting – Supported."

Relationships between military and civilian departments and agencies cannot be equated to military command authorities (e.g., operational control [OPCON], tactical control [TACON], support) as described in *JP 1*, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. In an interagency sense, the concept of supported/supporting is less about command relationships and more about the methods used to obtain and provide support. During combat operations, such as Operation DESERT STORM, DoD was the lead agency and was supported by other USG departments and agencies. In FDR operations, DoD typically supports USAID BHA.




Figure 7-3. *Operational and tactical relationships during FDR operations (Source: USAID BHA, modified by CFE-DM)*

7.2.2 Key Leader Engagement (KLE)

Key leader engagement (KLE) is essential for achieving Unity of Effort. While the DoD contributes significant capabilities when called to respond, it is also in a supporting role. DoD response forces rely on being collaborative, credible, and transparent in establishing relationships and providing value.

Success in FDR operations relies on partnerships. First, these partnerships begin with Phase 0 security cooperation activities and bilateral and multinational training exercises. The common saying in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region among disaster response stakeholders is always true, "you don't want to be exchanging business cards for the first time during a disaster."

Be proactive in engaging partners. However, be mindful of international humanitarian norms and the preferred optics of keeping a firewall between military actors and humanitarians (described in Chapters 3 and 6). For example, it is wise to check in with USAID or a UN CMCoord officer before sending a military logistician to join the Log Cluster daily meeting.

The common approach to locating the response force headquarters where it can best coordinate with the embassy and AS military has proven valuable. Additionally, the early entry team or military assessment team (such as the HAST) should include liaisons for the AS military, U.S. embassy, and USAID.

7.2.3 Communication Synchronization and Public Affairs

With DoD supporting less than 10% of USG FDR missions, it is likely that the scale of a disaster that DoD is called to support will be the type that receives significant 24-hour media attention. As an example, within 36 hours of the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, "there were hundreds of journalists and camera crews at the Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Haiti."[142]

DoD is a supporting actor within USG Strategic Communication (SC). DoD forces should expect guidance on SC intent, objectives, themes, and messages from the U.S. embassy, USAID, and higher headquarters. DoD should integrate and align messaging in support of the AS and USG interagency. As an example of unified messaging, USG leaders in the 2014 West Africa Ebola response held joint USAID-U.S. embassy-DoD public affairs events. As with coordination and information sharing, DoD forces must be transparent, approachable, and responsive to the public and media. In recent years, news media have been embedded at every level with DoD forces during FDR.

Observations from previous FDR missions:

- Develop a communication synchronization plan with the LFA, AS, and U.S. Embassy
- Plan for public affairs personnel to be on the early-entry team or lead assessment team
- Add a social media expert on the joint manning document for the response
- Leverage social media (Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, blogs, etc.) for communicating
- Develop and distribute a daily "JTF 2-Pager" or similar product that includes response themes, priorities, talking points, facts, and figures
- Be mindful not to raise inappropriate expectations regarding DoD's role and support

• Be timely, accurate, transparent, and consistent with information

Factors that guide key themes and messages are the commander's intent and higher headquarters' intent. Specific themes, messages, and further communication guidance will be developed specifically for each mission.

However, the following overarching themes provide a starting point for FDR:

- U.S. DoD expresses its sincere condolences to the people of AS, and is working closely with AS authorities to respond in this time of crisis
- The role of U.S. military forces during any Foreign Disaster Relief event is to respond rapidly to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and mitigate significant critical infrastructure damage
- When called upon, U.S. military forces will extend assistance to victims of natural or man-made disasters and support efforts to reduce risk to vulnerable populations
- U.S. military serves at the request of the AS and in support of U.S. government humanitarian relief operations
- U.S. military supports the humanitarian assistance and disaster response efforts of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
- During humanitarian relief missions, U.S. military forces are part of a larger U.S. whole of government effort led by the U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance
- Key to success is the unity of effort by the AS, USG, and civilian aid organizations

7.3 Logistics

As described in the previous chapter, the preferred role of foreign military actors in FDR is to provide indirect support and logistics infrastructure. While joint operations typically emphasize maneuver and intelligence, the primary role of the military in humanitarian assistance is to provide logistics capabilities.

There are numerous challenges for conducting and supporting logistics in FDR operations. First, the problem is complex and time sensitive as military capabilities are most valuable early, during the Emergency Relief Phase. The response force and military logisticians likely lack complete information on the scale of the problem, the status of critical logistical infrastructure, and the needs of the AS and its population. Further, the response force and GCC are downstream consumers of needs assessments conducted by the AS, international humanitarians, and USG interagency, which indirectly help anticipate requirements for logistics capabilities. Third, access to the AS and area may be challenging because of compromised air and sea

ports, challenges with diplomatic clearances for basing and overflight, or competition and crowding from a surge of diverse actors entering the area. Fourth, FDR operations require military logisticians to conduct dual logistics functions of moving and sustaining the DoD response force and facilitating or executing the reception and distribution of relief supplies and materials. The DoD logistical system is designed and focused primarily on internal support instead of external support during an FDR operation. Depending on complexity and scale, the response force J-4 is possibly not resourced to plan and direct logistics associated with large-scale humanitarian assistance operations. Other challenges may be the tyranny of distance (e.g., Nepal, Liberia, Oceania), deploying to an immature theater with limited support networks and an austere operating environment, competition for limited resources, and limited operational contracting opportunities in the AS.

The U.S. military has several unique enabling capabilities designed for rapid deployment and operations in austere, damaged, and degraded environments. The following are logistics-oriented observations and lessons from FDR operations:

- Pull versus Push with resources and capabilities; This well-worn maxim of FDR operations has been repeated for years; Still, there are recent examples of personnel and capabilities going forward to an AS that were not needed, requested, or related to operational requirements
- Maintain a small footprint; reduce internal sustainment requirements
- Deploying elements should be self-sufficient to the maximum extent to alleviate any burden on the AS and ensure that logistics resources are fully employed in the relief effort rather than sustaining response forces
- Maritime forces are logistically self-sufficient and do not require use of an aerial port or seaport; Aircraft carrier and amphibious ship operations can provide lift assets to support HA operations while minimizing the on-the-ground footprint
- If available, use existing facilities versus tents
- Include contracting support, logistics, and Joint Manning Document (JMD) SMEs on the initial assessment team and command element (see HAST recommendations in previous chapter)
- Logistics planners should base supply blocks on the planned duration of the operation provided by SecDef/OSD but keep in mind that in a disaster response supply lines tend to be limited and military cargo competes with supplies critically needed to assist the population
- Develop an on-the-shelf JMD for likely FDR operations and CONOP; Take a JMD expert on the early entry assessment team or HAST
- Work closely with the U.S. Country Team and USAID to identify the best entry and operating conditions/locations (e.g., facility access, resources within the region, country clearances, MoU)

- Humanitarian needs assessments should be conducted by humanitarian actors or the AS; Foreign military actors should not duplicate needs assessments or conduct them independent of USAID or the AS (This is not to be confused with military assessments the DoD conducts to identify military capabilities required to support civilian-led FDR)
- Incorporate leadership and staff from JTF-PO (if involved) into the joint headquarters
- Include joint force enablers, such as the JECC, throughout planning and execution
- Collaborate with USAID in all phases of logistics planning and execution
- Ensure operational contract services are collaborative and transparent with USAID, AS, and other stakeholders to avoid negative unintended consequences in the local area

7.3.1 Logistics Common Operational Picture (LCOP)

JP 3.0, *Joint Operations*, defines a Common Operational Picture (COP) as a single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. A Logistics COP is a tool for situational awareness and decision support, specifically for use by logistics personnel.

For large-scale and complex disasters, using an LCOP and the ability to rapidly share an accurate information picture enables a more efficient, collaborative, adaptive, and effective response. In fact, Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE required a "common operational picture" for logistics.[143] Beyond the use of an LCOP, JTF-Haiti commander, Lieutenant General Keen, emphasized the "need for an unclassified HA/DR COP and common database to openly share with DoD, U.S. interagency, UN, NGOs, and partner nations." He later recommended that an "HA/DR COP" include civilian-oriented information like displaced persons camps, hospitals, airport/port, roads, flood/land slide zones, locations of Military/UN/NGOs/ Govt."[144]

The LCOP should include information on operational requirements, daily logistics activities, logistics centers, supply routes, medical centers, and engineering projects. The COP might also include a visual representation of distribution networks, procurements, or positioning of supplies and equipment to support ongoing operations or emerging requirements.

7.3.2 Operational Contract Support (OCS)

"Operational Contract Support (OCS) is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies and services, including construction, from commercial sources in support of CCDR-directed operations and activities." OCS

provides access to commercial assets and services and uses local providers to reduce reliance on extended supply chains. OCS can provide the JFC greater flexibly, enhanced responsiveness, increased operational reach, and, for some services, mission-critical services at lower cost than military support. OCS can reduce the response force footprint in the AS and thus sustainment requirements. It can also employ the local workforce and reduce the number and types of operations that need to be transitioned to other agencies once relief efforts are concluded. However, OCS can also have unintended consequences such as increasing competition for critical goods and services and other unintended economic consequences in the local economy. Care should be taken to ensure the response force is not competing for critical or limited resources and actually doing "more harm than good." As with other aspects of FDR operations, the response force should include USAID in the OCS plan and process.

Contracting proved a key enabler in the 2014 West Africa Ebola response. For example, the commander of DLA in Europe was part of the initial U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) assessment team. An OCS SME followed shortly after. In addition, JTF-PO provided initial contracting capability. DLA also used working capital funds to support initial contracting actions prior to the subsequent approval of OHDACA funding. Including logistics and contracting experts in the original USARAF force package also "paid huge dividends from the beginning, and the benefits continued throughout the operation." "A robust contracting capacity helped JFC-UA mitigate problems by maximizing local capacity, thereby minimizing the DoD footprint."[145]

7.3.3 Engineering

Engineering capabilities can be critical in FDR operations, particularly for earthquakes and for critical infrastructure damage to air and sea ports, bridging, and power generation. The level of assistance can vary from limited, highly specialized teams to complete engineer units.

In recent years, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has supported FDR with projects that range from debris clearing in Sendai, Japan during 2011's Operation TOMODACHI to providing water wells in Nepal after the 2015 earthquake. During the response to the Haiti earthquake in 2010, Army and Navy engineers conducted structural assessments, repaired damaged structures, and provided instruction for local engineers. In fact, U.S. military engineers were involved with rubble removal, clearing culverts, and other activities well beyond the initial phase of the response.[146] As mentioned in the previous chapter, an Army engineer officer was part of the USAID DART during the Ebola response in Liberia to assist with designing and constructing Ebola Treatment Units (medical facilities).

The following, along with the key engineering capabilities offered in the previous chapter, are valuable support engineers have provided during FDR operations:

- Restore essential services
- Structural assessments, technical support, repairs
- Power plant teams/power generation
- Hydroelectric Dam assessment and repairs
- Water pipe repairs
- Sanitation and sewage in IDP camps
- Conduct structural assessment
- Debris clearing, road clearing, expeditionary bridging
- Specialized underwater services, clearing of obstacles, survey of port facilities, and salvage of vessels
- Construction of temporary facilities
- Medical treatment centers
- Critical infrastructure recovery
- Pavement and road repair

For more on joint engineering capabilities, refer to Appendix B, this handbook and for more on joint engineer operations, refer to *JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations*.

7.3.4 Medical

JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, describes medical assistance in FDR as "Medical forces typically have four health support missions in FHA operations:

1. Health service support for U.S. military forces
2. Health protection for U.S. military forces
3. Care for disaster victims
4. Assisting in reestablishing indigenous public health resources and institutions affected by the disaster."

DoD response forces have provided medical support in FDR operations in numerous disasters over the years, including Operation SEA ANGEL in Bangladesh in 1991, the Pakistan earthquake in 2005 to the Haiti earthquake in 2010, and the Nepal earthquake in 2015. In fact, JTF-505 did not initially provide medical support as one of its LOEs in Nepal. However, a second earthquake (7.3 magnitude) struck Nepal two weeks after the initial 7.8 magnitude earthquake disaster. In response to this second earthquake, based on new casualties and at the request of Nepal's government and guidance from USAID, JTF-505 established a casualty collection point at the Kathmandu airport, conducted MEDEVAC operations, and provided medical tents, cots, litters, and medical supplies.

While medical support can save lives and relieve suffering, it can also have diplomatic benefits and improve the AS perception of U.S. assistance. However, it is important to consider the negative second and third order effects or unintended consequences that do more harm than good. One example of negative second order effects from providing medical support occurred during the 2005 Pakistan earthquake described below.[147]

- It took 16 days for the first medical unit to be operational
- Medical units continued to see patients five months after the earthquake
- Patients were treated for injuries unrelated to the earthquake
- "Pakistani physicians complained that the free medical care provided was undermining their private practices
- Pakistani pharmacists in town complained that the U.S. flooded the area with free drugs and their business dried up"[148]

CFE-DM developed a checklist for FDR medical planners to assist with decision making on when/how to incorporate military medicine in a HA/DR mission:[149]

Military medicine supports Medical Diplomacy when it:

- Provides first aid to the affected populace
- Provides trauma/lifesaving treatment immediately following an event
- Improves public health (water, food safety, sanitation, vector control, etc.)
- Promotes western medicine in underserved areas
- Provides newborn and, in some instances, pre-natal care in areas where it is non-existent

Military medicine hinders Medical Diplomacy when it:

- Greatly exceeds local capability
- Lacks handoff to step down care of same or similar quality/acuity
- Creates additional unmet needs (infections, rehabilitation, after care, etc.)
- Reduces confidence in local health care providers/facilities
- Threatens local businesses (pharmacy, radiology, ancillary services)
- Overstays their operational effectiveness time

7.4 International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response (ICBRN-R)

The deliberate or unintentional release of hazardous chemicals, compounds, radiological or nuclear materials, biological pathogens, or toxins can cause grave damage to populations, institutions, and economies.

As the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and materials continues to grow, many nations are finding that they lack the capacity to unilaterally respond to these incidents. ICBRN-R is the USG assistance provided to an AS in response to the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent CBRN incident.[150]

As with all disasters, the AS has the primary responsibility for responding to a CBRN incident. If a CBRN event exceeds the AS's capacity to respond, the AS may request (or accept an offer of) international assistance. The USG provides focused and specialized CBRN resources necessary to save lives and alleviate suffering in the aftermath of a CBRN incident - whether through deliberate use or unintentional release.[151]

The two laws governing USG response to ICBRN-R situations are The International Disaster Assistance section of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), Title 22, and the military response to humanitarian response authorities found in Title 10, USC.

7.4.1 Support to ICBRN-R

The ability of the DoD to assist an AS government and its population with ICBRN-R support is:

- Accomplished through appropriate authorizations found in USG and foreign nation statutes, treaties, or agreements to deploy and employ DoD capabilities to assist with the missions, which are supported by DoD reach back and specialized CBRN technical support organizations directed to assist
- Enabled by deployed USG and DoD resources directed to provide assistance in a number of critical areas and under the leadership of the LFA
- Assisted by identified, available DoD emergency response resources such as specialized CBRN equipment, transportation, communications, and technical reach-back support
- Supported, to the maximum extent, by resources that can assist in the overall CBRN response when sufficient time exists to deploy assets to the vicinity of the incident

A request from an AS for ICBRN-R support will be implemented through a normal USG inter-organizational response to a request from an AS seeking disaster relief and support. The DoD will augment the USG response through the designation of a GCC to serve as a Supported Command with responsibility to further designate an ICBRN-R JTF to plan, organize, and execute DoD support activities within the AS area of operations.

This established relationship will be joined by Supporting GCCs, DoD agencies, and Services with resources to provide a wide range of CBRN technical support.

7.5 Foreign Disaster Relief Funding

There are two primary sources of funds that DoD can use to fund FDR: Operations and Maintenance (O&M) or OHDACA. However, DoD use of O&M funds for FDR is significantly restricted by law and policy. O&M funds may be used in limited circumstances, and only by exception (e.g., Presidential Executive Order 12966 and DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, provide guidance on the 72-Hour "Life or Limb" Exception).

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is the central DoD agency that synchronizes global security cooperation programs, funding, and efforts across OSD, Joint Staff, DoS, Combatant Commands, the Services, and U.S. civilian industry. The incremental costs for all DoD humanitarian assistance for both natural and man-made disasters are funded through the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Action (OHDACA) account in annual DoD appropriations. Guidance for OHDACA and DoD FHA programs can be found in DoD 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual* (SAMM), online: https://samm.dsca.mil/listing/chapters.

There are several DoD HA Authorities and Programs. OHDACA is an annual appropriation with a two-year period of availability that supports DoD HA activities conducted under the legislative authorities outlined below.

10 U.S.C. 402 "The Secretary of Defense may transport to any country, without charge (on a space available basis), supplies which have been furnished by a nongovernmental source and which are intended for humanitarian assistance."

10 U.S.C. 404 "The President may direct the Secretary of Defense to provide disaster assistance outside the United States to respond to manmade or natural disasters when necessary, to prevent loss of lives or serious harm to the environment."

10 U.S.C. 407 "The Secretary of a military department may carry out humanitarian demining assistance and stockpiled conventional munitions assistance in a country if the assistance will promote either the security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out; or the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities."

10 U.S.C. 2557 "The Secretary of Defense may make available for humanitarian relief purposes any nonlethal excess supplies of the Department of Defense."

10 U.S.C. 2561 "Funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for a fiscal year for humanitarian assistance shall be used for the purpose of providing transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide."




Figure 7-4. *Diagram of DoD Humanitarian Assistance Legislation and Programs (Source: DSCA Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-12).)*

Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Program. OHDACA-funded HA projects consist of collaborative DoD engagements with PN government authorities in permissive environments to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation or to increase PN capacity to provide essential human services to vulnerable populations.

Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Program. The DoD HMA Program provides assistance to PN civilian populations plagued by landmines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and the hazardous effects of unexploded ordnance (UXO) by developing indigenous PN capacity for humanitarian demining, land-based and underwater explosive ordnance disposal, and physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) of conventional munitions.

Excess Property (EP) Program. Under the DoD HA EP program, DoD may donate non-lethal excess DoD supplies and property for humanitarian assistance purposes. "Non-lethal supplies and property" includes items which are not weapons, ammunition, or other equipment or materiel designed to inflict serious bodily harm or death. EP provided for humanitarian assistance shall be transferred to the DoS, typically via the U.S. Embassy, to be distributed to the intended PN government recipient. EP donations can be distributed to NGOs or IOs only if the organization is supporting the population on behalf of the PN government. DSCA provides OHDACA funds for all costs associated with the transfer of EP to a PN for humanitarian assistance.

Transportation Programs (HATP). The HATP, authorized under two separate authorities (402 and 2561), allow DoD to partner with NGOs by providing transportation and delivery of privately donated humanitarian supplies and equipment to PN populations around the globe. DSCA centrally manages the Denton program and the Funded Transportation program, which are executed by USTRANSCOM on a space-available or OHDACA-funded basis and result in minimal cost to the donor.

Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR). DoD Components may provide non-reimbursable FDR as humanitarian assistance using available OHDACA funds, using Presidential drawdown authority (Section 506 of Public Law 87-195), or using other available authorities (DODD 5100.46). Additionally, DoD Components may provide FDR assistance when requested and funded on a reimbursable basis by other USG departments and agencies. This program is outlined in detail in chapter 2, this handbook.

7.5.1 Section 166a, Combatant Commands: Funding through the JCS or CCMD's Initiative Fund

The CJCS may provide funds to the CCDR, upon the request of the commander, or with respect to a geographic area or areas not within the AOR of a CCDR. This section provides the CCDR with a great deal of legal flexibility to conduct activities that include force training, contingencies, selected operations, mission command, joint exercises, HCA, to include urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance, military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries (including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses), personnel expenses of defense personnel for bilateral or regional cooperation programs, protection, and joint warfighting capabilities.

7.5.2 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) and Mutual Logistics Support Agreements (MLSA)

A broad range of statutes authorize DoD to provide or acquire equipment, logistical supplies, or services to and from foreign nations. ACSA and MLSA are bilateral agreements for the exchange of mutual logistics support, supplies and services, in return for cash payment, replacement in kind, or equivalent value exchange. ACSAs are the formal mechanisms that allow the DoD to acquire and, in some cases, provide logistic support, supplies, and services directly from/to eligible countries and international organizations. ACSAs and MLSAs are typically used during exercises, training, or emergencies, including FDR operations. They provide the necessary legal authority for U.S. military forces to both receive and provide logistics support from/to PN armed forces with whom they have the agreement. If an ACSA is in place with an affected state at the time DoD deploys to support FDR operations, it is advised that planners confirm whether the EXORD for FDR impacts the authority of the ACSA. Detailed guidance of ACSAs can be found in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 2120.01D. For more information see DODD 2010.9, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, CJCSI 2120.01, and *JP 4-0*, *Joint Logistics* (https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp4_0ch1.pdf?ver=2020-07-20-083800-823) or the OSD website: https://www.acq.osd.mil/ic/ACSA.html.)

In April 2016, a series of earthquakes struck the Kumamoto region of Kyushu, Japan. The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo did not issue a Disaster Declaration and USAID did not lead a USG FDR operation. However, U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) supported the Japanese relief effort. During the period April 18-23, U.S. C-130, MV-22, and UC-35 transport aircraft delivered 36 tons of food, water, and relief supplies. Approximately 130 military personnel in total contributed directly to the relief effort.[152] USFJ support to the Japan Self-Defense Forces was enabled via an ACSA. The ACSA allows DoD forces to exchange the most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, and equipment.

Conversely, there was no ACSA between the U.S. and Nepal during the 2015 Ghorka earthquake. During the response, there were requests from the Nepalese military that fell outside of the MITAMs process. The absence of an ACSA hindered JTF-505 in providing Logistics Support, Supplies, and Services (LSSS) to the Nepalese.[153]

7.6 USAID Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) Processes and Employment

The USAID BHA Request for Assistance (RFA) process has become known as both a process and a tool called “MITAM,” the Mission Tasking Matrix. The MITAM is a current operations management tool. The purpose of the

MITAM is to communicate specific requests for military support from the DART to DoD response forces. The use of MITAMs enable response forces to synchronize operations with DART priorities. While an approved ExecSec request provides the authority to deploy, the MITAM is the process used to track, vet, and prioritize requests employing the DoD response forces. At the highest levels, the MITAM is a mechanism used by DSCA to track spending throughout the operation. Post-response, the MITAM may be used as a source document to determine approved expenditures and ultimately what is eligible for reimbursement to DoD units. The MITAM may also be reviewed by the CCMD and/or used by OSD for visibility on response force operations.

7.6.1 MITAM Origin and Development

The MITAM was created by the then USAID/BHA Military Liaison Team (now USAID/BHA CMD) during the 2004/5 Indian Ocean Tsunami response. It has evolved over the years to fit requirements in all environments where DoD response forces are supporting a BHA humanitarian response. It should articulate the requested requirement/capability and not specific units or resources.

Each MITAM request should communicate the 5 W's with regards to the support the DART is requesting. The MITAM formatting is in Microsoft Excel so it is easily used in the field with or without an internet connection or in areas with low bandwidth. The MITAM is drafted by the DART Civil Military Affairs Coordinator (CMAC) and provided to the assigned U.S. forces when a validated request for assistance requires an unique military capability. Operational tempo may require the quick development of individual MITAMs, but with good communication, they should never be a surprise to tactical level response forces.

Figure 7-5 below shows the MITAM process flow from local needs for assistance by the AS and aid organizations, starting at the top right and flowing left. The left side of the diagram shows the process of USAID BHA validation before it becomes an RFA for DoD. BHA coordinates with the USG Country Team to validate and prioritize requests.

There are a few points worth highlighting. First, USAID BHA does not task the DoD response force. Again, the relationship is "supporting – supported." Also, BHA does not manage DoD assets and should articulate requirements to the DoD response force. The appropriate approach is that BHA requests assistance for a requirement not for a capability or specific asset.




Figure 7-5. The USAID Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) and request for assistance (RFA) process (Source: USAID BHA).

7.6.2 MITAM 1

MITAM 1 (see Appendix A) is used to inform the CCMD and its assigned forces on coordinating instructions and can be used to inform the OPORD from the GCC to the assigned forces. It is first issued at the GCC and sent to the response force and/or early-entry team. MITAM 1 can address the following:

- Request MITAM chain as the communication between the DART and the assigned forces
- Confirm communications and establish battle rhythm touchpoints
- Require operational tracking metrics
- Require fiscal tracking
- Link messaging with BHA Outreach
- Require unclassified information products
- Prevent un-requested donations

7.6.3 MITAM Tracking and Reporting

The USAID BHA DART validation process ensures a request is appropriate, valid, appropriately prioritized, requires military assets, cannot be accomplished by civilian alternatives (i.e., "unique capability"), and is critical. The MITAM captures, transmits, and tracks BHA-validated requests for DoD assistance. During the response, it is the responsibility of the DoD response force to track the receipt, progress, and completion of a MITAM for reporting with its higher headquarters.

Reporting can be done vocally with the CMAC on the ground, via email, phone, text, or formal communication mechanisms. In most cases, the CMAC will coordinate with the assigned unit to work these processes early and to shape the "battle rhythm" of reporting focused on the MITAM receipt, progress, and completion. During early phases of the response, a good assumption is there will be a steady flow of MITAMs. As the international community builds their capacity and the impact of the disaster is lessened, the amount of MITAMs will decrease. With that in mind, MITAMs can inform DoD response forces' end state.

This is important with "reimbursable" operations that require BHA DART validation for reimbursement. When the DoD response force is conducting FDR operations, OHDACA funds are how the GCC is reimbursed. Any DoD activities not validated under the FDR authorization and not reimbursable with OHDACA must be authorized under other available DoD authorities and fund sources.

7.6.4 MITAMs, Operational Coordination, and Military-to-Military Support

Once BHA provides a MITAM request, the U.S. military response force conducts analysis on the MITAM, plans and manages current operations, and conducts multilateral operational coordination with the AS military and others. For example, imagine the operating environment during the 2015 Nepal earthquake given that there were 9 foreign military teams sharing operational space.

Finally, notice the military-to-military support on the right side of the diagram in Figure 7-5. The DoD response force can support non-humanitarian requests. For example, during the response to Super Typhoon Haiyan, known as Operation DAMAYAN in November 2013, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) requested the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade to transport 1,000 AFP Marines to establish security. This was not a humanitarian request validated by BHA.

For the perspective on the volume and operations with MITAMs, Table 7-1 shows the MITAMs received and executed in Operation DAMAYAN (Philippines 2013) and Operation SAHAYOGI HAAT (Nepal 2015). Worth noting is the range of dates from the first and last MITAM received. It speaks to the typically short duration of FDR operations offered earlier in this chapter, usually 3-4 weeks from deployment to redeployment.



Figure 7-6. *A USAF C-130 transported 68 Colombian Army Soldiers and 40,000 pounds of food and water to the Colombian island of San Andrés to support post-Hurricane Iota operations, Nov. 22, 2020. Photo: Michael Wimbish, USSOUTHCOM.*

	Super Typhoon Haiyan (Philippines, 2013)	Ghorka Earthquake (Nepal, 2015)
Day from first-last MITAM	14	22
Missions Assigned	53	43
Missions Executed	43	25
Missions Canceled	10	18

Table 7-1. *MITAMs received and executed in Operation DAMAYAN (Philippines 2013) and Operation SAHAYOGI HAAT (Nepal 2015). (Source: JTF 505)*

7.7 FDR Operational Battle Rhythm

FDR operations can provide unique challenges in establishing a battle rhythm as JTF/responding forces will have to adjust to embassy and USAID timelines. In particular, the JTF needs to establish a MITAM synchronization process with the DART and coordinate reporting timelines to ensure that JTF reports to the COCOM, embassy cables, and USAID Fact Sheets contain the same information. Figure 7-7 provides an example of the JTF-Matthew battle rhythm used during the 2016 Haiti Hurricane response.




Figure 7-7. *JTF-Matthew battle rhythm during the Hurricane Matthew response in 2016 (Source: USAID BHA)*

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APPENDIX A – FORMS AND TEMPLATES

MITAM 1 summarizes the EXECSEC Memo to set expectations for DoD. Subsequent MITAMs will be Requests for Assistance (RFAs).

USAID/BHA DoD Mission Tasking Matrix (MiTaM)		
RESPONSE:	*Name of Response*	
Support requirement identified as of:	DATE OF EXECSEC	
MITAM #	1	*Summary of EXECSEC Tasking*
Priority	Priority	

WHO		
DART Civil-Military Affairs Coordinator	Name	Email, Phone
DART Civil-Military Affairs Officer (1)	Name	Email, Phone
DART Civil-Military Affairs Officer (2)	Name	Email, Phone
MITAM Manager	Name	Email, Phone

WHAT
Develop and initiate a system for planning MITAMs in support of the USAID Disaster Response, communicating MITAMs from the DART to the JTF, and then coordinating the execution and tracking of MITAMs. Specifically, request that the JTF:
1 - Designate a POC to receive MITAMs from the DART MITAM Manager
2 - Determine how MITAMS will be passed from the DART to the JTF; this must be done on an unclassified means. If the JTF deployed email system will not accept outside attachments, recommend establishing a file sharing site on Intelink IntelDocs.
3 - Initiate a system for tracking MITAM completion and recording military support achievements. If the response entails transportation of personnel/cargo, request a tracker that reconciles movements/flights with MTIAM numbers, number or personnel moved, weight of cargo moved, and flying/movement hours.
4 - Include at least one daily MITAM synchronization meeting between the DART MITAM Manager and JTF Staff in the JTF Battle Rhythm.
5 - When establishing JTF deployed workspace, allocate seats for CMAC/CMAOs allowing direct access to commander and planning & operations staff. If clearances are required, identify the requirement immediately so they may be passed through COCOM.

INITIAL COORDINATION REQUESTS	
Facilitate Imagery Requests	The DART anticipates requesting unclassified, non-LIMDUS, non-FOUO, non-SBU, non-NOFORN imagery of disaster effected areas and potential operating areas such as airfields. Individual MITAMs my require imagery support in order to execute, in particular transportation requests that may inherently requiring assessing routes or helicopter landing zones.
Establish Communications	It is anticipated that the DART will rely on the smartphone application "WhatsApp" for internal communications and for communicating with humanitarian partners. Request that the JTF be prepared with appropriate equipment and authorizations to use WhatsApp. If deploying to an area with no cell network, request that the JTF be prepared to communicate with the DART via commercial satellite phone.
Outreach & Public Affairs	Request JTF include Combat Camera, and that they establish a Defense Visual Information Distribution Service page for the response. Request that the JTF PAO make immediate contact with the DART Public Relations Officer in order to coordinate efforts: BHAOutreach@BHA.gov
Financial Tracking	Request JTF/COCOM establish a financial tracking system to monitor response related ODHACA expenditures.
Donations	BHA Logistics will coordinate the procurement and shipment of necessary commodities into the disaster area. Request that the JTF do not embark any intended relief commodities or donations unless specifically requested to via MITAM. BHA provides information on donations and ways to support a humanitarian crisis via the Center for International Disaster Information (cidi.org). Request the JTF/COCOM refer interested parties to this site to prevent problematic donations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Request that MITAM 1 be acknowledged by the JTF MITAM Coordinator confirming receipt directly with the DART MITAM Manager in order to verify that the communication process is established.

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APPENDIX B – DOD FDR CAPABILITIES

The primary mission of the DoD is national defense. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.01, Functions of the DoD and its major components, establishes the broad functions of the Department and its major Components. The core mission areas of the Armed Forces include military operations and activities required to achieve the security objectives addressed in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy. As prescribed by higher authority, the DoD shall maintain and use armed forces to:

- Support and defend the Constitution of the U.S. against all enemies, foreign and domestic
- Ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the U.S., its possessions, and areas vital to its interest
- Uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the U.S.

Disaster relief, under the broader mission of Stability Operations is a directed mission for DoD. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense and with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, DoD organizations participate in FDR operations. The majority of requests involve tactical level capabilities unique to DoD.

FDR is inherently a logistics-based operation. As such, request for DoD FDR support typically include intra-theater airlift, supply chain management, logistics distribution, medical logistics, aerial and ground transportation, engineering, communications, and civil affairs capabilities and assets. On a few occasions, DoD has been asked to temporarily augment the AS's existing Health Affairs and Security/Force Protection capabilities. This chapter provides an overview of unique DoD tactical capabilities.

B.1 Logistics

DoD's ability to rapidly distribute supplies, house personnel, and transport significant quantities of supplies, personnel, and equipment into isolated areas with limited infrastructure can be a critical enabler to the success of disaster relief operations. DoD's unique tactical logistics capabilities include distribution of supplies and equipment (such as food, water, fuel, construction materials, and other basic life sustainment items); engineering (including infrastructure assessments, inspection of facilities, utilities repairs, rapid repair of roads and bridges, and base camp support); aerial, ground, and waterborne transportation; and material handling equipment (to off-load supplies and equipment). These logistics assets are capable of filling critical gaps in the humanitarian response in support of the AS and the international humanitarian community.

(a) Distribution

During FDR operations, USAID BHA prefers to operate under a pull system (where mission priorities are based upon commodities requested) versus a push system (where items are shipped, based on availability, without regard for specific need or request). Failure to use a pull system can delay the delivery and distribution of critical relief commodities.

The distribution of humanitarian aid and disaster relief supplies must be coordinated in conjunction with the AS's overarching response and recovery plan. USTRANSCOM's Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC) and theater JDDOC work together to develop the overarching distribution plan from the strategic to tactical level. Furthermore, DoD coordination with USAID BHA and the WFP, the lead for the UN Logistics Cluster, will reduce congestion and facilitate the efficient flow of supplies, equipment, and personnel to the AS.

(b) Ground Transportation

A distribution point established at the seaport or aerial port of debarkation is essential to reducing congestion and facilitating the efficient flow of supplies and personnel to the Affected State. Initially, the JTF Theater distribution point should be coordinated by Joint Task Force- Port Opening (JTF-PO) personnel (if present), or the JDDOC and in collaboration with USAID BHA, or the logistics cluster and the Affected State's lead agency.

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps have the preponderance of rapidly deployable ground transportation assets, although Navy assets may also be available. Those ground transportation units include medium and heavy lift transport trucks; material handling equipment, such as forklifts and rough terrain cargo handling systems; and experienced logisticians to facilitate rapid loading, off-loading, transfer, and distribution of relief supplies and equipment.

(c) Air Transportation

The JTF's Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) will perform management of DoD aerial transport or flight operations. DoD aviation assets typically allocate the preponderance of available aerial transportation support to disaster relief operations; the remainder of its available support will be in direct support of deployed DoD forces. Aviation units supporting FDR will routinely provide Aviation Liaison Officers (ALO) to coordinate DoD flight operations with USAID BHA/DART, the AS, or, in some cases, with the UN Logistics Cluster.

Aviation Request and Assignment Process. Requests for DoD aviation support should be submitted through the USAID BHA or the DART using the MITAM process. (See Appendix A for MITAM format). When an organization requests support, they must identify the specific parameters required (e.g., cargo or personnel to be transported, delivery timeline, originating location, and destination), USAID BHA then validates the mission taskings using the MITAM validation process. The supporting agency is responsible for resourcing the requirement and providing the appropriate air asset to accomplish the mission.

B.2 DoD Aviation Support

DoD FDR aviation mission support may include:

- Intra-theater airlift of cargo, palletized loads, and personnel
- Aeromedical Evacuation (AE)
- Aerial logistics distribution
- Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)
- Aerial assessments/photography
- Personnel transport
- Population evacuation
- Firefighting (bucket operations)
- Airfield opening
- Airspace management
- Command and Control
- Search and Rescue
- Personnel Recovery

(a) U.S. Air Force Aviation Capabilities

Intra-theater Airlift. If authorized by the Secretary of Defense, the USAF, through USTRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command, is capable of providing intra-theater, fixed-wing aircraft support. The USAF primarily supports FDR using large cargo aircraft, including the C-130, C-17, and C-5 aircraft. While individual aircraft capabilities vary, all are capable of transporting oversized and palletized relief items often too large for commercial aircraft. Runway takeoff and landing lengths must be considered, as aircraft requirements change from platform to platform.

Aeromedical Evacuation. Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) units evacuate patients under the care of crewmembers and Critical Care Air Transport Teams (CCATT), using fixed-wing aircraft. AE units transport sick, seriously ill, or injured military personnel and their dependents stationed outside the continental United States (OCONUS). Under certain conditions, and if approved by the Secretary of Defense, AE units can also transport seriously ill or injured civilians.

The C-130 is the predominant AE platform, but it may be supplemented by the C-17; capacities for each platform are:

- C-130 – 74 litters or 92 ambulatory patients and attendants
- C-17 – 60 litters and 54 ambulatory patients and attendants

Unmanned Aerial Systems. USAF Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) such as Global Hawk can operate far above normal commercial traffic while providing situational assessment to ground commanders. Intermediate systems, such as the Predator, have supported recent disaster operations. These platforms can provide aerial imagery and full-motion video capability and dramatically increase real-time situational awareness for the JTF Commander.

(b) Army Aviation Capabilities

The Army is capable of providing a mix of fixed and rotary-wing capabilities to the JTF Commander and dependent upon the nature of the disaster and request, an Aviation Task Force would typically deploy. The Army's fixed wing fleet consists of the C-12 HURON, which is capable of transporting limited quantities of personnel and cargo.

These aircraft would typically be used in support of DoD, GCC, and JTF leadership transport during FDR operations. Helicopters are critical assets during FDR operations. When roads, bridges, and railroads may have been damaged by disaster, helicopters may be the only method to deliver relief supplies and transport relief workers to the operational area. Depending on the scale of the disaster and AS organic capabilities, an Aviation Task Force would normally deploy in support of FDR operations.

Army Combat Aviation Brigade. An Army Aviation Task Force typically includes a Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) headquarters for command and control of assigned aircraft. A CAB is capable of tailoring task forces to mission requirements. A CAB has six organic battalions, consisting of utility, cargo, and observation aircraft, including UH-60 medium lift, CH-47 heavy lift, MH-6 series observation, and UAS aircraft. CABs can deploy as a brigade, a large composite Aviation Task Force, or small tailored force package. CABs are capable of conducting the following missions:

- Air movement of equipment and supplies, including joint logistics-over-the-shore and aerial transport
- Logistics resupply (internal and external loads)
- Personnel transport
  - UH-60 MEDEVAC equipped aircraft and staffed for patient transport (with enroute care)

  - CH-47 and UH-60 are capable of performing casualty evacuation (patient transport without enroute care)
  - CH-47 aircraft are also capable of high-altitude operations and oversized heavy and special equipment movement
- Insertion and extraction operations
- Aerial assessments of key infrastructure - Aerial photography of roads, bridges, airports, helipads, landing strips, and seaports with all aircraft as well as full motion video using MH-6 helicopters and Army UAS
- Aviation logistics and maintenance support
- Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) operations
- Providing fuel where and when needed
- Airspace Command and Control Cells maintain a real-time single, integrated picture of airspace
- Air Traffic Service/Airfield Operations (deconflicting, synchronizing, and integrating all airspace requirements, including UAS)

(c) Naval Aviation Capabilities

U.S. Navy (USN) support capabilities include maritime patrol aircraft operations, helicopter operations, and UAS support through aircraft such as the MQ-4C Triton. P-8 Poseidon aircraft are capable of providing persistent, real-time, aerial video and photography that can be transmitted to the JTF. USN rotary-wing assets include the CH-53 heavy lift and H-60 medium lift fleets. All helicopters are capable of aerial search, internal and external cargo movement, personnel transfer, and personnel recovery by hoist from land and water areas that do not permit landing. Heavy lift helicopters, specifically MH-53E, also tow sonar equipment that can be used to determine if waterways are clear prior to reopening to vessel traffic. The Triton UAS is intended to provide real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions over vast ocean and coastal regions, to undertake continuous maritime surveillance, to conduct search and rescue missions, and to complement the P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. The Navy's newest addition, and Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) replacement, is the CMV-22 Osprey. The CMV-22 is designed to carry up to 6,000 pounds of cargo and/or personnel, and to operate up to a range of 1,150 nautical miles.

(d) Marine Corps Aviation Capabilities

The U.S. Marine Corps provides support to FDR by using expeditionary capabilities. Marine Forces plan for the use of forces, advise on the proper employment of USMC forces, and coordinate with and support USMC forces within the AOR. The Marine Corps UH-1 provides a command-and-control platform, while the CH-46 and CH-53 are capable of conducting medium to heavy lift transport.

The MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft offers a unique combination of speed and landing versatility.

Typically, in an FDR environment, if tasked, the USMC will provide a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). A MAGTF is comprised of four core elements: a Command Element (CE), a Ground Combat Element (GCE), an Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a Logistics Combat Element (LCE). As a modular organization, the MAGTF is tailorable to each mission through task organization. If tasked, the USMC can support FDR operations using fixed-wing (C-130), tilt-rotor aircraft (MV-22), or rotary-wing (CH-53, CH-46, and UH-1) aircraft.

The Navy and Marine Corps also have amphibious craft that have demonstrated response capability in littoral areas, particularly those affected by flooding, earthquakes, and tsunamis.

B.3 Maritime Forces

Maritime forces can provide operational flexibility and assured access while significantly reducing the footprint ashore and minimizing the permissions required from the AS to operate. Management of DoD maritime operations will be performed by the JTF Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC).

(a) Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)

MEUs, typically embarked within Amphibious Ready Groups, provide a forward-deployed, flexible, sea-based MAGTF, capable of conducting disaster relief and crisis response. MEUs are characterized by their sea-based forward presence, expeditionary nature, and interoperability with joint and combined forces. The MEU is ideally suited to provide immediate support for FDR operations. Every MEU deploys with a comprehensive communications suite providing voice, data, and Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) and Non-secure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) capability called a MEU Enabler.

MEUs typically deploy aboard three ships: an amphibious assault ship that holds the majority of the Marine ground and aviation forces, and two ships that hold equipment and move ground forces to shore. This approximately 2,200-person MAGTF provides command and control, ground, aviation, and logistics elements capable of 15-days of self-sustainment with minimal or no reliance on shore infrastructure. The ships supporting the MEU are capable of treating over 1,000 gallons of saltwater an hour and have engineering, medical capabilities, and ability to operate expeditionary airfields. The MEU is able to quickly reposition or disaggregate into smaller units as the situation requires and has the capacity to conduct security operations while simultaneously conducting FDR surveys/assessments and delivering aid and relief support.

(b) Naval Forces

Forces called upon to support FDR include aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike groups, surface action groups, individual ships, and Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) units.

NECC changed how the USN organizes, trains, and equips its forces to meet the Maritime Security Operations and Joint contingency operations requirements. NECC is not a stand-alone or combat force but, rather, a protection force that fills the gaps in the joint warfare arena and complements capabilities of foreign military partners. As an asset to operational commanders, NECC is designed to provide an array of capabilities that are unique to the expeditionary maritime environment as opposed to the blue water and land warfare environments. NECC units include Naval Construction Forces, Maritime Security Squadrons, Mobile Diving and Salvage units, Expeditionary Logistics Battalions, and Command and Control elements. Those units are capable of engineering services, refugee camp establishment, landward and seaward security, damage assessment, civil-military relations, port openings, personnel recovery, air and surface ship cargo offloading and distribution, and planning logistics, communication, and C2 staff-related functions.

Large deck amphibious ships are particularly useful for FDR operations as they can support both helicopters and small craft that can move supplies and equipment ashore. Those ships have organic medical support, C4I capabilities, and berthing and messing facilities.

Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships provide sea-based support to forces afloat, including supply and hospital ships, as well as high-speed ferries and landing craft that can access areas beyond major ports. Specialized Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) equipment including causeways, crane ships, and fuel systems can be of tremendous value to a heavily damaged port area but have long lead times to establish.

The Navy also has expertise and equipment for port opening operations, including construction battalions, beachmasters, salvage and dive units, and the Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG).

NAVELSG is organized and staffed to provide a wide range of supply and transportation support critical for crisis response and humanitarian service missions. NAVELSG consists of a full-time support staff, four Navy Expeditionary Logistics Regiments (NELR), and their subordinate Navy Cargo Handling Battalions (NCHB). NCHB is organized, trained, and equipped to load and off-load Navy and Marine Corps cargo carried in maritime pre-positioning ships and merchant or container ships in all environments, operate an associated temporary ocean cargo terminal, load

and off-load Navy and Marine Corps cargo carried in military controlled aircraft, and operate an associated expeditionary air cargo terminal.

(c) Maritime Airspace Control

Aircraft carriers and large amphibious ships are capable of providing maritime airspace control. Navy Helicopter Direction Control Centers are located on Landing Helicopter Assault/Landing Helicopter Dock (LHA/LHD)-class amphibious assault ships (see Figure 1B-5). Those ships have robust communications capabilities and are capable of airspace command and control during FDR operations. They are able to serve as the JFACC or assist the appointed JFACC in air space planning, integration, and de-confliction.

A USMC Air Support Squadron provides a Direct Air Support Center (DASC) cell for coordination and control of aircraft operating in direct support of a MAGTF. The entire DASC, or a portion of the cell, may deploy for FDR operations.

B.4 Engineering

FDR operations can be extremely engineer-intensive. In such cases, the JTF Commander may establish a subordinate Task Force (TF) to control engineering operations and mission support tasks. The TF may be formed around an existing engineer command or naval construction regiment. Engineering assets attached to the subordinate TF will normally be constituted from all engineering resources (i.e., JTF and GCC Service components in the AOR).

The joint force engineer and staff may have to coordinate engineering activities with USAID BHA, the AS, NGO/IGOs, and appropriate clusters. Some NGOs have unique engineering capabilities that may be integrated into the overall operational effort.

NGO/IGOs may request extensive military engineer support for their activities and programs. It is critical to establish an effective engineer liaison in the AS's Military Coordination Center to coordinate engineering supports.

The level of engineering assistance provided can vary from limited, highly specialized teams to complete engineer units. Limited teams are used to assess damage or estimate engineering repairs and can assist in specialized support such as power supply and distribution, utilities repair work, water purification, and well drilling operations. In large FDR operations, engineer units provide essential, general engineering support, including facility construction, structural repair, and camp construction for deployed forces.

Military engineers are frequently tasked to provide extensive cleanup and construction services and may be the only organization capable of providing that assistance. Requests for military engineering support should be coordinated, validated, and tasked through the USAID BHA MITAM process. For additional information on engineer operations, refer to *JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations*.

(a) Military Engineers

- Military engineers provide engineering and related services in four broad areas.
  - Military construction and support
  - Engineering research and development
  - Water and natural resources management
  - Support to other government agencies
- In general, military engineering is separated into four distinct types of units:
  - Combat engineers
  - Civil engineers
  - Horizontal engineers (i.e., bridges and roads)
  - Vertical engineers (i.e., buildings)
- Each Service has an engineering organization oriented to its missions and personnel trained and equipped to fulfill those missions.

Engineering Assessments

- The ability to analyze missions, both civilian and military, to produce the required outcome is a task required for engineering assessments.
- USAID BHA uses those assessments to assist in mission validation and delegation of tasks.

Engineering Capabilities

- **Debris Clearing.** Engineers, both combat and construction, have heavy equipment that is capable of removing debris, including:
  - Snow and ice
  - Mud and dirt
  - Limbs and trees
  - Vehicles
  - Broken equipment
  - Concrete
  - Barrier material
  - Waterborne debris in navigable waterways
- **Road, Ferry and Bridge Construction.** If there is not sufficient time to contract construction work, or if contractors are not available, military engineers can build and repair roads and bridges for temporary use.

- **Fireline/Dozer Operations.** Engineer units with bulldozers are capable of assisting with wildfire suppression using both equipment and manpower.
- **Shelter Construction.** Military engineering construction units have the ability to construct temporary shelters with associated sewer, electrical, and water for internally displaced persons. A good example of this occurred during Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE (2014) when a team of Navy Seabees, Soldiers, and Airmen from Joint Forces Command-United Assistance constructed the Monrovia Medical Unit, a 25-bed Ebola treatment unit.
- **Power Generation.** Engineers have power generation capabilities within most of their units. Mobile emergency power capability from 5 to 60 kilowatts or more is available.

WARNING: Military personnel are not permitted to connect military generators to civilian infrastructure. A certified civilian electrician must connect the power. Ensure that power lines are not reenergized by connecting infrastructure to generators.

(b) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)

- USACE provides an extensive range of expertise in:
  - Engineering and construction support
  - Critical infrastructure assessments
  - Temporary repairs
  - Temporary housing and critical public facilities
  - Debris management
- In fighting floods, USACE can:
  - Assist in search and rescue operations
  - Provide technical assistance and expertise
  - Make emergency repairs to levees and other flood control projects
  - May be able to provide flood fighting materials such as sandbags, plastic sheeting, lumber, pumps, and rocks
- Post-flood response activities of USACE may include:
  - Clearing drainage channels, bridge openings, or structures blocked by storm-generated debris
  - Clearing blockages to critical water supply intakes and sewer outfalls
  - Clearing debris necessary to reopen vital transportation routes
  - Restoring critical public services and facilities through temporary measures
  - Identifying hazard mitigation opportunities
- USACE can assist in rehabilitation by:
  - Repairing and/or restoring completed levees, floodwalls, and other flood damage reduction projects
  - Repairing and/or restoring hurricane or shore protection structures damaged or destroyed by wind, wave, or water action from storms

USACE aids military commanders through specially trained teams who

rapidly respond to floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, or other disasters whenever DoD has been tasked to assist in FDR.

Forward Engineering Support Teams (FEST) are the USACE elements that deploy to support engineer planning and mission execution. The FEST integrates USACE's capabilities with deployed engineer units to provide infrastructure planning, engineering design and assessment, contract construction, and environmental engineering to meet both military and civil requirements.

(c) Army Engineers

The military side of USACE is the largest engineering capability within DoD. The major engineering capabilities include keeping lines of communication and tactical march routes open, which may include continuous repair of damage caused by weather or heavy traffic.

Army Engineer Brigade capabilities include float-bridge assets for river-crossing operations. Multi-Role Bridge Companies transport, assemble, and operate ribbon rafts and float/fixed bridges during river-crossing operations.

Combat-Support Equipment Companies augment combat engineering units with equipment to move earth and maintain horizontal surfaces such as roads and airstrips. Combat engineers also assemble tactical bridges using panel-bridge companies or theater stocks.

Construction Engineers are capable of performing a variety of construction operations. The nature of FDR operations limits construction to essential facilities needed to sustain current operations. Missions include constructing:

- Forward logistics bases
- Heliports
- Main supply routes
- Bed down sites
- Specialized engineer units are capable of quarrying; electrical, water, gas, and sewer repair; and water pipeline, petroleum pipeline, and port construction.
- Topographic engineering companies are capable of providing map products and terrain-analysis for the JTF Commander and staff.

The U.S. Army Geospatial Center is part of USACE and provides geospatial products such as maps, hydrological information, and virtual fly-over capabilities to provide units supporting FDR with up-to-date information on the disaster area.

(d) Air Force Engineers

Air Force Combat engineers are capable of performing engineering-related aspects of air base operations. Basic missions of Air Force engineers include:

- Emergency repair (including rapid runway repair, facility repair, and utility repair)
- Bed down of Air Force units
- Operations and maintenance of Air Force facilities and installations
- Crash rescue and fire suppression
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
- CBRN, toxic industrial materials (TIM), and improvised explosive devices (IED)
- Construction management
- Supply of materiel and equipment to perform the engineering mission

Air Force engineers are organized into two types of units: Red Horse and Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (Prime BEEF).

Red Horse squadrons provide highly mobile, largely self-sufficient, rapidly deployable echelons to support major construction requirements and to repair heavy war damage. Red Horse units are stand-alone squadrons not tied to peacetime base support. They provide USAF component commanders a dedicated and flexible airfield with base heavy construction and repair capability. This capability allows the GCCs to react, initiate movement, and support missions as the air order of battle dictates. Red Horse units often accomplish major construction in forward locations, in advance of the main deploying force. They provide heavy horizontal (earth moving and pavements) and vertical (facility and utility skills such as petroleum, oils and lubricants, structural, mechanical, and power generation) engineer capability and possess special capabilities such as quarry operation (blasting and rock crushing), well drilling, concrete or asphalt batch plant operations, specialized building construction (K-Spans), and constructive explosive operations. Red Horse units are also required to be current in a variety of other capabilities across the range of military operations.

Prime BEEF is the primary organizational structure for supporting both mobility and in-place contingency requirements. The principal objective of deploying Prime BEEF squadrons and teams is to bed down and support an air and space expeditionary task force. Force bed down generally divides into three categories: aircraft, personnel, and infrastructure support. Aircraft support provides the maintenance shops, hangars, squadron operations centers, munitions storage, fuel storage, and other facilities directly supporting the flying mission. Personnel support provides the housing, feeding facilities, latrines, showers, administrative offices, and other indirect support facilities. Infrastructure support provides the utility systems, solid and hazardous waste disposal, roads, and communications that serve the bed down site. Bed down locations range from main operating bases with adequate existing facilities to bare bases with no facilities other than runways, taxiways, and aircraft parking aprons. Tasks accomplished by Prime BEEF units include airfield support, fire protection, fuel systems setup and support, EOD functions, construction of force protection (FP) infrastructure, base defense, base denial, airfield damage repair (ADR), facility repair, and utility repair.

(e) Navy Engineers

Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) delivers and maintains sustainable facilities; acquires and manages capabilities for the U.S. Navy's expeditionary forces; provides contingency engineering response; and enables energy security and environmental stewardship. NAVFAC is supported by Atlantic and Pacific Commanders who also serve as Fleet Engineers. NAVFAC is comprised of nine Facilities Engineering Commands that have additional responsibilities as Regional Engineers.

Naval Construction Force (NCF) consists of a group of deployable naval units that has the capability to construct, maintain, and operate shore, inshore, and deep-ocean facilities in support of the USN, USMC, and other agencies of the USG. The NCF is frequently referred to as the Seabees. Air-transportable, task-organized NCF units are capable of deployment with 48-hours' notice. Additionally, local contractual acquisition of heavy engineer equipment can augment air-transported equipment.

NCF missions include:

- Military base construction support, including operational, logistics, underwater, ship-to-shore, shore facilities construction, maintenance, and operation
- Ship-to-shore construction support operations
- Damage repair operations
- Disaster control and recovery operations

(f) Marine Corps Combat Engineer Battalions

Each USMC division is supported by one Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) that provides support to the division through task-organized engineer elements. The CEB can perform the following missions:

- Engineer reconnaissance
- Employing, repairing, and reinforcing bridge systems
- Construction support
- Repair and construction of roads
- Utility support, including mobile electric power equipment and potable water
- Constructing and improving vertical takeoff and landing sites

B.5 Communications

In an FDR environment, DoD missions may require use of multiple communication systems. Specific requirements may span the full capability of DoD communications abilities, including line of sight, over the horizon, and satellite communications systems for voice, video, and data. These assets, whether terrestrial or satellite based, may be the only communications infrastructure in the area of operations.

Interoperability is the key to successful disaster relief operations. Non-mission capable or incompatible communications, overloaded command centers, distraught citizens and exaggerated or inaccurate news media coverage contributes to confusion and chaos. See Chapter 7 for more information on communication. Units responding to support civilian responders must be prepared to integrate communication systems with civilian agencies. Because of equipment differences, spectrum requirements, and the geography at the incident, commanders should not assume that tactical radio equipment is interoperable with civilian equipment. Interoperability planning should include radio bridging devices that can connect varied devices such as tactical radios to cellular phones and sharing data through a common information management plan.

B.6 Civil Affairs

Civil Affairs (CA) units can provide the responding Commander with culturally oriented, linguistically capable personnel who can provide emergency coordination. These CA “generalists” possess a wealth of experience conducting a vast array of Civil-Military Operations (CMO) in permissive environments. Civil Affairs Service Commands: Conventional CA forces and their Service Commands are primarily composed of Reservists.

CA specialists are trained to quickly identify critical requirements needed by local citizens in disaster situations. They also work with the Country Team and USAID representatives to locate resources and coordinate CMO. Although each CA Service Command is different, all provide the Commander with CA capabilities. Persistent engagements teams such as Civil-Military Support Elements may already be in country when the disaster occurs and can provide valuable support to the relief effort.

(a) Army Civil Affairs

The 95th CA Brigade, assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and stationed at Fort Bragg, NC, is currently the Army's only active-duty CA Brigade . The majority of the Army's conventional forces CA personnel are in the Reserve Component (RC). The determination to mobilize RC CA assets must be a consideration during pre-deployment planning because the RFF and mobilization process for RC personnel is a lengthy process.

U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) is comprised of approximately 13,500 soldiers and constitutes 82 percent of DoD's CA forces and 83 percent of DoD's Psychological Operations forces. USACAPOC is located at Fort Bragg, NC, is the headquarters for all Army Reserve CA units, and provides support to theater and task force commanders.

(b) Marine Corps Civil Affairs

The USMC has CA personnel capable of supporting a JTF or MAGTF Commander. USMC CA personnel are trained and organized to facilitate planning, coordination, and execution of CMO. CA Groups are present at Marine Corps Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), and CA Detachments are at I, II, and III MEF.

B.7 Medical

Military medical capabilities may be requested to augment or sustain AS medical assets in order to save lives and minimize human suffering. This section gives a brief overview, by Service, of some of the capabilities available and is not intended to be an all-inclusive list.

(a) Army Medical Capabilities

Hospitalization. Army Combat Support Hospital Centers (CSHC) are Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF) capable of providing hospitalization and outpatient services for 248 patients when fully staffed and equipped.

In 2017, the Army started moving to a modular approach whereby CSHC were smaller, 32-bed field hospitals with augmentation dets that would provide medical, surgical, or lab capabilities as needed. Capabilities include emergency treatment, triage, and preparation of incoming patients for surgery; general, orthopedic, thoracic, urological, gynecological, and oral maxillofacial surgical capability; consultation services; pharmacy, psychiatry, community health nursing, physical therapy, clinical laboratory, blood banking, radiology, and nutrition care support; emergency dental treatment; medical administrative and logistical services; and laundry for patient linens.

Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) (Ground). Ground ambulance companies are capable of providing ground evacuation support for litter and ambulatory patients. Capabilities also include movement of patients between CSHC, aeromedical staging facilities, aeromedical staging squadrons, mobile aeromedical staging facilities, and railheads or seaports; emergency movement of medical personnel and supplies; and medical evacuation of wounded or injured personnel from the point of injury to supporting ambulance exchange points or MTFs.

Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) (Air). Army air ambulance companies can provide air evacuation support throughout the area of operations. Air ambulance companies have twelve to fifteen helicopter ambulances and four or five forward support medical evacuation teams. Their capabilities include air crash rescue support; expeditious delivery of blood products, and biological and medical supplies to meet critical requirements; and rapid movement of medical personnel, supplies, and equipment to support mass casualty requirements or emergency movement of patients between hospitals, aeromedical staging facilities, hospital ships, seaports, and railheads.

Veterinary Services. The Army medical detachment veterinary service support provides dispersed veterinary Role 1 and Role 2 (medical and resuscitative surgical care); veterinary Role 3 (comprehensive canine medical and surgical care); evacuation and hospitalization support for military and contractor working dogs; endemic zoonotic and foreign disease epidemiological surveillance and control; animal holding facility and kennel inspections; commercial food source audits for DoD procurement; food safety, quality, and sanitation inspections; food defense vulnerability assessments; food and water risk assessments; food microbiological and chemical laboratory diagnostics for supported units; and foreign humanitarian assistance programs in support of all branches of the Service throughout the area of operation.

Medical Logistics. Army medical logistics companies provide direct support for Class VIII (medical) supplies as well as field and sustainment-level medical equipment maintenance and repair. Unit capabilities also include reception, classification, and issue of up to 11.1 short tons of Class VIII (medical); storage for up to 51 short tons of Class VIII (medical) supplies; building and positioning Class VIII (medical) support packages in support of contingencies; reconstitution of medical logistics units, sections, or teams; and coordination for emergency delivery of Class VIII (medical) supplies. When directed, the unit can also perform the single integrated medical logistics management supply and requisition processing mission for all joint forces in the theater.

Area Medical Support. Area support medical companies are MTFs capable of providing support for treatment of patients with disease and minor injuries, triage of mass casualties, initial resuscitation/stabilization, advanced trauma management, and preparation for further evacuation of ill or injured patients. Capabilities also include evacuation of patients; emergency medical supply and resupply; behavioral health consultation, to include operational stress control elements; pharmacy, laboratory, and radiological services; emergency dental care to include stabilization of maxillofacial injuries and limited preventive dentistry; and patient holding capability.

Preventive Medicine. Preventive medicine detachments provide preventive medicine support and consultation for the prevention of disease; field sanitation, entomology, and sanitary engineering; occupational and environmental health surveillance; and epidemiology to minimize the effects of environmental injuries, enteric diseases, vector-borne disease, and other health threats with deployed forces. Capabilities also include monitoring pest management; field sanitation; water treatment and storage; waste disposal; other environmental health-related problems; recommending corrective measures; medical surveillance activities to assist in evaluating conditions affecting the health of the supported force; and epidemiological investigations. The detachment also monitors casualties, hospital admissions, and reports of autopsies for exposure to harmful agents (such as radiation, chemical, and biological hazards).

Combat and Operational Stress Control. Army Combat and Operational Stress Control detachments are capable of providing combat and operational stress control prevention and treatment services on an area basis. Capabilities include preventive consultation and stress education support; neuropsychiatric care, triage, and stabilization; assistance to non-medical units with operational stress reaction casualties; and critical events debriefing support. The detachments also have patient holding capability.

(b) Navy Medical Capabilities

U.S. Navy Amphibious Assault Ships. While the primary mission of amphibious assault ships is to support Marine landing forces, large-deck amphibious ships may be designated as Casualty Receiving and Treatment Ships (CRTS) and used for humanitarian and disaster relief missions. Primary CRTS (LHA/LHD) have laboratory (including blood) and radiology capabilities to support surgical suites. During disaster relief operations, primary CRTS are staffed to provide extensive medical and trauma support. Additional amphibious assault ships may be designated as secondary CRTS. These may include any class ship with the capability to receive and treat casualties if appropriate medical materiel and personnel are available to provide care. Ships normally designated as secondary CRTS include Landing Platform Dock (LPD), Landing Ship Dock (LSD) and Load Carrying Capacity (LCC) class ships. The LHDs and the LHAs have the largest medical capability of any amphibious ship currently in use. They are capable of receiving casualties from helicopters and waterborne craft. Major medical facilities aboard those ships include four main operating rooms, two emergency operating rooms, and dental operating rooms; a 14-bed intensive care unit and a 46-bed patient ward; multiple dressing stations; and a casualty collecting area on the flight deck. The ships also have medical elevators to transfer casualties from the flight deck to the ship's medical facilities.

Navy Hospital Ships. The U.S. Navy MERCY-class hospital ships are capable of providing a full-service, deployable hospital asset for use by the military and other USG agencies involved in the support of disaster relief and humanitarian operations worldwide. U.S. Naval Ships USNS MERCY (T- AH 19) and USNS COMFORT (T-AH 20) each contain 12 operating rooms and a 1,000-bed hospital facility (when staffed to that level); computerized tomography (CT) scan and digital radiological services; medical laboratory; pharmacy; 2 oxygen producing plants; a flight deck capable of landing military helicopters; and a side port to take on patients at sea. Limiting factors with their employment in FDR operations include the requirement to source staffing from major military treatment facilities (restricting or shutting down essential services) and the "tyranny of distance" (i.e., long deployment and transit times limit the utility of the platform for disaster affected populations).

USN Fleet Surgical Teams. The mission of Fleet Surgical Teams (FST) is to provide surgical specialty augmentation to the primary CRTS platforms. They are distinct, free-standing assets of the Atlantic and Pacific operating forces. When not aboard ship, FST members remain in an additional duty status at regional Navy military treatment facilities. There are nine FSTs, with teams located in Norfolk, VA, San Diego, CA, and Okinawa, Japan. The standard composition of an FST includes two surgeons, an anesthesiologist, four physicians (Family Practice, Internal Medicine, Emergency Medicine,

and Pediatrics), two nurses, a medical regulating officer, and nine enlisted support staff. FSTs are capable of being tailor-force packaged by specialty (e.g., orthopedic, pediatric, or trauma surgery) to meet specialized requirements of a disaster relief operation.

(c) Marine Corps Medical Capabilities

The USMC does not have a medical corps. All medical services are provided by the USN.

(d) Air Force Medical Capabilities

USAF Small Portable Expeditionary Aeromedical Rapid Response Team. Small Portable Expeditionary Aeromedical Rapid Response (SPEARR) teams provide rapid response, extremely mobile, and highly clinically capable medical assets in support of a wide spectrum of contingency missions. SPEARR teams, that may be comprised of all U.S. military personnel or include a combination of international military and civilian personnel in a coalition operation, provide force health protection and direct medical support for an initial period of five to seven days to a population-at-risk (PAR). Sustainment or resupply capability ensures continued medical care and force health protection. The scope of care includes public health and preventive medicine, flight medicine, primary care, emergency medicine and surgery, perioperative care, critical care stabilization, patient preparation for aeromedical transport, and AE coordination/ communication. The SPEARR Team is capable of being ready for deployment within two hours of initial mission notification. The two-hour response time is dependent on the collocation of personnel and equipment and availability of standing "on call" team.

The team functions as an Emergency Medical Support (EMEDS) module, which is comprised of four teams:

(1) USAF Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facility. A Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facility (MASF) can provide rapid response patient staging as well as limited holding and AE crew support capability to support humanitarian and civil disaster response operations. The MASF is normally located at or near airheads capable of supporting mobility airlift. The MASF provides forward support with the smallest footprint. It consists of three short crews, communications, liaison, and patient care teams. The MASF includes a capability to receive patients, provide supportive patient care, and meet administrative requirements on the ground while awaiting AE. Critical Care Air Transport Teams (CCATT) are assigned to every forward based MASF to enhance rapid evacuation. The MASF brings tents for patient care but will often use a building of opportunity to conduct AE operations.

The communications capability assigned to the MASF can be integrated into the tanker/airlift control element or operations cell. An individual may be identified to work with the aerial port element on the flight line to coordinate AE load planning, configuration, and operational support.

MASF Capabilities include:

- Patient reception
- Medical care to patients transiting through the AE system
- Supportive nursing care
- Administrative support
- Self-supporting tasks
- Holding capability for patients entering the AE system

The MASF is equipped and staffed for routine processing of up to 50 patients at a time and can process a maximum of 140 patients every 24 hours. Because it has no beds, patients remain on the litters provided by the originating facility.

(2) USAF Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Team. Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Team (AELT) provides support between the forward units and the AE system as the operational and clinical interface. AELT operational and clinical interface may occur at locations such as forward operating bases and aboard ship. The flight nurse on the team assists the medical unit in preparing AE patients for flight. The administrative officer is responsible for working with the airlift center and aerial port element to ensure the aircraft is properly configured, and equipment pallets, patients, and AE support personnel are properly manifested on the AE mission. Communications personnel will be integrated into the airlift operations element supporting flight line operations or the Wing Operations Center (WOC). Establishing a communication network with airlift operations is essential for rapid evacuation.

(3) USAF Medical Global Reach Laydown Team. Medical Global Reach Laydown Team provides preventive medicine support to:

- Expeditionary Site Surveys – Tactical Air Coordination Center (TALCE) ADVON Team initial laydown activities
- Gas and Go – Routine TALCE aircraft refueling operations
- Bare Base – TALCE personnel perform pre-deployment site survey to support follow-on force build-up
- Air Bridge – A series of enroute locations outlining an air route of travel for rapid deployment and sustainment of forces
- Contingency Response Group (CRG) – Medical Global Reach Laydown Team is assigned to CRG to provide medical support during rapid opening of contingency airfields; purpose is to bring significant order, foresight, speed, and safety during the crucial opening days of a contingency.

The Medical Global Reach Laydown Team deploys with the TALCE/ Medical Strike Team (MST) and assesses the health risks associated with environmental and occupational health hazards. More specifically, in support of establishing a potential Main Operating Base (MOB) in a forward deployed location, the Medical Global Reach Laydown Team:

- Provides medical input into the proper lay-down of installation facilities
- Determines adequacy of local billeting and public facilities
- Evaluates local medical capabilities
- Recommends locations for medical facilities
- Evaluates the safety and vulnerability of local food and water sources
- Assesses occupational and environmental hazards
- Performs vector/pest risk assessment
- Provides medical assessments
- Performs epidemiological risk assessments
- Performs health risk assessments
- Provides limited medical support, emergency planning, and response

(4) Patient Movement. To move casualties out of a disaster area, AS authorities will coordinate with supporting agencies to establish casualty collection points from which patients will be moved to appropriate levels of care based on the severity of their injuries. Casualty transportation to support that movement may be either dedicated or lift-of-opportunity from any combination of government, commercial, and private resources. AS authorities will need to leverage available ground, rail, and both fixed and rotary-wing assets to support movement of disaster victims to the closest available MTFs.

DoD may provide support to evacuate seriously ill or injured patients away from the disaster, but within the AS. The vast majority of that support will use ground transportation or rotary-wing assets. On very rare occasions, DoD casualty movement and transportation assets (including ships and fixed-wing strategic-lift platforms) may be used to move patients to regional nations that are willing to accept victims or to the U.S. for definitive care.

USTRANSCOM may provide strategic lift for the patient movement mission, and the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center may deploy a Joint Patient Movement Team (JPMT) to the area. A JPMT regulates and tracks all patients transported on DoD assets to reception and medical treatment facilities. USTRANSCOM coordinates DoD transportation assets and establishes aeromedical evacuation centers at both APOE and APOD locations.

Mortuary Affairs and Mass Fatality Management. GCCs are responsible for giving authoritative direction and guidance to the JTF Commander with regard to mortuary affairs (MA) and for designating a Service component to serve as the lead for the Theater MA Support Program. Individual unit commanders sustaining losses are responsible for recovery and evacuation of human remains to the nearest designated MA collection point. Every effort must be made to identify and account for recovered human remains of U.S. military personnel, government employees, government contractors, dependents, and other U.S. citizens who die in foreign areas subsequent to natural disasters.

In certain cases where large scale, high-impact disasters cause very large numbers of fatalities in an AS, the GCCs may make mass fatality management (MFM) assistance available. That assistance could involve the provision of logistical resources such as human remains' pouches or cold storage facilities for setting-up temporary morgues or engineering support to assist local authorities with mass internment measures when mass fatalities overwhelm AS mortuary support capacity.

Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, it is DoD policy that only dedicated Service MA personnel handle human remains. The Secretary of Defense may approve the use of non-MA personnel to support MA personnel in certain mass fatality scenarios.

More detailed information may be found in *JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations*.

DoD Mortuary Affairs Units. The DoD's MA capacity is very limited. The U.S. Army has two Active and two Reserve Component MA units stationed at Fort Lee, VA, and in Puerto Rico, respectively. DoD fixed-base MA facilities include:

- Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency, Hawaii
- Armed Forces Medical Examiner's Office
- Armed Forces Institute of Pathology
- Mortuary Affairs Squadron (MA), Dover Air Force Base

Support provided by DoD MA personnel will be tailored to the needs of the requesting authority. All DoD FDR MA/MFM support will be conducted in close coordination with appropriate authorities designated as the lead agency for MA/MFM by the AS.

B.8 International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response (ICBRN-R)

(a) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

DTRA provides considerable technical expertise and experience to support to every facet of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) and CBRN defense and response, both domestically and internationally. DTRA is ideally suited to support ICBRN-R as a DoD asset with close ties to USG organizations and agencies, as well as most every international counterpart organization. In support of DoD, DTRA provides support to WMD/CBRN related planning at the operational and tactical levels; provides related exercise support at all levels of the government and DoD; and provides targeted support through deployed WMD/CBRN military advisory and operational planning teams, and through technical reach-back capabilities that provide WMD/CBRN modeling, hazard predictions, assessments, publications, and analysis support through an Operations Center that operates 24 hours a day at their resident WMD and CBRN national reach-back and situational awareness facility.

(b) Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI)

The AFRRI provides DoD technical support capability for nuclear and radiological accidents or incidents. An AFRRI medical radiobiology advisory team (MRAT) responds as part of the DTRA CBRN Advisory Team. The MRAT provides expertise and advice to commanders and primary care providers following a nuclear or radiological incident.

(c) Air Force Radiation Assessment Team.

This global response team provides personnel and equipment for the provision of technical assistance and field response to radiological and/or nuclear accidents, incidents, or threats.

(d) CBRN Response Enterprise

The CBRN response enterprise provides mass casualty and personnel decontamination, emergency medical care, ground and aviation medical and casualty evacuation, and search and rescue to support USG ICBRN-R operations, as requested by the LFA as approved by or directed by the SecDef.[154]

Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF).
The CBIRF deploys on short notice in response to an international CBRN incident to provide hazard detection; identification; search and extraction; technical rescue and mass casualty decontamination; medical triage; and emergency medical support.

Army 20th CBRNE Command. The 20th CBRNE Command provides specialized CBRNE operational support to the supported GCC, JFC, and theater Army element. It provides C2 of assigned CBRN forces and CBRNE technical assistance and is linked to a technical reach-back capability.

B.9 United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)

(a) Joint Task Force – Port Opening (JTF-PO)

USTRANSCOM's JTF-PO capability enables it to rapidly establish and operate aerial and sea ports of debarkation and distribution nodes in support of GCC FDR operations. As part of the Global Response Force (GRF), JTF-PO can deploy quickly via VOCO from Commander USTRANSCOM rather than via the RFF process.

JTF-PO elements are capable of "opening" a theater for follow on forces. JTF-PO has capabilities to assess, open, clear, provide In-transit visibility (ITV), synchronize end-to-end movement of cargo, and conduct Joint Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration (JRSOI). JTF-PO was designed to be in place in advance of deploying forces, sustainment, or humanitarian aid (relief) supplies.

JTF-PO can have an assessment team on the ground in 36 hours with an Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) ready to fly in 36 hours and Seaport of Embarkation (SPOE) ready to fly in 60 hours. JTF-PO mission duration is 30-45 days until relieved by a theater sustainment command organization.

Port opening is a joint process that is normally performed by the GCC and supported by USTRANSCOM. As an example, depending on the situation, the GCC could use one of the following packages to open an APOD:

- Air Mobility Command's contingency response group and an army arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG)
- USTRANSCOM's JTF-PO APOD element

To open an SPOD, one of the below force packages can be used:

- Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) elements contracting stevedore and other terminal functions
- USTRANSCOM's JTF-PO SPOD element
- SDDC elements in conjunction with transportation brigade expeditionary (TBX) and/or attached subordinate units

In its first contingency response operation since being established, the JTF-PO SPOD team opened the port at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and managed operations crucial for success during the 2010 Haiti Earthquake response. During the 2014 West Africa Ebola response, lead elements of JTF-PO established an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) in Dakar, Senegal, an APOD at Roberts International Airport in Monrovia, Liberia, and an SPOD at the port of Buchanan, Liberia. In 2016, JTF-PO was used during the Hurricane Matthew response in Haiti. Figure B-1 illustrates command relationships for JTF-PO.




Figure B-1. *JTF-PO Command Relationships (Source: USTRANSCOM, "Joint Task Force-Port Opening, Concept of Operations," 15 October 2014)*

(b) Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC)

USTRANSCOM's Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) provides mission-tailored, joint capability packages to GCCs to facilitate the rapid establishment of joint force headquarters, fulfill Global Response Force execution and bridge joint operational requirements. JECC has personnel ready to provide staff and planning augmentation support. The JECC consists of three subordinate joint commands which provide flexible, expeditionary joint operational and theater strategic planners, and communications and public affairs experts who are experienced in complex joint operations.

Early consideration of JECC support is encouraged as a key enabler for command and control. JECC capabilities include:

- **Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE).** Joint planning capabilities include plans, operations, logistics, information management, and intelligence support specialists experienced in planning and collaborating with U.S. and multinational partners during FDR operations. They are trained to assist in establishing, organizing, and operating the joint force HQ elements.
- **Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE).** Joint Public Affairs (PA) capabilities include advice and assistance to commanders in gaining and maintaining the initiative and meeting the challenges of the information environment. The criticality of PA during FDR places considerable strain on existing PA staffs, which JECC can assist during the planning and execution of an FDR mission.
- **Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE).** Joint communications capabilities include enroute, early entry, and scalable communications services capability to link CCDRs and USG departments and agencies. When directed, this capability can rapidly extend military or commercial systems or services to coalition forces, international organizations, or NGOs specific to the emerging contingency.

(c) Air Force Contingency Response Groups (CRG)

While all of the Services have expertise in conducting emergency port opening surveys and assessments, the Air Force Contingency Response Groups (CRG) have been repeatedly employed to support aerial ports during FDR operations in recent years. The CRG's primary mission is airbase opening for an Air Force component, another Service, or coalition partner. Each CRG is a standardized force module dedicated to the airfield opening task.

CRGs are extremely flexible because they can be tailored into a number of smaller packages to meet the requirements of any contingency. CRGs have Expeditionary Capability Sets with capabilities in airfield surveys, assessments and repairs, operations and advisors, cargo and personnel handling, heavy construction, security, communications, and airbase construction.

CRGs are assigned to Air Mobility Command (AMC), U.S. Air Forces, Pacific (PACAF), and U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE).

In recent years, CRGs have supported Operation TOMODACHI in Japan in 2011 (621st Contingency Response Wing (CRW)), the 2015 Ghorka Earthquake response in Nepal (36th CRG), Hurricane Matthew in Haiti in

2016 (621st CRW), Sulawesi Earthquake in Indonesia in 2018 (36th CRG), Cyclone Idai in Mozambique in 2019 (435th CRG), and Hurricane Dorian in The Bahamas in 2019 (821st CRG).



Figure B-2. *36th Contingency Response Group Airmen work with Bangladesh Air Force members to remove cargo from their C-130 Hercules May 7, 2015, Kathmandu, Nepal (U.S. Air Force Pacific Photo/Staff Sgt. Melissa White/RELEASED)*

(d) Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS)

JLOTS are operations in which Navy and Army forces conduct logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) operations together under a JFC. A LOTS operation is the process of loading and off-loading ships in austere areas where fixed port facilities are damaged, unavailable, or inadequate for operational needs. JLOTS provides the JFC flexibility to choose off-load locations including, but not limited to, a bare beach, an austere port, or a damaged but fixed port in order to mitigate limited port access.
GCCs have overall responsibility for JLOTS operations in their AOR. In JLOTS operations, Service elements are normally integrated under one JLOTS commander who usually has tactical control authority to direct JLOTS operations.

While the term JLOTS was not in use, early examples of large-scale amphibious operations include Operation OVERLORD during World War II and Operation CHROMITE in the Korean War. More recently, JLOTS was utilized with critical value during the 2010 Haiti Earthquake response, Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. JLOTS enabled the delivery of shipping containers and cargo while the seaport and its piers were unusable, and the airport was congested.

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APPENDIX C – COMMONLY USED DISASTER TERMINOLOGY AND ACRONYMS

C.1 Terminology

The standardization of key terminology and definitions contributes to unity of effort by reducing differences due to language. Terminology and definitions for this concept of operations are derived primarily from sources that are widely accepted internationally for disaster management and emergency response, such as the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance (IDRL Guidelines) and the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) Program's Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP). The following is a list of commonly used definitions and key terminology:

- **Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD).** See Port of Debarkation (POD)
- **Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE).** See Port of Embarkation (POE)
- **Affected State.** The State upon whose territory persons or properties are affected by a disaster.
- **Assisting Actor.** Any assisting humanitarian organization, assisting State or other foreign entity, such as a private company providing charitable relief, or person responding to a disaster on the territory of the Affected State or sending in-kind or cash donations.
- **Assisting Humanitarian Organization.** A foreign, regional, or international non-profit entity whose mandate and activities are primarily focused on humanitarian relief, recovery, or development.
- **Assisting State.** A State providing disaster relief or initial recovery assistance, whether through civil or military components.
- **Civil Military Coordination (CMCoord).** Is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation with the military, with a strong emphasis attached to coordination as a shared responsibility.
- **Critical Care Transport Team.** Highly specialized and uniquely skilled three-person U.S. Air Force medical team that augments standard aeromedical evacuation crew members and turns an aircraft into a flying intensive care unit.
- **Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Rapid Deployment Team.** A 13 member rapidly deployable team made up of subject matter experts from DLA to support Department of Defense logistics.

- **Disaster.** A serious disruption of the functioning of society, which exceeds national coping capacities and poses a significant, widespread threat to human life, health, property, or the environment, whether arising from accident, nature, or human activity, whether developing suddenly or as the result of long-term processes but excluding armed conflict.
- **Disaster Relief.** Goods and services provided to meet the immediate needs of disaster-affected communities.
- **Donor Nation.** A State that provides financial, material, and personnel support to assist in the response and recovery from disasters.
- **Equipment.** Physical items (such as vehicles and radios) other than goods necessary to undertake disaster relief or initial recovery assistance.
- **EXECSEC Memo.** Formal request that goes from USAID and the Department of State to the Department of Defense to request the latter's assistance for disaster relief operations.
- **Goods.** The supplies intended to be provided to disaster-affected communities for their relief or initial recovery.
- **Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ).** A specified ground area for landing helicopters to embark or disembark cargo and/or personnel; may contain one or more landing sites.
- **Humanitarian Assistance (HA).** Activities conducted to relieve or reduce human pain, disease, or hunger, created by conditions that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. It focuses on short-term emergency relief, providing basic life-saving services that are disrupted because of the humanitarian crisis.
- **Humanitarian Community (HC).** Agencies and organizations whose primary or significant focus is the provision of humanitarian aid, assistance, relief, development support, and human rights advocacy. For the purpose of this Appendix, these agencies and organizations include United Nations relief agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement.
- **Humanitarian-Military Coordination Concept (HuMOCC).** A focal point for information-sharing and updates, task sharing and division, shared/joint planning on humanitarian needs and gaps (actual, anticipated, or projected), and available military capacity on the ground.
- **Internally Displaced Persons (IDP).** Persons forced or obliged to flee from their homes as a result of or to avoid the effects of natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.
- **International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG).** A global network of more than 90 countries and organizations under the UN umbrella. INSARAG deals with urban search and rescue (USAR) related issues, aiming to establish minimum international standards for USAR teams and methodology for international coordination in

earthquake response based on the INSARAG Guidelines endorsed by the United Nations GA Resolution 57/150 of 2002, on "Strengthening the Effectiveness and Coordination of International Urban Search and Rescue Assistance."[155]

- **Initial Recovery Assistance.** Goods and services intended to restore or improve, to a defined level, the pre-disaster living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including initiatives to increase resilience and reduce risk, provided for an initial period after the immediate needs of disaster-affected communities have been met, as determined by the Affected State.
- **Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).** Under the leadership of the UN Under-Secretary-General/Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), the IASC develops humanitarian policies, agrees on a clear division of responsibility for the various aspects of humanitarian assistance, identifies and addresses gaps in response, and advocates for effective application of humanitarian principles. The IASC is a unique inter-agency standing committee that provides a strategic forum for coordination, policy development, and decision-making involving key UN and non-UN humanitarian assistance partners.
- **Lines of Communication (LOC).** The route that connects an operating military unit with its supply base. Supplies and equipment are transported along the line of communication.
- **Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC).** Organization composed of staff elements required to integrate multinational force contributions (forces and capabilities) into a contingency operation. An MNCC focuses on command and control, coordination, and cooperation in any given contingency requiring a multinational force response.
- **Originating State.** The State from which disaster relief and initial recovery personnel, goods, and equipment begin travel to the Affected State.
- **Personnel.** The staff and volunteers providing disaster relief or initial recovery assistance.
- **Port of Debarkation (POD).** Geographic point at which cargo or personnel are discharged. This is a seaport (SPOD) or aerial port (APOD) of debarkation; for unit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the destination.
- **Port of Embarkation (POE).** Geographic point at which cargo or personnel are boarded. This is a seaport (SPOE) or aerial port (APOE) of embarkation.
- **Sector (Humanitarian).** In humanitarian vernacular, a thematic area of work such as logistics; emergency telecommunications; food; water, sanitation, and hygiene; and shelter. The cluster system is organization by sector.[156]

- **Services.** Activities (such as rescue and medical care) undertaken by disaster relief and initial recovery personnel on behalf of disaster-affected communities.
- **Transit State.** The State through whose territorial jurisdiction disaster relief or initial recovery assistance passes on its way to or from the Affected State in connection with disaster relief or initial recovery assistance.
- **Unified Action.** The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.
- **Unity of Effort.** Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization – the product of successful unified action.

C.2 Acronyms

Below is a list of acronyms commonly used during FDR missions.

Acronym	Definition
AADMER	ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response
AAR	After Action Report
ACCE	Air Component Coordination Element
ACSA	Acquisition Cross-Service Agreements
ADCON	Administrative Control
ADVON	Advance Echelon
AHA Centre	ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AMCITS	American Citizens
AO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APAN	All Partners Access Network
APOD	Aerial Port of Debarkation
APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation
AS	Affected State
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AST	Airfield Survey Team
ATO	Air Tasking Order
AU	African Union
BHA	Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, United States Agency (formerly Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance)
C2	Command and control
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives
CCATT	Critical Care Air Transport Teams
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirements
CCMD	Combatant Command
CCS	Commander's Communication Synchronization

Acronym	Definition
CCT	Combat Controller Teams
CDEMA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency
CE	Command Element
CEB	Combat Engineer Battalion
CFE-DM	Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
CIDI	Center for International Disease Information
CIM	Civil Information Management
CISM	Critical Incident Stress Management
CIS	Computer Information System
CMCoord	UN Civil Military Coordination Officer
CMI	Classified Military Information
CMO	Civil Military Operations
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
COM	U.S. Embassy Chief of Mission
CONOP	Concept of Operations
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
COP	Common Operational Picture
COS	Chief of Staff
COTS	Commercial Off-The-Shelf
CRG	Contingency Response Group
CUI	Controlled Unclassified Information
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DAST	Disaster Area Survey Team
DATT	Defense Attaché
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission (American Embassy)
DDC	Disaster Declaration Cable
DIRLAUTH	Direct liaison authorized

Acronym	Definition
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EADRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center
ECHO-ERCC	European Community Humanitarian Office-Emergency Response Coordination Centre
EEFI	Essential Elements of Friendly Information
EMEDS	Emergency Medical Support
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EP	Excess Property
EPU	Expeditionary Port Units
ER	Emergency Relief
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
ETC	Emergency Telecommunications Cluster
EU	European Union
EXORD	Execute Order
FCE	Forward Command Element
FDR	Foreign Disaster Relief
FEST	Forward Engineer Support Team
FHA	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FHP	Force Health Protection
FMA	Foreign Military Asserts
FMN	Federated Mission Network
GA	General Assembly
GCC	Geographic Combatant Commander
GDACS	Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System
GEOINT	Geospatial Intelligence
GETS	Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
GIG	Global Information Grid
GPC	Geospatial Planning Cell
GPS	Global Positioning System
HA	Humanitarian Assistance

Acronym	Definition
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief
HAA/M	Humanitarian Assistance Advisor/Military
HAST	Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team
HAZMAT	Hazardous Material
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HF	High Frequency
HHS	Health and Human Services
HIU	Humanitarian Information Unit
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Center
HSS	Health Service Support
HLZ	Helicopter Landing Zone
HuMOCC	Humanitarian Military Operations Coordination Center
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICBRN-R	International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IDRA	International Disaster Relief Assistance
IDRL	International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance (Guidelines)
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IHC	International Humanitarian Community
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IM	Information Management
INSARAG	International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
IO	International Organizations

Acronym	Definition
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
ISB	Intermediate Staging Base
ISR	Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IT	Information Technology
JACCE	Joint Air Component Coordination Element
JAT	Joint Assessment Team
JCSE	Joint Communications Support Element
JDDOC	Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center
JEC	Joint Enabling Capabilities
JECC	Joint Enabling Capabilities Command
JFACC	Joint Forces Air Component Commander
JHAST	Joint Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team
JIC	Joint Information Center
JIIC	Joint Interagency Information Center
JLLIS	Joint Lessons Learned Information System
JLOC	Joint Logistics Operations Center
JLOTS	Joint Logistics Over the Shore
JMD	Joint Manning Document
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JOCA	Joint Operations Center of ASEAN
JOTC	Joint Operations and Tasking Center
JP	Joint Publication
JPASE	Joint Public Affairs Support Element
JPERSTAT	Joint Personnel Status
JRSOI	Joint Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration
JTF	Joint Task Force
JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

Acronym	Definition
KM	Knowledge Management
KMO	Knowledge Management Officer
LCA	Logistics Capacity Assessment
LCB	Logistics Coordination Board
LCC	Load Carrying Capacity
LCE	Logistics Combat Element
LCOP	Logistics Common Operational Picture
LFA	Lead Federal Agency
LNO	Liaison Officer
LOC	Lines of Communication
LOE	Lines of Effort
LOGSTAT	Logistics Status
LOTS	Logistics-Over-the-Shore
MA	Mortuary Affairs
MCDA	Military and Civil Defense Assets
MDRO	Mission Disaster Relief Officer
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MHE	Material Handling Equipment
MILGROUP	Military Group
MITAM	Mission Tasking Matrix
MLSA	Mutual Logistics Support Agreement
MNCC	Multinational Coordination Center
MNF-SOP	Multinational Force Standard Operating Procedure
MNMCC	Multi-National Military Coordination Center
MOB	Main Operating Base
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoH	Ministry of Health
MOP	Measure of Performance
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPAT	Multinational Planning Augmentation Team
MTF	Medical Treatment Facility
NAVFAC	Naval Facilities Engineering Command

Acronym	Definition
NDMO	National Disaster Management Office
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation
NGA	National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NOAA	National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCS	Operational Contract Support
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (now called Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance BHA)
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPORD	Operations Order
OPT	Operational Planning Team
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSOCC	On-Site Operations Coordination Centers
PA	Public Affairs
PAG	Public Affairs Guidance
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PII	personal identification information
PIR	Priority Information Requirement
POLAD	Political Advisor
POTUS	President of the United States
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
RCRC	Red Cross/Red Crescent
RF	Radio Frequency
RFA	Request for Assistance
RFF	Request for Forces
RFI	Request for Information
RHCC	Changi Regional HADR Coordination Centre

Acronym	Definition
RMT	Response Management Team (USAID/BHA)
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RPOE	Rapid Port Opening Elements
RSO	Regional Security Officer
SAMM	Security Assistance Management Manual
SASOP	ASEAN Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations
SIPRNET	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SITREP	Situation Report
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
SPOD	Seaport Point of Debarkation
SPOE	Seaport of Embarkation
SPP	State Partnership Program (of the U.S. National Guard)
SROE	Standing Rules of Engagement
TACON	Tactical Control
TALCE	Tactical Air Coordination Center
TASKORD	Tasking Order
TF	Task Force
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command
UAS	Unmanned Aerial Systems
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UISS	unclassified information sharing service
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service

Acronym	Definition
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRD	United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAR	Urban Search and Rescue
USEMB	U.S. Embassy
USGS	U.S. Geological Survey
USNS	U.S. Naval Ship – Naval Sealift Command
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command
VOCO	Verbal Order of the Commanding Officer
VOSOCC	United Nations Virtual On-Site Coordination Center
VPN	Virtual Private Network
WASH	Water, Sanitation, Hygiene
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Association

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ENDNOTES

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